A 
CA  RE  FUL  and  STRICT 

I    N    Q    U    I    R    Y 

INTO 

t 

The  modern  prevailing  Notions 

OF       THAT 

FREEDOM  of  W  I  L  £, 

Which  is  fuppofed  to  be  eiTential 

T    O 

MORAL  AGENCY,  VIRTUE  and  VICE, 
REWARD  and  PUNISHMENT,  PRAISE 
and  BLAME. 

By  the  late  Reverend  and  Learned 

JONATHAN    EDWARDS,   A.   M. 

Prefident  of  the  College  of  Ne<w-Jerfey. 

Rom.  ix.  1 6.  //  is  not  ofbim  that  willeth 

The   FOURTH  EDITION. 

WILMINGTON,  (Delaware] 
Printed  and  Sold  by  JAMES  ADAMS,  in  lli 
M.DCC.XC. 


THE 

PREFACE. 

ANY  find  much  Fault  with  the  calling  profeffing 
Chriftians,  that  differ  one  from  another   in  fome 
Matters  of  Opinion,  by  diftin<S  Names  ;  efpecially 
calling  them  by  the  Names  of  particular  Men,  who 
have  diftinguiftied  themfelves  a«  Maintainers  and 
Promoters  of  thofe  Opinions  :    as  the  calling  fome  profeffing 
Chriftians  Artmnimns,  from  Arminius  ;  others  Arians,  from    A- 
rius  ;  others  Socinians,  from  Socinus,  and  the  like.     They  think 
it  unjuft  in  itfelf ;    as  it  feems  to  fuppofe  and  fuggeft,  that  the 
Perfons  mark'd  out  by  thefe  Names,  received  thofe  Doctrines 
which  they  entertain,  out  of  Regard  to,  and  Reliance  on  thofe 
Men  after  whom  they  are  named  ;  as  tho'  they  made  them  their 
Rule:  in  the  fame  Manner,  as  the  Followers  of  CHRIST  are 
called  Chriftiaus,    after  his  Name,  whom  they  regard    and  de 
pend  upon,  as  their  great  Head  and  Rule.     Whereas,  this  is  an 
unjuft  and  -groundlefs  Imputation  on  thofe  that  go  under  the 
foremention'd  Denominations.     Thus  (fay  they)  there  is  not 
the  leaft  Ground  to  fuppofe,  that  the  chief  Divines,  who  em 
brace  the  Scheme  of  Doftrine  which  is  by  many  called  Armini- 
anlfmy  believe  it  the  more  becaufe  Arminius  believed  it :  and 
that  there  is  no  Reafon  to  think  any  other,  than  that  they  fin- 
cerely  and  impartially  ftudy  the  holy  Scriptures,  and  inquire 
after  the  Mind  of  Chrift,  with  as  much  Judgment  and  Sincerity, 
as  any  of  thofe  that  call  them  by  thefe  Names ;  that  they  feek 
after  Truth,  and  are  not  careful  whether  they  think  exadly  as 
Arminius  did;  yea,  that  in  fome  Things  they  actually  differ 
from  him.     This  Practice  is  alfo  efteemed  actually  injurious  on  . 
tins  Account,  that  ij  is  fuppofed  naturally  to  lead  the  Multi 
tude 


iv  The  PREFACE. 

tude  to  imagine  the  Difference  between  Perfons  thus  named  and 
others,  to  be  greater  than  it  is ;  yea,  as  tho'  it  were  fo  great, 
that:  they  mult  be  as  it  were  another  Species  of  Beings.  And 
they  object  againil  it  as  ariiing  from  an  uncharitable,  narrow, 
contracted  Spirit ;  which,  they  fay,  commonly  inclines  Perfons 
to  confine  all  trjat  is  good  to  themfelves  and  their  own  Party, 
and  to  make  a  wide  diftinftion  between  themfelves  and  others, 
and  ftigmatize  thofe  that  differ  from  them  with  odious  Names. 
They  iay  moreover,  that  the  keeping  up  fudfc  a  Diiiinition  of 
Names  has  a  dire&  Tendency  to  uphold  Diftance  and  Difaffec- 
tion,  and  keep  alive  mutual  Hatred  among  Chriftians,  who 
ought  all  to  be  united  in  Friendfhip  and  Charity,  however  they 
can't  in  all  Things  think  alike. 

I  confefs,  thefe  Things  are  very  plaufible.  And  I  will  not 
deny,  that  there  are  fome  unhappy  Confequences  of  this  Diftinc- 
tion  of  Names,  and  that  Men's  Infirmities  and  evil  Difpofitions 
often  make  an  ill  Improvement  of  it.  But  yet  I  humbly  con 
ceive,  thefe  Objections  are  carried  far  beyond  Reafcn.  The 
Generality  of  Mankind  are  difpofcd  enough,  and  a  great  Deal 
too  much,  to  Uncharitablenefs,  and  to  be  cenforious  and  bitter 
towards  thofe  that  differ  from  them  in  religious  Opinions  : 
which  evil  Temper  of  Mind  will  take  Occafion  to  exert  itfelf, 
from  many  Things  in  themfelves  innocent,  ufeful  and  neceffary : 
But  yet  there  is  no  Neceflity  to  fuppofe,  that  the  thus  diflin^ 
guifhing  Perfons  of  different  Opinions  by  different  Names, 
arifcs  mainly  from  an  uncharitable  Spirit.  It  may  arife  from 
the  Difpoiition  there  is  in  Mankind  (whom  God  has  diftin- 
guifhed  with  an  Ability  and  Inclination  for  Speech)  to  improve 
the.  Benefit  of  Language,  in  the  proper  Ufe  and  Defign  of 
Names,  given  to  Things  which  they  have  often  Occafion  to 
fpeak  of,  cr  ^fignify  their  Minds  about ;  which  is  to  enable 
them  to  exprefs  their  Ideas  with  Eafe  and  Expedition,  without 
being  incumber'd  with  an  obfcure  and  difficult  Circumlocution. 
And  the  thus  diftinguifhing  Perfons  of  different  Opinions,  in  re 
ligious  Matters,  may  not  imply  nor  infer  any  more  than  that 
there  is  a  Difference,  and  that  the  Difference  is  fuch  as  we  find 
we  have  often  Occafion  to  take  Notice  of,  and  make  Mention  of. 
That  which  we  have  frequent  Occafion  to  fpeak  of,  (whatever 
it  be,  that  gives  the  Occafion)  this  wants  a  Name :  and  'tis 
always  a  Defeft  in  Language,  in  fuch  Cafes,  to  be  obliged  to 
make  ufe  of  a  Defcription,  inftead  of  a  Name.  Thus  we  have 
cften  Occafion  to  fpeak  of  thofe  who  are  the  Descendants  of 
the  ancient  Inhabitants  of  France,  who  were  Subjects  or 
Heads  of  the  Government  of  that  Land,  and  fpake  the  Lan 
guage  peculiar  to  it  -3  in  Biltinction  from  tnc  Befcendants  of 

the 


The  P  R  E  F  A  C  E.  v 

the  Inhabitants  of  Spain,  who  belonging  to  that  Community, 
and  fpake  the  Language  of  that  Country.  And  therefore  we 
find  the  great  Need  of  diftinft  Names  to  fignify  thefe  different 
Sorts  of  People,  and  the  great  Convenience  of  thofe  diftinguim- 
ing  Words,  krtnch,  and  Spaniards;  by  which  the  Signification 
of  our  Minds  is  quick  and  cafy,  and  our  Speech  is  delivered 
from  the  Burden  ojf  a  continual  Reiteration  of  diffufe  Defcrip- 
tions,  with  which  it  muft  othcrwife  be  embarraiTed. 

That  the  Difference  of  the  Opinions  of  thofe,  who  in  their 
general  Scheme  of  Divinity  agree  with  thcfe  two  noted  Men, 
C(il-vint  and  Arminius,  is  a  Thing  there  is  often  Occafion  to 
fpeak  of,  is  what  the  Practice  of  the  latter,  itfelf  confcfles ; 
who  are  often,  in  their  Difcourfes  and  Writings,  taking  No 
tice  of  the  fuppofed  abfurd  and  pernicious  Opinions  of  the  for 
mer  Sort.  And  therefore  the  making  Ufe  of  different  Names 
in  this  Cafe  can't  reafonably  be  objected  againft,  or  condemn 
ed,  as  a  Thing  which  muft  come  from  fo  bad  a  Caufe  as  they 
ailign.  It  is  eafy  to  be  accounted  for,  without  fuppofing  it  to 
arife  from  any  other  Source,  than  the  Exigence  and  natural 
Tendency  of  the  State  of  Things ;  confidering  the  Faculty  and 
Difpofition  God  has  given  Mankind,  to  exprefs  Things  which 
they  have  frequent  Occafion  to  mention,  by  certain  diftinguifh- 
ing  Names.  It  is  an  Effecl:  that  is  fimilar  to  what  we  fee 
arife,  in  innumerable  Cafes  which  arc  parellel,  where  the  Caufe 
is  not  at  all  blame- worthy. 

Neverthelefs,  at  firft  I  had  Thoughts  of  carefully  avoiding 
the  Ufe  of  the  Appellation,  Arminian,  in  this  Treadle.  But  I 
foon  found  I  mould  be  put  to  great  Difficulty  by  it ;  and  that 
my  Difcourfe  would  be  fo  incumbered  with  an  often  re 
peated  Circumlocution,  inftead  of  a  Name,  which  would  ex 
prefs  the  Thing  intended,  as  well  and  better,  that  I  altered  my 
Purpofe.  And  therefore  I  muft  afk  the  Excufe  of  fuch  as  am 
apt  to  be  offended  with  Things  of  this  Nature,  that  I  have  fo 
freely  ufed  the  Term  Arminian  in  the  following  Difcourfe.  I 
protefs  it  to  be  without  any  Defign,  to  ftigmatize  Perfons  of 
any  Sort  with  a  Name  of  Reproach,  or  at  all  to  make  them 
appear  more  odious.  If,  when  I  had  Occafion  to  fpeak  of  thofe 
Divines  who  are  commonly  called  by  this  Name,  I  had,  in- 
fte^d  of  ftyling  them  Arminians,  called  them  thefe  Men,  as 
Dr.  Whit  by  does  Calviniftic  Divines ;  it  probably  would  not 
have  been  taken  any  better,  or  thought  to  fnew  a  better  Tem 
per,  or  more  good  Manners.  I  have  done  as  I  would  be  done 
by,  in  this  Matter.  However,  the  Term  Calvinift  is  in  thefe 
Days,  among  moft,  a  Term  of  greater  Reproach  than  the 

Term 


Ti  The  P  R  E  F  A  C  E. 

Term  Arminian',  yet  I  fnould  not  take  it  at  all  amifs,  to  be 
called  a  Calvinijl,  for  Diftinction's  Sake  :  tho'  I  utterly  dif- 
claim  a  Dependance  on  Calvin,  or  believing  the  Doctrines 
which  I  hold,  becaufe  he  believed  and  taught  them ;  and 
cannot  juftly  be  charged  with  believing -in  every  Thing  juft  as 
he  taught. 

But  left  I  mould  really  be  an  Occaflon  of  Injury  to  fome 
Perfons,  I  would  here  give  Notice,  that  tho'^^enerally  {peak 
of  that  Doctrine,    concerning  Free-will  and   moral  Agency, 
which  I  oppofe,  as  an  Arminian  Doctrine ;  yet  I   would  not  be 
underftood,  that  every  Divine  or   Author  whom  I  have  Occa- 
iion  to  mention  as  maintaining  that  Doctrine,  was  properly  an 
Arminian,  or  one  of  that  Sort  which  is  commonly  called  by 
that  Name.     Some  of  them  went  far  beyond  the  Arminians  : 
And  I  would  by  no  Means  charge  Arminians  in  general  with  all 
the  corrupt  Doctrine,  which  thefe  maintained.     Thus,  for  In- 
ftance,  it  would  be  very  injurious,  if  I  mould  rank  drminian 
Divines  in  general,  with  fuch  Authors  as  Mr.  Chubb.     I  doubt 
not,  many  of  them  have  fome.  of  his  Doctrines  in  Abhorrence; 
tho'  he  agrees,  for  the  moil  Part,  with  Arminians,  in  his  No 
tion  of  the  Freedom   of  the  Will.     And  on  the  other  Hand, 
tho'  I  fuppofe  this  Notion  to  be  a  leading  Article  in  the  Ar mi- 
man  Scheme,  that  which,  if  pnrfued  in  its  Confequences,  will 
truly  infer,  or  naturally  lead  to  all  the  reft ;  yet  I  don't  charge 
all  that  have  this  Doctrine,  with  being  Arminians.     For  what 
ever  may  be  the  Confequences  of  the  Doctrine  really,  yet  fome 
that  hold  this  Doctrine,  may  not  own  nor  fee  thefe  Confe 
quences  ;  and  it  would  be  unjuft,  in  many  Inftances,  to  charge 
every  Author  with  believing  and  maintaining  all  the  real  Con 
fequences  of  his  avowed  Doctrines.     And  I  defire  it  may  be 
particularly  noted,  that  tho'  I  have  Occafion  in  the  following 
Difcourfe,  often  to  mention  the  Author  of  the  Book  entitled, 
An  Ej/ay  on  the  Freedom  of  the  Will,  in   God  and  -the  Creature, 
as  holding    that  Notion  of   Freedom  of   the  Will,  which    I 
oppofe  ;  yet  I  don't  mean  to  call  him   an  Arminian :  however 
in  that  Doctrine  he  agrees  with  Arminians,  and  departs  from 
the  current  and  general  Opinion  of  C^vimfts.     If  the  Author 
of  that  Effay  be  the  fame  as   it  is  commonly  afcribcd  to,  he 
doubtlcfs  was  not  one  that  ought  to  bear  that  Name.  But  how 
ever  good  a  Divine  he  was  in  many  Refpects,  yet  that  particu 
lar  Arminian  Doctrine  which  he  maintained,  is  never  the  better 
for  being  held  by  fuch  an  One  :  nor  is  there  lefs  Need  of  oppof- 
ing  it  on  that  Account ;  but  rather  is  there  the  more  Need  of  it; 
as  it  will  be  likely  to  have  the  more  pernicious  Influence,  for 
feeing  taught  by  a  'Divine  of  his  Name  aiid<  Character ;  fuppof- 

ing 


The  PREFACE.  vii 

Ing  the  Do&rine  to  be  wrong,  and  in  itfelf  to  be  of  an  ill 
Tendency. 

I  have  Nothing  further  to  fay  by  Way  of  Preface  j  but  only 
to  befpcak  the  Reader's  Candour,  and  calm  Attention  to  what 
1  have  written.  The  Subject  is  of  fuch  Importance,  as  to  de 
mand  Attention,  and  the  moft  thorough  Confideration.  Of  all 
Kinds  o£  Knowledge  that  we  can  ever  obtain,  the  Knowledge 
of  God,  and  the  Knowledge  of  ourfelves  are  the  moft  importanta 
As  Religion  is  the  gr^at  Bufmefs,  for  which  we  are  created, 
and  on  which  oiupjHappinefs  depends ;  and  as  Religion  confifts 
in  an  IntercourfeT>etween  ourfelves  and  our  Maker ;  and  fo  has 
its  Foundation  in  God's  Nature  and  our's,  and  in  the  Relation 
that  God  and  we  ftand  in  to  each  other;  therefore  a  trua 
Knowledge  of  both  muft  be  needful  in  Order  to  true  Religion. 
But  the  Knowledge  of  ourfelves  conlifts  chiefly  in  right  Appre- 
hehfions  concerning  thofe  two  chief  Faculties  of  our  Nature, 
the  Underftanding  and  Will.  Both  are  very  important :  yet  the 
Science  of  the  latter  muft  be  confefled  to  be  of  greateft  Moment ; 
in  a&  much  as  all  Virtue  and  Religion  have  their  Seat  more  inv- 
mediately  in  the  Will,  confifting  more  efpecially  in  right 
Acls  and  Habits  of  this  Faculty.  And  the  grand  Queftion 
about  the  Freedom  of  the  Will,  is  the  main  Point  that  belongs 
to  the  Science  of  the  Will.  Therefore,  I  fay,  the  Importance 
of  this  Subject  greatly  demands  the  Attention  of  Chriftians,  and 
efpecially  of  Divines.  But  as  to  my  Manner  of  handling  the 
Subject,  I  will  be  far  from  prefuming  to  fay,  that  it  is  fuch  as 
demands  the  Attention  of  the  Reader  to  what  I  have  written. 
I  am  ready  to  own,  that  in  this  Matter  I  depend  on  the  Rea 
der's  Courtefy.  But  only  thus  far  I  may  have  fome  Colour  for* 
putting  in  a  Claim;  that  if  the  Reader  be  difpofed  to  pafs  his 
Cenfure  on  what  I  have  written,  I  may  be  fully  and  patiently 
heard,  and  well  attended  to,  before  I  am  condemned.  How 
ever,  this  is  what  I  would  humbly  ajk  of  my  Readers ;  toge 
ther  with  the  Prayers  of  all  fincere  Lovers  of  Truth,  that  I  may- 
have  much  of  that  Spirit  which  Chrift  promifed  his  Difciples, 
which  guides  into  all  Truth  ;  and  that  the  blefled  and  powerful 
Influences  of  this  Spirit  would  make  Truth  victorious  in  the 
World, 


A  Ge« 


General    TABLE* 

• 

OF        T    H    E     • 

CONTENTS. 

$^ 

PART        I. 

Wherein  arc  explained  various  Terms  and  Things 
belonging  to  the  Subject  of  the  enfuing  Dif- 
courfe. 

SECT.  I.  Concerning  the  Nature  of  the  Will.  Pag.  i,  &c. 
SECT.    II.    Concerning   the  Determination  of  the  Will. 

Pag.    j. 

SECT.  III.  Concerning  the  Meaning  of  the  Terms  Necrffity, 

Inipojjibility  >  Inability,  &c.   and  of  Contingence.  Pag-    *3* 

SECT.  IV.  Of  theDiftinftionof»«/Wand™0m/Necef- 

fity  and  Inability.  Pag.  20. 

SECT.  V.  Concerning  the  Notion  of  Liberty  ,  and  of  moral 

Agency.  Pag.  27. 

PART        II. 

Wherein  it  is  confidered,  Whether  there  is,  or 
can  be  any  fuch  Sort  of  FREEDOM  OF  WILL,  as 
that  wherein  Arminians  place  the  Eflenceofthe 
Liberty  of  all  moral  Agents;  and  whether  any 
fuch  Thing  ever  was,  or  can  be  conceived  of. 


S 

felf-dcitrmining  Power*  Pag.  3  1 

SECT 


ECT.  I.  Shewing  the  manlfeft  Inconfiftence  of  the  Arml- 
nian  Notion  of  Liberty  of  Will>  coafifting  in  the  Will's 


CONTENTS.  ix 

SECT.  II.  Several  fuppofed  Ways  of  evading  the  foregoing 
Reasoning  conildered.  Pag.  35. 

SECT.  III.  Whether  any  Event  whatfoever,  and  Volition 
in  particular,  can  come  to  pafs  without  a  Caufe  of  its  Exiftence. 

Pag.  41. 

SECT.  IV.  Whether  Volition  can  arife  without  a  .Caufe, 
thro'  \b£.A8i<vity  of  the  Nature  of  the  Soul.  Pag.  47. 

SECT.  V.  Shewing  that  if  the  Things  aflerted  in  theie 
Evasions  (hould  be  fuppofed  to  be  true,  they  are 'altogether 
impertinent,  and  can't  help  the  Caufe  of  Ar?ninian  Liberty ; 
and  how,  this  being  the  State  of  the  Cafe,  Arminian  Writers  are 
obliged  to  talk  inconfijlentiy.  Pag.  £1, 

SECT.  VI.  Concerning  the  Will's  determining  in  Things 
which  are  perfectly  indifferent,  in  the  View  of  the  Mind.  Pag.  55. 

SECT.  VII.  Concerning  the  Notion  of  Liberty  ot  Will 
confirming  in  Indifference.  Pag.  63. 

SECT.  VIII.  Concerning  the  fuppofed  Liberty  of  the  Will, 
as  oppofite  to  all  Necejfity,  Pag.  73. 

SECT.  IX.  OftheConne-aionofthc  Ads  of  the /T/// with 
the  Dictates  of  the  Undemanding.  Pag.  76. 

SECT.  X.  Volition  neceflarily  connected  with  the  Influence 
of  Motives :   With  particular  •  Observations  on  the  great  Incon-   • 
fiftence  of  Mr.  Chubb's  Affertiohs  and  Reafonings,  about  the 
Freedom  of  the  Will.  Pag.  84. 

SECT.  XI.  The  Evidence  of  God's  .certain  Foreknowledge 
of  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents.  Pag.  98. 

SECT.  XII.  God's  certain  Foreknowledge  of  the  future  -Vo 
litions  of  moral  Agents,  inconjiftent  with  fuch  a  Contingence  of 
thofe  Volitions,  as  is  without  all  Neceflity.  Pag.  117. 

And  infers  a  Neceflity  of  Volition,  as  much  as  an  abfolute 
Decree.  ^ag*  I22» 

SECT.  XIII.  Whether  we  fuppofe  the  Volitions  of  moral 
Agents  to  be  connected  with  any  Thing  antecedent,  or  not, 
yet  they  muft  be  necejfary,  in  fuch  a  Senfe,  as  to  overthrow 
Arminiati  Liberty,  Pag.  131, 

PART        III. 

Wherein  is  inquired,  Whether  any  fuch  Liberty 
of  Will,  as  Arminians  hold,  be  neceilary  to  moral , 
Agency,    Virtue  and  Vice,   Praife    and   Dif- 
praife,  &c. 

SECT.  I.  God's  moral  Excellency  neceffary,  yet  (virtuous  and 
Praife-<worthy*  ?aS-    J35* 

SECT,  II.  The  Ad3  of  the  Will  of  the  human  Soul  of 
B         "*  JESUS 


The  C  O  N  T  EN  T  S. 

ESUS   CHRIST  nccejjarily   holj;    yet  virtuous,   praife- worthy , 


?ECT.  TIL  The  Cafe  of  fuch  as  wtz  given  up  of  God  to  Sin, 
and  of  fallen  Man  in  general,  proves  moral  Necejfity  and  Ina 
bility  to  be  confident  with  Blame-'worthiuifs.  Pag.  153. 

SECT.  IV.  Command*  and  Obligation  to  Obedience,  r?a- 
fijient 'with  moral  Inability  to  obey.  ^ag*  '59- 

SECT.  V.  That  Sincerity  of  Defires  and  Endeavours,  which 
is  fuppofed  to  «?*<:#/£  in  the  Non-performance  of  Things  in 
themfelves  good,  particularly  confidered.  Pag.  170. 

SECT.  VI.  Liberty  of  Indifference,  not  only  not  necejjary  to 
Virtue,  but  utterly  inconjiftent  with  it :  and  all,  either  virtu 
ous,  or  vicious  Habits  and  Inclinations,  inconfiftent  with  Armi- 
•nian  Notions  of  Liberty,  and  moral  Agency.  Pag.  178. 

SECT.  VII.  Armitjian  Notions  of  moral  Agency  inconfift 
ent  with  all  Influence  of  Motive  and  Inducement,  in  either  vir 
tuous  or  vicious  Actions.  Pag.  1 85. 

PART        IV. 

Wherein  the  chief  Grounds  of  the  Reafonings  of 
ArmiitianSi  in  Support  and  Defence  of  their  No 
tions  of  Liberty,  moral  Agency,  &c.  andagainlt 
the  oppofitc  Doctrine,  are  confidered. 

SECT.  I.  The  EJfcme  of  the  Virtue  and  Vice  of  the  Difpo- 
fitions  of  the  Heart,  and  Acls  of  the  Will,  lies  not  in  their 
Caufe,  but  their  Nafure.  Pag.  192. 

SECT.  II.  I'he  Falfencfs  and  Inconfiftence  of  that  metaphy- 
fical  Notion  of  Aciion  and  Agency,  which  feems  to  be  generally 
entertained  by  the  Defenders  of  the  forementioned  Notions  of 
Liberty,  moral  Agency,  £5fr.  Pag.  19^. 

SECT.  III.  The  Reafons  why  fome  think  it  contrary  to 
common  Senfe,  to  fuppofe  Things  which  are  neceffary,  to  be 
worthy  of  either  Praife  or  Blame.  Pag.  206. 

.SECT.  IV.  It  is  agreeable  to  common  Senfe,  and  the  natural 
Notions  cf  Mankind,  to  fuppofe  moral  Neceffity  to  be  coniiftent 
with  Praife  and  Blame,  Reward  and  Punimment.  Pag,  212. 

SECT.  -V.  Concerning  thofe  Objcclions,  That  this  Scheme 
of  Neceffity  renders  all  Means  and  Endeavours  for  the  avoid 
ing  of  Sin,  cr  the  obtaining  Virtue  and  Holinefs,  vain  and  to 
no  Purpofe  :  And  that  it  makes  Men  no  more  than  mere  Ma 
chines,  in  Affairs  of  Morality  and  Religion.  Pag.  220. 

SECT.  VI.  Concerning  that  ObjcBion  againft  the  Doclrinc 
which  has  been  maintained,  That  it  agrees  with  the  Strical 
Do&rine  of  Fate,  and  the  Opinion  of  Mr,  Hc/bbs*  Pag.  227. 

SECT, 


C  O  N  T  E  NT  S.  xi. 

SECT.  VII.  Concerning  the  NeceJ/l.y  of  the  divine 
Will.  Fag.  230. 

SECT.  VIII.  Some  further  Qljcffions-  againft  the  moral 
Neceffity  of  GOD'S  Volitions,  confidered.  Pag.  239. 

SECT.  IX.  Concerning  that  Objection  againft  the  Doctrine 
which  has  been  maintained,  That  it  makes  GOD  the  Author  of 
Sin.  Pag.  252, 

SECT.  X.  Concerning  Sins  firft  Entrance  into  the  World. 

Pag.  268. 

SECT.  XI.  Of  a  fuppofed  Inconffaice  of  thefe  Principles 
with  GOD'S  moral  Character.  I*ag'  2"]O. 

SECT.  XII.  Of  a  fuppofed  Tendency  of  thefe  Principles 
to  Atheifm,  and  Licentioitfnefs.  Pag.  274. 

SECT.  XIII.  Concerning  that  Objection  againft  the  Rea- 
foning  by  which  the  Calviniftic  Doftrine  is  fupported,  That  it 
is  metapkyfical  and  abftrnfe.  Pag,  278. 

The  CONCLUSION. 

WHAT  Treatment  this  Difcourfe  may  probably  meet 
with,  from  fome  Perfons.  Pag.  285. 

Confequences  concerning  feveral  Calviniftic  Dodrines  ;  fuch  as 
an  ttaever/ttlf  decijive  Providence.  ^S*  2^^* 

The  total  Depravity  and  Corruption  of  Man  s  Nature.  Pag.  287. 

Efficacious  Grace.    •  v-Pag*   2S8. 

An  univerfal  and  abfolute  Decree;  and  abfolute,  eternal, 
perfonal  Election.  Pag.  289. 

Particular  Redemption.  -P^g-   290. 

P  erf  eve  ranee  of  Saints.  I*ag'   291. 

Concerning  the  Treatment  which  Calvinijlic  .Writers  and 
Divines  have  met  with.  Pag.  292, 

The  Unhappinefs  of  the  Change  lately  in  many  Protcjt-af 
Countries.  Pag.  z£ 

The  Boldnefs  of  fome  Writers. 

The  excellent  Wifdom  appearing  in  the  holy  Scriptures. 


if  to 


^M^ 

^^ 


'  his  lik~ 
jd  has  fo 

£  Body,  fuch 

is  nothing  elfe 

in 

.  .97. 


•*-o\">     -Qf^^7lf\ 

fcw^s** 

PART      I. 

Wherein  are  .explained  and  flated 
various  Terms  and  Things  belong 
ing  to  the  Subject  of  the  enfuing 
Difcourfe. 


SECTION    I. 


Concerning  the  Nature  of  the  Will. 


poflibly  be  thought,  that  there  is  no  great 
Need  of  going  about  to  define  or  defcribe  the  Will; 
this  Word  being    generally   as   well    underftood 
as  any   other  Words    we   can  ufe  to  explain  it: 
And  fo  perhaps  it    would  be,    had    not  Philofo- 
.SL    Metaphyiicians    and    Polemic    Divines    brought    the 
Notiofc  into   Obfcurity  by  the  Things    they  have  faid  of  it. 
with  Pr:e  it   is  fo,   I  think  it  may   be   of  fome   Ufe,   and 
SECT  to  the  greater  Clearnefs  in  the  following  Difcourfe, 
of  Necefifew  Things'  concerning  it. 
ing  of  Sin,  \. 

no  Purpofe:"ore  I  obferve,  that  the  Will  (without  any  meta- 
chines,  in  Affing)  is  plainly,  That  by  which  the  Mind  chufes  any 
SECT.  VI.  fculty  of  the  Will  is  that  Faculty  or  Power 
which  has  beei/lind  by  which  it  is  capable  of  chujing.  An  Aft 
Doftriae  of  jFtfAf/ame  as  an  Aft  of  Cbufixg  or  Choice* 


•2  tte  Nature  of  the  Will.  Part  I, 

If  any  think  'tis  a  more  perfeft  Definition  of  the  Will,  to 
fay,  that  it  is  that  by  which  the  Soul  either  chufes  or  refufes; 
I  am  content  with  it  :  tho'  I  think  that  't-s  enough  to  fay,  It's 
that  by  which  the  Soul  chufes  :  For  in  every  Aft  of  Will 
whatfoever,  the  Mind  chufes  one  Thing  rather  than  another  ; 
it  chufes  fomething  rather  than  the  Contrary,  or  rather  than 
the  Want  or  Non-exiftence  of  that  Thing.  So  in  every  Act 
of  Refufal,  the  Mind  chufes  the  Abfence  of  the  Thing  re- 
i  iifed  ;  The  Pofitive  and  the  Negative  are  fet  before  the  Mind 
For  its  Choice,  and  it  chufes  the  Negative  ;  and  the  Mind's 
making  its  Choice  in  that  Cafe  is  properly  the  Aft  of  the 
Will;  The  Will's  determining  between  the  two  is  a  volun 
tary  determining  ;  but  that  is  the  fame  Thing  as  making  a 
Choice.  So  that  whatever  Names  we  call  the  Acl  of  the  Will 
by,  Chujing,  Refujing,  Approving,  Difappro-ving,  Liking,  Dijlik<- 
ing,  Embracing^  Rfje&ing,  Determining,  Direfiing,  Command 
ing,  Forbidding,  Inclining  or  being  a<verfe,  a  being  pleafed  or 
difpleafed  with  ;  all  may  be  reduced  to  this  of  Chafing.  For 
the  Soul  to  aft  voluntarily,  is  evermore  to  ad 


Mr.  Locke  *  fays,  "  The  Will  fignifies  Nothing  but  a  Power 
"  or  Ability  to  prefer  tfr  chufe"  And  in  the  foregoing  Plage 
fays,  "  The  Word  Preferring  feems  beft  to  exprefs  the  Aft  of 
"  Volition  :"  But  adds,  that  "  it  does  it  notprecifely  ;  For,  (fays 
he)  "  tho'  a  Man  would  prefer  Flying  to  Walking,  yet  who 
"  can  fay  he  ever  wills  it?"  But  the  Inftarjce  he  mentions 
don't  prove  that  there  is  any  Thing  elfe  in  Willing,  but  merely 
Preferring  :  For  it  (hould  be  confidered  what  is  the  next  and 
immediate  Objeft  of  the  Will,  with  refpeft  to  a  Man's 
Walking,  or  any  other  external  Action  ;  which  is  not  his  be 
ing  removed  from  one  Place  to  another,  on  the  Earth,  or 
thro'  the  Air  ;  thefe  are  remoter  Objefts  of  Preference  ;  but 
itich  or  fuch  an  immediate  Exertion  of  himfelf.  The  Thing 
nextly  chofen  or  prefer'd  when  a  Man  wills  to  walk,  is  not  his 
being  removed  to  fuch  a  Place  where  he  would  be,  but  fuch 
an  Exertion  and  Motion  of  his  Legs  and  Feet,  Sec.  in  order  to 
it.  And  his  willing  fuch  an  Alteration  in  his  Body  in  the  pre- 
fent  Moment,  is  nothing  elfe  but  his  chufing  or  preferring 
fuch  an  Alteration  in  his  Body  at  fuch  a  Moment,  or  his  lik 
ing  it  better  than  the  Forbearance  of  ft.  And  God  has  fo 
made  and  eftablifhed  the  human  Nature,  the  Soul  being  united 
to  a  Body  in  proper  State,  that  the  Soul  preferring  or  chufmor 
fuch  an  immediate  Exertion  or  Alteration  of  the  Body,  fuch 
an  Alteration  inflantaneoufly  follows.  There  is  nothing  elfe 

in. 

*  Human  Underftanding,  Edit,  7.  Vol.  I.  P.  197, 


Seft.  I.         The  Nature  of  the  Will.  3 

in  the  Actings  of  my  Mind,  that  I  am  confcious  of  while  I 
walk,  but  only  my  preferring  or  chuiing,  thro3  fucceflive  Mo 
ments,  that  there  fhould  be  fuch  Alterations  of  my  external 
Senfations  and  Motions  ,•  together  with  a  concurring  habitual 
Expectation  that  it  will  be  fo ;  having  ever  found  by  Experi 
ence,  that  on  fuch  an  immediate  Preference,  fuch  Senfations 
and  Motions  do  actually  inftantaneoufly,  and  conftantly  arife. 
But  it  is  not  fo  in  the  Cafe  of  Flying  :  Tho'  a  Man  may  be  faid 
remotely  to  chufe  or  prefer  Flying  ;  yet  he  don't  chufe  or  pre 
fer,  incline  to-  or  defire,  under  Cicumftances  in  View,  any 
immediate  Exertion  of  the  Members  of  his  Body  in  order  to 
it ;  becaufe  he  has  no  Expectation  that  he  fliould  obtain  the 
defired  End  by  any  fuch  Exertion  ;  and  he  don't  prefer  or  in 
cline  to  any  bodily  Exertion  or  Effort  under  this  apprehended 
Circumftance,  of  jts  being  wholly  in  vain.  So  that  if  we  care 
fully  diftinguifh  the  proper  Objects  of  the  feveral  Ads  of  the 
Will,  it  will  not  appear  by  this,  and  fuch-like  Inftances,  that 
there  is  any  Difference  between  Volition  and  Prefertnce  ;  or  that 
a  Man's  chufmg,  liking  beft,  or  being  belt  pleafed  with  a 
Thing,  are  not  the  fame  with  his  willing  that  Thing ;  as  they 
feem  to  be  according  to  thofe  general  and  more  natural  Noti 
ons  of  Men,  according  to  which  Language  is  formed.  Thus 
an  Act  of  the  Will  is  commonly  exprefs'd  by  its  pleaftng  a  Man 
to  do  thus  or  thus  ;  and  a'  Man's  doing  as  he  *wtllst  and  doing 
as  he  phafesy  are  the  fame  Thing  in  common  Speech. 

Mr.  Locke  fays,  f  "  The  Will  is  perfeftly  diftinguim'd  from 
Dcfire ;  which  in  the  very  fame  Action  may  have  a  quite 
contrary  Tendency  from  that  which  our  Wills  fet  us  upon. 
A  Man,  (fays  he)  whom  I  canno.t  deny,  may  oblige  me  to 
ufe  Perfuafions  to  another,  which,  at  the  fame  Time  I  am 
fpeaking,  I  may  wifh  may  not  prevail  on  him.  In  this 
Cafe  'tis  plain  the  Will  and  Defire  run  counter."  I  dofl't 
fuppofe,  that  #7//and  Dejlre  are  Words  of  precifely  the  fame 
Signification  :  Will  feems  to  be  a  V/ord  of  a  more  general  Sig 
nification,  extending  to  Things  prefent  and  abfent.  Dejlre  re- 
fpects  fomething  abfent.  I  may  prefer  my  prefent  Situation 
and  Pofture,  fuppofe  fitting  ftill,  or  having  my  Eyes  open, 
and  fo  may  will  it;/  But  yet  I  can't  think  they  are  fo 
entirely  diftinct,  tHit  they  can  ever  be  properly  faid  to  run 
counter.  A  Man  never,  in  any  Inftance,  wills  any  Thing 
contrary  to  his  Defires,  or  defires  any  Thing  contrary  to  his 
Will.  The  foremention'd  Inftance,  which  Mr.  Locke  pro 
duces,  don't  prove  that  he  ever  does.  He  may,  on  fome  Con- 
fideration  or  other,  will  to  utter  Speeches  which  have  a  Ten 
dency 
*  Hum.  Und.  Vol.  L  P.  203,  204. 


4  <Tbe  Nature  of  the  Will.  Part  I." 

dency  to  perfuade  another,  and  flill  may  defire  that  they  may 
not  perfuade  him  :  But  yet  his  Will  and  defire  donyt  run- 
counter  to  all :  The  Thing  which  he  wills,  the  very  fame  he 
.  cs  ;  and  he  don't  will  a  Thing,  and  defire  the  contrary 
in  any  Particular.  In  this  Inftance,  it  is  not  carefully  obferv- 
cd,  what  is  the  Thing  will'd,  and  what  is  the  Thing  defired  : 
If  it  were,  it  would  be  found  that  Will  and  Defire  don't  clafli 
in  the  leaft.  The  Thing  will'd  on  fome  Confideration,  is  to 
utter  fuch  Words ;  and  certainly,  the  fame  Confideration  fo 
influences  him,  that  he  don't  defire  the  contrary  ;  ail  Things 
conlidered,  he  chufes  to  utter  fuch  Words,  and  c.:n't  defire 
not  to  utter  them.  And  fo  as  to  the  Thing  which  Mr.  Locke 
fpeaks  of  as  ceiired,  viz.  that  the  Words,  tho'  They  tend  to 
perfuade,  fhould"  not  be  effectual  to  that  End,  his  Will  is 
riot  contrary  to  this  ;  he  don't  will  that  they  mould  be  efFeftu- 
ai,  but  rather  wills  that  they  Ihould  not,  as  he  defires.  In 
order  to  prove  ihat  the  Will  and  Defire  may  run  counter,  it 
iaould  be  mown  that  they  may  be  contrary  one  to  the  other 
in  the  fame  Thing,  or  with  refpedl  to  the  very  fame  Objecl  of 
Will  or  Defire :  But  here  the  Objeds  are  two ;  and  in  each, 
taken  by  themfebes,  the  Will  and  Defire  agree.  And  'tis  no 
Wonder  that  they  mould  not  agree  in  different  Things,  how 
ever  little  diftinguimeti  they  are  in  their  Nature.  The  Will 
may  not  agree  with  the  Will,  nor  Defire  agree  with  Defire,  in 
different  Things.  As  in  this  very  Inftance  which  Mr.  Locke 
mentions,  a  Perfon  may,  on  fome  confideration,  defire  to  ufe 
Perfualiofls,  and  at  the  fame  Time  may  defire  they  may 
not  prevail :  But  yet  no  Body  will  fay,  that  Dejtre  runs  coun 
ter  to  Defire ;  or  that  this  proves  that  Dcfirt  is  perfectly  a 
diftinft  Thing  from  Defire. — The  like  might  be  obferved  of 
the  other  Inftance  Mr.  Locke  produces,  of  a  Man's  defiring  to 
bee  Jed  of  Pain,  &c. 

But  not  to  dwell  any  longer  on  this,  whether  Dejtre  and 
Will,  and  whether  Preference  and  Volition  be  precifely  the  fame 
Things  or  no ;  yet,  I  truft  it  will  be  allowed  by  all,  that  in 
every  Aft  of  Will  there  is  an  Aft  of  Choice;  that  in 
every  Volition  there  is  a  Preference,  or  a  prevailing  Inclination 
of  the  Soul,  whereby  the  Soul,  at  that  Inftant,  is  out  of  a 
State  of  perfeft  Indifference,  with  refpeft  to  the  direft  ObjecT: 
of  the  Volition.  So  that  in  every  Aft,  .0r  going  forth  of  the 
Will,  there  is  fome  Preponderation,of  the  "Mind  or  Inclination, 
one  Way  rather  than  another ;  and  the  Soul  had  rather  have 
or  do  one  Thing  than  another,  or  than  no?  -i  have  or  do  that 
Thing;  and  that  there,  where  there  is  abfol-.:;::y  no  preferring 
or  chufing,  but  a  perfeft  ccmth.  m,  there  is  no 

Volition, 

SECTION  II. 


Se<5t.  II.    Of  the  Determination  of  the  Will         5 

tSboocc  3CCOSOCCOCCQQCCOCCCCQDSC  ;cooo«cococ  •&»  loctoorooaorooococcccoccooooooec  oeocoooc  «^J» 

SECTION     II. 

Concerning  the  Determination  of  the  Will. 

BY  determining  the  Will,  if  the  Phrafe  be  ufed  with  any  Mean 
ing,  muft  be  intended,  caujing  that  the  Aft  of  the  II  ill  or 
Choice  Jbould  be  thus,  and  not  otherwife :  And  the  Will  is  faid 
to  be  determined,  when,  in  Confequence  of  forhe  Action,  or 
Influence,  its  Choice  is  directed  to,  and  fixed  upon  a  particular 
Object.  As  when  we  fpealc  of  the  Determination  ot  Motion, 
we  mean  caufing  the  Motion  of  the  Boily  to  be  fuch  a  Way, 
or  in  fuch  a  Direction,  rather  than  another. 

To  talk  of  the  Determination  of  the  Will,  fuppofes  an 
Effect,  which  muft  have  a  Caufe.  If  the  Will  be  determined, 
there  is  a  Determiner.  This  muft  be  fuppofed  to  be  intend 
ed  even  by  them  that  fay,  the  Will  determines  itfelf.  If  it  be 
fo,  the  Will  is  both  Determiner  and  determined  ;  it  is  a  Caufe 
that  acts  and  produces  Effects  upon  itfelf,  and  is  the  Object  of 
its  own  Influence  and  Action. 

With  refpect  to  that  grand  Inquiry,  What  determines  the 
Will,  it  would  be  very  tedious  and  unneceflary  at  prefent  to 
enumerate  and  examine  all  the  various  Opinions,  which  have 
been,  advanced  concerning  this  Matter ;  nor  is  it  needful  that 
I  mould  enter  into  a  particular  Difquifition  of  all  Points  deba 
ted  in  Difputes  on  that  Queftion,  Whether  the  Will  always  fol 
lows  the  loft  diftate  of  the  Under/landing.  .  It  is  fufficient  to  my 
prefent  Purpofe  to  fay, — //  is  that  Motive,  which,  as  it  Jiands 
in.  the  View  of  the  Mind,  is  the ftrongeft ,  that  determines  the  WilL 
— But  it  may  be  neceflary  that  I  (hould  a  little  explain  my 
Meaning  in  this. 

By  Motive,  I  mean  the  Whole  of  that  which  moves,  excites 
or  invites  the  Mind  to  Volitipn,  whether  that  be  one  Thing 


fmgly,  or  many  Th|Hfe  conjunctly.     Many  particular  Things 
may  concur  and  unlfe  their  Strength  to  induce  the  Mind; 


and  when  it  is  10, Tan  together  are  as  it  were  one  complex 
Motive.  And  when  I  fpeak  of  the  ftrongcft  Motive,  I  have 
Refpect  to  the  Strength  of  the  Whole  that  operates  to  induce 
to  a  particular  Act  of  Volition,  whether  that  be  the  Strength 
of  one  Thing  alone,  or  of  many  together, 

What. 


6  Wlcat  determines  the  Will.         Part  I. 

Whatever  is  a  Motive,  in  this  Senfe,  muft  be  fomething  that 
is  extant  in  the  Vie<u>  or  Apprehtnfion  of  the  Under/landing,  or  per 
ceiving  Faculty.  Nothing  can  induce  or  invite  the  Mind  to 
will  or  aft  any  Thing,  any  farther  than  it  is  perceived,  or  is 
fome  Way  or  other  in  the  Mind's  View ;  for  what  is  wholly 
unperceived,  and  perfectly  out  of  the  Mind's  View,  can't  afrbcl: 
the  Mind  at  all.  "Tis  moil  evident,  that  nothing  is  in  the 
Mind,  or  reaches  it,  or  takes  any  Hold  of  it,  any  othsrwife 
than  as  it  is  perceived  or  thought  cf. 

And  I  think  it  muft  alfo  he  allowed  by  all,  that  every  Thing 
that  is  properly  called  a  Motive,  Excitement  or  Inducement 
to  a  perceiving  willing  Agent,  has  fome  Sort  and  Degree  of 
tendency ,  or  Advantage  to  move  or  excite  the  Will,  previous  to 
the  Effeft,  or  to  the  Aft  of  the  Will  excited.  This  previous 
Tendency  of  the  Motive  is  what  «  call  the  Strength  of  the  Mo 
tive.  That  Motive  which  has  a  lefs  Degree  of  previous  Ad 
vantage  or  Tendency  to  move  the  Will,  or  that  appears  lefs 
inviting,  as  it  ftands  in  the  View  of  the  Mind,  is  what  I  call 
a  weaker  Motive.  On  the  contrary,  that  which  appears  moft 
inviting,  and  has,  by  what  appears  concerning  it  to  the  Un- 
derftanding  or  Apprehenfion,  the  greateft  Degree  of  previous 
Tendency  to  excite  and  induce  the  Choice,  is  what  I  call  the 
Jlrongeft  Motive.  And  in  this  Senfe,  I  fuppofe  the  Will  is  al 
ways  determined  by  the  ftrongeft  Motive. 

Things  that  exift  in  the  View  of  the  Mind,  have  their 
Strength,  Tendency  or  Advantage  to  move  or  excite  its  Will, 
from  many  Things  appertaining  to  the  Nature  and  Cir- 
Cumftances  of  the  Diking  view'd,  the  Nature  and  Circumftances 
of  the  Mind  that  views  y  and  the  Degree  and  Manner  of  its  V-ieiu  ; 
which  it  would  perhaps  be  hard  to  make  a  perfect  Enumeration 
of.  But  fo  much  I  think  may  be  determined  in  general,  with 
out  Room  for  Controverfy,  that  whatever  is  perceived  or  ap 
prehended  by  an  intelligent  and  voluntary  Agent,  which  has  the 
Nature  and  Influence  of  a  Motive  to  Volition  or 'Choice,  is 
considered  or  view'd  as  good;  nor  has  it  any  Tendency  to  in 
vite  or  engage  the  Election  of  the  Soul  in  any  further  Degree 
than  it  appears  fuch.  For  to  fay  otherwife,  would  be  to  fay, 
that  Things  that  appear  have  a  Tendency  by  the  Appearance 
they  make,  to  engage  the  Mind  tolled  them,  fome  other 
Way  than  by  their  appearing  eligible  to  it;  which  is  ab- 
furd.  And  therefore  it  muft  be  true,  in  fome  Senfe,  that  the 
Will  always  is  as  the  greateft  apparent  Good  is.  But  only,  for  the 
right  understanding  of  this,  two  Things  muft  be  well  and 
diftinftly  obferved, 

C  I,  It 


&&.  II-        fWrat  determines  /&  Wilt  f 

1.  It  mud  be  obferved  in  what  Senfe  I  ufe  the  Term  Good; 
namely,  as  of  the  fame  Import  with  Agreeable.     To   appear 
good  to- the  Mind,  as  I  ufe  the  Pbrafe,  is  the  fame  as  to  appear 
egw  fable,  QI  feem  f  leafing  to  the  Mind.    Certainly,  nothing  ap 
pears  inviting  and  eligible  to  the  Mind,  or  tending  to  engage 
its  Inclination  and   Choice,    confidered  as  evil  or  difagreeable; 
nor  indeed,  v&indijjeffntf.  and  neither  agreeable  nor  difagreea- 
$Je.     But  if  it  tends  to  draw  the  Inclination,  and  move  the 
Will,  it   muft   be   under  the  Notion-  of  that  which  fiats  the 
Mind.     And  therefore  that  muft  have  the  greateft  Tendency 
to  atiraft   and   engage  h,  which;  as  it  Hands  in   the  Mind's 
View,-  fuits  it  belt,  and  pleafes  it  moft ;  and  in  that  Senfe,  is- 
the  greateft  apparent  Good:  to  fay  otherwise,  is  little,  if  any 
Thing,  fhort  of  a-  direct  and  plain  Contradiction. 

The  Word  Good,-  in  this  Senfe,  includes  in  its  Signification,,, 
the  Removal  or  Avoiding  of  Evil,  or  of  that  which  is  difa 
greeable  and  uneafy.  'Tis  agreeable  and  pleafing,  to  avoid  what 
is  difagreeable  and  difpleaiing,  and  to  have  Uneaiinefs  remo 
ved.  So  that  here  is  included  what  Mr.  Locke  fuppofes  deter 
mines  the  Will.  For  when  he  fpeaks  of  uneafmefs  as  de 
termining  the  Will,,  he  muft  be  underftood  as  fuppofing  that 
the  End  or  Aim  which  governs  the  Volition  or  Aft  of  Prefe 
rence,  is  the  Avoiding  or  Removal  of  that  Uneaiinefs ;  and 
that  is  the  fame  Thing  as  chufmg  and  feeking  what  is  more 
eafy  and  agreeable.. 

2 ,  When   I  fay,  the  Will  is  as  the  greateft  apparent  Good 
is,  or   (as  I  have  explained  it)    that  Volition  has  always  for  its 
Objeft  the  Thing   which   appears  moft  agreeable  ;  it  muft  be 
carefully  obferved,  to  avoid  Confufion  and  needlefs  Objection, 
that  I  fpeak  of  the  dirtfi  and  immediate  Objed   of  the  Aft  of 
Volition ;  and  not  fome  Objeft  that  the  Aft  of  Will  has  not 
an  immediate,  but  only  an  indireft  and  remote  Refpeft  to. 
Many  Afts  of  Volition  have  fome  remote  Relation  to  an  Ob 
jeft,  fhat  is  different  from  the  Tiling  moft  immediately  will'd 
and  chofen,     Thus,  when  a  Drunkard  has  his  Liquor  before 
him,  and  he  has  to  chufe  whether  to  drink  it,  or  no  ;  the  proper 
and  immediate   Objefts,  about  which  his  prefent  Volition  is 
converfant,  and  between  which  his  Choice  now  decides,  are 
his  own  Afts,  in  drinking  the  Liquor,  or  letting  it  alone ;  and 
this  will  certainly  be  don-'  according  to  what,  in  the  prefent 
View  of  his  Mind,  taken  in  the  Whole  of  it,  is  moft  agreeable 
to  him.     If  he  chufes  or  wills  to  drink  it,  and  not  to  let  it 
alone  ;   then  this   Aftion,  as  it  ftands  in  the   View   of  his 
.Mind ,  with  all  that  belongs  to  its  Appearance  there,  is  more 
agreeable  and  pieafing  than  letting  it  alone, 

But 


£  What  determines  the  WilL      '  Part  L 

But  the  Objeds  to  which  this  Ad  of  Volition  may  relate 
•more  remotely,  and  between  which  his  Choice  may  determine 
.-more  indiredly,  are  the  prefent  Pleafure  the  Man  expeds  by 
drinking,  and  the  future  Mifery  which  he  judges  will  be  the 
•Confequence  of  it:  He  may  judge  that  this  future  Miierjc, 
when  it  comes,  wril  be  more  difagreeable  and  unpleafant,  tl,an 
refraining  from  drinking  now  would  be.  But  thefe  two 
Things  are  not  the  proper  Objeds  that  the  Ad  of  Volition  fpo- 
ken  of  is  nextly  converfant  about.  For  the  Ad  of  Will  fpo- 
ken  of  is  concerning  prefent  Drinking  or  Forbearing  to  drink. 
If  he  wills  to  drink,  then  Drinking  is  the  proper  Objed  of  the 
Ad  of  his  Will.;  and  drinking,  ombme  Account  or  other,  now 
appears  moft  agreeable  to  him,  and  fuits  hj.m  beft.  If  he  chufes 
to  refrain,  then  Refraining  is  the  immediate  Objed  of  his 
Will,  and  is  mod  pleallng  to  him.  if  in  the  Choice  he 
makes  in  the  Cafe,  he  prefers  a  prefent  Pleafare  to  a  future 
Advantage,  which  he  judges  will  be  greater  when  it  comes; 
then  a  leifer  prefent  Pleafure  appears  more  agreeable  to  him 
than  a  greater  Advantage  at  a  Diftance.  If  on  the  contrary  a 
future  Advantage  is  preter'd,  then  that  appears  moft  agreeable, 
and  fuits  him  beft.  And  fo  ftill  the  prefent  Volition  is  as 
the  greateft  apparent  Good  at  prefent -is. 

£  have  rather  chofen  to  exprefs  myfelf  thus,  that  the  Will 
always  is  as  the  greatejl  apparent  Good,  or  as  <v)hat  appears  mo/l  &~ 
greeable,  lsy  than  to  fay  that  the  Will  is  determined  by_  the  greateft 
apparent   Good,  or  by   what  feems  mod   agreeable ;    becaufe 
an  appearing  molt  agreeable  or  pleafmg  to  the  Mind,  and  the 
Mind's  -preferring  and  chafing,    feem  hardly  to  be  properly 
and  perfectly  diftiijd.     If  ftrift  Propriety  in  Speech  be  infiited 
on,    it    may    more    properly    be    faid,     that    the   voluntary 
Adion    which    is  the    immediate  Confequence  ^and  Fruit   of 
tiie   Mind's  Volition  or  Choice,  is  determined  by  that  which 
appears  moft  agreeable,  than  the  Preference   or  Choice   itfelf; 
but  that  the  Ad  of  Volition  itfelf  is   always  determined   by 
that  in  or  about  the  Mind's  View  of  the  Objed,  which  cewfes 
it  to  appear  mod  agreeable.    I  fay,  in  or  about  theMhid's  Vis*w 
of  the  Objed,  becaufe  what  has  InflAfee  to  render  an  Object 
in  View  agreeable,  is  not  only  whatjBpears  in  the   Object 
viewed,  but  alfo  the  Manner  of  the^Bw,  and   the  State  and. 
Circnniftances  of  the  Mind  that  views. — -Tarticularly  to  enume-  ' 
rate  all  Things  pertaining  to  the  Mind's  View  of  the  Objeds  of 
Volition,  which  have  Influence  in  their  appearing  agreeable  to 
the  Mind,  would  be   a  Matter  of  no  fmall  Difficulty,    and 
might   require  a  Treatife  by  itfelf,  and  is  not  nscelTary  to  my 
prefent  Purpofe,     I  mall  therefore  only  mention  jfome  Things 
in  general,  C  2  I, 


Sed.  II.  What  determines  the  Will.  9 

I.  One  Thing  that   makes   an   Objsft   proposed  to  Choice 
agreeable,  is  the  apparent  Nature  and  Circumjtances  of  ibc  Objefit* 
And  there  are  various  Things  of  this  Sort,  that  have  an  Hand 
in  rendering  the  Objeft  more  of  iefs  agreeable ;  as, 

1.  That  which  , appears  in   the   Gbjeft,    which  renders  it 
leauiiful  and  pleafant,  or  deformed  and  irkfome  to  the  Mind  j 
viewing  it  as  it  is  in  iffclf- 

2.  The  apparent  Degree  of  Pleafure  or  Trouble  attending 
the  Object,  or  the  Conference  of  it.     Such  Concomitants  and 
Confequents  being  viewed  as  Circumftances  of  the  Object,  are 
to  be  confidered  as  belonging  to  it,  and  as  it  were  Parts  of  it  ; 
as  it  Hands  in  the   Mind's  View,  as   a   propofed  Object  of 
Choice. 

3.  The  apparent  State  of  the  Pleafure  or  Trouble  that  ap* 
pears,  with  Refpecl  to  Dijiance  of  Time  ;  being  either  nearer 
or  farther  off.     'Tis  a  Tiling  in  itfcif  agreeable  to  the  Mind, 
to  have  Pleafure  fpeedily ;  and  dlfagreeable,  to  have  it  delayed  : 
So  that  if  there  be  two  equal  Degrees  of  Pieafure  fet  in  the 
Mind's  View,  and  all  other  Things  are  equal,  but  only  cne 
is  beheld  as  near,  and  the  other  far  oiT ;  the  nearer  will  ap 
pear  moft  agreeable,  and  fo  will  be  chofen.     Becaufe,  tho'  the 
Agreeablenefs  of  the  Objecls  be  exaftly  equal,    as  view'd  in 
Themfelves,  yet  not   as  view'd  in  their  Circumftances ;  one 
of  them  having  the  additional  Agreeablenefs  of  the  Circum- 
ftance  of  Nearnefs. 

II.  Another  Thing  that  contributes  to  the  Agreeablenefs  of 
an  Objecl  of  Choice,  as  it  ftands  in  the  Mind's  View,  is  the 
Manner  cf  the  View.     If  the  ObjecT  be  fomething  which  ap 
pears  connected  with  future  Pleafure,  not  only  will  the  Degree 
of  apparent  Pleafure  have  Influence,  but  alfo  the  Manner  of 
the  View,  efpecially  in  two  Refpcfts. 

1 .  With  refpeft  to  the  Degree  of  Judgment,    or  ^irmnefs 
of  AJfent,  v/ith  which  the  Mind  judges  theTleafure  to  be  fu 
ture.    Becaufe  it  is  more  agreeable  to  have  a  certain.  Happinefs, 
than  an  uncertain  one ;  and  a  Fleafure  viewed  as  more  proba 
ble,  all  other  Things  being  equal,  is  more  agreeable  to  the 
Mind,  than  that  whichjt  view'd  as  Iefs  probable. 

2.  With  refpeft  to  the   Degree  of  the  Idea  of  the  future 
Pleafure.     With  Regard  to  Things  which  are  the  Subjecl  of 
our  Thoughts,  either  paft,    prefent  or  future,  we  have  much 
more  of  an  Idea  or  Apprehenlion  of  fome  Things  than  others ; 
that  is,   our  Idea  is   much  more  clear,    lively   and  firong. 
Thus,  the  Ideas  we  have  of  fenfible  Things '  by  immediate 
Senfation,   are  ufually  much  more  lively  than  thofe  we  have 
by  mere  Imagination,  or  by  Contemplation  of  tlltjn  when  ab- 


io  What  determines  the  Will.          Part  I. 

My  Idea  of  the  Sun,  when  I  look  upon  it,  is  more 
vivid,  than  when  I  only  think  of  it.  Our  Idea  of  the  f \veet 
Reiim  of  a  delicious  Fruit  is  ufually  ftronger  when  we  tafte  it, 
.than  when  we  only  imagine  it.  And  fometirhes,  the  Ideas  we 
have  of  Things  by  Contemplation,  are  much  ftronger  and  clear 
er,  than  at  other  Times.  Thus,  a  Man  at  one  Time  has  a 
much  ftronger  Idea  of  the  Pleasure  which  is  to  be  enjoyed  in 
eating  fome  Sort  of  Food  that  he  loves,  than  at  another.  Now 
the  Degree,  or  Strength  of  the  Idea  or  Senfe  that  Men  have 
of  future  Good  or  Evil,  is  one  Thing  that  has  great  Influ 
ence  on  their  Minds  to  excite  Choice  or  Volition.  When  of 
two  Kinds  of  future  Pleafure,  which  the  Mind  considers  of, 
and  are  prefented  for  Choice,  both  are  fuppofed  exactly  equal 
by  the  judgment,  and  both  equally  certain,  and  all  other 
7'hings  are  equal,  but  only  one  of  them  is  what  the  Mind 
has  a  far  more  lively  Senfe  of,  than  of  the  other ;  this  has  the 
greateft  Advantage  by  far  to  aflecT:  and  atfraft  the  Mind,  and 
move  the  Will.  'Tis  now  more  agreeable  to  the  Mind,  to  take 
the  Pleafure  it  has  a  ftrong  and  lively  Senfe  of,  than  that 
which  it  has  only  a  faint  Idea  of.  The  View  of  the  former 
is  attended  wkh  the  ftrongeft  Appetite,  and  the  greatelt  Unea- 
finefs"  attends  the  Want  of  it;  and  'tis  agreeable  to  the  Mind, 
to  have  Uncafmefs  removed,  and  its  Appetite  gratified.  And 
if  fevera!  future  Enjoyments  are  prefented  together,  as  Com 
petitors  for  the  Choice  of  the  Mind,  {bme  of  them  judged  to 
be  greater,  and  others  lefs ;  the  Mind  alfo  having  a  greater 
Senfe  and  more  lively  Idea  of  the  Good  of  fome  of  them,  and, 
of  others  a  lefs ;  and  fome  are  viewed  as  of  greater  Certainty 
or  Probability  than  others  ;  and  thofe  Enjoyments  that  appear 
rnoft  agreeable  in  one  of  thefe  Refpefts,  appfears  kaftfoin. 
others:  In  this  Cafe,  all  other  Things  being  equal,  the  A- 
greeablenefs  of  a  propofed  Object  of  Choice  will  be  in  a  De 
gree  fome  Way  compounded  of  the  Degree  of  Good  fuppofed 
by  the  j  udgoient,  ttie  Degree  of  apparent  Probability  or  Cer 
tainty  of  that  Good,  and  the  Degree  of  the  View-  or  Senfe,  or 
Livelinefs  of  the  Idea  the  Mind  has,  of  that  Good  ;  becaufe 
all  together  concur  to  constitute  the* Degree  in  which  the  Ob 
ject  appears  at  prefent  agreeable  -3  and  accordingly  Volition  will 
be  determined. 

I  might  further  obferve,  the  State  of  the  Mind  that 
views  a  propofed  Objeft  of  Choice,  is  another  Thing  that 
contributes  to  the  Agreeablenefs  or  Difagreeablenefs  of  that 
Dbjed ;  the  particular  Temper  which  the  Mind  has  by  Na 
ture,  or  that  has  been  introduced  and  cftablimed  by  Educa 
tion,  Example^  Cuftom,  or  fome  other  Means ;  or  the  Frame 

or 


Sect  IL         What  determines  the  Will.  <t* 

or  State  that  the  Mind  is  in  on  a  particular  Occafion. 
That  Objedl  which  appears  agreeable  to  one,  does  not  fo  to 
another.  And  the  fame  Objeft  don't  always  appear  alike  agree,- 
able  to  the  fame  Perfon,  at  different  Times.  It  is  moft  a- 
greeable  to  fome  Men,  to  follow  their  Reafon  ;  and  to  others, 
to  follow  their  Appetites :  To  fome  Men,  it  is  more  agreeable 
to  deny  a  vicious  Inclination,  than  to  gratify  it ;  Others  it 
fuits  belt  to  gratify  the  vileft  Appetites.  'Tis  more  difagreea- 
ble  to  fome  Men  than  others,  to  counter-acl  a  former  Refo- 
lution.  In  thefe  Refpefts,  and  many  others  which  might  be 
mentioned,  different  Things  will  be  moft  agreeable  to  different 
Perfons  ;  and  not  only  fo,  but  .to  the  fame  Perfons  at  different 
Times. 

But  poffibly  'tis  needlefs  and  improper,  to  mention  the 
Frame  and  State  of  the  Mind,  as  a  diilinft  Ground  of  the 
Agreeablenefs  of  Objects  from  the  other  two  mentioned  be 
fore  ;  viz.  The  apparent  Nature  and  Circumftances  of  the 
Objecls  viewed,  and  the  Manner  of  the  View  :  Perhaps  if 
we  ftriftly  coniider  the  Matter,  the  different  Temper  and 
State  of  the  Mind  makes  no  Alteration  as  to  the  Agreeable 
nefs  of  Objects,  any  other  Way,  than  as  it  makes  the  Ob 
jects  themfelves  appear  differently  beautiful  or  deformed, 
having  apparent  Pleafure  or  Pain  attending  them  :  And  as  it 
occafiom  the  Manner  of  the  View  to  be  different,  cairfes  the 
Idea  of  Beauty  or  Deformity,  Pleafure  or  Uneafmefs,  to  be 
more  or  kfs  lively. 

However,  I  think  fo  much  is  certain,  that  Volition,  In  no 
one  Inftance  that  can  be  mentioned,  is  otherwife  than  the 
jgreateft  apparent  Good  is,  in  •  the  Manner  which  has  been 
explained.  The  Choice  of  the  Mind  never  departs  from  that 
which,  at  that  Time,  and  with  Refpect  to  the  direcl  and 
ammediate  Objefts  of  that  Decifion  of  the  Mind,  appears 
irioft  agreeable  and  pleating,  all  Things  eonfidered.  If  the  im 
mediate  Objefts  of  the  Will  are  a  Man's  own  Actions,  then 
thofe  Aftions  which  appear  moft  agreeable  to  him  he  wills.  If 
it  .be  now  moft  agreeable  to  him,  all  Things  eonfidered,  to  walk, 
then  he  now  wills  to  walk.  If  it  be  now,  upon  the  Whole  of 
what  at  prefent  appears  to  him,  moft  agreeable  to  fpeak,  then  he 
choofes  to  fpeak  :  If  it  fuits  him  beft  to  keep  Silence,  then 
he  chocfes  to  keep  Silence.  There  is  fcarcely  a  plainer 
and  more  umverfal  Diftate  of  the  Senfe  and  Experience  of 
Mankind,  than  that,  when  Men  aft  voluntarily,  and  do  what 
they  pleafe,  then  they  do  what  fuits  them  beft,  or  what  is 
jojoft  Mgrctabk  to  them.  To  fay,  that  they  do  what  they  pleafe, 

cr 


12  What  determines  the  Will.          Part  I. 

or  what  pleafes  them,  but  yet  don't  do  what  is  agreeable  to 
them,  is  the  fame  Thing  as  to  fay,  they  do  wha^t  they  pleafe, 
but  don't  aft  their  Pleafure ;  and  that  is  to  fay,  that  they 
db  what  they  pleafe,  and  yet  don't  do  what  they  pleafe. 

It  appears  from  thefe  Things,  that  in  fome  Senfe,  the  Will 
always  follows  the  loft  Difiate  of  the  Under/landing.  But  then  the 
Under/landing  muft  be  taken  in  a  large  Senfe,  as  including  the 
whole  Faculty  of  Perception  or  Apprehenfion,  and.  not  merely 
what  is  called  Reafon  or  Judgment.  If  by  the  Dictate  of  the 
Underilanding  is  meant  what  Reafon  declares  to  be  bdt  or 
moil  for  the  Perfon's  Happinefs,  taking  in  the  Whole  of  hift 
Duration,  it  is  not  true,  that  the  Will  always  follows  the  laft 
Dictate  of  the  Un^erfta-ndmg,  Such  a  Dictate  of  Reafon  19 
quite  a  different  Matter  from  Things  appearing  now  rnoft 
agreeable ;  all  Things  being  put  together  which  pertain  to 
the  Mind's  prefent  Perceptions,  Apprehenfions  or  Ideas,  in. 
any  Refpect.  Altho'  that  Dictate  of  Reafon,  when  it  takes 
Place,,  is  one  Thing  that  is  put  into  the.  Scales,  and  is  to  be 
confidered  as  a  Thing  that  has  Concern  in  the  compound  In^ 
fluence  which  moves  and  induces  the  Will ;  and  is  one  Thing 
that  is  to  be  confidered  in  eftimating  the  Degree  of  that  Ap 
pearance  of  Good  which  the  Will  always  follows ;  either  as 
having  its  Influence  added  to  other  Things,  or  fubducted 
from  them.  When  it  concurs  with  other  Things,  then  its 
Weight  is  added  to  them,  as  put  into  the  fame  Scale ;  but 
when  it  is  againft  them,  it  is  as  a  Weight  in  the  oppofite 
Scale,  where  it  refifts  the  Influence  of  other  Things :  yet 
its-  Refiftance  is  often  overcome  by  their  greater  Weight,  and 
fo  the  Act  of  the  Will  is  determined  in  Oppofition  to  it. 

The  Things  which  I  have  faid  may,  I  hoper  ferve,.  in  fome 
Meafure,  to  illuitrate  and  confirm  the  Pofition  I  laid  down 
in  the  Eeginning  of  this  Section,  viz.  That  the  Will  is  airways 
determined  by  the  Jlrtngeft  Motive,  or  by  that  View  of  the  Mind 
which  has  the  greatcft.  Degree  of  previous  Tendency  to  ex 
cite  Volition.  But  whether  I  have  been  fo  happy  as  rightly 
to  explain  the  Thing  wherein  confifts  the  Strength  of  Motives,, 
or  not,  yet  my  failing  in  this  will  not  overthrow  the  Pofition 
itfelf;  which  carries  much  of  its  own  Evidence  with  it,  and 
is  the  Thing  of  chief  Importance  to  the  Purpofe  of  the  en- 
fuing  Diicourfe :  And  the  Truth  of  it,  I  hope^  will  appear 
with  greater  Clearnefs,  before  I  have  fmiftied  what  I  have  tc» 
fay  .on  the  Subject  of  human  Liberty, 

SECT, 


Sedt.  IIL-         fbe  Nature  of  Neceffity.  13 

^ 

fj^  <3i^5CCOOCC3MIO;S5W00003CCOOOO  30009000^5*  tOCC  0000  QiOOOJOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOCOOOCOOOO  «^}» 

S  EC  T  I  O  N       IIL 

Concerning   the   Meaning  of  the  'Terms  Necefiity, 
Impoffibilify,  Inability,  &C;    and  of  Contin- 
,   gence. 

TH  E  Words  Neccffarj,  ImpoJJibh,  &c.  are  abundantly  tifed 
in  Controverfies  about  Free-will   and  moral   Agency; 
and  therefore  the  Senfe  in  which  they  are  ufed,   "Ihould  be 
clearly  undeiitood. 


Here  I  might  fay,  that  a  Thing  is  then  faid  to  be 
when  it  muft  be,  and  cannot  be  othcrwife.  But  this  would 
not  properly  be  a  Definition  of  Neceffity,  or  an  Explana 
tion  of  the  Word,  any  more  than  if  I  explained  the  Word 
muft,  by  there  being  a  Neceffity.  The  Words  muft,  'can, 
and  cannot,  need  Explication  as  much  as  the  Words  neceffarj, 
and  impoffible;  excepting  that  the  former  are  Words  that 
Children  commonly  life,  and  know  fomething  of  the  Meaning 
of  earlier  than  the  'latter. 

/ 

The  Word  necejjary,  as  ufed  in  common  Speech,  is  a  rela 
tive  Term  ;  and  relates  to  fome  fuppofed  Oppofition  made 
to  the  Exiftence  of  the  Thing  fpoken  of,  which  is  overcome,. 
or  proves  in  vain  to  hinder  or  alter  it.  That  is  neceflary,  ir; 
the  original  and  proper,  Senfe  of  the  Word,  which  is,  or  will 
be,  ndtwithftanding  all  fuppofable  Oppofitibn.  To  fay,  that 
a  Thing  is  necefTary,  is  the  fame  Thing  as  to  fay,  that  it  h 
impoffible  it  ftiould  not  be  :  But  the  Word  imp'ffible  is  mani- 
feftly  a  relative  Term,  and  has  Reference  to  fuppofed  Power 
exerted  to  bring  a  Thing  to  pafs,  which  is  infufficient  for  the 
Effccl  ;  As  the  Word  imable  is  relative,  and  has  Relation  to 
Ability  or  Endeavour  which  is  infufficient;  and  as  the 
Word  Irrefiftalle  is  relative,  and  has  always  Reference  to 
Kefiftance  which  is  made,  or  may  be  made  to  fome  Force 
or  Power  tending  to*  an  Effect,  and  is  infufficient  to  withfland 
the  Power,  or  hinder  the  Effect.  The  common  Notion  of 
Kcccffity  and  ImpofTibility  implies  fonjetjijng  that  fruftrates 
Endeavour  or  Defire, 

Here 


Part  L  Tbe  Nature  of  Neceftky.  14 

Here  feveral  Things  are  to  be  noted. 

i.  Things  arc  faid  to  be  neceflary  \\\  general,  which  are  or 
will  be  not  withitanding  any  fuppofable  Oppofition  from  us  or 
others,  or  from  whatever  Quarter.  But  Things  are- faid  to  be 
neceilary  to  us,  which  are  or  will  be  notwithstanding  all  Op 
poiition  fuppofable  in  the  Cafe  from  us.  The  fame  may  be 
cbfcrved  of  the  Word  impcffible>  and  other  fuch  like  Terms. 

2.  Thefe  Terms  necejjary,    impoffible,    irrefijlalle  9    &c.  do 
efpecialiy  belong  to   the  Controverfy  about  Liberty  and  moral 
Agency,  as  ufed  in  the  latter  of  the  two  Senfes  now  mentioned, 
viz.  as    necelfary  or  impoffible  to  us,  and  with  Relation  to  any 
fuppofable  Oppofition  or  Endeavour  of  ours. 

3.  As  the  Word  Neceffity,  in  its  vulgar  and  common  Ufe, 
is  relative,  and  has  always  Reference  to  fome   fuppofable  in- 
fufficient  Oppofition ;  fo  when  we  fpeak  of  any  Thing  as  ne- 
ceffary  to  us,  it  is  with  Relation  to  fome  fuppofable  Oppofition 
of  our  Wills,  or  fome  voluntary  Exertion  or  Effort  of  ours  to 
the  contrary.     For   we    don't  properly  make  Oppofition  to 
an  Event,    any  otherwife  than  as  we  voluntarily  oppofe    it. 
Things  are  faid  to  be  what  muft  be,  or  neceffarily  are,  as  to  us, 
when  they  are,  or  will  be,  tho*  we  delire  or  endeavour  the 
contrary,  or  try  to  prevent  or  remove  their  Exiftence :  But 
fuch  Oppofition  of  ours  always  either  confifts  in,  or  implies 
Oppofition  of  our  Wills. 

'Tis  mahifeft  that  all  fuch  like  Words  and  Phrafes,  as  vulgarly 
ufed,  are  ufed  and  accepted  in  this  Manner.  A  Thing  is 
faid  to  be  neceffary,  when  we  can't  help  it,  let  us  do  what  we 
will.  So  any  Thing  is  faid  to  be  impijfille  to  us,  when  we 
would  do  it,  or  would  have  it  brought  to  pafs,  and  endea 
vour  it ;  or  at  leaft  may  be  fuppofed  to  defirc  and  feek  it ; 
but  all  our  Defires  and  Endeavours  are,  or  would  be  vain. 
And  that  is  faid  to  be  irrejiftable,  which  overcomes  all  our 
Oppofition,  Refiilance,  and  Endeavour  to  the  contrary.  .And 
we  arc  to  be  faid  Unable  to  do  a  Thing,  when  our  fuppofable 
Defires  and  Endeavours  to  do  it  are  infufficient. 

We  are  accuftomed,  in  the  common  Ufe  of  Language,  to 
apply  and  underftand  thefe  Phrafes  in  this  Senfe  :  We  grow  up 
with  fuch  a  Habit ;  which  by  the  daily  Ufe  of  thefe  Terms, 
in  fuch  a  Senfe,  from  our  Childhood,  becomes  fix'd  and 
fettled  ;  fo  that  the  Idea  of  a  Relation  to  a  fuppofed  Will, 
Defoe  and  Endeavour  of  ours,  is  ftrengly  connected  with 
D  thefe 


Nature  of  Neceffity.  Part  L 

thefe  Terms,  and  naturally  excited  in  our  Minds,  whenever 
we  Iiear  the  Words  ufed.  Such  Ideas,  and  thefe  Words,  are 
fo  united  and  aiTociated,  that  they  unavoidably  go  together  ; 
one  fuggefts  the  other,  and  carries  the  other  with  it,  and  ne 
ver  can  be  feparated  as  long  as  we  live.  And  if  we,  ufe  the 
Words  *  as  Terms  of  Art,  in  another  Senfe,  yet,  unlefs  we 
are  exceeding  Circumfpecl  and  wary,  we  Yhall  infenfibly  flide 
into  the  vulgar  Ufe  cf  them,  and  fo  apply  the  Words  in  a  very 
i-nconfiilent  iVUnner :  this  habitual  Connection  of  Ideas  will 
deceive  and  confound  us  iri  our  Reafonings  and  Difcourfes, 
wherein  we  pretend  to  ufe  thefe  Terms  in  that  Manner,  as 
Terms  of  Art* 

4.  It  follows  from  what  has  been  observed,  that  when  thefe 
Terms  neceffary ,  impoftblf,  irrefijliblf,  unable,  &c.  are  ufed  ii? 
Cafes  wherein  no  Oppofition,  or  infufficient  Will  or  Endea 
vour,  is  fuppofed,  or  can  be  fuppofed,  but  the  very  Nature  of 
the  fuppofed  Cafe  itfelf  excladcs  and  denies  any  fuch  Oppofi- 
fion,  Will  or  Endeavour  \  thefe  Terms  are  then  not  ufed  in  their 
proper  Signification,  but  quite  beiide  their  Ufe  in  common 
Speech.  The  R.eafon  is  manifeft ;  namely,  that  in  fuch 
Cafes,  we  can't  ufe  the  Words  with  Reference  to  a  fuppcfa- 
ble  Oppofition,  Will  or  Endeavour.  And  therefore  if  any 
Man  ufes  thefe  Terms  in  fuch  Cafes,  he  either  u&s  them 
nonfenfically,  or  in  fome  new  Senfe,  diverfe  from  their  ori 
ginal  and  proper  Meaning.  As  for  Inftance  ;  If  a  Man  mould 
affirm  after  this  Manner,  Tha{  it  is  neceffary  for  a  Man,  and 
what  muft  be,  that  a  Man  mould  chufe  Virtue  rather  than 
Vice,  during  the  Time  that  he  prefers  Virtue  to  Vice ;  and 
that  it  is  a  Thing  impoiiible  and  irrefiftible,  that  it  mould  be 
©thsnvife  than  that  he  mould  have  his  Choice,  fo  long  as  this 
Choice  continues ;;  fuch  a  Man  would  ufe  thefe  Terms  mujl, 
irrejijlille,  &c.  with  perfect  Infignificance  and  Nonfenfe,  or  in 
fipme  new  Senfe,  diverfe  from  their  common  Ufe ;  which  is 
with  Reference,  as  has  been  obferved,  to  fuppofable  Oppo 
fition,  Unwillingnefs  and  Refiftance ;  whereas,  here,  the  very 
Suppofition  excludes  and  denies  any  fuch  Thing :  for  the 
Cafe  fuppofed  is  that  of  being  willing,  and  chufmg. 

£.  It  appears  from  what  has  been  faid,  that  thefe  Terms 
nece/Jary,  ivpffible,  &c.  are  often  ufed  by  Philofopher-s  and  Me- 
taphyficians  in  a  Senfe  quite  diverfe  from  their  common  Ufe< 
and  original  Signification:  For  they  apply  them  to  many 
Cafes  in  which  no  Gppoiitixm  is  fuppofed  or  fuppofable.  Thus 
they  ufe  them  with  Refpeft  to  God's  Exiftence  before  the 
Creation  of  the  Wprld,  when  there  was  no  other  Being  but 

Ha; 


Sea.  III.          The  Nature  of  Neceffity.  ifS 

He :  fo  with  regard  to  many  of  the  Difpoiiticns  and  Afts  of 
the  divine  Being,  fuch  as  his  loving  Himfelf,  his  loving 
Righteoufnefs,  hating  Sin,  &€.  So  they  apply  thefe  Terms  to 
many  Cafes  of  the  Inclinations  and  Actions  of  created  intel 
ligent  Beings,  Angels  and  Men  ;  wherein  all  Oppofition  of 
the  Will  is  {hut  out  and  denied,  in  the  very  Supposition  of 
the  Cafe. 

Mffaphyjical  or  Ph&fophical  Neceffity  is  nothing  diubrent 
from  their  Certainty.  I  fpeak  not  now  of  the  Cercamty  of 
Knowledge,  but  the  Certainty  that  is  in  Things  themfelves,- 
which  is  the  Foundation  of  the  Certainty  of  the  Knowledge  of 
them  ;  or  that  wherein  lies  the  Ground  of  the  Infallibility  of 
the  Proportion  which  affirms  them* 

What  is  fometimes  given  as  the  Definition  of  Philofophical 
Neceflity,  namely,  'That  by  which  a  Taing  cannot  but  be,  or  ivhere- 
by  it  cannot  be  other--wife,  fails  of  being  a  proper  Explanation  of  it, 
on  -two  Accounts :  Firft,  the  Words  Can,  or  Cannot,  need 
Explanation  as  much  as  the  Word  Neceffity ;  and  the  former 
may  as  well  be  explained  by  the  latter,  as  the  latter  by  the 
former.  Thus,  il"  any  one  afked  us  what  we  mean,  when  we 
fay,  a  Thing  cannot  but  be,  we  might  explain  ourfelves  by  fay 
ing,  we  mean,  it  muft  neceiTarily  be  fo  ;  as  well  as  explain 
Neceffity,  by  faying,  it  is  that  by  which  a  Thing  cannot  but  be. 
And  Secondly,  this  Definition  is  liable  to  the  fore-mentioned 
great  Inconvenience  :  The  Words  cannrt,  or  unable,  are  pro 
perly  relative,  and  have  Relation  to  Power  exerted,  or  that 
may  be  exerted,  in  order  to  the  Thing  fpoken  of;  to  which,  as 
I  have  now  obferved,  the  Word  NeceJ/ity,  as  uied  by  Philofo- 
phers,  has  no  Reference. 

Philofophical  Neceffity  is  really  Nothing  elfe  than  the  full 
and  fix'd  Connexion  between  the  Things  fignified  by  the 
Subject  and  Predicate  of  a  Proportion,  which  afErms  Some 
thing  to  be  true.  When  there  is  fuch  a  Connection,  then  the 
Thing  affirmed  in  the  Propcfuicn  is  iieceiTary,  in  a  Philofophi 
cal  Senfe  ;  whether  any  Oppolitien,  or  contrary  Effort  be  fup- 
pofed,  or  fuppofable  in  the  Cafe,  or  no.  When  the  Subject 
and  Predicate  of  the  Proportion,  which  affirms  the  Exigence 
of  any  Thing,  either  Subftauce,  Quality,  Aft  or  Circumftance, 
nave  a  full  and  certain  Connection,  then  the  Exiftence  or 
Being  of  that  Thing  is  faid  to  be  neceflary  in  a  metaphyfical 
Senfe.  And  in  this  Senfe  I  ufc,  the  Word  Necfffrtj,  in  the  fol 
lowing  Difcourfe,  when  I  endeavour  to  prove  that  Necejfiij  if 
not  iatonjtftent  with  Liberty. 

D    3  The 


ly  .-The  Nature  of  Necefiity.  Part  I. 

The  Subjeft  and  Predicate  of  a  Propofition,  which  affirms 
Exiftence  of  Something,  may  have  a  full*  fix'd,  and  certain 
Connexion  feveral  Ways. 

(ij  They  may  have  a  full  and  perfect  Connexion  in  axd 
of  themfefoes ;  becaufe  it  may  imply  a  Contradiction,  or  grofs 
Abfurdity,  to  fuppofe  them  not  connected.  Thus  many 
Things  are  neceflary  in  their  own  Nature.  So  the  eternal 
Exiftence  of  Being  generally  confidered,  is  neceflary  in  itfelj ": 
becaufe  it  would  be  in  itfelf  the  greatcft  Abfurdity,  to  deny 
the  Exiftence  of  Being  in  general,  or  to  fay  there  was  abfo- 
lute  and  univerfal  Nothing ;  and  is  as  it  were  the  Sum  of  all 
Contradictions ;  as  might  be  fhewn,  if  this  were  a  proper 
Place  for  it.  So  God's  Infinity,  and  other  Attributes  ar$ 
Jieceffary.  So  it  is  neceflary  in  its  own  Nature,  that  two  and 
two  mould  be  four ;  and  it  is  necefiary,  that  all  right  Lines 
drawn  from  the  Center  of  a  Circle  to  the  Circumference 
Ihould  be  equal.  It  is  neceflary,  fit  and  fuitable,  that  Men. 
ihould  do  to  others,  as  they  would  that  they  (hould  do  to 
them.  So  innumerable  Metaphyfical  ard  Mathematical  Truths 
are  neceflary  in  Themfel<ves ;  The  Subject  and  Predicate  of 
the  Proportion  which  affirms  them,  are  perfectly  connected  of 
themfel<ves, 

(2.}  The  Connection  of  the  Subject  and  Predicate  of  a 
Propofition,  which  affirms  the  Exiftence  of  Something,  may 
be  fix'd  and  made  certain,  becaufe  the  Exiftence  of  that 
Thing  is  already  come  to  pafs ;  and  either  now  is,  or  has 
been ;  and  fo  has  as  it  were  made  fure  of  Exiftence.  And 
therefore,  the  Propofition  which  affirms  prcfent  and  paft  Ex 
iftence  of  it,  may  by  this  Means  be  made  certain,  and  ne- 
ceflarily  and  unalterably  true  ;  the  paft  Event  has  nV'd  and 
decided  the  Matter,  as  to  its  Exiftence;  and  has  made  it 
impoffible  but  that  Exiftence  {hould  be  truly  Predicated  of  it. 
Thus  the  Exiftence  of  whatever  is  already  come  to  pafs,  is 
3iow  become  necefiary  ;  'tis  become  impoflible  it  fliould  be 
Ctherwife  than  true,  that  fuch  a  Thing  has  been. 

(3.)  The  Subject  and  Predicate  of  a  Propofition  which 
affirms  Something  to  be,  may  have  a  real  and  certain  Con 
nection  conjequentially  ;  and  fo  the  Exigence  of  the  Thing  may 
be  consequentially  neceflary ;  as  it  may  be  furely  and  firmly 
Connected  with  fomething  elfe,  that  is  neceflary  in  one  of 
the  former  Refpects.  As  it  is  either  fully  and  thoroughly 
connected  with  that  which  is  absolutely  neceflary  in  its  own, 

Naturc4 


Sect  III.        ¥be  Nature  of  NeceiTity.  1 8 

Nature,  or  with  fomething  which  has  already  received  and 
made  fu re  of  Exigence.  This  Neceflky  lies  /«, ,  or  may  be 
explained  by' the  Connection  of  two  or  more  Propoiitions  one 
with  another.  Things  which  are  perfectly  connected  with 
other  Things  that  are  neceflary,  are  neceflary  themfelves,  by 
a  Neccfiity  of  Confequence. 

And  here  it  may  be  abferved,  that  all  Things  which  are 
future,  or  which  will  hereafter  begin  to  be,  which  can  be 
faid  to  be  neceflary,  are  neceflary  only  in  this  laft  \Vay.  1  heir 
Exiftence  is  not  necellary  in  itfelt;  for  if  fo,  they  always 
would  have  exifted.  Nor  is  their  Exiftence  become  ne 
ceflary  by  being  made  fure,  by  being  already  come  to  pafs,, 
Therefore,  the  only  Way  that  any  Thing  that  is  to  come  to 
pafs  hereafter,  is  or  can  be  neceflary,  is  by  a  Conne  tun 
with  fomething  that  is  neceflary  in  its  own  Nature,  or  fome 
thing  jhat  already  is,  or  has  been ;  fo  that  the  one  being 
fuppofed,  the  other  certainly  follows.  And  this  alfo  is  the 
only  Way  that  all  Things  paft,  excepting  thofe  which  were 
from  Eternity,  could  be  necefiary  before  they  came  to  pafs,  or 
could  come  to  pafs  neceflarily ;  and  therefore  the  only  Way 
in  which  any  EfFeft  or  Event,  or  any  Thing  whatfoever  that 
ever  has  had,  or  will  have  a  Beginning,  has  come  into  Being 
necefiarily,  or  will  hereafter  neceflarily  exift.  And  therefore 
this  is  the  NecefTity  which  efpecially  belongs  to  Controverfies 
about  the  Ads  of  the  Will. 

It  may  be  of  fome  Ufe  in  thefe  Controverfies,  further  to 
pbferve  concerning  metaphyjlcal  Neeeflity,  that  (agreeable  to  the 
Diftinclion  before  obferved  of  Necellity,  as  'vulgarly  under- 
fipod)  Things  that  exift  may  be  faid  to  be  neceflary,  either 
with  a  general  or  particular  Neeeflity.  The  Exiftence  of  a 
Thing  may  be  faid  to  be  neceflary  with  a  general  Ncceflity, 
\vhen  all  Things  whatfoever  being  confidered,  there  is  3 
Foundation  for  Certainty  of  their  Exiftence  ;  or  when  in 
the  moft  general  and  univerfal  View  of  Things,  the  Subject 
and  Predicate  of  the  Propofition,  which  affirms  its  Exiftence, 
would  appear  with  an  infallible  Connection. 

An  Event,  or  the  Exiftence  of  a  Thing,  may  be  faid  to  be 
neceflary  with  a  particular  Neeeflity,  or  with  Regard  to  a  par 
ticular  Perfon,  Thing  or  Time, 'when  Nothing  that  can  be 
taken  into  Confideration,  in  or  about  that  Perfon,  Thing 
or  Time,  alters  the  Cafe  at  all,  as  to  the  Certainty  of  that 
Event,  or  the  Exiftence  of  that  Thing;  or  can  be  of  any 

Account 


Nature  of  Necefiity.  Part  I. 

Account  at  all,  in  determining  the  Infallibility  of  the  Con 
nection  of  the  Subject  and  Predicate  in  the  Proportion  which 
affirms  the  Exiftence  of  the  Thing  ;  fo  that  it  is  all  one,  as 
to  that  Perfon,  or  Thing,  at  leaft,  at  that  Time,  as  if  the 
Exiftence  were  neceffary  with  a  Necefiity  that  is  moft  »»/- 
tve/fal  an(J  abfolute.  Thus  there  are  many  Things  that  hap 
pen  to  particular  Perfons,  which  they  have  no  Hand  in,  and 
in  the  Exiftence  of  which  no  Will  ol  theirs  has  any  Concern, 
at  leaft,  at  that  Time;  .which,  whether  they  are  ne 
ceflary  or  not,  with  Regard  to  Things  in  general,  yet  are  ne 
ceflary  to  them,  and  with  Regard  to  any  Volition  of  theirs 
at  that  Time;  as  they  prevent  all  Acts  of  the  Will  about 
the  Affair.  —  I  (hall  have  Occafion  to  apply  this  Qbferva- 
tion  to  particular  Infta~nces  in  the  following  Difcourfe.  —  Whe 
ther  the  fame  Things  that  are  necelTary  with  a  particular  Ne 
ceffity,  be  not  alfo  neeeflary  with  a  general  Necefiity,  may  be 
a  Matter  of  future  Confideration.  lit  that  be  as  it  will,  it  al 
ters  not  the  Cafe,  as  to  the  Ufe  of  this  Diilinc~Uon  of  the 
JCinds  of  Neceffity. 

Thefe  Things  may  be  fufficient  for  the  explaining  of  the 
Terms  Neceffarj  and  Neceffiiy,  as  Terms  of  Art,  and  as  often 
ufedby  Metaphyficians,  and  controverfial  Writers  in  Divinity, 
in  a  Senfe  diverfe  from,  and  more  exteniive  than  their  origi 
nal  Meaning,  in  common  Language,  which  was  before  ex 
plained. 

What  has  been  faid  to  (hew  the  Meaning  of  the  Terms 
NeceJ/ary  and  Necejity,  may  be  fufficient  for  the  Explaining  of 
the  oppofite  Terms,  Impoj/ible  and  Impoflibility.  For  there  is 
no  Difference,  but  only  tkat  the  latter  are  negative,  and  the 
former  politive,  Jmpojfibility  is  the  fame  as  negative  Nectffity, 
or  a  Neceffity  that  a  Thing  mould  not  be.  And  it  is  ufed  as 
a  Term  of  Art  in  a  like  Diverfity  from  the  original  and  vulgar 
Meaning,  with  Neceffity. 


The  fame  may  be  obferved  concerning  the  W'ords 
and  Inability.  It  has  been  obferved,  that  thefe  Terms,  in  their 
original  and  common  Ufe,  have  Relation  to  Will  and  En 
deavour,  as  fuppofable  in  the  Cafe,  and  as  inefficient  for 
the  bringing  to  pafs  the  Thing  will'd  and  endeavoured.  But 
as  thefe  Terms  are  often  ufed  by  Philofophers  and  Divines, 
efpecially  Writers  on  Controverfies  about  Free-  Will,  they 
are  ufed  in  a  quite  different,  and  far  more  extenfive  Senfe  ; 
and  are  applied  to  many  Cafes  wherein  no  Will  or  Endea 

vour 


Sedt.  III.     Of  natural  aud  moral  Neceflity.     20 

vcur  for  the  bringing  of  the  Thing  to  pafs,  is  or  can  be  fup- 
pcfed,  but  is  actually  denied  and  excluded  in  the  Nature  of 
the  Cafe. 

As  the  Words  nec*J/°ary,impof/ible,  unable,  &c.  are  ufed  by 
polemic  Writers,  in  a  Senfe  diverfe  from  their  common  Signi 
fication,  the  like  has  happened  to  the  Term  Contingent*  Any 
Thing  is  faicl  to  be  contingent,  or  to  come  to  pafs  by  Chance 
or  Accident,  in  the  original  Meaning  of  fuch  Words,,  when- 
its  Connexion  with  its  Caufes  or  Antecedents,  according  to 
the  eftabliihed  Courfe  of  Things,  is  not  difcerned ;  and  fo 
is  what  we  have  no  Means  of  the  Forefight  ©f.  And  efpe- 
cially  is  any  Thing  faid  to  be  contingent  or  accidental  with 
regard  to  us,  when  any  Thing  comes  to  pafs  that  we  are  con 
cerned  in,  as  Cccafions  or  Subjects,  without  our  Foreknow 
ledge,  and  befide  our  Defign  and  Scope. 

But  the  Word  Contingent  is  abundantly  ufed  in  a  very  diffe 
rent  Senfe  ;  not  for  That  whofe  Connection  with  the  Series  of 
Things  we  can't  difcern,  fo  as  to  forefee  the  Event;  but  for 
fomething  which  has  abfolutely  no  previous  Ground  or  Rea- 
fon,  with  which  its  Exigence  has  any  fix'd  and  certain  Con 
nection. 


3  E  C  T  I  O  N     IV. 


Of  the  DiftinBion  of  natural  and  moral  Neceflity, 
and  Inability. 


HAT  Neceflity  which,  has  been  explain'd,  confuting  in 
JL  an  infallible  Connexion  of  the  Things  fignified  by  the 
Subjeft  and  Predicate  of  a  Propofition,  as  intelligent  Beings 
are  the  Subjects  of  it,  is  diftinguiih'd  into  moral  and  natural 
Neceflity. 

I  mail  not  now  Hand  to  inquire  whether  this  Diftinftion  be 
a  proper  and  perfect  Diftin&ion  ;  but  ihall  only  explain  how 
thefe  two  Sorts  of  Neceflity  are  underftood,  as  the  Terms  are 
fbmetimes  ufed,  and  as  they  arc  ufed  in  the  following  Dif- 

eourfe* 


2 1          Of  natural  and  moral  Ncceflity.     Part  L 

The  Phrafe,  moral  Neceffity',  is  ufed  varioufly :  fometimes  'tis 
ufed  for  a  Neceffity  of  moral  Obligation.  So  we  fay,  a  Man 
is  under  Neceffity,  whence  is  under  Bonds  of  Duty  and  Con- 
fcience,  which  he  can't  be  difcharged  from.  So  the  Word 
hecejflity  is  often  ufed  for  great  Obligation  in. Point  of  Interefc. 
Sometimes  by  moral  Neceffity  is  meant  that  apparent  Con 
nection  of  Things,  which  is  the  Ground  of  moral  Evidence ; 
and  fo  is  diftinguifhed  from  abjolute  Neceffity,  or  that  fure  Con 
nection  of  Things,  that  is  a  Foundation  for  infallible  Certainly. 
In  this  Senfe,  moral  Neceffity  fignifies  much  the  fame  as  that 
high  Degree  of  Probability  3  which  is  ordinarily  fdfHcient  to 
fatisfy,  and  be  relied  upon  by  Mankind,  in  their  Conduct  and 
Behaviour  in  the  World,  as  they  would  confult  their  own 
Safety  and  Intereft,  and  treat  others  properly  as  Members  of 
Society.  And  fometimes  by  moral  Neceffity  is  meant  that 
Neceffity  of  Connection  and  Cdnfequence,  v/hich  arifes.from 
fuch  moral  Caufes,  as  the  Strength  of  Inclination,  or  Motives* 
and  the  Connection  which  there  is  in  many  Cafes  between  thefe, 
and  fuch  certain  Volitions  and  Actions.  And  it  is  in  this 
Senfe,  that  I  ufe  the  Phrafe,  moral  Necefjityy  in  the  following 
Difcourfe. 

By  natural  Necejfiy,  as  applied  to  Men,  I  mean  fuch  Ne 
ceffity  as  Men  are  under  through  the  Force  of  natural  Caufes ; 
as  diftinguilhed  from  what  are  called  moral  Caufes,  fuch  as 
Habits  and  Difpofitions  of  the  Heart,  and  moral  Motives  anct 
Inducements.  Thus  Men  placed  in  certain  Circumftances, 
are  the  Subjects  of  particular  Senfations  by  Neceffity :  They 
feel  Pain  when  their  Bodies  are  wounded ;  they  fee  the  Ob 
jects  prefented  before  them  in  a  clear  Light,  when  their  Eyes 
are  open'd  :  fo  they  adent  to  the  Truth  of  certain  Propofi- 
tions,  as  foon  as  the  Terms  are  underftood  ;  as  that  two  and 
two  make  four,  that  black  is  not  white,  that  two  parallel 
Lines  can  never  crofs  one  another  :  fo  by  a  natural  Neceffity 
Men's  Bodies  move  downwards,  when  there  is  nothing  to  fup- 
port  them. 

But  here  feveral  Things  may  be  noted  concerning  thefe  two 
Kinds  of  Neceffity. 

i.  Moral  Neceffity  may  be  as  abfolute,  as  natural  Neceffity. 
That  is,  the  Effeft  may  be  as  perfectly  connected  with  its  mo 
ral  Caufe,  as  a  naturally  neccffary  Effect  is  with  its  natural 
Caufe.  Whether  the  Will  in  every  Cafe  is  neceffarily  deter 
mined  by  the  ftrongeft  Motive,  or  whether  the  Will  ever 
makes  any  Refiftance  to  fuch  a  Motive,  or  can  ever  oppofe 
the  ftrongeft  prefent  Inclination,  or  not ;  if  that  Matter  mould 
be  controyerted,  yet  I  fuppofc  none  will  deny,  but  that,  in 

fome 


Se61r.  IV.    Of  natural  and  moral  Neceffity.       22 

fome  Cafes,  a  previous  Bias  and  Inclination,  or  the  Motive 
prefented,  may  be  fo  powerful,  that  the  ACi  of  the  Will  may 
f:e  certainly  and  indiffolubly  connected  therewith.  When 
Motives  or  previous  Bias  are  very  ftrong,  all  will  allow  that 
there  is  fome  Difficulty  in  going  againft  them*  And  if  they 
were  yet  ftronger,  the  Difficulty  would  be  (till  greater  :  And 
therefore,  if  more  were  Hill  added  to  their  Strength,  to  a  cer 
tain  Degree,  it  would  make  the  Difficulty  fo  great,  that  it 
"would  be  wholly  impvflible  to  furmount  it ;  for  this  plain  Rea- 
ibn,  becaufe  whatever  Power  Men  may  be  fuppofed  to  have 
to  furmount  Difficulties,  yet  that  Power  is  riot  infinite  ;  and  fo 
woes  not  beyond  certain  Limits.  If  a  Man  can  furmount  ten 
Degrees  of  Difficulty  of  this  Kind,  with  twenty  Degrees  of 
Strength,  becaufe  the  Degrees  of  Strength  are  beyond  the  De 
grees  of  Difficulty;  yet  if  trie  Difficulty  be  increafed  to  thirty, 
or  an  hundred,  or  a  thoufand  Degrees,  arid  his  Strength  not 
£lfo  increased,  his  Strength  will  be  wholly  infufficient  to  fur- 
mount  the  Difficulty.  As  therefore  it  muft  be  allowed,  that 
there  may  be  fuch  a  Thing  as  a  furs  and  perfeft  Connection 
between  moral  Caufes  and  Effecls  •  fo  this  only  is  what  I  call 
By  the  Name  of  moral  Neceffity. 

2.  When  I  ufe  this  Diftin&ion  of  moral  and  natural  Ne-* 
cejfity,  I  would  not  be  nnderftood  to  fuppofe,  that  if  any 
Thing  comes  to  pafs  by  the  former  Kind  of  Neceffity,  the 
Nature  of  Things  is  not  concerned  in  it,  as  well  as  in  the 
latter.  I  don't  mean  to  determine,  that  when  a  moral  Habit 
or  Motive  is  fo  ftrong,  that  the  Aft  of  the  Will  infallibly  fol 
lows,  this  is  not  owing  to  the  Nature  of  Things  :  But  thefe  are 
the  Names  that  thefe  two  Kinds  of  Neceffity  have  ufually  been 
called  by ;  and  they  rriiift  be  diftinguimcd  by  fome  Names  or 
other  ;  for  there  is  a  Diitindtion  or  Difference  between  them, 
that  is  very  important  in  its  Confequences.  Which  Diffe 
rence  does  not  lie  fo  much  in  the  Nature  of  the  Connexion,  as 
in  the  two  Terms  connected.  The  Caufe  with  which  the  Effect 
5s  connected,  is  of  a  particular  Kind ;  viz.  that  which  is  of  a 
moral  Nature  ;  either  fome  previous  habitual  Difpofition,  or 
Tome  Motive  exhibited  to  the  Underftanding.  And  the  Effect 
is  alfo  of  a  particular  Kind  ;  being  likewife  of  a  moral  Nature; 
confifting  in  fome  Inclination  or  Volition  of  the  Soul,  ojr  vo-« 
luntary  Aftion. 

I  fuppofe,  that  Necefilty  which  is  called  natural,  in  Diftinc- 
tion  from  moral  Neceffity,  is  fo  called,  becaufe  mere  Nature ',  as 
the  Word  is  vulgarly  ufed,  is  concerned,  without  any  Thing 

E  of 


23       Of  natural  and  moral  Necefiity,       Part  L 

of  Choice.  The  Word  Nature  is  often  ufed  in  Oppofition  to 
Choice"  not  becaufe  Nature  has  indeed  never  any  Hand  in  our 
Choice ;  but  this  probably  comes  to  pafs  by  Means  that 
we  firft  get  our  Notion  of  Nature  from  that  difcernable  and 
obvious  Courfe  of  Events,  which  we  obferve  in  many  Things 
that  our  Choice  has  no  Concern  in;  and  efpecially  in  the 
material  World  ;  which,  in  very  many  Parts  of  it,  we  eafily 
perceive  to  be  in  a  fettled  Courfe  ;  the  ftated  Order  and  Man 
ner  of  Succeflion  being  very  apparent.  But  where  we  don't 
readily  difcern  the  Rule  and  Connection,  (tho'  there  be  a 
Connection,  according  to  an  eftabliihed  Law,  truly  taking 
Place)  we  fignify  the  Manner  of  Event  by  fome  other  Name. 
Even  in  many  Things  which  are  feen  in  the  material  and  ina 
nimate  World,  which  don't  difceraably  and  obvioufly  come  to 
pafs  according  to  any  fettled  Courfe,  Men  don't  call  the  Man 
ner  of  the  Event  by  the  Name  of  Nature,  but  by  fuch  Name* 
as  Accident,  Chance,  Contingence,  &c.  So  Men  make  a  Diftinc- 
tion  between  Nature  and  Choice  j  as  tho'  they  were  compleat- 
ly  and  univerfally  dinftincl.  Whereas,  I  fuppofe  none  will  de 
ny  but  that  Choice,  in  many  Cafes,  arifes  from  Nature,  as  truly 
as  other  Events.  But  the  Dependance  and  Connection  betweea 
Afts  of  Volition  or  Choice,  and  their  Caufes,  according  to 
eftablimed  Laws,  is  not  fo  fenfible  and  obvious.  And  we  ob 
ferve  that  Choice  is  as  it  were  a  new  Principle  of  Motion  and 
Action,  different  from  that  eftablifhed  Law  and  Order  of  Things 
which  is  moft  obvious,  that  is  feen  efpecially  in  corporeal  and 
fenfible  Things :  And  alfo  that  Choice  often  mterpofes,  inter 
rupts  and  alters  the  Chain  of  Events  in  thefe  external  Gbjecls, 
and  eaufes  them  to  proceed  otherwife  than  they  would  do,  if 
let  alone,  and  left  to  go  on  according  to  the  Laws  of  Motion 
among  themfelves.  Hence  it  is  fpoken  of,  as  if  it  were  a 
Principle  of  Motion  entirely  diftincl:  from  Nature,  and  pro 
perly  fet  in  Oppofition  to  it.  Names  being  commonly  given 
to  Things,  according  to  what  is  moft  obvious,  and  is  fuggefted 
f>y  what  appears  to  the  Senfes  without  Reflection  and  Refearclu 

3.  It  rnaft  beobferved,  that  in  what  has  been  explain 'd,  as 
£gnified  by  the  Name  of  Moral  Neccffity,  the  Word  NeceJJity  is- 
not  ufcd  according  to  the  original  Defign  and  Meaning  of  the 
Word:  For,  as  was  obferved  before,  fuch  Terms  necejfary,  im- 
poffible,  irrejiftible ,  Sec.  in  common  Speech,  and  their  molt  pro 
per  ocnfc/  are  always  relative;  having  Reference  to  fome  fup- 
pofable  voluntary  Oppofition  or  Endeavour,  that  is  inefficient. 
But  no  fuch  Oppofition,  or  contrary  Will  and  Endeavour,  is 
le  in  the  Cafe  of  moral  Nsccfflty ;  which  is  a  Cer 
tainty 


Se<5t.  IV.  Of  moral  Inability.  24 

tainty  of  the  Inclination  and  Will  itfelf;  winch  does  not 
admit  of  the  Suppofition  of  a  Will  to  oppoie  and  refift  it. 
For  'tis  abfurd,  to  fuppofe  the  fame  individual  Will  to  oppoie 
itfelf,  in  its  prefent  Aft ;  or  the  prefent  Choice  to  be  oppo- 
fite  to,  and  relifting  prefent  Choice  :  as  abfurd  as  it  is  to  talk  of 
two  contrary  Motions,  in  the  fame  moving  Body,  at  the  fame 
Time.  And  therefore  the  very  Cafe  fuppofed  never  admits  of 
any  Trial,  whether  an  oppofiag  or  refilling  Will  can  overcome 
this  Neceflity. 

What  has  been  faid  of  natural  and  moral  Neceffity,  may 
ferve  to  explain  what  is  intended  by  natural  and  moral  Inabi 
lity.  We  are  faid  to  be  naturally  unable  to  do  a  Thing,  whe,n 
we  can't  do  it  if  we  will,  becaufe  what  is  molt  commonly 
called  Nature  don't  allow  of  it,  or  becaufe  of  fome  impeding 
Defeft  or  Obftacle  that  is  extrinlic  to  the  Will ;  either  in 
the  Faculty  of  Underftanding,  Conftitution  of  Body,  or  ex 
ternal  Objects.  Moral  Inability  confifts  not  in  any  of  thefe 
Things  ;  but  either  in  the  Want  of  Inclination  ;  or  the  Strength 
of  a  contrary  Inclination ;  or  the  Want  of  fuificient  Motives  in 
View,  to  induce  and  excite  the  Act  of  the  Will,  or  the  Strength 
of  apparent  Motives  to  the  contrary.  Or  both  thefe  may  be 
refolved  into  one  ;  and  it  may  be  faid  in  one  Word,  that  mo 
ral  Inability  confifts  in  the  Oppofition  or  Want  of  Inclination. 
For  when  a  Perfon  is  unable  to  will  or  chufe  fuch  a  Thing, 
through  a  Defect  of  Motives,  or  Prevalence  of  contrary  Mo 
tives,  'tis  the  fame  Thing  as  his  being  unable  through  the 
Want  of  an  Inclination,  or  the  Prevalence  of  a  contrary  Incli 
nation,  in  fuch  Circumftances,  and  under  the  Influence  of  fuch 
Views. 

To  give  fome  Inftances  of  this  moral  Inability. — A  Woman 
of  great  Honour  and  Chaftity  may  have  a  moral  Inability  to 
proftitute  herfelf  to  her  Slave.  A  Child  of  great  Love  and 
Duty  to  his  Parents,  may  be  unable  to  be  willing  to  kill  his 
Father.  A  very  lafcivious  Man,  in  Cafe  of  certain  Opportu 
nities  and  Temptations,  and  in  the  Absence  of  fuch  and  fuch 
Reftraints,  may  be  unable  to  forbear  gratifying  his  LufL  A 
Drunkard,  under  fuch  and  fuch  Circumftances,  may  be  una 
ble  to  forbear  taking  of  ftrong  Drink.  A  very  malicious 
Man  may  be  unable  to  exert  benevolent  Acts  to  an  Enemy,  or 
to  deiire  his  Profperity  :  Yea,  fome  may  be  fo  under  the  Pow 
er  of  a  vile  Difpofition,  that  they  may  be  unable  to  love  thofe 
who  are  moft  worthy  of  their  Eiteem  and  Affection.  A  ftrong 
Jiabit  of  Virtue  and  great  Degree  of  Holinefs  may  caufe  a 
moral  Inability  to  love  Wickedncfs  in  general,  may  render  a 

E  3  Mam 


25  Of  moral  Inability.  Part  L 

Man  unable  to  take  Complacence  in  wicked  Ferfons  or  Things ; 
or  to  chufe  a  wicked  Life,  and  prefer  it  to  a  virtuous  Life, 
And  on  the  other  Hand,  a  great  Degree  of  habitual  Wicked- 
nefs  may  lay  a  Man  under  an  Inability  to  love  and  chufe  Ho- 
linefs ;  and  render  him  utterly  unable  to  love  an  infinitely  holy 
Being,  or  to  chufe  and  cleave  to  him  as  his  chief  Good. 

Here  it  may  be  of  Ufe  to  obferve  this  Diftinclion  of  mora.1 
Inability,  <viz.  of  that  which  is  general  and  habitual,  and  that 
which  is  particular  and  occajional.  By  a  general  and  habitual  mo-' 
ral  Inability,  I  mean  an  Inability  in  the  Heart  to  all  Exercifes 
or  Acls  of  Will  of  that  Nature  or  Kind,  through  a  fix'd  and 
habitual  Inclination,  or  an  habitual  and  ituted  Defecl, 
or  Want  of  a  certain  Kind  of  Inclination.  Thus  a  very 
511-natur'd  Man  may  be  unable  to  exert  fuch  Acls  of 
Benevolence,  as  another,  who  is  full  of  good  Nature,  com 
monly  exerts ;  and  a  Man,  whofe  Heart  is  "habitually  void  of 
Gratitude,  may  be  unable  to  exert  fuch  arid  fuch  grateful  Acls, 
through  that  ftated  Defect  of  a  grateful  Inclination.  By  parti 
cular  and  occafanal  moral  Inability,  I  mean  an  Inability  of  the 
Will  or  Heart  to  a  particular  Aft,  thro'  the  Strength  or  Defeat 
of  prefent  Motives,  or  of  Inducements  prefented  to  the  View 

of  the  Underftanding,  on  this  Qccafion.- If  it  be  fo,  that  the 

Will  is  always  determined  by  the  ilrongeft  Motive,  then  it 
muft  always  have  an  Inability,  in  this  latter  Senfe,  to  Act  other- 
wife  than  it  does ;  it  not  being  poffible,  in  any  Cafe,  that  the 
Will  fliould,  at  prefent,  go  againft  the  Motives  v/hich  has  now, 
all  Things  considered,  the  greateft  Strength  and  Advantage  to 
excite  and  induce  it. — The  former  of  thefe  Kinds  of  moral  Ina 
bility,  confifting  in  that  which  is  ftated  habitual  and  general, 
is  moft  commonly  called  by  the  Name  of  Inability ;  becaufe 
the  Word  Inability,  in  its  moft  proper  and  original  Significa 
tion,  has  Refpecl  to  fome  ftated  Defett.  And  this  efpecially 

obtains  the  Name  of  Inability  alfo  upon  another  Account : 

1  before  obferved,  that  the  Word  Inability  in  its  original  and 
moft  common  Ufe,  is  a  relative  Term ;  and  has  Refpecl  to 
Will  and  Endeavour,  as  fuppofable  in  the  Cafe,  and  as  in- 
fufficient  to  bring  to  pafs  the  Thing  defired  and  endeavoured. 
ISIow  there  may  be  more  of  an  Appearance  and  Shadow  of  this, 
with  Refpecl  to  the  Acls  which  arife  from  a  fix'd  and  ftrong 
Habit,  than  others  that  arife  only  from  tranfient  Occafions  and 
Caufes.  Indeed  Will  and  Endeavour  againft>  or  diverfe  from 
prefent  Acls  of  the  Will,  are  in  no  Cafe  fuppofable,  whether 
thofe  Acls  be  occafional  or  habitual ;  for  that  would  be  to 
foppofe  the  Will,  at  prefent,  to  be  otherwife  than,  at  prefear. 


Se&.  IV.  Of  moral  Inability.  26 

it  is.  But  yet  there  may  be  Will  and  Endeavour  againft  future 
Ads  of  the  Vill,  or  Volitions  that  are  likely  to  take  Place,  as 
view'd  at  a  Diitance.  'Tis  no  Contradiction,  to  fuppofe  that 
the  Ads  of  the  Will  at  one  Time,  may  be  againft  the  Ads 
of  the  "Will  at  another  Time ;  and  there  may  be  Defires  and 
Endeavours  to  prevent  or  excite  future  Ads  of  the  Will ;  but 
fuch  Defires  and  Endeavours  are,  in  many  Cafes,  rendered 
inefficient  and  va;n,  thro'  Fixednefs  of  Habit :  When  the  Oc- 
caliori  returns,  the  Strength  of  Habit  overcomes,  and  baffles 
all  fuch  Oppofiticn.  In  this  Refped,  a  Man  may  be  in  mifer 
rable  Slavery  and  Bondage  to  a  ftrong  Habit.  But  it  may  be 
Comparatively  eafy  to  make  an  Alteration  with  Refped  to  fuch 
future  Ads,  as  are  only  occalional  and  tranfient;  becaufe  the 
Occafion  or  tranlient  Caufe,  if  forefeen,  may  often  eafily  be 
prevented  or  avoided.  On  this  Account,  the  moral  Inability 
that  attends  fix'd  Habits,  efpecially  obtains  the  Name  of  Ing,- 
Vilify.  And  then,  as  the  Will  may  remotely  and  indiredly  re- 
iift  itfelf,  and  do  it  in  vain,  in  the  Cafe  of  ftrong  Habits  ;  fq 
Reafon  may  refill  prefent  Ads  of  the  Will,  and  its  Refiftancc 
|>e  infufiicieru  ;  and  this  is  more  corumorjy  the  Cafe  alfo, 
when  the  Ads  arife  from  ftrqng  Habit. 

But  it  muft  be  obferved  concerning  moral  Inability,  in  each 
Kind  of  it,  that  the  Word  Inability  is  ufed  ir^  a  Senfe  very  di- 
yerfe  from  its  original  Import.  The  Word  fignifies  only  a 
natural  Inability,  in  the  proper  Ufe  of  it ;  and  is  applied  tq 
fuch  Cafes  only  wherein  a  prefent  Will  or  Inclination  to  the; 
Thing,  with  Refped  to  which  a  Perfon  is  faid  to  be  unable, 
is  fuppofable.  It  can't  be  truly  faid,  according  to  the  ordi 
nary  Ufe  of  Language,  that  a  malicious  Man,  let  him  be 
never  fo  malicious,  can't  hold  his  Hand  from  ilriking,  or  that 
he  is  net  able  to  (hew  his  Neighbour  Kindnefs;  or  that  a 
Drunkard,  let  his  Appetite  be  never  fo  ftrong,  can't  keep  the 
Cup  from  his  Mouth.  In  the  ftrideft  Propriety  of  Speech,  a 
Man  has  a  Thing  in  his  Power,  if  he  has  it  in  his  Choice, 
or  at  his  Eledion  :  And  a  Man  can't  be  truly  faid  to  be  una- 
j?le  to  do  a  Thing,  when  he  can  do  it  if  he  will.  'Tis  im 
properly  faid,  that  a  Perfon  can't  perform  thofe  external  Ac 
tions,  which  are  dependent  on  the  Ad  of  the  Will,  and  which 
would  be  eafily  performed,  if  the  Ad'  of  the  Will  were  pre 
fent.  And  if  it  be  improperly  faid,  that  he  cannot  perform 
thofe  external  voluntary  Adions,  which  depend  on  the  Will, 
'tis  in  fome  Refped  more  improperly  faid,  that  he  is  unable  to 
exert  the  Acts  of  the  Will  themfelves ;  becaufe  it  is  more  evi 
dently  falfe,  with  Refped  to  thefe,  that  he  can't  if  he  will : 

Foe 


27        Of  Liberty  and  moral  Agency.      Part  I. 

For  to  fay  fo,  is  a  down-right  Contradiction  :  It  is  to  fay,  he 
cant  will,  if  he  does  will.  And  in  this  Cafe,  not  only  is  it 
true,  that  it  is  eafy  for  a  Man  to  do  the  Thing  if  he  will, 
but  the  very  willing  is  the  doing ;  when  once  lie  has  will'd, 
the  Thing  is  performed ;  and  nothing  elfe  remains  to  be 
done.  Therefore,  in  thefe  Things  to  ;ifcribe  a  Non-perfor 
mance  to  the  Want  of  Power  or  Ability,  is  not  juft ;  becaufe  the 
Thing  wanting  is  not  a  being  able,  but  a  being  Billing.  There 
jare  Faculties  of  Mind,  and  Capacity  of  Nature,  and  every 
Thing  elfe,  fufficient,  but  a  Difpolitiori :  Nothing  is  wantin? 
but  a  Will. 


SECTION     V. 

Concerning  the   Notion   of  Liberty,  and  of  moral 
Agency. 

TH  E  plain  and  obvious  Meaning  of  the  Words  Freedom 
and  Liberty,  in  common  Speech,  is  Power,  Oppor 
tunity  ,  or  Advantage,  that  any  one  has,  to  do  as  he  phafes.  Or  in 
other  Words,  his  being  free  from  Hindrance  or  Impediment 
in  the  Way  of  doing,  or  conducing  in  any  Refpeft,  as  he 
wills.  *  And  the  contrary  to  Liberty,  whatever  Name  we 
call  that  by,  is  a  Perfon's  being  hinder'd  or  unable  to  con- 
duel  as  he  will,  or  being  neceffitated  to  do  otherwife. 

If  this  which  I  have  mentioned  be  the  Meaning  of  the 
Word  Liberty,  in  the  ordinary  Ufe  of  Language ;  as  I  truft 
that  none  that  has  ever  learn'd  to  talk,  and  is  unprejudiced, 
will  deny ;  then  it  will  follow,  that  in  propriety  of  Speech, 
neither  Liberty,  nor  its  contrary,  can  properly  be  afcribed  to 
any  Being  or  Thing,  but  that  which  has  fuch  a  Faculty, 
Power  or  Property,  as  is  called  Will.  For  that  which  is 
pofleffed  of  no  fuch  Thing  as  Will,  can't  have  any  Power  or 
Opportunity  of  doing  according  to  its  Will,  nor  be  neceffitated 
to  aft  contrary  to  its  Will,  nor  be  reftrained  from  acting  agreea 
bly  to  it.  And  therefore  to  talk  of  Liberty,  or  the  contrary, 
as  belonging  to  the  'very  Will  it/elf,  is  not  to  fpeak  good  Senfe ; 
if  we  judge  of  Senfe,  and  Nonfenfe,  by  the  original  and  proper 
Signification  of  Words.  For  the  Will  itfelf  is  not  an  Agent 
that  has  a  Will :  The  Power  of  chuling,  itfelf,  has  not  a 

Power 

*  I  fay  not  only  doing,  but  conducing ;  becaufe  a  voluntary  forbearing 
to  do,  fitting  ftill,  keeping  Silence,  &c.  are  Inftances  of  Perfons  Conduft,  a- 
feout  whieh  Liberty  is  exercifed ;  tho'  they  are  not  fo  properly  called  doing. 


Sedt.  V.  tfbe  Notion  ^Liberty  #  Amoral  Agency.   2  8 

Power  of  chufing.  That  which  has  the  Power  of 
Volition  or  Choice  is  the  Man  or  Soul,  and  not 
the  Power  of  Volition  itfelf.  And  he  that  has  the  Li 
berty  of  doing  according  to  his  Will,  is  the  Agent  or  Doer 
who  is  poffefied  of  the  Will ;  and  not  the  Will  which  he  is 
pofieffed  of.  We  fay  with  propriety,  that  a  Bird  let  loofe  has 
Power  and  Liberty  to  fly ;  but  not  that  the  Bird's  Power  of 
flying  has  a  Power  and  Liberty  of  flying.  To  be  free  is  the 
Property  of  an  Agent,  who  is  poiTefled  of  Powers  and  Facul 
ties,  as  much  as  to  be  cunning,  valiant,  bountiful,  or  zea 
lous.  But  thefe  Qualities  are  the  Properties  of  Men  or  Per- 
fons ;  and  not  the  Properties  of  Properties. 

There  are  two  Things  that  are  contrary  to  this  which  fa 
called  Liberty  in  common  Speech.  One  is  Conjiraint;  the  fame- 
is  otherwife  called  Force,  Compulfion,  and  Coadhn;  which  is  a 
Perfon's  being  neceffitated  to  do  a  Thing  contrary  to  his  Will. 
The  other  is  Reftraint;  which  is  his  being  hindred,  and  not 
having  Power  to  do  according  to  his  Will.  But  that  which 

has  no  Will,  can't  be  the  Subjeft  of  thefe  Things. 1 

need  fay  the  lefs  on  this  Head,  Mr.  Locke  having  fet  the  fame 
Thing  forth,  with  fo  great  Clearnefs,  in  his  Ejfay  on  the  human 
Under/landing. 

But  one  Thing  more  I  would  obferve  concerning  what  is 
vulgarly  called  Liberty;  namely,  that  Power  and  Opportunity 
for  one  to  do  and  conduct  as  he  will,  or  according  to  his 
Choice,  is  all  that  is  meant  by  it ;  without  taking  into  the 
Meaning  of  the  Word,  any  Thing  of  the  Caufe  or  Original 
of  that  Choice ;  or  at  all  confidering  how  the  Perfon  came 
to  have  fuch  a  Volition ;  whether  it  was  caufed  by  fome  ex 
ternal  Motive,  or  internal  habitual  Bias;  whether  it  was  de- 
termin'd  by  fome  internal  antecedent  Volition*  or  whether  it 
happen'd  without  a  Caufe  ;  whether  it  was  neceffarily  con- 
necled  with  fomething  foregoing,  or  not  connected.  Let  the- 
Perfon  come  by  his  Volition  or  Choice  how  he  will,  yet,  if 
he  is  able,  and  there  is  Nothing  in  the  Way  to  hinder  his  pur- 
fuing  and  executing  his  Will,  the  Man  is  fully  and  perfectly 
free,  according  to  the  primary  and  common  Notion  of  Free 
dom. 

What  has  been  faid  may  be  fufficient  to  fhew  what  is 
meant  by  Liberty,  according  to  the  common  Notions  of  Man 
kind,  and  in  the  ufual  and  primary  Acceptation  of  the  Word  : 
But  the  Word,  as  ufed  \yyArminians,  Pelagians  and  others,  who 
oppofe  the  Cal<vinifts,  has  an  entirely  different  Signification. — » 
Thefe  feveral  Things  belong  to  their  Notion  of  Liberty* 

i.  That 


29  The Notionof  Liberty  and  moral  Agency.  Part  I, 

j.  That  it  confifts  in  a  Self-determining  Power  in  the  Will,  or 
a  certain  Sovereignty  the  Will  has  over  itfelf,  and  its  own 
Ads,  whereby  it  determines  its  own  Volitions ;  fo  as  not  to 
be  dependent  in  its  Determinations,  on  any  Caufe  without 
itfelf,  nor  determined  by  any  Thing  prior  to  its  own  Ads. 

2.  Indifference  belongs  to  Liberty  in  their  Notion  of  it,  or  that 
the  Mind,    previous  to  the  Aft  of  Volition  be,    in  equilibria. 

3.  Contingence  is  another  Thing  that  belongs  and  is  eflential 
to  it ;    not  in  the  common  Acceptation  of  the  Word,    as  that 
has  been  already  explain'd,    but  as  oppbfed  to  all  NeceJ/ity, 
or  any  fixed  and  certain  Connection  with  fome  previous  Ground 
or  Reafon  of  its  Exiftence.     They  fuppofe  the  Effence  of  Li 
berty  fo  much  to  confift   in   thefe  Things,    that  unlefs  the 
Will  of  Man  be   free  in  this  Senfe,    he   has  no  real  Free 
dom,   how  much  focver  he  may  be  at  Liberty  to   Ad;  ac 
cording  to  his  Will. 

A  moral  Agent  is  a  Being  that  is  capable  of  thofe  Adions 
that  have  a  moral  Quality,  and  which  can  properly  be  de 
nominated  good  or  evil  in  a  moral  Senfe,  virtuous  or  vici 
ous,  commendable  or  faulty.  To  moral  Agency  belongs  a 
moral  Faculty,  or  Senfe  of  moral  Good  and  Evil,  or  of  fuch  a 
Thing  as  Defert  or  Wprthinefs  of  Praife  or  Blame,  Re 
ward  or  Punimment;  and  a  Capacity  which  an  Agent  has 
of  being  influenced  in  his  Adions  by  moral  Inducements  or 
Motives,  exhibited  to  the  View  of  Underftanding  and  Rea 
fon,  to  engage  to  a  Condud  agreeable  to  the  moral  Faculty* 

The  Sun  is  very  excellent  and  beneficial  in  its  Aclion  and 
Influence  on  the  Earth,  in  warming  it,  and  caufmg  it  to 
bring  forth  its  Fruits;  but  it  is  not  a  moral  Agent:  Its 
Adion,  tho'  good,  is  not  virtuous  or  meritorious.  Fire 
that  breaks  out  in  a  City,  and  confumes  great  Part  of  it,  is 
very  mifchievous  in  its  Operation  ;  but  is  not  a  moral  A- 
gent :  what  it  does  is  not  faulty  or  fmful,  or  deferving  of 
any  Punifhment.  The  brute  Creatures  are  not  moral  Agents : 
the  Adions  of  fome  of  them  are  very  profitable  and  pleafant ; 
others  are  very  hurtful :  yet,  feeing  they  have  no  moral  Fa 
culty,  or  Senfe  of  Defcrt,  and  don't  Ad  from  Choice  guided 
by  Underftanding,  or  with  a  Capacity  of  reafoning  and  re 
flecting,  but  only  from  Inftind,  and  are  not  capable  of  being 
influenced  by  moral  Inducements,  their  Adions  are  not  proper 
ly  fmful  or  virtuous;  nor  are  they  properly  the  Sub- 
jeds  of  any  fueh  moral  Treatment  for  what  they  do,  as  mo 
ral  Agents  are  for  their  Faults  or  good  Deeds, 

Here 


•Sed.  V.  Of  moral  Agency.  30 

Here  it  maybe  noted,  that  there  is  a  circumftantial  diffe 
rence  between  the  moral  Agency  of  a  Ruler  and  a  Subjefi. 
J  cMl  it  circtti»Jlanth.l*,  becaufe  it  lies  only  in  the  Difference 
of  moral  Inducements  they  are  capable  of  being  influen 
ced  by,  arifin<r  from  the  Difference  of  Cifc-um/tatiCfs.  A 
Ruler  adling  in  that  Capacity  only,  is  not  capable  of  being 
influenced  by  a  moral  Law,  arid  its  Sanctions  of  Threat- 
nings  and  Promifes,  Rewards,  and  Punifhments,  as  the  Subjeff 
is  ;  tho'  both  may  be  influenced  by  a  Knowledge  of  moral 
Good  and  Evil  :  And  therefore  the  yr.oral  Agency  of  the 
Supreme  Being,  who  acls  only  in  the  Capacity  of  a  Ruler  to 
wards  his  Creatures,  and  never  as  a  Subject,  differs  in  that 
Refpedl  from  the  moral  Agency  of  created  intelligent  Be 
ings.  God's  Acftions,  and  particularly  thofe  which  he  ex 
erts  as  a  moral  Goverhour,  have  moral  Qualifications;  are 
morally  good  in  the  higheft  Degree.  They  are  moft  per 
fectly  holy  and  righteous  ;  and  we  muft  conceive  of  Him  as 
influenced  in  the  ingheft  Degree,  by  that  which,  above  ail 
others,  is  properly  a  moral  Inducement  ;  cvis.  the  moral  Good 
which  He  fees  in  fuch  and  fuch  Things  :  And  therefore  He 
is,  in  the  moil  proper  Senfe,  a  moral  Agent,  the  Source  of  all 
rnoral  Ability  and  Agency*  the  Fountain  and  Rule  of  all  Vir 
tue  and  moral  Good  ;  tho'  by  Reafon  of  his  being  Supreme 
over  all,  'tis  hot  poffible  He  ftiould  be  under  the  Influence  of 
L.aw  or  Command,  Promifes,  or  Threatnings,  Rewards,  or  Pu- 
rnihments,  Counfels  or  Warnings*  The  eilentiil  Qualities  of 
a  moral  Agent  are  in  God,  in  the  greateft  poffible  Perfection  • 
fuch  as  Underftanding,  to  perceive  the  Difference  between  mo 
ral  Good  and  Evil;  a  Capacity  of  difcernirg  that  moral  Wor- 
thinefs  and  Demerit,  by  which  fome  Things  are  Praife-wor- 
thy,  others  deferving  of  Blame  and  Punifhment  ;  and  alfo 
a  Capacity  of  Choice,  and  Choice  guided  by  Underftanding, 
and  a  Power  of  acting  according  to  his  Choice  or  Pleafure,  and 
being  capable  of  doing  thofe  Things  which  are  in  the  higheft 
Senfe  Praife-  worthy.  And  herein  does  very  much  confift  that 
Image  of  God  wherein  he  made  Man,  (which  we  read  of  Gen* 
j.  26,  27.  and  Chap.  ix.  6.)  by  which  God  diftinguimed  Man 
from  the  Beafts,  «wz.  in  thofe  Faculties  and  Principles  of  Na 
ture,  whereby  He  is  capable  of  moral  Agency.  Herein  very 
much  confifts  ^natural  linage  of  God;  as  his  fpiritual  and 
Amoral  Image,  wherein  Man  was  made  at  firft,  confifted  in  that 
inoral  Excellency,  that  he  was  endowed  with. 


PART 


~      | 
1 


J(  O  *.  jrf 

^ 

PART     II. 


Wherein  it  is  considered  whether 
there  is  or  can  be  any  fuch  Sort  of 
FREEDOM  OF  WjLL,  as  that  wherein 
Arminians  place  the  EfTence  of 
the  Liberty  of  all  moral  Agents  ; 
and  whether  any  fuch  Thing  ever 
was  or  can  be  Conceived  of- 


SECTION     1. 

vg  t&e  manifefl  Incovfiftence  of  tbe  Arminian 
Notion  of  Liberty  of  Will,  confining  in  tbe 
£elf~determiniriir  Power. 


A  V I N  G  taken  Notice  of  thefe  Things  which 
*  mar  be  neceflary  to  be  obferved,  concerning- 

-  " 


TJ   ^S§   the  Meaning  of   the  principal  Terms    and 
^  $£   Phrafes  made  ufe  of  in  Controverfies  concern- 
j|   ing  human  Liberty,  and  particularly  obferved 


aafe^difc       what  Liberty  is,  according  to  the  common- 
?    Language,  and  general  Appreheniion  of  Man- 


Jcind,  and  what  it  is  as  understood  and  maintained  by  A 
I  proceed  to  confider  the  Arminian  Notion  of  the  Freedom  of  the 
Witta  and  the  fuppofed  Neceffity  of  it  in  Order  to  moral  Agen- 
c/j  or  in  Order,  to  any  Cue's  being  capable  of  Virtue  or  Vice, 

and 


Se6t.  L  The  Inconjtftence,  &c.  33 

and  properly  the  Subject  of  Command  or  Counfel,  Praife  or 
JBlame,  Promifes  or  Threatnings,  Rewards  or  Pnniihments  j 
or  whether  that  which  has  been  defcribed,  as  the  Thing  meant: 
by  Liberty  in  common  Speech,  be  not  fufficientj  and  the  only 
Liberty,  which  makes,  or  can  make  any  one  a  moral  Agent, 
and  fo  properly  the  Subject  of  thefe  Things.  In  (his  Part,  I 
{hall  confider  whether  any  fuch  Thing  be  poffible  or  conceiva 
ble,  as  that  Freedom  of  Will  which  Arminians  iniiit  on ;  and 
{hall  inquire  whether  any  fuch  Sort  of  Liberty  be  necefi'ary  u* 
moral  Agency,  &c,  in  the  next  Part. 

And  Firft  of  all,  I  mall  confider  the  Notion  of  a  Se/f- 
determining  Power  in  the  Will :  wherein,  according  to  the 
Arminians,  does  moft  effentially  confift  the  Will's  Freedom  ; 
and  mall  particularly  inquire,  whether  it  be  not  plainly  ab- 
furd,  and  a  manifeit  Inconiiftence,  to  fuppofe  that  the  W  ill  it- 
Jelf  determines  all  the  free  Afts  of  the  Will* 

Here  I  (hall  not  infill  on  the  great  Impropriety  of  fuch 
Phrafes,  arid  Ways  of  fpeaking,  as  the  Will's  determining  it- 
felf;  becaufe  Actions  are  to  be  afcribed  to  Agents,  and  not 
properly  to  the  Powers  of  Agents ;  which  improper  Way  of 
fpeaking  leads  to  many  Miftakes,  and  much  Confufion,  as 
Mr.  Locke  obferves.  'But  I  mail  fuppofe  that  the  Arminians9 
when  they  fpeak  of  the  Will's  determining  itfelf,  do  by  the 
#7/7  mean  the  Soul  willing.  \  Ihall  take  it  for  granted,  that 
when  they  fpeak  of  the  Will,  as  the  Determiner,  they  mean 
the  Soul  in  the  Exercife  of  a  Power  of  Willing,  or  acting  volun 
tarily.  I  ihall  fuppofe  this  to  be  their  meaning,  becaufe  No 
thing  elfe  can  be  meant,  without  the  groffeft  and  piaineft  Ab- 
furdity.  In  all  Cafes,  when  we  fpeak  of  the  Powers  or  Prin 
ciples  of  Ailing,  as  doing  fuch  Things,  we  mean  that  the  A- 
gents  which  have  thefe  Powers  of  a&ing,  do  them,  in  th$ 
Exercife  of  thofe  Powers.  So  when  we  fay,  Valour  fights 
courageoufly,  we  mean,  the  Man  who  is  under  the  Influ 
ence  of  Valour  fights  courageoufly.  When  we  fay,  Lov« 
feeks  the  Objeft  loved,  we  mean,  the  Perfon  loving  feeks  tha$ 
Objeft.  When  we  fay,  the  Underftanding  difcerns,  we  mean 
the  Soul  in  the  Exercife  of  that  Faculty.  So  when  it  is  fai^3 
the  Will  decides  or  determines,  the  Meaning  muft  be,  that 
the  Perfon  in  the  Exercife  of  a  Power  of  Willing  and  Chufmgs 
or  the  Sou,!  aft:ng  voluntarily,  determines, 

F  Therefore 


33  We  Inconfjlence  of  Part  IL 

Therefore,  if  the  Will  determines  all  its  own  free  Xdb,. 
the  Soul  determines  all  the  free  Ads  of  the  Will  in  the  Ex-' 
ercife  of  a  Power  of  Willing  and  Chufmg ;  or,  which  is  the 
fame  Thing,  it  determines  them  of  Choice;  it  determines 
its  own  Adts  by  chufing  its  own  Ads.  If  the  Will  deter 
mines  the  Will,  then  Choice  orders  and  determines  the 
Choice:  and  Acls  of  Choice  are  ftibjeft  to  the  Decifion, 
and  follow  tfie  Ccndcdl  of  other  Ads  of  Choice.  And 
therefore  if  the  Will  determines  all  its  own  free  Ads,  the.! 
every  free  Adi  of  Choice  is  determined  by  a  preceding  Ac!' 
of  Choice,,  chuiing  that  Adi.  And  if  that  preceding  Adi  of 
the  Will  or  Choice  be  alfo  a  free  Aft,  then  by  thefe  Princi 
ples,  in  this  Adi  too,  the  Will  is  Self-determined;  that  is, 
this,  in  like  Manner,  is  an  Adi  that  the  Soul  voluntarily  chu- 
fes ;  or  which  is  the  fame  Thing,  it  is  an  Adi  determined  ftill 
by  a  preceding  Adi  of  the  Will,  chufing  that.  And  the  like. 
may  again  be  obferved  of  the  laft  mentioned  Aft.  Which 
brings  us  diredlly  to  a  Contradiction  :  for  it  fuppofcs  an  Act  01 
the  Will  preceding  the  firft  Act  in  the  whole  Train,  directing. 
and  determining  the  reft  ;  or  a  free  Act  of  the  Will,  before 
the  firft  free  Act  of  the  Will.  Or  elfe  we  mull  come  at  laft 
to  an  Act  of  the  Will,  determining  the  confequent  Acts,  wherein 
the  WTiU  is  not  felf-determined,  and  fo  is  not  a  free  Act.,  in 
this  Notion  of  Freedom  :  But  if  the  firft  Act  in  the  Train,  de 
termining  and  fixing  the  reft,  be  not  free,  none  of  them  all 
can  be  free  ;  as  is  manifeft  at  firft  View,  but  ihali  be  demon- 
ftrated  prefently. 

If  the  Will,  '  which  we  find  governs  the  Members  of  the 
Body,  and  determines  and  commands  their  Motions  and 
Aftions,  does  alfo  govern  itfelf,  and  determine  its  own  Mo 
tions  and  Acts,  it  doubtlefs  determines  them  the  fame  Way, 
even  by  antecedent  Volitions.  The  Will  determines  which 
Way  the  Hands  and  Feet  fhall  move,  by  an  Act  of  Volition 
or  Choice :  and  there  is  no  other  Way  of  the  Will's  deter 
mining,  directing  or  commanding  any  Thing  at  all.  Whatfo- 
ever  the  Will  commands,  it  commands  by  an  Act  of  the  Will. 
And  if  it  has  itfelf  under  its  command,  and  determines  it 
felf  in  its  own  Actions,  it  doubtlefs  does  it  the  fame  Way  that 
it  determines  other  Things  which  are  under  its  Command. 
So  that  if  the  Freedom  of  the  Will  confifts  in  this,  that  it 
has  itfelf  and  its  own  Actions  under  its  Command  and 
Direction,  and  its  own  Volitions  are  determined  by  itfelf, 
it  will  follow,  that  every  free  Volition  arifes  from  another  an 
tecedent  Volition,  directing  and  commanding  that :  And  if 

diat 


Sect.  1.  Self -determining  Power.  3^ 

that  dire  ft  ing  Volition  be  alfo  free,  in  that  alfo  the  Will  is  as- 
tjrrnined  ;  that  is  to  fay,  that  directing  Volition  is  deter 
mined  by  another  going  before  that;  and  fo  on,  'till  we 
come  to  the  iirit  Volition  in  the  whole  Series :  And  if  that 
firii  Volition  be  free,  and  the  Will  felf-determincd  in  it,  then 
that  is  determined  by  another  Volition  preceding  that  ; 
v/hich  is  a  Contradiction  :  becaafe  by  the  Suppofition,  it  can 
have  none  before  it,  to  direct  or  determine  it,  being  the  firft  in 
the  Train.  But  if  that  firft  Volition  is  not  determined  by  any 
oreceding  Act  of  the  Will,  then  that  Act  is  not  determined 
ty  the  Will,  and  fo  is  not  free  in  the  Armiman  Notion  of 
Freedom,  which  confiiis  in  the  Will's  Self-determination. 
And  if  that  firft  Act  of  the  Will,  v/hich  determines  and 
fixes  the  fubfequent  Acts,  be  not  free,  none  of  the  following 

Acts,    which  are  determined  by  it,  can  be  free. If  we 

fuppofe  there  are  five  Acts  in  the  Train,  the  fifth  and  lad  de 
termined  by  the  fourth,  and  the  fourth  by  the  third,  the  third 
by  the  fecond,  and  the  fecond  by  the  firft  ;  If  the  firil  is  not 
•••mined  by  the  Will,  and  fo  not  free,  then  none  of  them 
are  truly  determined  by  the  Will :  that  is,  that  each  of  them 
are  as  they  are,  and  not  otherwife,  is  not  firil  owing  to  the  Will, 
bat  10  the  Determination  of  the  firft  in  the  Series,  which  is  no^ 
dependent  on  the  Will,  and  is  that  which  the  Will  has  no 
Hand  in  the  Determination  of.  And  this  being  that  which 
duckies  what  the  teit  (hall  be.,  and  determines  their  Exig 
ence  ;  therefore  the  firft  Determination  of  their  Exiftence 
is  not  from  the  Will.  The  Cafe  is  juft  the  fame,  if,  inftead 
of  a  Chain  of  five  Ads  of  the  Will,  we  mould  fuppofe  a 
Succeffion  of  Ten,  or  an  Hundred,  or  ten  Thouiand.  If 
the  firft  Act  be  not  free,  being  determined  by  fomething  out 
of  the  Will,  and  this  determines  the  next  to  be  agreeable  to 
4tfelf,  and  that  the  next,  and  fo  on;  They  ar,e  none  of  them. 
free,  but  all  originally  depend  on,  and  are  determind  by 
fome  Caufe  out  of  me  Will :  and  fo  all  Freedom  in  the  Cafe 
is  excluded,  and  no  Aft  of  the  Will  can  be  free,  according 
to  this  Notion  of  Freedom,  If  we  mould  fuppofe  a  long 
Chain,  often  Thoufand  Links,  fo  connected,  that  if  the  firft 
Link  moves,  it  will  move  the  next,  and  that  the  next ;  and  fo 
the  whole  Chain  muft  be  determined  to  Motion,  and  in  the 
Direction  of  its  Motion,  by  the  Motion  of  the  firft  Link ; 
and  that  is  moved  by  fomething  elfc:  In  this  Cafe,  tho'  all 
{he  Links,  but  one,  are  moved  by  other.  Parts  of  the  fame 
Chain;  yet  it  appears  that  the  Motion  of  no  One,  nor  the 
Direction  of  its  Motion,  is  from  any  Self-moving  or  Self- 
dete.ymining  Power  in  the  Chain,  any  more  than  if  every 

Link 


3£  Some  Evafions  conftdered.          Part  IL 

Link  were  immediately  moved  by  fomething  that  did  not  be 
long  to  the  Chain.  -  If  the  Will  be  not  free  in  the  firft  Aft, 
which  caufes  the  next,  then  neither  is  it  free  in  the  next, 
which  is  caufed  by  that  firft  Aft  :  for  tho'  indeed  the  Will 
caufed  it,  yet  it  did  not  caufe  it  freely  ;  becaufe  the  preceding 
Aft,  by  which  it  was  caufed,  was  not  free.  And  again,  if  the 
Will  be  not  free  in  the  fecond  Aft,  fo  neither  can  it  be  in  the 
third,  which  is  caufed  by  that;  becaufe,  in  like  Manner,  that 
third  was  determined  by  an  Aft  of  the  Will  that  was  not  free, 
And  fo  we  may  go  on  to  the  next  Aft,  and  from  that  to  the 
next  :  And  how  long  foever  the  Succeffion  of  Afts  is,  it  is  all 
one;  if  the  firft  on  which  the  whole  Chain  depends,  and 
which  determines  all  the  reft,  be  not  a  free  Aft,  the  Will  is 
not  free  in  caufing  or  determining  any  one  of  thofe  Afts; 
becaufe  the  Aft  by  which  it  determines  them  all,  is  not  a  free 
Aft;  and  therefore  the  Will  is  no  more  free  in  determining 
them,  than  if  it  did  not  caufe  them  at  all.  -  Thus,  this  Ar 
menian  Notion  of  Liberty  of  the  Will,  confifting  in  the  Will's 
Self-determination,  is  repugnant  to  itfelf,  and  (huts  itfelf  whol 
ly  out  of  the  World. 

<XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX) 
SECTION     IL 

Several  fuppofed  Ways    of   evading  the  Aforegoing 

conftdered. 


IF  to  evade  the  Force  of  what  has  been  obferved,  it  mould 
be  faid,  that  when  the  Arminiam  fpeak  of  the  Will's  deter 
mining  its  own  Afts,  they  don't  mean  that  the  Will  de 
termines  its  Acts  by  any  preceding  Act,  or  that  one  Act  of 
the  Will  determines  another  ;  but  only  that  the  Faculty  or 
Power  of  Will,  or  the  Soul  in  the  Ufe  of  that  Power,  de 
termines  its  own  Volitions  ;  and  that  it  does  it  without  any 
Act  going  before  the  Act  determined  ;  fuch  an  Evafion  would 
be  full  of  the  moft  grofs  Abfurdity.  -  1  confefs,  it  is  an  Eva 
fion  of  my  own  inventing  ;  and  I  don't  know  but  I  fhould 
wrong  the  Arminians,  in  fuppofmg  that  any  of  them  would 
make  ufe  of  it.  But  it  being  as  good  a  one  as  I  can  invent,  I 
would  obferye  upou  it  a  few  Things, 


Sc(ft.  II.         Supfojed  Evailons  confidered.          36 

Firft,  If  the  Faculty  or  Power  of  the  Will  determines  an 
Act  of  Volition,  or  the  Soul  in  the  U/e  or  Exerdfe  of  that 
Power,  determines  it,  that  is  the  fame  Thing  as  for  the  Soul 
to  determine  Volition  by  an  Ad  of  Will.  For  an  Exerdfe  of 
the  Power  of  Will,  and  an  A&  of  that  Power,  are  the  fame 
Thing.  Therefore  to  fay,  that  the  Power  of  Will,  or  the 
Soul  in  the  U/e  or  Exerdfe  of  that  Power,  determines  Voli 
tion,  without  an  Afi  of  Will  preceding  the  Volition  deter 
mined,  is  a  Contradiction. 

Secondly,  If  a  Power  of  Will  determines  the  Act  of  the  Will., 
then  a  Power  of  Chufing  determines  it.  For,  as  was  before 
obferved,  in  every  Act  of  Will,  there  is  Choice,  and  a  Power 
of  Willing  is  a  Power  of  Chufing.  But  if  a  Power  of  Chufing 
determines  the  Act  of  Volition,  it  determines  it  by  Chufing  it. 
For  'tis  moft  abfurd  to  fay,  that  a  Power  of  Chufing  deter 
mines  one  Thing  rather  than  another,  without  chufing  any 
Thing.  But  if  a  Power  of  Chufing  determines  Volition  by 
chufing  it,  then  here  is  the  Act  of  Volition  determined  by  an 
antecedent  Choice,  chufing  that  Volition. 

Thirdly,  To  fay,  the  Faculty,  or  the  Soul,  determines  its 
own  Volition,  but  not  by  any  Act,  is  a  Contradiction.  Be- 
caufe  for  the  Soul  to  direft,  decide,  or  determine  any  Thing, 
is  to  act ;  and  this  is  fuppofed ;  for  the  Soul  is  here  fpoken 
<of  as  being  a  Caufe  in  this  Affair,  bringing  fornething  to 
pafs,  or  doing  fomething  ;  or,  which  is  the  fame  Thing,  ex 
erting  itfelf  in  order  to  an  Effect,  which  Effect  is  the  Deter 
mination  of  Volition,  or  the  particular  Kind  and  Manner  of 
an  Act  of  Will.  But  certainly,  this  Exertid:i  or  Action  i» 
not  the  fame  with  the  Effect,  in  order  to  the  Production  of 
which  it  is  exerted  ;  but  muft  be  fomething  prior  to  it. 

Again,  The  Advocates  for  this  Notion  of  the  Freedom  of 
the  Will,  fpeak  of  a  certain  Sovereignty  in  the  Will,  whereby 
it  has  Power  to  determine  its  own  Volitions.  And  there 
fore  the  Determination  of  Volition  muft  itfelf  be  an  Act  of  the 
Will ;  for  otherwife  it  can  be  no  Exercife  of  that  fuppofed 
Power  and  Sovereignty. 

Again,  If  the  Will  determines  itfelf,  then  either  the  Will 
is  aSeve  in  determining  its  Volitions,  or  it  is  not.  If  it  be 
active  in  it,  then  the  Determination  is  an  Afl  of  the  Will  5 
a*id  fo  there  is  one  Act  of  the  Will  determining  another. 
But  if  the  Will  is  not  'affivc  in  the  Determination,  then  how 

does 


37  Suppofed  Evafions  cirjldered.         Fart  II; 

does  It  fxercife  any  Liberty  in  it  ?  Thefe  Gentlemen  fuppcfe 
that  the  Thing  wherein  the  Will  exercifes  Liberty,  is  in 
its  determining  its  own  Acls.  But  how  can  this  be,  if 
it  be  not  cttive  in  determining  r  Certainly  the  Will,  or 
the  Soul,  can't  txcfcife  any  Liberty  in  that  wherein  it  don't 
a£,  or  wherein  it  don't  exerdfettfflf.  So  that  if  either  Part 
of  this  Dilemma  be  taken,  this  Scheme  of  Liberty,  confift- 
ing  in  Self-determining  Power,  is  overthrown,  If  there  be 
in  Aft  of  the  Will  in  determining  all  its  o,wn  free  Afts, 
then  one  free  Aft  of  the  Will  is  determined  by  another  ;  and 
fo  we  have  the  Abfurdity  of  every  free  Acl,  even  the  very 
firft,  determined  by  a  foregoing  free  Aft.  But  if  there  be 
no  Acl:  or  Exercife  of  the  Will  in  determining  its  own  Acls, 
then  no  Liberty  is  exercifcd  in  determining  them.  From 
whence  it  follows,  that  no  Liberty  confifls  in  the  Will's  Power 
to  determine  its  own  Acls :  Or,  which  is  the  fame  Thing, 
that  there  is  no  fuch  Thing  as  Liberty  confifting  in  a  Self-de 
termining  Power  of  the  Will. 

If  it  mould  be  faid,  That  aitho'  it  be  true,  if  the  Soul  de 
termines  its  own  Volitions,  it  muft  be  aclive  in  fo  doing; 
and  the  Determination  itfelf  mull  be  an  Acl;  yet  there  is 
no  Need  of  fuppofing  this  Acl  to  be  prior  to  the  Volition  de 
termined  ;  But  the  Will  or  Soul  determines  the  Acl  of  the 
Will  in  Willing;  It  determines  its  own  Volition,  in  the  very 
Aft  of  Volition  ;  It  direcls  and  limits  the  Aft  of  the  Will, 
caufing  it  to  be  fp  and  not  otherwife,  in  exerting  the  Acl, 
without  any  preceding  Acl  to  exert  that.  If  any  mould  fay 
after  this  Manner,  they  muft  mean  one  of  thcfe  three  Things : 
Either,  (i.)  That  the  determining  Aft,  tho'  it  be  before  the 
Aft  determined  In  the  Order  of  Nature,  yet  is  not  before  it 
in  the  Order  of  Time.  Or  (2.)  That  the  determining  Acl  is 
not  before  the  Aft  determined,  either  in  the  Order  of  Time 
or  Nature,  nor  is  truly  diftincl  from  it ;  But  that  the  Soul's 
determining  the  Aft  of  Volition  is  the  fame  Thing  with  its 
exerting  the  Aft  of  Volition  :  The  Mind's  everting  fuch  a 
particular  Acl,  is  its  caufing  and  determining  the  Aft.  Or, 
(5.)  That  Volition  has  no  Caufe,  and  is  no  Effeft  ;  but 
comes  into  Exiftence,  with  fuch  a  particular  Determination, 
without  any  Ground  or  Reafon  of  its  Exiftence  and  Determi 
nation.- 1  Ihall  confider  thcfe  diilinclly. 

(r.)  If  all  that  is  meant,  be,  that  the  determining  Aft  is 
not  before  the  Acl  determined  in  Order  of  'Time,  it  will  not 
help  the  Cafe  at  all,  tho'  it  Ihould  be  allowed.  If  it  be  be-- 

fore, 


Seel.  II.       Suppofed  Evafions  confidered.  38 

fore  the  determin'd  Aft  in  the  Order  of  Nature,  being  the 
Caufe  or  Ground  of  its  Exiftence,  this  as  much  proves  it  to 
be  diftinft  from  it,  and  independent  on  it,  as  if  it  were  be 
fore  in  the  Order  of  Time.  As  the  Caufe  of  the  particular 
Motion  of  a  natural  Body  in  a  certain  Direction,  may  have 
no  Diftarice  as  to  Time,  yet  can't  be  the  fame  with  the  Mo 
tion  effected  by  it,  but  muft  be  as  diftinft  from  it,  as  any 
other  Caufe,  that  is  before  its  Effeft  in  the  Order  of  Time : 
as  the  Architect  is  diftinft  from  the  Houfe  which  he  builds, 
or  the  Father  diftirift  from  the  Sen  which  he  begets.  And  if 
the  Ad  of  the  Will  determining  be  diftinft  from  the  Ad  de 
termined,  and  before  it  in  the  Order  of  Nature,  then  we  can 
go  back  from  one  to  another,  'till  we  come  to  the  firft  in  the 
Series,  which  has  no  Act  of  the  Will  before.it,  in  the  Order 
of  Nature,  determining  it ;  and  confequendy  is  an  Aft  not 
determined  by  the  Will,  and  fo  not  a  free  Aft,  in  this  Notion 
of  Freedom.  And  this  being  the  Act  which  determines  all 
the  reft,  none  of  them  are  free  Acts.  As  when  there  is  a 
Chain  of  many  Links,  the  firft  of  which  only  it  taken  hold 
of  and  drawn  by  Hand  ;  all  tine  reft  may  follow  and  be  mov 
ed  at  the  fame  Inftant,  without  any  Diftance  of  Time ;  but 
yet  the  Motion  of  one  Link  is  before  that  of  another  in  the 
Order  of  Nature;  the  laft  is  moved  by  the  next,  and  that 
by  the  next,  and  fo  'till  we  come  to  the  firft ;  which  not 
being  moved  by  any  other,  but  by  fomething  diftinct  from 
the  whole  Chain,  this  as  much  proves  that  no  Part  is  moved 
by  any  Self-moving  Power  in  the  Chain,  as  it  the  Motion 
of  one  Link  followed  that  of  another  in  the  Order  of  Time* 

(2.)  If  any  mould  fay,  that  the  determining  Act  is  not  be 
fore  the  determined  Act,  either  in  the  Order  of  Time,  or  of 
Nature,  nor  is  diftinct  from  it;  but  that  the  Exertion  of  the 
Act  is  the  Determination  of  the  Act;  That  for  the  Soul  to 
exert  a  particular  Volition,  is  for  it  to  cauie  and  determine 
that  Act  of  Volition :  I  would  on  this  obferve,  that  the 
Thing  in  Queition  feems  to  be  forgotten,  or  kept  out  o£ 
Sight,  in  a  Darknefs  and  Unintelligiblenefs  of  Speech ;  un- 
lefs  fuch  an  Objector  would  mean  to  contradict  himfelf.  The 
very  Act  of  Volition  itfelf  is  doubtlefs  a  Determination  of 
Mind  ;  i.  e.  it  is  the  Mind's  drawing  up  a  Conclufion,  or 
coming  to  a  Choice  between  two  Things,  or  more,  propofed 
to  it.  But  determining  among  external  Objefts  of  Choice,  is 
not  the  fame  with  determining  the  A&  of  Choice  itfelf,  among 
various  poflible  Acts  of  Choice.  The  Queftion  is,  What 
influence?,  directs,  or  determines  the  Mind  or  Will  to  come 

G  t 


39  Suppofed  Evaiions  confidered-          Part  IL 

'3>  fuch  a  Conclufion  or  Choibc  as  it  does  ?  or  what  is  the 
Caufe,  Ground  or  Reafon,  why  it  concludes  thus,  and  not 
otherwife  ?  Now  it  mult  be  anfwered,  according  to  the  Arminian 
Notion  of  Freedom,  that  the  Will  influences,  orders  and 
determines  itfelf  thus  to  Adi.  And  if  it  does,  I  fay,  it  muft 
be  by  fome  antecedent  Adi.  To  fay,  it  is  caufed,  influenced 
2-nd  determined  by  fomething,  and  yet  rrot  determined  by  any 
Thing  antecedent,  either  in  Order  of  Time  or  Nature,  is  a 
Contradiction.  For  that  is  what  is  meant  *by  a  Thing's  be 
ing  prior  in  the  Order  of  Nature,  that  &  is  fome  Way  the 
Gaufe  or  Reafon  of  the  Thing,  with  Refpedl  to  which  it  is 
faid  t®  be  prior. 

If  the  particular  Aft  or  Exertion  of  Will,  which  comes 
into  Exiftence,  beany  Thing  properly  determined  at  all,  then  it 
lias  fome  Caufe  of  its  exiiling,.  and1  of  its  exifting  in  fuch  a- 
particular  determinate  Manner,  and  not  another ;  fome 
Caufe,  whofe  Influence  decides  the  Matter:  which  Caufe  is- 
diftindl  from  the  Effedl,  and  prior  to  it.  But  to  fay,  that  the 
Will  or  Mind  orders,  influences  and  determines  itfelf  to  ex 
ert  fuch  an  Adi  as  it  does,  by  the  very  Exertion  itfeif,  is  to- 
make  the  Exertion  both  Caufe  and  ElFedl;  or  the  exerting  fuch 
an  Adi,  to  be  a  Caufe  of  the  Exertion  of  fuch  an  Adt.  For 
the  Queftion  is,  What  is  the  Caufe  and  Reafon  of  the  Soul's 
exerting  fuch  an  Act  ?  To  which  the  Anfwer  is,  the  Soul  ex 
erts  fuch  an  Act,-  and  that  is  the  Caufe  of  it.  And  fo,  by  this, 
the  Exertion  Hiuft  be  prior  in  the  Order  of  Nature  to  itfelf, 
and  diftinct  from  itfelf. 

f  5.")  If  the  Meaning  be,  that  the  Soul's  Exertion  of  fuch 
a  particular  Act  of  Will,  is  a  Thing  that  comes  to  pafs  of  it- 
felf,  without  any  Caufe ;  and  that  there  is  abfolutely  no 
Ground  or  Reafon  of  the  Soul' s  being  determined  to  exert 
fuch  a  Volition,  and  make  fuch  a  Choice,  rather  than  ano 
ther;  I  fay,  if  this  be  the  Meaning  of  Armininns,  when  they 
contend  fo  earneftly  for  the  Will's  determining  its  own  Acts, 
and  for  Liberty  of  Will  confining  in  Self-determining  Power  ; 
they  do  nothing  but  confound  Themfelves  and  others  with 
Words  without  a  Meaning.  Irr  the  Queftion,  What  determines 
the  Will?  and  in  their  Anfwer,  that  the  Will  determines  itfelf, 
and  in  all  the  Difpute  about*  it,  it  feems  to  be  taken  for  grant 
ed,  that  fomething  determines  the  Will ;  and  the  Controverfy 
©n  this  head  is  not,  whether  any  Thing  at  all  determines  it, 
or  whether  its  Determination  has  any  Caufe  or  Foundation 
at  aH  r  bat  whore  the  Foundation  of  it  is,  whether  in  ths 

wm 


Seft.  II.       S&ppofed  Evafion$  cwfidereH  40 

Will  itfelf,  or  fomewhere  e'lSe.  But  it  the  Thing  intended 
bs  what  is  above  rnention'd,  then  all  comes  to  this,  that  No- 
thing  at  all  determines  the  Will ;  Volition  having  absolutely 
no  Caufe  or  Foundation  ojt  its  Exiftence,  either  within,  or  with 
out.  There  is  a  great  Noife  made  about  Self-determining 
Power,  as  the  Source  of  all  free  Acts  of  the  Will :  But  when 
jfhe  Matter  comes  to  be  explained,  the  Meaning  is,  that  no 
Rower  at  all  is  the  Source  of  thefe  Acts,  neither  Self-deter 
mining  Power,  nor  any  other,  but  they  arife  from  Nothing  ; 
.no  Caufe,  no  Power,  no  Influence,,  being  at  all  concern 'd  in 
the  Matter. 

However,  this  very  Thing,  even  that  the  free  Acts  of  the 
Will  are  Events  which  come  £o  pafs  without  a  Caufe,  is  cer 
tainly  implied  in  the  Arminian  Notion  of  Liberty  of  Will ;  tho' 
it  be  very  inconfiftent  with  many  other  Things  in  their 
Scheme,  and  repugnant  to  fome  Things  implied  in  their  No 
tion  of  Liberty.  Their  Opinion  implies,  that  the  particular 
Determination  of  Volition  is  without  any  Caufe;  becaufe 
they  hold  the  free  Acts  of  the  Will  to  be  Contingent  Events  ; 
and  Contingence  is  effential  to  Freedom  in  their  Notion  of  itr 
But  certainly,  thofe  Things  which  have  a  prior  Ground  and 
Reafon  of  their  particular  Exiftence,  a  Caufe  which  antece*- 
dently  determines  them  to  be,  and  determines  them  to  be  juft 
as  they  are,  don't  happen  contingently.  If  fomething  forego^- 
ing,  by  a  caufal  Influence  and  Connection,  determines  and 
fixes  precifely  their  coming  to  pafs,  and  the  Manner  of  it,  then 
it  don't  remain  a  contingent  ThiEg  whether  they  ihajl  come  to 
pafs  or  no,, 

And  becaufe  it  is  a  Queftion,  in  many  Refpects,  very  im* 
portant  in  this  Controverfy  about  the  Freedom  of  Will, 
Whether  the  free  Afls  of  the  Will  are  Events  nvhich  come  to  pafs 
without  a  Caufe  ?  I  fhall  be  particular  in  examining  this  Point 
in  the  -two  following  Sections, 


44444444444444444444444. 


G  3  •          SECTIOW 


No  Event  without  a  Caufe.         Part  II. 


SECTION     III. 

Whether  any  Event  wbatfoever,  and  Volition  in 
particular,  can  come  to  pafs  without  a  Caufe  of 
its  Exigence. 

BEFORE  I  enter  on  an  Argument  on  this  Subject,  I 
would  explain  how  I  would  be  underftood,  when  I 
life  the  Word  Caufe  in  this  Difcourfe  :  fince,  for  want  of  a 
better  Word,  I  fhall  have  Occafion  to  ufe  it  in  a  Senfe  which 
is  more  extenfive,  than  that  in  which  it  is  fometimes  ufed. 
The  Word  is  often  ufed  in  fo  reflrained  a  Senfe  as  to  fignify 
only  that  which  has  a  pofitive  Efficiency  or  Influence  to  produce 
a  Thing,  or  bring  it  to  pafs.  But  there  are  many  Things 
which  have  no  fuch  positive  productive  Influence  ;  which  yet. 
are  Caufes  in  that  Refpect,  that  they  have  truly  the  Nature 
of  a  Ground  or  Reafon  why  fome  Things  are,  rather  than 
others  ;  or  why  they  are  as  they  are,  rather  than  otherwife. 
Thus  the  Abfence  of  the  Sun  in  the  Night,  is  not  the  Caufe 
of  the  failing  of  the  Dew  at  that  Time,  in  the  fame  Manner 
as  its  Beams  are  the  Caufe  of  the  Afcending  of  the  Vapours 
rn  the  Day-time  ;  and  its  Withdrawment  in  the  Winter,  is 
not  in  the  fame  Manner  the  Caufe  of  the  Freezing  of  the 
Waters,  as  its  Approach  in  the  Spring  is  the  Caufe  of  their 
Thawing  :  But  yet  the  Withdrawment  or  Abfence  of  the 
Sun  is  an  Antecedent,  with  which  thefe  Effects  in  the  Night 
and  Winter  are  connected,  and  on  which  they  depend  ;  and 
is  one  Thing  that  belongs  to  the  Ground  and  Reafon  why 
they  come  to  pafs  at  that  Time,  rather  than  at  other  Times  • 
tho'  the  Abfence  of  the  Sun  is  Nothing  pofitive,  nor  has 
any  pofitive  Influence. 

It  may  be  further  obferved,  that  when  I  fpeak  of  Connexion 
of  Caufes  and  Effetts,  I  have  Refpect  to  moral  Caufes,  as  well 
as  thofe  that  are  called  natural  in  Diftinction  from  them. 
Moral  Caufes  may  be  Caufes  in  as  proper  a  Senfe,  as  any 
Caufes  whatfoever  ;  may  have"  as  real  an  Influence,  and  may 
as  truly  be  the  Ground  and  Reafon  of  an  Event's  coming  to 
pafs. 

Therefore  I  fometimes  ufe  the  Word  Caufe  ,  in  this  Inquiry, 
to  fignify  any  Antecedent,  either  natural  or  moral,  pofitive  or 

negative, 


-Se6L  III.        No  Event  without  a  Caufe.  42 

negative,  on  which  an  Event,  either  a  Thing,  or  the  Manner 
and  Circumftance  of  a  Thing,  fo  depends,  that  it  is  the 
Ground  and  Reafon,  either  in  Whole,  or  in  Part,  why  it  is, 
rather  than  not  ;  or  why  it  is  as  it  is,  rather  than  otherwife : 
Or,  in  other  Words,  any  Antecedent  with  which  a  confequent 
Event  is  fo  connected,  that  it  truly  belongs  to  the  Reafon 
why  the  Proportion  which  affirms  that  Event,  is  true ;  whe 
ther  it  has  any  pofitive  Influence,  or  not.  And  in  an  Agreea- 
blenefs  to  this,  I  fometimes  ufe  the  Word  Efe3t  for  the 
Confequence  of  another  Thing,  which  is  perhaps  rather  an 
Occauon  than  a  Caufe,  moft  properly  fpeaking. 

I  am  the  more  careful  thus  to  explain  my  Meaning,  that  I 

may  cut  off  Oecaiion,  from  any  that  might  feek  Occaiion  to 

cavil  and  object  againft  fome  Things  which  I  may  fay  con- 

1    cerning  the  Dependance  of  all  Things  which  come  to  pafs, 

on  fome  Caufe,  and  their  Connection  with  their  Caufe. 

Having  thus  explain'd  what  I  mean  by  Caufe%  I  afTert,  that 
Nothing  ever  comes  to  pafs  without  a  Caufe.  What  is  Self- 
exiftent  muft  be  from  Eternity,  and  muft  be  unchangeable : 
But  as  to  all  Things  that  begin  to  be,  they  are  not  belf-ex- 
iftent,  and  therefore  muft  have  fomc  Foundation  of  their  Ex- 
iilence  without  themielves.  — That  whatfoever  begins  to  be, 
which  before  was  not,  muft  have  a  Caufe  why  it  then  begins  to 
exift,  feems  to  be  the  firft  Didate  of  the  common  and  natural 
Senfe  which  God  hath  implanted  in  the  Minds  of  all 
Mankind,  and  the  main  Foundation  of  all  our  Reafonings 
about  the  Exiftence  of  Things,  paft,  prefent,  or  to  come. 

And  this  Dictate  of  common  Senfe  equally  refpects  Sub- 
jftances  and  Modes,  or  Things  and  the  Manner  and  Circum- 
jftances  of  Things.  Thus,  if  we  fee  a  Body  which  has  hither 
to  been  at  Reft,  ftart  out  of  a  State  of  Reft,  and  begin 
to  move,  we  do  as  naturally  and  neceffarily  fuppofe  there  is 
fome  Caufe  or  Reafon  of  this  new  Mode  of  Exiftence,  as 
of  the  Exiftence  of  a  Body  itfelf  which  had  hitherto  not 
exifted.  And  fo  if  a  Body,  which  had  hitherto  moved  in  a 
certain  Direction,  ftiould  fuddenly  change  the  Direction  of 
its  Motion ;  or  if  it  mould  put  off  its  old  Figure,  and  take 
a  new  one ;  or  change  its  Colour  j  the  Beginning  of  thefe 
new  Modes  is  a  new  Event,  and  the  Mind  of  Mankind 
aeceffarily  fuppofes  that  there  is  fome  Caufe  or  Reafoa 
of  them,  </ 


43  No  Event  without  a  Caufe.  Part  IL 

If  this  grand  Principle  of  common  Senfe  be  taken  away,  ail 
Arguing  from  Effects  to  Caufes  ceafeth,  and  fo  all  Knowledge  of 
any  Exiftence,  befides  what  we  hav£  by  the  molt  direct  and 
immediate  Intuition.  Particularly  all  our  Proof  of  the  Being 
of  God  ceafes :  We  argue  his  Being  from  our  own  Being, 
and  the  Being  of  other  Things,  which  we  are  fenfible  once 
were  not,  but  have  begun  to  be  ;  and  from  the  Being  of  the 
World,  with  all  its  conft-ituent  Parts,  and  the  Manner  of 
their  Exiftence ;  all  which  we  fee  plainly  are  not  neceflary  in 
their  own  Nature,  and  fo  not  Self-exiftent,  and  therefore 
jnuft  have  a  Caufe.  But  if  Things,  not  in  themfelves  ne- 
ceffary,  may  begin  to  be  without  a  Caufe,  all  this  arguing  is 
vain. 

Indeed,  I  will  not  affirm,  that  there  is  in  the  Nature  of 
Things  no  Foundation  for  the  Knowledge  of  the  Being  of 
God  without  any  Evidence  of  it  from  his  Works.  I  do  fup^ 
pofe  there  is  a  great  Abfurdity,  in  the  Nature  of  Things  fim- 
ply  confidered,  in  fuppofing  that  there  fhould  be  no  God, 
or  in  denying  Being  in  general,  and  fuppofing  an  eternal, 
abfolute,  univerfal  Nothing  :  And  therefore  that  here  would 
be  Foundation  of  intuitive  Evidence  that  it  cannot  be,  and 
that  eternal  infinite  moft  perfect  Being  muft  be ;  if  we  had 
Strength  and  Compreheafion  of  Mind  fufficient,  to  have  a 
clear  Idea  of  general  and  univerfal  Being,  or,  which  is 
the  fame  Thing,  of  the  infinite,  eternal,  moft  perfect  di 
vine  Nature  and  Efience.  But  then  we  mould  not  properly 
come  to  the  Knowledge  of  the  Being  of  God  by  arguing  ; 
bot  our  Evidence  would  be  intuitive :  We  mould  fee  it,  as 
we  fee  other  Things  that  are  neceflary  in  themfelves,  the 
Contraries  of  which  are  in  their  own  Nature  abfurd  and  con 
tradictory  ;  as  we  fee  that  twice  two  is  four ;  and  as  we  fee 
that  a  Circle  has  no  Angles.  If  we  had  as  clear  an  Idea  of 
univerfal  infinite  Entity,  as  we  have  of  thefe  other  Things,  I 
fuppofe  we  mould  moft  intuitively  fee  the  Abfurdity  of  fuppof 
ing  fuch  Being  not  to  be  ;  mould  immediately  fee  there 
is  no  Room  for  the  Queftion,  whether  it  is  poflible  that 
Being,  in  the  moft  general  abftracled  Notion  of  it,  mould 
not  be.  But  we  have  not  that  Strength  and  Extent  of  Mind, 
to  know  this  certainly  in  this  intuitive  independent  Manr 
her :  But  the  Way  that  Mankind  come  to  the  Knowledge  of 
the  Being  of  God,  is  that  which  the  Apoftle  fpeaks  of,  Rom. 
I.  20.  The  inwijible  Things  of  Him,  from  the  Creation  of  the  World \ 
are  dearly  feen;  being  under/load  by  the  Things  that  are  made;  e<V£» 
bis  etern&l  Power  find  Godhead.  We  firji  afcend,  and  prove  a 


Sedt-  IIL        No  Event  without  <?  Caufe.  4^ 

Pofterivri,    or  from   Effefts,    that  there  muft   be  an  eternal . 
Caufe ;    and  then  fecondly^  prove  by  Argumentation,  not  In 
tuition,    that  this  Being   muft  be  necefiarily    exiftent ;    and 
then  thirdly ,  from  the  proved  Neceility  of  his  Exiftence,  WQ 
may  defcend,   and  prove  many  of  his  Perfections  a  Priori. 

But  if  once  this  grand  Principle  of  common  Senfe  be  given 
up,  that  what  is  not  necejjary  initfelfy  muft  have  a  Caufe  ;  and 
we  begin  to  maintain,  that  Things  may  come  into  Exiftencer 
and  begin  to  be,  which  heretofore  have  not  been,  of  them-- 
felves,  without  any  Caufe ;  all  our  Means  of  afcending  in 
our  arguing  from  the  Creature  to  the  Creator,  "'and  all  our 
Evidence  of  the  Being  of  God,  is  cut  off  at  one  Blow.  In 
this  Cafe,  we  can't  prove  that  there  is  a  God,  cither  from  ,  ' 
the  Being  of  the  World,  and  the  Creatures  in  it,  or  from  the 
Manner  of  their  Being,  their  Order,  Beauty  and  Ufe.  FOP 
if  Things  may  come  into  Exiftence  without  any  Caufe  at  all-, 
then  they  doubtlefs  may  without  any  Caufe  anfwerable  to  the 
Effecl,  Our  Minds  do  alike  naturally  fuppofe  and  determine 
both  thefe  Things ;  namely,  that  what  begins  to  be  has  a 
Caufe,  and  alfo  that  it  has  a  Caufe  proportionable  and 
agree'able  to  the  Effec~K  The  fame  Principle- which  leads  us  to 
determine,  that  there  cannot  be  any  Thing  coming  to  pafs 
without  a  Caufe,  leads  us  to  determine  that  there  cannot  be 
more  in  the  Effect  than  in  the  Caufe. 

Yea,  if  once  it  Ihould  be  allowed,  that  Things  may  come 
to  pafs  without  a  Caufe,  we  Ihould  not  only  have  no  Proof 
of  the  Being  of  God,  but  we  Chould  be  without  Evidence  of 
the  Exiftence  of  any  Thing  whatfoever,  but  our  own  imme 
diately  prefent  Ideas  and  Confcioufnefs.  f'or^ye  have  not 
Way  to  prove  any  Thing  elfe,  but  by  arguing  from  Effects 
to  Catties :  from  the  Ideas  now  immediately  in  View,  we  ar 
gue  other  Things  not  immediately  in  View  :  from  Senfations 
now  excited  in  us,  we  infer  the  Exiftence  of  Things  without 
us,  as  the  Caufes  of  thefe  Senfations :  And  from  the  Ex 
iftence  of  thefe  Things,  we  argue  other  Things,  which  they 
depend  on,  as  Effe&s  on  Caufes.  We  infer  the  paft  Exift 
ence  of  our  Selves,  or  any  Thing  elfe,  by  Memory ;  only 
as  we  argue,  that  the  Ideas,  which  are  now  in  our  Minds» 
are  the  Confequences  of  paft  Ideas  and  Senfations.  We  im 
mediately  perceive  nothing  elfe  but  the  Ideas  which  are  this. 
Moment  extant  in  our  Minds.  We  perceive  or  know  othec 
Things  only  by  Means  of  thefe,  as  neceflarily  connected  with 
'  '  other  s*. 


45  No  Event  without  a  Caufe .  Part  II. 

others,  and  dependent  on  them.  But  if  Things  may  be 
without  Caufes,  ail  this  neceflary  Connexion  and  Depen 
dence  is  diffolved,  and  fo  all  Means  of  our  Knowledge  is 
gore.  If  there  be  no  Abfurdity  or  Difficulty  in  fuppofing 
one  Thing  to  ftart  out  of  Non-Exiftence,  into  Being,  of  it- 
felf  without  a  Caufe  ;  then  there  is  no  Abfurdity  or  Difficulty 
in  fuppofing  the  fame  of  Millions  of  Millions.  For  Nothing, 
or  no  Difficulty  Multiplied,  ftill  is  Nothing,  or  no  Difficulty  : 
Nothing  multiplied  by  Nothing  don't  inereafe  the  Sum. 

And  indeed,  according  to  the  Hypothefis  I  am  oppofing, 
of  the  Ads  of  the  Will  coming  to  pafs  without  a  Caufe,  it 
is  the  Cafe  in  Faft,  that  Millions  of  Millions  of  Events  arc 
continually  coming  into  Exiftence  Contingently,  without  any 
Caufe  or  Reafon  why  they  do  fo,  all  over  the  World,  every 
Day  and  Hour,  thro*  all  Ages.  So  it  is  in  a  conftant  Suc- 
ceffion,  in  every  moral  Agent.  This  Contingency,  this 
efficient  Nothing,  this  effectual  No-Caufe,  is  always  ready 
at  Hand,  to  produce  this  Sort  of  Effefts,  as  long  as  the 
Agent  exifts,  and  as  often  as  he  has  Occafion. 

If  it  were  fo,  that  Things  only  of  one  Kind,  viz.  Afts  of 
the  Will,  feem'd  to  come  to  pafs  of  Themfelves ;  but  -thofe 
of  this  Sort  in  general  came  into  Being  thus ;  and  it  were 
an  Event  that  was  continual,  and  that  happen'd  in  a  Courfe, 
wherever  were  capable  Subjects  of-fuch  Events;  this  very 
Thing  would  demonftrate  that  there  was  fome  Caufe  of  them, 
which  made  fuch  a  Difference  between  this  Event  and  others, 
and  that  they  did  not  really  happen  contingently.  For  Con- 
tingence  is  blind,  and  does  not  pick  and  choofe  for  a  particu 
lar  Sort  of  Events.  Nothing  has  no  Choice.  This  No-Caufe, 
which  caufes  no  Exiftence,  can't  caufe  the  Exifterice  which 
comes  to  pafs,  to  be  of  one  particular  Sort  only,  diftiriguifh'd 
from  all  others.  Thus,'  that  only  one  Sort  of  Matter  drops 
out  of  the  Heavens,  even  Water,  and  that  this  comes  fo 
often,  fo  conftantly  and  plentifully,  all  over  the  World,  in  all 
Ages,  Ihows  that  there  is  fome  Caufe  or  Reafon  of  the  falling 
of  Water  out  of  the  Heavens ;  and  that  fomething  belides 
mere  Contingence  has  a  Hand  in  the  Matter. 

If  we  ftiould  fuppofe  Non-entity  to  be  about  to  bring  forth ; 
and  Things  were  coming  into  Exiftence,  without  any  Caufe 
or  Antecedent,  on  which  the  Exiftence,  or  Kind  or  Manner 
of  Exiftence  depends ;  or  which  could  at  all  determine  whe 
ther  the  Things  Ihould  be,  Stones,  or  Stars,  or  Beafts,  or 

Angels, 


Sect.  III.     Volition  arifes  not  without  a  Caufe.     46 

Angels,  or  human  Bodies,  or  Souls,  or  only  ibrne  new  Mo 
tion  or  Figure  in  natural  Bodies,  or  fome  new  Senfations  in 
Animals,  or  new  Ideas  in  the  human  Underftanmg,  or  new 
Volitions  in  the  Will ;  or  any  Thing  elfe  of  all  die  infinite 
Number  of  PoiTibles ;  then  certainly  it  would  not  be  expecl- 
ed,  altho'  many  Millions  of  Millions  of  Things  are 
coming  into  Exiftence  in  this  Manner,  all  over  the  face  of 
the  Earth,  that  they  fhould  all  be  only  of  one  particular 
Xind,  and  that  it  mould  be  thus  in  all  Ages,  and  that  this 
Sort  of  Exiftences  fhould  never  fail  to  come  to  pafs  where 
there  is.  Room  for  them,  or  a  Subject  capable  of  them,  and 
tftat  conftantly,  whenever  there  is  Occafion  for  them. 

If  any  mould  imagine,  there  is  fomething  in  the  Sort  of 
Event  that  renders,  it  poflible  for  it  to  come  into  Exiftence 
without  a  Caufe  ;  and  fnould  fay,  that  the  free  Ads  of  the 
VPill  are  Exiftences  of  an  exceeding  different  Nature  from 
ether  Things ;  by  Reafon  of  which  they  may  come  into  Ex 
iftence  without, any  previous  Ground  or  Reafon  of  it,  tho" 
other  Things  cannot ;  If  they  make  this  Objection  in  good 
Earned,  it  would,  be  an  Evidence  of  their  itrangely  forget 
ting  themfelves :  For  they  would  be  giving  an  Account  of 
fome  Ground  of  the  Exiftence  of  a  Thing,  when  at  the  fame 
Time  they  would  maintain  there  is  no  Ground  of  its  Exilt- 
ence.  Therefore  I  would  obferve,  that  the  particular  Nature 
of  Exiftencej  be  it  pever  fo  diverfe  from  others,  c?.n  lay  no 
Foundation  for  that  Thing's  coming  into  Exigence  without  a 
Caufe ;  becauie  to  fuppofe  this,  would  be  to  fu'ppofe  the 
particular  Nature  of  Exigence  to  be  a  Thing  prior  to  the 
Exiftence ;  and  fo  a  Thing;  which  makes  Way  for  Exift 
ence,  with  fuch  a  Circumftance,  namely  without  a  Caufe  or 
Reafon  of  Exiftence.  But  that  which  in  any  Refpeft  makes 
Way  for  a  Thing's  corning  into  Being,  or  for  'any  Manner 
or  Circumftance  of  its  firft  Exiftence,  muft  be  prior  to  the 
Exiftence.  The  diftinguifn'd  Mature  of  the  Effeft,  which 
is  fomething  belonging  to  the  EfTecT:,  can't  have  Influence 
backward,  to  aft  before  it  is.  The  peculiar  Nature  of  that 
Thing  called  Volition,  can  do  Nothing,  can  have  no  Influ 
ence,  while  it  is  not.  And  afterwards  it  is  too  late  for  its 
Influence :  for  then  the  Thing  has  made  fure  of  Exiftence 
already,  without  its  Help. 

So  that  it  is  indeed  as  repugnant  to  Reafon,  to  fuppofe 
that  an  Ac~t  of  the  Will  fhould  come  into  Exiftence  without 
a  Caufe;,  as  to  fuppofe  the  human  Soul,  or  an  Angel,  or 

H  the 


47      Volition  arifes  not  without  a  Caufe.     Part  It. 

the  Globe  of  the  Earth,  or  the  whole  Univerfe,  (hould  come 
into  Exiilence  without  a  Caufe.  And  if  once  we  allow,  that 
•fuch  a  Sort  of  Effect  an  a  Volition  may  come  to  pafs  without 
a  Caufe,  how  do  we  know  but  that  many  other  Sorts  of 
Effefts  may  do.fo  too  ?  'Tis  not  the  particular  Kind  of  Effeft 
that  makes  the  Abfurdity  of  fuppofing  it  has  Being  without  a 
Caufe,  but  fomething  which  is  common  to  all  Things  that  ever 
begin  to  be,  *uiz.  that  they  are  not  Self-exiftent,  or  neceflary 
in  the  Nature  of  Things. 


•xSp  ocoeooocoootooocooooooocooocooocooceoooft  «^»  poeowjr  OToeoooftooaecaor  ooocaoocoooc  ooso  »>g*; 

SECTION     IV. 

Whether  Volition  can'avife  without  a  Caufe,  through 
the  Activity  of  the  Nature  of  the  Soul. 


Author  of  the  Effay  en  the  Freedom  of  the  Will  in 
JL  God  and  the  Creatures,  in  Anfwer  to  that  Gbieftiorv 
againfl  his  Doftrine  of  a  Self-determining  Power  in  the 
Will ,  ( P.  68 , 69. )  'That  Nothing  is,  or  comes  to  pafs,  without  afiiffici- 
ent  Reafon  why  it  is,  and  why  it  is  in  this  Manner  rather  tka-i 
another,  Allows  that  it  is  thus  in  corporeal  Things,  which  an 
•properly  and  philofophicall^  [peaking,  pajfi<ve  Beings ;  but  denies 
that  it  is  thus  in  Spirits,  which  are  Beings  of  an  adlue  Nature, 
who  ha"je  the  Spring  of  Action  ^within  themjel<ves,  and  can  deter 
mine  themfelves.  By  which  it  is  plainly  fuppofed,  that  fueh  an 
Event  as  an  Aft  of  the  Will,  may  come  to  pafs  in  a  Spirit,  with 
out  a  fuiiicient  Reafon  why  it  comes  to  pafs,  or  why  it  is  after 
this  Manner,  rather  than  another ;  by  Reafon  of  the  Activity 

of  the  Nature  of  a  Spirit. But  certainly  this  Author,  in 

this  Matter,  mcA  be  very  unwary  and  inadvertent.     For, 

i .  The  Objection  or  Difficult?  propofed  by  this  Author, 
/eems  to  be  forgotten  in  his  Anfwer  or  Solution.  The  very 
Difficulty,  as  he  himfelf  propofes  it,  is  this ;  How  an  Event 
can  come  to  pafs  without  afufficient  Reafon  why  it  is,  or  why  it 
is  in  this  Manner  rather  than  another?  Inftead  of  folving  this 
Difficulty,  or  anfwering  this  Queftion  with  Regard  to  Voli 
tion,  as  he  propofes,  he  forgets  himfelf,  and  anfwers  ano 
ther  Queftion  quite  diverfe,  and  wholly  inconfiftent  with 
this,  WR,  What  is  a  fwflfcient  Reafon  why  it  is,  and  why  it  is 


•Se&.  IV.      Volition  not  without  a  Csiufe}  &c.      4$ 

in  this  Manner  rather  than  another  ?  .And  he  affigns  the 
Aftive  Being's  .own  Determination  as  the  Caufe,  and  a 
Caufe  fuflicient  for  the  Effeft ;  and  leaves  all  the  Difficulty 
unrefolved,  and  the  Queftion  unanfwered,  which  yet  returns, 
even,  How  the  Soul's  own  Determination,  which  he  fpeaks 
of,  canae  to  exift,  and  to  be  what  it  was  without  a  Caufe  ? 
The  Aftivity  of  the  Soul  may  enable  it  to  be  the  Caufe  of 
Effects ;  but  it  don't  at  all  enable  or  help  it  to  -be  the  Sub- 
jeft  of  Effefts  which  have  no  Caufe;  which  is  the  Thing 
this  Author  fuppofes  concerning  Ads  of  the  Will.  Activity 
of  Nature  will  no  more  enable  a  Being  to  produce  Effects,. 
and  determine  the  Manner  of  their  Exiftence,  within  itfelf, 
without  a  Caufe,  than  out  of  itfelf,  in  fome  other  Being* 
But  if  -an  aftive  Being  mould,  through  its  Activity,  produce 
and  determine  an  Effect  in  fome  external  Object,  how  abfurd 
would  it  be  to  fay,  -that  the  EfFeft  was  produced  without -a  Caufe.! 

2.  The  Queftion  is  not  fo  much,  How  a  Spirit  endowed 
with   Aftbity  comes   to  aft,  as  why  it  exerts  fuch  an  Aft, 
and  not  another ;  or  why  it  afts  with  fuch  a  particular  De 
termination  ?  If  Aftivity  cf  Nature  be  the  Caufe  why  a  Spirit 
(the  Soul  of  Man  for  Inftance)  afts,  and  don't  lie  ftill ;  yet 
that  alone  is  not  the  Caufe  why  its  Aftion  is  thus  and  thus 
limited,  dirtfted   and  determined.     Aftive  Nature  is  a  general 
Thing ;  'tis  an  Ability  or  Tendency   of  Nature   to   Aftion, 
generally  taken;    which    may    be    a   Caufe  why  the   Soul 
afts  as  Occafion  or  Reafon  is  given  ;   but  this  alone  can't 
be  a  fufficient  Caufe  why  the  Soul  exerts  fuch   a  particular 
Aft,  at  fuch  a  Time,  rather  than  others.     In  order  to  this, 
there  mutt  be  fomething  befides  a  general  Tendency  to  Aftion  ; 
there  muft  alfo  be  a  particular  Tendency  to  that  individual 

Aftion.-^ If  it  mould  be  alked,  why  the  Soul  of  Man  ufes 

its  Aftivity  in  fuch  a  Manner  as  it  does ;  and  it  fhould  be  an- 
fwered,  that  the  Soul  ufes  its  Aftivity  thus,  rather  than  other,- 
wife,  becaufe  it  has  Aftivity;  would  fuch  an  Anfwer  fatisfy  a 
rational  Man  '•?  Would  it  not  rather  be  locked  upon  as  a  ve 
ry  impertinent  x>ne .? 

3.  An  aftive  Being  can  bring  no  EfFefts  to  pafs  by  his 
Aftivity,  but  what  are  confequent  upon  his  afting :  He  pro 
duces  Nothing  by  his  Aftivity,  any  other  Way  than  by  the 
Exercife  of  his  Aftivity,  and  fo  Nothing  but  the  Fruits  of 
its   Exercife :     He    brings  Nothing   to   pafs    by   a  dormant 
Aftivity.     But  the  Exercife  of  his  Aftivity  is  Aftion  ;  and  fo 
Ms  Aftion,  or  Exerciie  cf  his  Aftiyity,  muft  be  prior  to  the 

H  3 


49          Volition  not  without  d  Caufe,  Part  !L 

Effe&s  of  his  Activity.  If  an  active  Being  produces  an. 
Eilecl:  in  another  Being,  about  which  his  Activity  is  convert 
fant,  the  Effect  being  the  Fruit  of  his  Activity,  his  Adi-' 
vity  muft  be  firft  exerciied  or  exerted,  and  the  Effect  of  it 
muft  follow.  So  it  muft  be,  with  equal  Reafon,  if  the 
active  Being  is  his  own  Object,  and  his  Activity  is  conver- 
fant  about  Himfelf,  to  produce  and  determine  fome  Effect 
in  himself  ;  ftill  the  Exercife  of  his  Activity  muft  go  before 
the  Effect,  which  he  brings  to  pafs  and  determines  by  it. 
And  therefore  his  Activity  can't  be  the  Caufe  of  the  Deter 
mination  of  the  firft  Action,  or  Exercife  of  Activity  itfelf, 
whence  the  Effects  of  Activity  arife  ;  for  that  would  imply 
a  Contradiction  ;  It  would  be  to  fay,  the  firft  Exercife  of  Activi 
ty  is  before  the  firft  Exercife  of  Activity,  and  is  the  Caufe  of  it. 


4.  That  the  Soul,  tho'  an  active  Subftance,  can't  div 
its  own  Acts,  but  by  firft  acting  ;  or  be  a  determining 
Caufe  of  different  Acts,  or  any  different  Effects,  fometimes 
of  one  Kind,  and  fometimes  of  another,  any  other  Way 
than  in  Confequence  of  its  own  diverfe  Acts,  is  manifeft  by 
this  ;  That  if  fo,  then  the  fame  Caufe,  the  fame  caufal 
Power,  Force  or  Influence,  without  Variation  in  anyReJpe&3 
would  produce  different  Effects  at  different  Times.  For  the 
fame  Subftance  of  the  Soul  before  it  acts,  and  the  fame 
active  Nature  of  the  Soul  before  it  is  exerted  (i.  e.  before  in 
the  Order  of  Nature)  would  be  the  Caufe  of  different 
Effects,  viz.  different  Volitions  at  different  Times.  But  the 
Subftance  of  the  Soul  before  it  acts,  and  its  active  Nature 
before  it  is  exerted,  are  the  fame  without  Variation.  For  'tis 
fome  Act  that  makes  the  firft  Variation  in  the  Caufe,  as  to  any 
caufal  Exertion,  Force  or  Influence.  But  if  it1  be  fo,  that 
the  Soul  has  no  different  Caufality,  or  diverfe  caufal  Force 
or  Influence,  in  producing  thefe  diverfe  Effects;  then  'tis 
evident,  that  the  Soul  has  no  Influence,  no  Hand  in  the 
diverfity  of  the  Effect  ;  and  that  the  Difference  of  the  Effect 
can't  be  owing  to  any  Thing  in  the  Soul  ;  or  which  is  the 
\  fame  Thing,  the  Soul  don't  determine  the  Diverfity  of  the 
Effect;  which  is  contrary  to  the  Suppofition.  --  'Tis  true, 
the  Subftance  of  the  Soul  before  it  acts,  and  before  there  is 
any  Difference  in  that  Refpect,  may  be  in  a  different  State 
and  Circumfiances  :  But  thofe  whom  I  oppofe,  will  not 
allow  the  different  Circumftances  of  the  Soul  to  be  the  de 
termining  Caufes  of  the  Acts  of  the  Will  ;  as  being  con- 
trary  to  their  Notion  of  Self-determination  and  Self-moticn.  • 

5.  Let 


5e6t  IV.          '  tbro*  the  Soul's  A&ivity.  53 

5.  Let  us  fuppofe,  as  thefe  Divines  do,  that  there  arc  no 
Acts  of  the  Soul,  flndly  fpeakmg,  but  free  Volitions  ; 
Then  it  will  foliovv,  that  the  Soul  is  an  adive  Being  in 
Nothing  further  than  it  is  a  voluntary  or  eledive  Being  ; 
£nd  whenever  it  produces  Effects  actively,  it  produces  Effects 
voluntarily  and  eledively.  But  to  produce  EfFeds  thus,  i$ 
the  fame  Thing  as  to  produce  Effeds  in  Confequence  ofy  and 
according  to  its  own  Choice.  And  if  fo,  then  furely  the 
Soul  don't  by  its  Activity  produce  all  its  own  Afts  of  Will 
or  Choice  themfelves :  For  this,  by  the  Suppofition,  is  to 
produce  all  its  free  Ads  of  Choice  voluntarily  and  eleftive- 
}y,  or  in  Confequence  of  its  own  free  Ads  of  Choice,  which 
brings  the  Matter  direftly  to  the  fore- mentioned  Contra 
diction,  of  a  free  Aft  of  Choice  before  the  firft  free  Aft  of 
Choice. — —According  to  thefe  Gentlemen's  own  Notion  o£ 
Action,  if  there  arifes  in  the  Mind  a  Volition  without  a  free 
Aft  of.  the  Will  or  Choice  to  determine  and  produce  it, 
the  Mind,  is  not  the  adive  voluntary  Caufe  of  that  Voli 
tion  ;  becaufe  it  don't  arife  from,  nor  is  regulated  by  Choice 
or  Defign  :  And  therefore  it  can't  be,  that  the  Mind  mould 
be  the  adive,  voluntary,  determining  Caufe  of  the  firft  and 

leading  Volition  that  relates   to  the  Affair. The  Mind's 

being  a  defigning^  Caufe,  only  enables  it  to  produce  ErTefts  in 
Confequence  of  its  Defign;  it  will  not  enable  it  to  be  the 
defigning  Caufe  of  all  its  own  Defigns.  The  Mind's  being 
an  elective  Caufe,  will  only  enable  it  to  produce  Effefts  in 
Confequence  cf  its  Elefltin,  and  according  to  them ;  but 
can't  enable  it  to  be  the  elective  Caufe  of  all  its  own  Elec 
tions;  becaufe  that  fuppofes  an  Eledion  before  the  firft  E- 
ledion.  So  the  Mind's  being  an  a3ive  Caufe  enables  it  to 
produce  Effeds  in  Confequence  of  its  own  Atls>  but  can't 
enable  it  to  be  the  determining  Caufe  of  all  its  own  Ads ; 
for  that  is  ftill  ia  the  fame  Manner  a  Contradidion ;  as  it 
fuppofes  a  determining  Act  converfant  about  the  firft  Act, 
and  prior  to  it,  having  a  caufal  Influence  on  its  Exiftence,  and 
Manner  of  Exiftence, 

I  can  conceive  of  Nothing  elfe  that  can  be  meant  by  the 
Soul's  having  Power  to  caufe  and  determine  its  own  Voli 
tions,  as  a  Being  to  whom  God  has  given  a  Power  of 
Action,  but  this;  that  God  has  given  Power  to  the  Soul, 
fometimes  at  leaft,  to  excite  Volitions  at  its  Pleafure,  or 
according  as  it  chufes.  And  this  certainly  fuppofes,  in  all 
fuch  Cafes,  a  Choice  preceding  aJl  Volitions  which  are 

'   '   thus 


5*  <Thtfe  Evafons  impertinent.  Part  II. 

thus  caufed,    even  the  very  firft  of  them  :   Which  runs  into 
the   fore-mentioned  great  Abfurdity. 

Therefore  the  Activity  of  the  Nature  of  the  Sou!  affords 
no  Relief  from  the  Difficulties  which  the  Notion  of  a  Self- 
determining  Power  in  the  Will  is  attended  with,  nor  will  it 
help,  in  the  leaft,  its  Abfurdities  and  Inconfiftences. 


SECTION     V. 

Shewing,  that  if  the  things  afferted  in  theje  Eva*. 
fions  (hould  be  Juppojed  to  be  truey  they  are  al 
together  impertinent^  and  cant  help  thz  Caufe  of 
Arminian  liberty;  And  how  (this  being  tht 
State  of  the  Cafe)  Arminian  Writers  an  obliged 
to  talk  inconfifienily.  \ 


WHAT  was  laft  Obferved  in  the  preceding 
may  (hew,  not  only  that  the  active  Nature  of 
the  Soul  can't  be  a  Reafon  why  any  Act  of  the  Will  is,  or 
why  it  is  in  this  Manner,  rather  than  another  j  but  alfo 
that  if  it  could  be  fo,  and  it  could  be  proved  that  Volitions 
are  contingent  Events,  in  that  Senfe,  that  their  Being  and 
Manner  of  Being  is  not  fix'd  or  determined  by  any  Caufe, 
or  any  Thing  antecedent  ;  it  would  not  at  all  ferve  the  Pur- 
pofe  of  Arminiansy  to  ellablifh  the  Freedom  of  the  Will,  ac 
cording  to  their  Notion  of  its  Freedom,  as  confifting  in  the 
Will's  Determination  of  its  Self;  which  fuppofes  every  free 
Act  of  the  Will  to  be  determined  by  fome  Act  of  the  Will 
going  before  to  determine  it  ;  in  as  much  as  for  the  Will  to 
determine  a  Thing,  is  the  fame  as  for  the  Soul  to  determine 
a  Thing  by  W  illing  ;  and  there  is  no  Way,  that  the  Will  can 
determine  an  Act  of  the  Will,  than  by  willing  that  Act  of 
the  Will,  or,  which  is  the  fame  Thing,  chuftng  it.  So  that 
here  muft  be  two  Acts  of  the  Will  in  the  Cafe,  one  going 
before  another,  one  converfant  about  the  other,  and  the  lat 
ter  the  Object  of  the  former,  and  chofen  by  the  former. 

If 


Se'dt.  V.          fbefe  Eva/tons  impertinent.  52 

If  the  Will  don't  caufe  and  determine  the  Act  by  Choice* 
it  don't  caufe  or  determine  it  at  all ;  for  that  which  is  not 
determined  by  Choice,  is  not  determined  voluntarily  or 
willingly. :  And  to  fay,  that  the  Will  determines  fomething 
which  the  Soul  don't  determine  willingly,  is  as  much  as  to 
fay,  that  fomething  is  done  by  the  Will,  which  the  Sou! 
don't  do  with  its  Will* 

So  that  if  Arminian  Liberty  of  Will,  confuting  in  the 
Will's  determining  its  own  Acts,  be  maintained,  the  old 
Abfurdity  and  contradiction  muft  be  maintained,  that  every 
free  Act  of  Will  is  caufed  and  determined  by  a  foregoing  free 
Act  of  Will  :  Which  don't  confift  with  the  free  Act's  arifing 
without  any  Caufe,  and  being  fo  contingent,  as  not  to  be  fix'd 
by  any  Thing  foregoing..  So  that  this  Evafion  muft  be  given 
lip,  as  not  at  all  relieving,  and  as  that  which,  inflead  of  fup- 
porting  this  Sort  of  Liberty,  directly  deftroys  it. 

And  if  it  Ihould  be  fuppofed,  that  the  Soul  determines  its 
own  Acts  of  Will-  fome  other  Way,  than  by  a  foregoing 
Act  of  Will ;  ftill  it  will  not  help  the  Caufe  of  their  Liberty 
of  Will.  If  it  determines  them  by  an  Act  of  the  Under- 
ftanding,  or  fome  other  Power,  then  the  Will  don't  deter 
mine  itfelf;  and  fo  the  Self-determining  Power  of  the  W7ill  is 
given  up.  And  what  Liberty  is  there  exercifed,  according  to 
their  own  Opinion  of  Liberty,  by  the  Soul's  being  deter 
mined  by  fomething  beiides  its-  own  Choice  ?  The  Acts  of 
the  Will,  it  is  true,  may  be  directed,  and  effectually  deter 
mined  and  fix'd ;  but  it  is  not  done  by  the  Soul's  own  Will 
and  Pleafure  :  There  is  no  Exercife  at  all  of  Choice  or  Will 
in  producing  the  Effect :  And  if  Will  and  Choice  are  not 
exercifed  in  it,  how  is  the  Liberty  of  the  Will  exercifed  in  it  ? 

So  that  let  Arminians  turn  which  Way  they  pleafe  with  their 
Notion  of  Liberty,  confifting  in  the  Will's  determining  its- 
own  Acls,  their  Notion  deftroys  itfelf.  If  they  hold  every 
free  Act  of  Will  to  be  determined  by  the  Soul's  own  free 
Choice,  or  foregoing  free  Act  of  Will ;  foregoing,  either  in- 
the  Order  of  Time,  or  Nature  ;  it  implies  that  grofs  Contra 
diction,  that  the  firft  free  Act  belonging  to  the  Affair,  is  de 
termined  by  a  free  Act  which  is  before  it.  Or  if  they  fay- 
that  the  free  Acts  of  the  Will  are  determined  by  fome  other 
Act  of  the  Soul,  and  not  an  Act  of  Will  or  Choice,  This 
alfo  deftroys  their  Notion  of  Liberty,  confiding  in  the  Acts 
of  the  Will  being  determined  by  the  Will  itfelf:  Or 


53         Arminians  talk  iftcbnfiitehtly.         t%t  1L 

if  they  hold  that  the  Afts  cf  the  Will  are  determined  by 
Nothing  atallfazt  is  prior  to  them,  but  that  they  are  contin 
gent  in  that  Senfe,  that  they  are  determined  and  fixed  by  no 
Caufe  at  all ;  this  alfo  deftroys  their  Notion  of  Liberty,  con- 
iifting  in  the  Will's  determining  its  own  Ads. 

This  being  the  true  ftate  cf  the  Arminian  Notion  bf.Lir 
berty,  it  hence  comes  to  pafs,  that  the  Writers  that  defend 
it  are  forced  into  grofs  Inconfiftences,  in  what  they  fay  upon 
this  Subject.  To  inftance  in  Dr.  Whithy  ;  he  in  his  Difcoijrfe 
on  the  Freedom  of  the  Will,  *  oppofes  the  Opinion  of  the 
Cal-uinijls,  who  place  Man's  Liberty  only  in  a  Power  of  doing 
what  He  *wit/t  as  that  wherein  they  plainly  agree  with  Mr. 
Hobbes,  And  yet  he  himfelf  mentions  the  very  fame  Notion 
of  Liberty,  as  the  Dictate  of  the  Senfe  and  common  Reafon  of 
Mankind,  and  a  Rule  laid  doivn  by  the  Light  cf  Nature  ;  viz.  That 
Liberty  is  a  Power  of  Ailing  from  our  Selves,  or  DOING  ^HAT 
WE  WILL.  +  This  is  indeed,  as  he  fays,  a  Thing  agreeable 
to  the  Senfe  and  common  Rtafen  of  Mankind ;  and  therefore  'tis 
not  fo  much  to  be  wondered  at,  that  he  unawares  acknow 
ledges  it  againft  himfelf:  For  if  Liberty  don't  conftft  in  this, 
what  elfe  can  be  devifed  that  it  fhould  confift  in :  If  it  be 
faid,  as  Dr.  Whitby  elfewere  infifts,  That  it  don't  only  con 
fift  in  Liberty  of  dning  what  we  will,  but  alfo  a  Liberty  of 
willing  without  Neceffity  ;  ftill  the  Queftion  returns,  What 
does  that  Liberty  of  willing  without  Neceffity  confift  in,  but 
in  a  Power  of  willing  as  we  pleafe*  without  being  impeded, by 
a  contrary  Neceffity  ?  or  in  other  Words,  A  Liberty  for  the 
Soul  in  its  willing  to  aft  according  to  its  own.  Choice  ?  Yea, 
ihis  very  Thing  the  fame  Author  feems  to  allow,  and  fup- 
pofe  again  and  again,  in  the  Ufe  he  makes  of  Sayings  of  the 
Fathers,  whom  he  quotes  as  his  Vouchers.  Thus  he  cites 
thefe  Words  of  Origen,  which  he  produces  as  a  Teftimony 
On  his  Side;  ||  The  Soul  a8s  By  HER  OWN  CHOICE,  and 
it  is  free  for  her  to  incline  to  whatever  Part  SHE  WILL.  And 
thofe  Words  of  Jujtiu;  %  Th?  Dofirine  of  the  Chri/lianf 
is  this9  That  Nothing  is  done  or  fujfered according  to  Fate,  but  that 
rvery  Man  doth  Good  or  Evil  ACCORDING  TO  HIS  OWN 
FREE  CHOICE.  And  from  Eufebius,  thefe  Words  ;  §  If 
Fate  be  eftablijh'd,  Philofophy  and  Piety  are  overthrown. — • — All 
thefe  Things  defending  upon  the  Neceffity  introduced  by  the  Stars, 

and 

.  *  In  his  Book  on  the  five  Points,  ad  Edit.  P.  350,  351,  352' 
.+  Ibid.  P.  325,  356,  Jl  Ibid,  P.  34*.  $  Ibid.  P.  360*  $  Md. 
P.  363. 


Secft.V.       Armiaians  talk  inconMently.  54 

uru?  not  upon  Meditation  and  Exercife  PROCEEDING  FROM 
OUR  OWN  FREE  CHOICE.  And  again,  the  Words  of 
Macarius  ,-  |j  Gsd,  to  preserve  the  Liberty  of  Man  s  Will,  fujfered. 
their  Bodies  to  die,  that  it  might  be  IN  THEIR  CtfOICE  to  turn. 

to  Good  or  Evil, '-I  hey  who  are  aded  by  the  Holy  Spirit ,  are 

not  held  under  any  Nece]/rty)  but  have  Liberty  to  turn  themselves, 
and  DO  WHAT  'THEY  WILL  in  this  Life. 

Thus,  the  Doctor  in  Effect  comes  into  that  very  No 
tion  of  Liberty,  which  the  Calvimfls  have;  which  he  at 
die  fame  Time  condemns,  as  agreeing  with  the  Opinion  of 
Mr.  Hobbts,  namely,  the  Soul's  Ading  by  its  own  Choice,  Men's 
doing  Good  or  E'vil  according  to  their  own  free  Choice ,  Their  being 
in  that  Exercife  which  proceeds  from  their  own  fret  Choice,  Having 
it  in  their  Choice  to  turn  to  Goo  dor  E<vil,  and  doing  what  they  wilL 
So  that  if  Men  exercife  this  Liberty  in.  the  Acts  of  the  Will 
themfelves,  it  muft  be  in  exerting  Acts  of  Will  as  they  will, 
or  according  to  their  own  free  Choice;  or  exerting  Acts  of  Will 
that  proceed  from  their  Choice.  And  if  it  be  fo,-  then  let  every 
one  judge  whether  this  don't  fuppofe  a  free  Choice  going  be 
fore  the  free  Act  of  Will,  or  whether  an  Aft  of  Choice  don't 
go  before  that  Aft  of  the  Will  which  proceeds  from  it.  And 
if  it  be  thus  with  all  free  Acts  of  the  Will,  then  let  every 
one  judge,  whether  it  won't  follow  that  there  is  a  free 
Choice  or  Will  going  before  the  firft  free  Aft  of  the  Will 
exerted  in  the  Cafe.  And  then  let  every  one  judge,  whether 
this  be  not  a  Contradiction.  And  finally,  let  every  one 
judge  whether  in  the  Scheme  of  thefe  Writers  there  be  any 
Poffibility  of  avoiding  thefe  Abfurdities. 

If  Liberty  confifts,  as  Dr.  Whhby  himfelf  fays,  in  a  Man's 
doing  what  He  will ;  and  a  Man  exercifes  this  Liberty,  not 
only  in  external  Actions,  but  in  the  Acts  of  the  Will  them 
felves  j  then  fo  far  as  Liberty  is  exercifed  in  the  latter,  it 
confifts  in  willing  what  he  wills  :  And  if  any  fay  fo,  one  of 
thefe  two  Things  muft  be  meant,  either  i .  That  a  Man  has 
Power  to  Will,  as  he  does  will ;  becaufe  what  he  wills,  he 
wills  ;  and  therefore  has  Power  to  will  what  he  has  Power 
to  will.  If  this  be  their  Meaning,  then  all  this  mighty  Con- 
troverfy  about  Freedom  of  the  Will  and  Self- determining 
Power,  comes  wholly  to  Nothing;  all  that  is  contended 
for  being  no  more  than  this,  That  the  Mind  of  Man  does 
what  it  does,  and  is  the  Subject  of  what  it  is  the  Subject  of, 
I  otr 

U  nid.  369,  370, 


55         Of  ch'jfwg  in  Things  indifferent.      --Part  11, 

or  that  what  is,  is ;  wherein  None  has  any  Controverfy  with 
them.  Or,  2.  The  Meaning  muft  be,  that  a  Man  has 
Power  to  will  as  he  pleafes  <5>r  chufes  to  will :  Tliat  isr  he 
has  Power  by  one  Act  of  Choice,  to  chufe  another ;  by  an 
antecedent  Aft  of  Will  to  chufe  a  confequent  Aft  j  and 
therein  to  execute  his  own  Choice.  And  if  this  be  their 
Meaning,  it  is  nothing  but  Shuffling  with  thofe  they  difpute 
xvith,  and  baffling  their  own'Reafon,  For  ftill  the  Quettion 
returns,  wherein  lies  Man's  Liberty  in  that  antecedent  Aft 
of'WiH  which  chofe  the  confequent  Aft;  The  Anfwer  ac 
cording  to  the  fame  Principles  mutt  be,  that  his  Liberty  in 
this  aifb  lies  in  his  willing  as  he  would,  or  as  he  chofe,  or 
agreeable  to  another  Aft  of  Choice  preceding  that.'  And  fo 
the  Queftion  returns  in  infinitum,  and  the  like  Anfwer  muft  be 
made  in  infinitum:  In  order  to  iupport  their  Opinion,  there 
muft  be  no  Beginning,  but  free  Afts  of  Will  muft  have 
been  chofen  by  foregoing  free  Afts  of  Wrill,  in  the  Soul  of 
every  Man,  without  Beginning ;  and  fo  before  he  had  a 
Being,  from  all  Eternity. 


SECTION     VI. 

Concerning  the  WiWs  determining  in  Things  which 
arc  perfifiiy    indifferent,   in    the   View   of  the 


-Mind. 


A  Great  Argument  for  Self-determining  Power,  is  the 
fuppofed  Experience  we  universally  have  of  an  Ability 
to  determine  our  Wills,  in  Cafes  whereiii  no  prevailing  Mo 
tive  is  prefented  :  The  Will  (as  is  fuppofed)  has  its  Choice  to 
make  between  two  or  more  Things,  that  are  perfeftly  equal 
in  the  View  of  the  Mind  ;  and  the  Will  is  apparently  altoge 
ther  indifferent  ;  and  yet  we  find  no  Difficulty  in  coming  to  a 
Choice  ;  the  Will  can  inftantly  determine  itfelf  to  one,  by  a 
Ibvereign  Power  which  it  has  over  itfelf,  without  being  rhov-- 
cd  by  any  preponderating  Inducement, 

Thuj 


SechVI.       Of  thuflng  in  Things  indifferent.        56 

Thus  the  forementioned  Author  of  an  Ej/ay  on  the  Freedom 
f  the  Will,  £c.  P.  25,  26,  27,  fuppofes,  "  That  there  are 
many  Inftances,  wherein  the  Will  is  determined  neither 
by  prefent  Uneafmefs,  nor  by  the  greatefc  apparent  Good, 
nor  by  the  laft  Didate  of  the  Understanding,  nor  by 
any  Thing  elfe,  but  merely  by  itfelf,  as  a  Sovereign  Self- 
determining  Power  of  the  Soul ;  and  that  the  Soul  does 
not  will  this  or  that  Action,  in  fome  Gafes,  by  any  other 
Influence,  but  becaufe  it  will.  Thus  (fays  he)  I  can  turn 
my  Face  to  tire  South,  or  the  North  ;  I  can  point  with  my 

Finger  upward,    or    downward. And    thus,    in    fome 

Cafes,  the  Will  determines  itfelf  in  a  veiy  fovereigjn  Man 
ner,  becaufe  it  will,  without  a  Reafon  borrowed  from  the 
Understanding  :  and  hereby  it  difcovers  its  own  perfect 
Power  of  Choice,  rifmg  from  within  itfelf,  and  free  from, 
all  Influence  or  Reftraint  of  any  Kind."  And  in  Pages  66, 
70,  £sf  73,  74,  This  Author  very  expreflly  fuppofes  the  Will 
in  many  Cafes  to  be  determined  by  no  Motive  at  «//,  and  A£ts 
altogether  without  Motive,  or  Ground  of  Preference — Here  I 
would  obferve,  * 

i.  The  very  Suppofition  which  is  here  made,  dire&ly  con 
tradicts  and  overthrows  itfelf :  For  the  Thing  fuppofed, 
wherein  this  grand  Argument  confifts,  is,  That  amorrg  feveral 
Things  the  Will  actually  chufes  one  before  another,  at  the 
fame  Time  that  it  is  perfedly  indifferent  ;  which  is  the  very 
fame  Thing  as  to  fay,  the  Mind  has  a  Preference,  at  the 
fame  Time  that  it  has  no  Preference,  What  is  meant  can't 
be,  that  the  Mind  is  indifferent  before  it  comes  to  have  a 
Choice,  or  'till  it  has  a  Preference ;  or,  which  is  the  fame 
Thing,  that  theMj^id  is  indifferent  until  it  comes  to  be  not 
indifferent  :  Fo|Pcertainly  this  Author  did  not  fuppofe  he 
had  a  Controverfy  with  any  Perfon  in  fuppoiing  this.  And. 
then  it  is  Nothing  to  his  Purpofe,  tliat  the  Mind  which 
chufes,  was  indifferent  oi*ce  ;  uniefs  it  chufes,  remaining  in 
different  ;  for  otherwjfe,  it  don't  chufe  at  all  in  that  Cafe  of 
Indifference,  concerning  which  is  all  the  Queftion.  Befides, 
it  appears  in  Faft,  that  the  Thing  which  this  Author  fup-. 
pofes,  is  not  that  the  Will  chufes  one  Thing  before  ano 
ther  concerning  which  it  is  indifferent  before  it  chufes;  but 
alfo  is  indifferent  ~*when  it  chufts  •  and  that  its  being  otherwife 
than  indifferent  is  not  'till  afterwards,  in  Confequence  of 
its  Choice ;  that  the  chofen  Thing's  appearing  preferable 
and  more  agreeable  than  another,  arifes  from  its  Choice 
already  made.  His  Words  are,  (P.  30 J  "  Where  the  Ob- 
13 


57       Of  chujing  in  Things  indifferent.     Part.  IL 

4f  jeds  which  are  propofed,  appear  equally  fit  or  good,  ti.o 
*-"  Will  is  left  without  a  Guide  or  Director;  and  therefore 
"  muft  make  its  own  Choice,  by  its  own  Determination  j  it 
being  properly  a  Self- determining  Power.  And  in  fuch 
Cafes  the  Will  does  as  it  were  make  a  Good  to  itfelf  by  its 
own  Choice,  /.  e.  creates  its  own  Pleafure  or  Delight 
in  this  Self-chofen  Good.  Even  as  a  Man  by  feizing 
upon  a  Spot  of  unoccupied  Land,  in  an  uninhabited 
*'  Country,  makes  it  his  own  PoffeiTion  and  Property,  and 
"  as  fuch  rejoices  in  it.  Where  Things  were  indifferent 
'*  before,  the  Will  finds  Nothing  to  make  them  more  agreea- 
*'  blev  confidered  merely  in  themfelves ;  but  the  Pleafure  it 
"  feels  ARISING  FROM  ITS  OWN  CHOICE,  and  its 
"  Perfeverance  therein.  We  love  many  Things  which  we 
"  have  chofen,  AND  PURELY  BECAUSE  WE  CHOSE 
«  THEM." 

This  is  as  much  as  to  fay,  that  we  firfl  begin  to  prefer  many 
Things,  now  cealing  any  longer  to  be  indifferent  with 
Refpeft  to  them,  purely  becaufe  we  have  prefer'd  and  chofen 

them  before. Thefe  Things  muft  needs  be  fpoken  incon- 

fiderately  by  this  Author.  Choice  or  Preference  can't  be 
before  itfelf,  in  the  fame  Inftance,  either  in  the  Order  of 
Time  or  Nature  :  It  can't  be  the  Foundation  of  itfelf,  or 
the  Fruit  or  Confequence  of  itfelf.  The  very  Aft  of  chufmg 
one  Thing  rather  than  another,  is  preferring  that  Thing,  and 
that  is  fetting  a  higher  Value  on  that  Thing.  But  that  the 
Mind  fets  an  higher  Value  on  one  Thing  than  another,  is  not, 
in  the  firfl  Place,  the  Fruit  of  its  fetting  a  higher  Value  on  that 
Thing. 

% 

This  Author  fays,  P.  36.  "  The  Will  may  be  perfectly  in- 
"  different,  and  yet  the  Will  may  determine  itfelf  to  chufe 
«'  one  or  the  other."  And  again  in  the  fame  Page,  "  I  am 
"  entirely  indifferent  to  either ;  and  yet  my  Will  may  de- 
<f  dermine  itfelf  to  chufe,"  And  again,  "  Which  I  fh all  chufe 
«'  muft  be  determined  by  the  mere  Aft  of  my  Will."  If 
the  Choice  is  determined  by  a  mere  Act  of  Will,  then 
the  Choice  is  determined  by  a  mere  Act  of  Choice.  And 
concerning  this  Matter,  viz.  that  the  Aft  of  the  Will  itfelf 
is  determined  by  an  Aft  of  Choice,  this  Writer  is  exprefs,  in 
P.  72.  Speaking  of  the  Cafe,  where  there  is  no  fuperiour  Fit- 
'  nefs  in  Objefts  prefented,  he  has  thefe  Words :  "  There  it 
"  muft  aft  by  its  own  CHOICE,  and  determine  itfelf  as 
<'  it  PLEASES."  Wkre  it  is  fuppcfed  that  the  very  Deter 
mination  9 


I. 


Seel:. VI.     Ofibe  Witt's  determining)  &c.  $$ 

minath*,  which 'is  the  Ground  and  Spring  of  the  Will's  Aft, 
is  an  Aft  of  Choice  and  Pleafure,  wherein  one  Aft  is  more 
agreeable,  and  the  Mind  better  pleafed  in  it  than  another  ; 
and  this  Preference,  and  fuperiour  Pleaftdnefs  is  the  Ground  of 
all  it  does  in  the  Cafe.  And  if  fo,  the  Mind  is  not  indiffe 
rent  when  it  determines  itfelf,  but  kad^  rather  do  one  Thing 
than  another,  had  rather  determine  itfelf  one  Way  than 
another.  And  therefore  the  Will  don't  aft  at  all  in  In 
difference  ;  not  fo  much  as  in  the  firft  Stej>  it  takes,  or  the 
firft  Rife  and  Beginning  of  its  afting.  If  it  be  poflible  foe 
the  Underftanding  to  aft  in  Indifference,  yet  to  be  fure  the 
WTill  never  does ;  becaufe  the  Will's  beginning  to  aft  is  the 
very  fame  Thing  as  its  beginning  to  chufe  or  prefer.  And 
if  in  the  very  firft  Aft  of  the  Will,  the  Mind  prefers  fome- 
thing,  then  the  Idea  of  that  Thing  prefer'd,  does  at  that 
Time  preponderate,  or  prevail  in  the  Mind ;  or,  which  is 
the  fame  Thing,  the  Idea  of  it  has  a  prevailing  Influence  on 
the  Will.  So  that  this  wholly  deftroys  the  Thing  fuppofed, 
<viz.  That  the  Mind  can  by  a  fovereign  Power  chufe  one  of 
two  or  more  Things,  which  in  the  View  of  the  Mind  are, 
in  every  Refpeft,  perfectly  equal,  one  of  which  does  not  at 
all  preponderate,  nor  has  any  prevailing  Influence  on  the 
Mind  above  another. 

So  that  this  Author,  in  his  grand  Argument  for  the  Abi 
lity  of  the  Will  to  chufe  one  or  two,  or  more  Things, 
concerning  which  it  is  perfectly  indifferent,  does  at  the  fame 
Time,  in  EfFeft,  deny  the  Thing  he  fuppofes,  and  allows 
and  afferts  the  Point  he  endeavours  to  overthrow ;  even  that 
the  Will,  in  chufing,  is  fubjecl:  to  no  prvailing  Influence 
of  the  Idea,  or  View  of  the  Thing  chofen.  And  indeed  it 
is  impollible  to  offer  this  Argument  without  overthrowing  it  ; 
the  Thing  fuppofed  in  it  being  inconfiftent  with  itfelf, 
and  that  which  denies  itfelf.  To  fuppofe  the  Will  to  aft 
at  all  in  a  State  of  perfeft  Indifference,  either  to  determine 
itfelf,  or  to  do  any  Thing  elfe,  is  to  afiert  that  the  Mind 
chufes  without  chufiug.  To  fay  that  when  it  is  indifferent, 
it  can  do  as  it  pleafes,  is  to  fay  that  it  can  follow  its  Plea- 
fare,  when  it  has  no  Pleafure  to  follow.  And  therefore  if 
there  be  any  Difficulty  in  the  Inftances  of  two  Cakes,  or  two 
Eggs,  &c.  which  are  exactly  alike,  one  as  good  as  another ; 
concerning  which  this  Author  fuppofes  the  Mind  in  Faft  has 
*  Choice,  and  fo  in  Effeft  fuppofes  that  it  has  a  Preference ; 
it  as  much  concern'd  himfelf  to  folve  the  Difficulty,  as  it 
does  thofe  whona  he  tippofes  :  For  if  thefe  Inftances  prove 

any 


59  Of  the  Witts  determining  Part  II. 

a^y  Thing  to  his  Purpofe,  they  prove  that  a  Man  cbufc* 
without  Choice.  And  yet  this  is  not  to  his  Purpofe  ;  be- 
caufe  if  this  is  what  he  aflerts,  his  own  Words  are  as  much 
againft  him,  and  do  as  much  contradict  him,  as  the  Words 
of  thofe  he  difputes  againft  can  do. 

2.  There  is  no  great  Difficulty  in  (hewing,  in  fuch  Inftan- 
ces  as  are  alledged,  not  only  that  it  muft  needs  befo,  that  the 
Mind  muft  be  influenced  in  its  Choice  by  fomething  that  has 
a  preponderating  Influence  upon  it,  but  alfo  ho<w  it  is  Jo. 
A  little  Attention  to  our  own  Experience,  and  a  diftinft 
Confideration  of  the  Acls  of  our  Minds  in  fuch  Cafes, 
will  be  fufficient  to  clear  up  the  Matter, 

Thus,  fuppofing  I  have  a  Chefs-board  before  me  ;  and 
becaufe  I  am  required  by  a  Superiour,  or  defired  by  a  Friend, 
or  to  make  fome  Experiment  concerning  my  own  Ability  and 
Liberty,  or  on  fome  other  Confideration,  I  am  determined 
to  touch  fome  one  of  the  Spots  or  Squares  on  the  Board  with 
my  Finger  ;  not  being  limited  or  directed  in  the  firft  Propo- 
fal,  or  my  own  .firft  Purpofe,  which  is  general,  to  any  one 
in  particular  5  and  there  being  nothing  in  the  Squares  in 
themfelves  confidered,  that  recommends  any  one  of  all  the 
fixty-four,  more  than  another :  In  this  Cafe,  my  mind  de 
termines  to  give  itfelf  up  to  what  is  vulgarly  called  Accident,  t 
by  determining  to  touch  that  Square  which  happens  to  be 
moft  in  View,  which  my  Eye  is  efpeciaUy  upon  at  that  Mo 
ment,  or  which  happens  to  be  then  moft  in  my  Mind,  or 
which  I  mall  be  directed  to  by  fome  other  fuch-like  Accident. 
Here  are  feveral  Steps  of  the  Mind's  proceeding  (tho*  all 
may  be  done  as  it  were  in  a  Moment)  the  firft  Step  is  its 
general  Determination  that  it  will  touch  one  of  the  Squares. 
The  next  Step  is  another  general  Determination  to  give  itfelf 
up  to  Accident,  in  fome  certain  Way ;  as  to  touch  that 
wmch  (hall  be  moft  in  the  Eye  or  Mind  at  that  Time,  or  to 
fame  other  fuch-like  Accident.  The  third  and  laft  Step  is  a 
particular  Determination  to  touch  a  certain  individual  Spot, 
ercn  that  Square,  which,  by  that  Sort  of  Accident  the  Mind 

has 

•f-  I  have  elfewhere  obferved  what  that  is  which  is  vulgarly  called 
Occident ;  That  it  is  Nothing  akin  to  the  Arminian  metaphyfical 
Notion  of  Contingencej  fomething  not  connected  with  any  Thing 
foregoing ;  But  that  it  is  fomething  that  comes  to  pafs  in  the 
Courfe  of  Things,  in  fome  Affair  that  Men  are  concerned  in* 
unforefeen,  and  not  owing  to  their  Defiga. 


Sed.VI.  in  things  indifferent.  60 

has  pitched  upon,  has  actually  offered  itfelf  beyond  others* 
Now  'tis  apparent  that  in  none  of  thefe  feveral  Steps  does 
the  Mind  proceed  in  abfolute  Indifference,  but  in  each  of 
them  is  influenced  by  a  preponderating  Indikement.  So  it  is 
in  theySVy?  Step  ;  The  Mind's  general  Determination  to  touch 
one  of  the  fixty-four  Spots  :  The  Mind  is  not  abfolutely  in 
different  whether  it  does  fo  or  no  :  It  is  iilduced  to  it,  for 
the  Sake  of  making  fome  Experiment,  or  by  the  Defire  of  a 
Friend,  or  fome  other  Motive  that  prevails.  So  it  is  in  the 
fecond  Step,  The  Mind's  determining  to  give  itfelf  up  to 
Accident,  by  touching  that  which  fhall  be  moft  in  the  Eye, 
or  the  Idea  of  which  mall  be  moft  prevalent  in  the  Mind,  &c» 
The  Mind  is  not  abfolutely  indifferent  whether  it  proceeds 
by  this  Rule  or  no ;  but  chufes  it,  becaufe  it  appears  at 
that  Time  a  convenient  and  requiiite  Expedient  in  order 
to  fulfil  the  general  Purpofe  aforefaid.  And  fo  it  is  in  the 
third  and  laft '  Step,  Its  determining  to  touch  that  indivi 
dual  Spot  which  actually  does  prevail  in  the  Mind's  View* 
The  Mind  i;s  not  indifferent  concerning  this ;  but  is  influ 
enced  by  a  prevailing  Inducement  and  Reafon ;  which  is, 
that  this  is  a  Profecution  of  the  preceding  Determination, 
which  appeared  requifite,  and  was  fix'd  before  iii  the  fecond 
Step. 

Accident  will  ever  ferve  a  Man,  without  hindering  him  a 
Moment,  in  fuch  a  Cafe.  It  will  always  be  fo  among  a 
Number  of  Objects  in  View,  one  will  prevail  in  the  Eye, 
Or  in  Idea  beyond  others.  When  we  have  our  Eyes  open  in 
the  clear  Sun-mine,  many  Objects  ftrike  the  Eye  at  once, 
and  innumerable  Images  may  be  at  once  painted  in  it  by  the 
Rays  of  Light ;  but  the  Attention  of  the  Mind  is  not 
equal  to  feveral  of  them  at  once ;  or  if  it  be,  it  don't  conti 
nue  fo  for  any  Time.  And  fo  it  is  with  Refpeft  to  the 
Ideas  of  the  Mind  in  general :  .Several  Ideas  are  not  in 
equal  Strength  in  the  Mind's  View  and  Notice  at  once  ;  or 
at  leaft,  don't  remain  fo  for  any  fenfible  Continuance.  There 
is  nothing  in  the  World  more  eonftantly  varying,  than  the 
Ideas  of  the  Mind :  They  don't  remain  precifely  in  the? 
fame  State  for  the  leaft  perceivable  Space  of  Time;  as  is 
evident  by  this,  That  all  perceivable  Time  is  judged  and 
perceived  by  the  Mind  only  by  the  Succeflion  or  the  fuc- 
ceffive  Changes  of  its  own  Ideas.  Therefore  while  the 
Views  or  Perceptions  of  the  Mind  remain  precifely  ia  the 
fome  State,  there  is  no  perceivable  Space  or  Length  of  Time, 
becaufe  no  fenfible  Succefiion  at  all. 


61         Of  the  mil's  determining,  &c.       Part  IL 

As  the  Ads  of  the  Will,  in  each  Step  of  the  fore-men 
tioned  Procedure,  don't  come  to  pafs  without  a  particular 
Caufe,,  every  Ad  is  owing  to  a  prevailing  Inducement ;  fo 
the  Accident,  as  I  have  called  it,  or  that  which  happens  irt 
the  unfearchable  Courfe  of  Things,  to  which  the  Mind 
yields  itfelf,  and  by  which  it  is  guided,  is  not  any  Thing 
that  comes  to  pafs  without  a  Caufe ;  and  the  Mind  in  de 
termining  to  be  guided  by  it,  is  not  determined  by  fomething 
that  has  no  Caufe;  any  more  than  if  it  determined  to  be 
guided  by  a  Lot,  or  the  cafting  of  a  Die.  For  tho'  the  Die's 
falling  in  fuch  a  Manner  be  accidental  to  him  that  cafts  it, 
yet  none  will  fuppofe  that  there  is  no  Caufe  why  it  falls  as 
it  does.  The  involuntary  Changes  in  the  Succeflion  of  our 
Ideas,  tho'  the  Caufe  may  not  be  obferved,  have  as  much  a 
Caufe,  as  the  changeable  Motions  of  the  Motes  that  float  in 
the  Air,  or  the  continual,  infinitely  various,  fueceffive  Changes 
of  the  Unevenneffes  on  the  Surface  of  the  Water. 

There  are  twp  Things  efpecially,  which  are  probably  the 
Occaiions  of  Confufion  in  the  Minds  of  them  who  infift  up 
on  it,  that  the  Will  ads  in  a  proper  Indifference,  and  without 
being  moved  by  any  Inducement,  in  its  Determinations  in 
fuch 'Cafes  as  have  been  mentioned. 

i.  They  feem  to  miftake  the  Point  in  Queftion,  or  at  lead 
not  to  keep  it  diftindly  in  View.  The  Queftion  they  difpute 
about,  is,  Whether  the  Mind  be  indifferent  about  the  Objects 
prefented,  one  of  which  is  to  be  taken,  touch'd,  pointed  to, 
&c.  as  two  Eggs,  two  Cakes,  which  appear  equally  good. 
Whereas  the  Queftion  to  be  conlidered,  is,  Whether  the 
Perfon  be  indifferent  with  Refped  to  his  own  Aftions ;  whe 
ther  he  don't,  on  fome  Conlideration  or  other,  prefer  one 
Acl  with  Refped  to  thefe  Objeds  before  another.  The 
Mind  in  its  Determination  and  Choice,  in  thefe  Cafes,  is 
not  moil  immediately  and  diredly  converfartf  about  the 
Objefts  prefented;  but  the  ASs  to  be  done  concerning  thefe  Ob 
jeds.  The  Objeds  may  appear  equal,  and  the  Mind  may 
never  properly  make  any  Choice  between  them  :  But  the 
next  Ad  of  the  Will  being  about  the  external  Adions  to 
be  performed,  Taking,  Touching,  &c.  thefe  may  not  ap 
pear  equal,  and  one  Adion  may  properly  be  chofen  before 
another.  In  each  Step  of  the  Mind's  Progrefs,  the  Deter 
mination  is  not  about  the  Objeds,  unlefs  indiredly  and  im 
properly,  but  about  the  Adions,  which  it  chufes  for  other 
Reafons  than  any  Preference  of  the  Objects,  and  for  Reafons 
not  taken  at  all  from  the  Objeft&| 

There 


Sect.  VI.       Of  chufmg  in  Things  indifferent.         62 

There  is  no  Necefiity  of  fuppofing,  that  the  Mind  does 
ever  at  all  properly  chufe  one  of  the  Objects  before  ano 
ther  ;  either  before  it  has  taken,  or  afterwards.  Indeed  the 
Man  chufes  to  fake  or  touch  one  rather  than  another;  but 
not  becaufe  he  chufes  the  Thing  taken  t  or  touch'  d  ;  but  from 
foreign  Confiderations.  The  Cafe  may  be  fo,  that  of  two 
Things  offered,  a  Man  may,  for  certain  Reafons,  chufe 
and  prefer  the  taking  of  that  which  he  undervalues,  and 
chufe  to  neglect  to  take  that  which  his  Mind  prefers.  In 
fuch  a  Cafe,  chufmg  the  Thing  taken,  and  chufmg  to  take, 
"are  diverfe  :  and  fo  they  are  in  a  Cafe  where  the  Things 
prefented  are  equal  in  the  Mind's  Efteem,  and  neither  of 
them  preferred.  All  that  Fact  and  Experience  makes  evi 
dent,  is,  that  the  Mind  chufes  one  Action  rather  than  ano 
ther  :  And  therefore  the  Arguments  which  they  bring,  in 
order  to  be  to  their  Purpofe,  ought  to  be  'to  prove  that  the 
Mind  chufes  the  Action  in  perfect  Indifference,  with  Refpect 
to  that  Afiion  „•  and  not  to  prove  that  the  Mind  chufes  the 
Action  in  perfect  Indifference  with  Refpect  to  the  Oljeft  ; 
which  is  very  poifible,  and  yet  the  Will  not  act  at  all  with 
out  prevalent  Inducement,  and  proper  Preponderation. 

2.  Another  Reafon  of  Confufion  and  Difficulty  in  this 
Matter,  feems  to  be,  not  diftinguifhing  between  a  general 
Indifference,  or  an  Indifference  with  Refpect  to  what  is  to 
be  done  in  a  more  diftant  and  general  View  of  it,  and  a  par 
ticular  Indifference,  or  an  Indifference  with  Refpect  to  the 
next  immediate  Act,  view'd  with  its  particular  and  prefent 
Circumftances.  A  Man  may  b:^  perfectly  indifferent  with 
Refpect  to  his  own  Aftivns,  in-  the  former  Refpect  ;  and  yet 
not  in  the  latter.  Thus,  in  the  foregoing  Inflance  of  touch 
ing  one  of  the  Squares  of  a  Chefs-board  ;  when  'tis  firft 
propofed  that  I  fhould  touch  one  of  them,  I  may  be  per 
fectly  indifferent  which  I  touch  ;  becaufe  as  yet  I  view 
the  Matter  remotely  and  generally,  being  but  in  the  firft 
Step  of  the*  Mind's  Progrefs  in  the  Affair  :  But  yet,  when 
I  am  actually  come  to  the  laft  Step,  and  the  very  next  Thing 
to  be  determined  is,  which  is  to  be  touch'd,  having  already 
determined  that  I  will  touch  that  which  happens  to  be 
moft  in  my  Eye  or  Mind,  and  my  Mind  being  now  fix'd  on 
a  particular  one,  the  Act  of  touching  that,  confidered  thus 
immediately,  and  in  thefe  particular  prefent  Circumflances,  is 
not  what  my  Mind  is  abfolutely  indifferent  about. 


SECT  ION 


Of  Liberty  of  Indifference.  Part  IL 


SECTION  VII. 

Concerning  the  Notion  of  Liberty  of  Will  canfijiing 
in  Indifference. 

W.HAT  has  been  faid  in  the  foregoing  Seftion,  has 
a  Tendency  in  fome  Meafure  to  evince  the  Abfur- 
dity  of  the  Opinion  of  fuch  as  place  Liberty  in  Indiffe 
rence,  or  in  that  Equilibrium  whereby  the  Will  is  without 
all  antecedent  Determination  or  Bias,  and  left  hitherto  free 
from  any  prepofTtifmg  Inclination  to  one  Side  or  the  other  ; 
that  the  Determination  of  the  Will  to  either  Side  may  be 
entirely  from  itfelf,  and  that  it  may  be  owing  only  to  its 
ov/n  Power,  and  that  Sovereignty  which  it  has  over  itfelf, 
that  it  goes  this  Way  rather  than  that.  || 

But  in  as  much  as  this  has  been  of  fuch  long  ftanding,  and 
has  been  fo  generally  received,  and  fo  much  infiftcd  on  by 
Pelagians,  Semi-Pelagians,  "Jefuits,  Socinian.s,  Arminians,  and 
others,  it  may  deferve  a  more  full  Conli  deration.  And 
therefore  I  (hall  now  proceed  to  a  more  particular  and  tho 
rough  Inquiry  into  this  Notion. 

Now 


jj  Dr.  Whitby,  and  fome  other  Ai-mhiia-'r^  ma.ke  a  Diftinclion  of  dif 
ferent  Kinds  of  Freedom;  one  of  God,  and  perfeft  Spirits  above: 
another  of  Perfons  in  a  State  of  Trial.  The  former  Dr.  Whitly 
allows  to  conlift  with  Neceffity;  the  latter  he  holds  to  be  without 
Neceffity:  And  this  latter  he  fuppofes  to  be  requifite  to  our  being 
the  Subjects  of  Praife  or  Difpraiie,  Rewards  or  Puniihments,  Pre 
cepts  and  Prohibitions,  Promifes  and  Threats,  Exhortations  and 
•  Dehdrtations,  and  a  Covenant-Treaty.  And  to  this  Freedom  he 
fuppofes  Indifference  to  be  requifite.  In  his  Difcourfe  On  the  five 
Points,  P.  299>  300,  he  fays  ;  "  It  is  a  Freedom  (fpeaking  of  a  Free 
dom  not  only  from  Ccvaftion,  but  from  Neceffity)  requifite,  as  we 
conceive,  to  render  us  capable  of  Trial  or  Probation,  and  to 
4  render  our  Actions  worthy  of  Praife  or  Difpraife,  and  our  Per 
fons  of  Rewards  or  Puniihments."  And  in  the  next  Page,  fpeak- 
'  ing  of  the  fame  Matter,  He  fays,  "  Excellent  to  this  Purpofe1, 
are  the  Words  of  Mr.  Thorndike  :  We  fay  not,  that  Indifference  's 
f  requl/ite  to  all  Freedom,  but  to  the  Freedom  of  Man  alone  in  this 
State  of  Travail  and  Prescience:  the  Ground  of  ivhich  is  God's  Ten- 
*'  der  of  a  Treaty,  and  Conditions  of  Peace  and  Reconcilement  to  fallen 
*'  Man,  together  iiuith  tbcfe  Prtcepfs  and  Prohibitions,  thofe  Promifes 
«*-  and-T'&reats,  thofe  Exhortations  end  Dehgrtatiwi)  it  if  enforced  ivlt/j,'* 


Sect.  VII.  Of  Liberty  cwfiftingin  Indifference.    64 

Now  left  fome  fhould  fuppofe  that  I  don't  underftand  thofe 
that  place  Liberty  in  Indifference,  or  fhould  charge  me  with 
mifreprefenting  their  Opinion,  I  would  fignify,  that  I  am 
fenfible,  there  are  fome,  who  \vhen  they  talk  of  the  Liberty 
of  the  Will  as  confiding  in  Indifference,  exprefs  themfelves 
as  tho'  they  would  not  be  und^rftood  of  the  Indifference  of 
the  Inclination  or  Tendency  of  the  Will,  but  of,  I  know 
not  what,  Indifference  of  the  Soul's  Power  of  Willing ;  or 
that  the  Will,  with  Refpecl  to  its  Power  or  Ability  to  chufe, 
is  indifferent,  can  go  either  Way  indifferently,  either  to  the 
right  Hand  or  left,  either  act  or  forbear  to  act,  one  as  well 
as  the  other.  Tho'  this  feems  to  be  a  Refining  only  of 
fome  particular  Writers,  and  newly  invented,  and  which 
will  by  no  Means  confifl  with  the  Manner  of  Expreflion  ufed 
by  the  Defenders  of  Liberty  of  Indifference  in  general. 
And  I  wifh  fuch  Refiners  would  thoroughly  confider,  whether 
they  distinctly  know  their  own  Meaning,  when  they  make  a 
DiiHnction  between  Indifference  of  the  Soul  as  to  its  Poiver 
or  Ability  of  Willing  or  Chufmg,  and  the  Soul's  Indiffe 
rence  as  to  the  Preference  or  Choice  itfelf;  and  whether 
they  don't  deceive  themfelves  in  imagining  that  they  have 
any  diftinct  Meaning  at  all.  The  Indifference  of  the  Soul 
as  to  its  Ability  or  Power  to  WTill,  muft  be  the  fame  Thing 
as  the  Indifference  of  the  State  of  the  Power  or  Faculty  of 
the  Will,  or  the  Indifference  of  the  State  which  the  Soul 
itfelf,.  which  has  that  Power  or  Faculty,  hitherto  remains 
in,  as  to  the  Exercife  of  that  Power,  in  the  Choice  it  ihall 
by  and  by  make. 

But  not  to  infift  any  longer  on  the  Abftrufenefs  and 
Inexplicable nefs  of  this  Diftinction ;  let  what  will  be  fup- 
pofed  concerning  the  Meaning  of  them  that  make  Ufe  of  it, 
thus  much  muft  at  leait  be  intended  by  Armenians,  when 
they  talk  of  Indifference  as  effential  to  Liberty  of  Will,  if 
they  intend  any  Thing,  in  any  Refpect  to  their  Purpofe, 
<vzz.  That  it  is  fuch  an  Indifference  as  leaves  the  Will  not 
determined  already  ;  but  free  from  actual  Poflbffion,  and 
vacant  of  Predetermination,  fo  far,  that  there  may  be 
Room  for  the  Exercife  of  the  Self-determining  Power  of  the 
Will ;  and  that  the  Will's  Freedom  confifts  in,  or  depends 
upon  this  Vacancy  and  Opportunity  that  is  left  for  the  Will 
kfelf  to  be  the  Determiner  of  the  Act  that  is  to  be  the  free 
Act.  X  / 


65      Of  Liberty  confifling  m  Indifference,   Fart  II. 

And  here  I  would  obferve  in  the  firft  Place,  thai  to  make 
out  this  Scheme  of  Liberty,  the  Indifference  rnuft  be  per- 
fe<3  and  abfclute ;  there  muft  be  a  perfect  Freedom  fiora  all 
antecedent  Preponderation  or  Inclination.  Becaufe  if  the 
Will  be  already  inclined,  before  it  exerts  its  own  fovereign 
Power  on  itfelf,  then  its  Inclination  is  not  wholly  owing 
to  itfelf:  If  when  two  Oppofites  are  propofed  to  the  Soul 
for  its  Choice,  the  Propofai  don't  find  the  Soul  wholly  in  a 
State  of  Indifference,  then  it  is  not  found  in  a  State  of  Li 
berty  for  mere  Self-determination.-- The  leaft  Degree  of 

antecedent  Bias  muft  be  inconfiftent  with  their  Notion  of 
Liberty,  For  fo  long  as  prior  Inclination  poffeiTes  the  Will, 
and  is  not  removed,  it  binds  the  Will,  fo  that  it  is  utterly 
impoflible  that  the  Will  fhould  act  otherwife  than  agreeably 
to  it.  Surely  the  Will  can't  act  or  chufe  contrary  to  a  re 
maining  prevailing  Inclination  of  the  Will.  To  iuppofc 
otherwife,  would  be  the  fame  Thing  as  to  fuppofe,  that  the 
Will  is  inclined  contrary  to  its  prefent  prevailing  Inclination, 
or  contrary  to  what  it  is  inclined  to,  That  which  the  Will 
chufes  and  prefers,  that,  all  Things  confidered,  it  Prepon 
derates  and  inclines  to.  It  is  equally  impoflible  for  the 
Will  to  chufe  contrary  to  its  own  remaining  and  prefent 
preponderating  Inclination,  as  'tis  to  prefer  contrary  to  its 
own  prefent  Preference,  or  chufe  contrary  to  its  own  prefent 
Choice.  The  Will  therefore,  fo  long  as  it  is  under  the 
Influence  of  an  old  preponderating  Inclination,  is  not  at 
Liberty  for  a  hew  free  Act,  or  any  Act  that  mall  now  be 
an  Act  of  Self-determination.  The  Act  which  is  a  Self- 
determin'd  free  Act,  muft  be  an  Act  which  the  Will  de 
termines  in  the  PoiTeilion  and  Ufe  of  fuch  a  Liberty,  as  con- 
fifts  in  a  Freedom  from  every  Thing,  which,  if  it  were 
there,  would  make  it  impoffible  that  the  Will,  at  that 
Time,  fhould  be  otherwife  than  that  Way  to  which  it 
tends. 

If  any  one  fhould  fay,  there  is  no  Need  that  the  In 
difference  mould  be  perfect ;  but  altho'  a  former  Inclination 
and  Preference  ftill  remains,  yet,  ifjtben't  very  ftrong  and 
violent,  poffibly  the  Strength  of  the  Will  may  oppofe  and 
overcome  it : 

This   is  grofly  abfurd ;  for  the  Strength  of  the  Will,    let 
it  be  never  fo  great,  does  not  at  all  enable  it  to  act  one  Way, 
and  not   the  contrary  Way,    both  at  the   fame   Time.     It 
gives  it  no  fuch  Sovereignty  and  Command,  as  to  caufe  it 
felf 


Sect.  VII.  Of  Liberty  of  Will  conjifting,  &c.      66 

felf  to   prefer  arid  not  to  prefer  at   the  fame  Time,    or  to 
chufe  contrary  to  its  own  prefent  Choice. 

Therefore,  if  there  be  the  leaft  Degree  of  antecedent  Pre- 
ponderation  of  the  Will,  it  muft  be  perfectly  abolifhed, 
before  the  Will  can  be  at  Liberty  to  determine  itfelf  the 
contrary  Way.  And  if  the  Will  determines  itfelf  the 
fame  Way,  it  v/as  not  a  free  Determination,  becaufe  the 
Will  is  not  wholly  at  Liberty  in  fo  doing  :  Its  Deter 
mination  is  not  altogether  from  itfelf,  but  it  was  partly  de 
termined  before,  in  its  prior  Inclination :  And  all  the  Free 
dom  the  Will  exercifes  in  the  Cafe,  is  in  an  Increafe  of  In 
clination,  which  it  gives  itfelf,  over  and  above  v/hat  it  had 
by  the  foregoing  Bias ;  fo  much  L  from  itfelf,  and  fo  much 
js  from  perfeft  Indifference.  For  tho'  the  Will  had  a  pre 
vious  Tendency  that  Way,  yet  as  to  that  additional  Degree 
of  Inclination,  it  had  no  Tendency.  Therefore  the  previ 
ous  Tendency  is  of  no  Confideration,  with  Refpeft  to  the 
Act  wherein  the  Will  is  free.  SQ  that  it  comes  to  the  fame 
Thing  which  was  faid  at  firit,  that  as  to  the  Aft  of  the  Will, 
wherein  the  Will  is  free,  there  mull  be  perfett  Indifference,  or 
Equilibrium. 

To  illuftrate  this;  If  we  mould  foppofe  a  fovereign  Self- 
moving  Power  in  a  natural  Body  :  But  that  the  Body  is  in 
Motion  already,  by  an  antecedent  Bias;  for  Inftance,  Gra 
vitation  towards  the  Center  of  the  Earth  ;  and  has  one  De 
gree  of  Motion  alre'ady,  by  Virtue  of  that  previous  Ten 
dency ;  but  by  its  felf- moving  Power  it  adds  one  Degree 
more  to  its  Motion,  and  moves  fo  much  more  fwiftly  to 
wards  the  Center  of  the  Earth  than  it  would  do  by  its  Gra 
vity  only  :  It  is  evident,  that  all  that  is  owing  to  a  felf-rriov- 
ing  Power  in  this  Cafe,  is  the  additional  Degree  of  Motion  ; 
and  that  the  other  Degree  of  Motion  which  it  had  from 
Gravity,  is  of  no  Confideration  in  the  Cafe,  don't  help  the 
EfFeft  of  the  free  felf-moving  Power  in  the  leaft ;  the  EiFecT: 
is  juft  the  farrie,  as  if  the  Body  had  received  from  itfelf 
one  Degree  of  Motion  from  a  State  of  perfect  Reft.  So  if 
we  mould  fupppfe  a  felf-moving  Power  given  to  the  Scale  of 
a  Balance,  which  has  a  Weight  of  one  Degree  beyond  the 
oppofite  Scale ;  and  we  afcribe  to  it  an  Ability  to  add  to  it 
felf  another  Degree  of  Force  the  fame  Way,  by  its  felf- 
moving  Power ;  This  is  juft  the  fame  Thing  as  to  afcribe 
to  it  a  Power  to  give  itfelf  one  Degree  of  Preponderation 
a  perfecl  Equilibrium;  and  fo  much  Po^vcr  as  the 

Scale 


67  Of  Liberty  of  Will  Part  II. 

Scale  has  to  give  itfelf  an  Over-balance  from  a  perfect  E~ 
quipoife,  fo  much  felf-moving  felt-preponderating  Power  it 
has,  and  no  more.  So  that  its  free  Power  this  Way  is  al 
ways  to  be  meafured  from  perfect  Equilibrium. 

I  need  fay  no  more  to  prove,  that,  if  Indifference  be 
cflTential  to  Liberty,  it  muft  be  perfect  Indifference ;  and 
that  fo  far  as  the  Will  is  deftitute  of  this,  fo  far  it  is  defti- 
tute  of  that  Freedom  by  which  it  is  its  own  Mafter,  and  in 
a  Capacity  of  being  its  own  Determiner,  without  being  at 
ail  paffive,  or  fubjeft  to  the  Power  and  Sway  of  fomethiug 
elfe,  in  its  Motions  and  Determinations. 

Having  obferved  thefe  Things,  let  us  now  try  whether 
this  Notion  of  the  Liberty  of  Will  confifting  in  Indiffe 
rence  and  Equilibrium,  and  the  Will's  Self-determination 
in  fuch  a  State,  be  not  abfurd  and  inconfiftent. 

And  here  I  would  lay  down  this  as  an  Axiom  of  undoubt 
ed  Truth  ;  y  hat  every  free  Afi  is  done  in  a  State  of  Freedom,  and 
*20t  only  after  fuch  a  State.  If  an  Aft  of  the  Will  be  an  Aft 
wherein  the  Soul  is  free,  it  muft  be  exerted  in  a  State  of 
Freedom,  and  in  the  Time  of  Freedom.  It  will  not  fuffice,  that 
the  Aft  immediately  follows  a  State  of  Liberty;  but  Li 
berty  muft  yet  continue,  and  co-exift  with  the  Aft ;  the  Soul 
remaining  in  Poflefiion  of  Liberty.  Becaufe  that  is  the  No 
tion  of  a  free  Aft  of  the  Soul,  even  an  Aft  wherein  the  Soul 
ufcs  or  txernfes  Liberty.  But  if  the  Soul  is  not,  in  the  very 
'Time  of  the  Aft,  in  the  PoffiJ/ion  of  Liberty,  it  can't  at 
that  Time  be  in  the  Ufe  of  it. 

Now  the  Queftion  is,  whether  ever  the  Soul  of  Man  puts 
forth  any  Aft  of  Will,  while  it  yet  remains  in  a  State  of  Li 
berty,  in  that  Notion  of  a  State  of  Liberty,  ^iz.  as  implying 
a  State  of  Indifference ;  or  whether  the  Soul  ever  exerts  an 
Aft  of  Choice  or  Preference,  while  at  that  very  Time 
the  Will  is  in  a  perfeft  Equilibrium,  not  inclining  one  Way 
more  than  another.  The  very  putting  of  the  Queftion  is 
fufficient  to  mew  the  Abfurdity  of  the  affirmative  Anfwer : 
For  how  ridiculous  would  it  be  for  any  Body  to  infift,  that 
the  Soul  chufes  one  Thing  before  another,  when  at  the 
very  fame  Inftant  it  is  perfeftly  indifferent  with  Refpeft  to 
each  !  This  is  the  fame  Thing  as  to '  fay,  the  Soul  prefers 
one  Thing  to  another,  at  the  very  fame  Time  that  it  has  no 
Preference.— Choice  and  Preference  can  no  more  be  in  a 

State 


Sedt.VIL  confifiiiig  in  Indifference.  68 

State  of  Indifference,  than  Motion  can  be  in  a  State  of  Reft, 
or  than  the  Preponderation  of  the  Scale  of  a  Balance  can  be 
in  a  State  of  Equilibrium.  Motion  may  be  the  next  Moment 
after  Reft  ;  but  can't  co-exift  with  it,  in  any ,  even  the  haft  Part  of 
it.     So  Choice  may  be  immediately  after  a  State  of  Indifference, 
but  has  no  Co-exiftence  with  it :     Even  the  very  Beginning  oi? 
it  is  not  in  a  State -of  Indifference.     And  therefore  if  this  be 
Liberty,  no  Aft  of  the  Will,  in  any  Degree,  is    ever  per 
formed  in  a  State  of  Liberty,  or  in    the  Time   of  Liberty. 
Volition    and  Liberty  are  fo  far  from  agreeing  together,  and 
being  eflential  one  to  another,  that  they  are  contrary  one  to 
another,  and   one   excludes  and  deftroys  the  other,  as  much 
as  Motion  and  Reii,  Light  and  Darknefs.,  or  Life  and  Death. 
So  that  the  Will  afts  not  at  all>  dees  not  fo  much  as  begin 
to  Aft  in  the  Time  of  fuch  Liberty  :  Freedom  is  perfectly 
at   an  End,  and  has   ceafed  to   be,  at  the  firft  Moment  of 
Aftion  j  and    therefore  Liberty    can't    reach  the  Aftion,  to 
affeft,  or  qualify  it,  or  give  it  a  Denomination,,  or  any  Part  of 
it,  any  more  than  if  it  had  ceafed  to  be  twenty  Years  before 
the  Aftion  began.     The  Moment  that  Liberty  ceafes  to  be, 
it  ceafes  to  be  a  Qualification  of  any  Thing.     If  Light  and 
Darkne'fs  fucceed  one  another  inftantaneoufly,  Light  qualifies 
Nothing  after  it  is^  gone  out,  to   make  any  thing  lightforae 
or  bright,  any  more  at  the  firft  Moment  of  perfeft  Darknefs, 
than  Months   or   Years     after.     Life    denominates   Nothing 
'vital  at  the  firft  Moment  of  perfeft  Death.     So  Freedom,  if  it 
confifts   in,  or   implies  Indifference,  can  denominate  Nothing 
free,  at  the   firft  Moment  of  Preference   or  Preponderation  : 
Therefore  'tis  manifeft,  that  no  Liberty  which  the  Soul  is  pof- 
fefled  of,  or  ever  ufes,  in  any   of  its  Afts  of  Volitioa,  con 
fifts  in  Indifference  ;  and   that  the  Opinion  of  fuch   as  fup- 
pofe,  that  Indifference  belongs  to  the  very  Efience  of  Liberty,, 
is  to  the  higheft  Degree  abfurd  and  contradictory. 

If  any  one  ihould  imagine,  that  this  Manner  of  arguing 
is  Nothing  but  Trick  and  Delufion ;  and  to  evade  the 
Reafoning,  mould  fay,  that  the  Thing  wherein  the  Will  ex- 
crcifes  its  Liberty,  is  not  in  the  Aft  of  Choice  or  Prepon 
deration  itfelf,  but  in  determining  itfelf  to  a  certain  Choice 
or  Preference ;  That  the  Aft  of  the  Will  wherein  it  is  free, 
and  ufes  its  own  Sovereignty,  confifts  in  its  caufing  or  de 
termining  the  Change  or  Tranjition  from  a  State  of  Indifference 
a  certain  Preference,  or  determining  to  give  a  certain 
urn  to  the  Balance,  which  has  hitherto  been  even ;  and 
that  this  Aft  the  Will  exerts  in  a  State  'of  Liberty,  or  while 
the  Will  yet  remains  in  Equilibrium,  and  perfeft  Mafter  o£ 

it- 


or 

I 


69  Of  Liberty  of  Will  conftftwgin  Indifference.  Pa.  iL 

itfelf: 1   fay,    if  any   One  chufes  to  exprefs  his  Notion 

of  Liberty  after  this,  or  fome  fuch  Manner,  let  us  fee  if  he  can 
make  out  his  Matters  any  better  than  before. 

What  is  afferted  is,  that  the  Will,  while  it  yet  remains  in 
perfect  Equilibrium,  without  Preference,  determines  to  change 
itfelf  from  that  State,  and  excite  in  itfelf  a  certain  Choice 
or  Preference.  Now  let  us  fee  whether  this  don't  come- 
to  the  fame  Abfurdity  we  had  before.  If  it  be  fo  that 
the  Will,  while  it  yet  remains  perfectly  Indifferent,  deter 
mines  to  put  itfelf  out  of  that  State,  and  give  itfelf  a  cer 
tain  Preponderation ;  Then  I  would  inquire,  whether  the 
Soul  don't  determine  this  of  Choice  ;  or  whether  the  Will's 
coming  to  a  Determination  to  do  fo,  be  not  the  fame  Thing 
as  the  Soul's  coming  to  a  Choice  to  do  fo.  If  the  Sou)  don't 
determine  this  of  Choice,  or  in  the  Exercife  of  Choice, 
then  it  don't  determine  it  voluntarily.  And  if  the  Soul  don't 
determine  it  voluntarily,  or  of  its  own  Will,  then  in  what 
Senfe  does  its  Will  determine  it  ?  And  if  the  Will  don't 
determine  it,  then  how  is  the  Liberty  of  Will  exercifed  in 
the  Determination  ?  What  fort  of  Liberty  is  exercifed 
by  the  Soul  in  thofe  Determination?',  wherein  there  is 
no  exercife  of  Choice,  which  are  not  voluntary,  and  wherein 

the  Will  is  not  concerned  ? Eat  if  it  be  allowed,  that  this 

Determination  is  an  Ad  of  Choice,  and  it  be  infilled  on,  that 
the  Soul,  while  it  yet  remains  in  a  State  of  perfect. Indiffe 
rence,  chufes  to  put  itfelf  out  of  that  State,  and  to  turn  it 
felf  one  Way ;  then  the  Soul  is  already  come  to  a  Choice,  and 
chufes  that  Way.  And  fo  we  have  the  very  fame  Abfurdity 
which  we  had  before.  Here  is  the  Soul  in  a  State  of  Choice, 
and  in  a  State  of  Equilibrium,  both  at  the  fame  Time  :  the 
Soul  already  chufing  one  Way,  while  it  remains  in  a  State 
of  perfect  Indifference,  and  has  no  Choice  of  one  Way 

more  than  the 'other. And  indeed  this  Manner  of  talking, 

tho'  it  may  a  little  hide  the  Abfurdity,  in  the  Obfcurity  of 
Expreffion,  is  more  nonfenfical,  and  increafes  the  Inconfift- 
erice.  To  fay,  the  free  Aft  of  the  Will,  or  the  Ad  which 
the  Will  exerts  in  a  State  of  Freedom  and  Indifference,  does 
not  imply  Preference  in  it/  but  is  what  the  Will  does  in 
order  to  caufmg  or  producing  a  Preference,  is  as  much  as  to 
fay,  the  Soul  chufes  (for  to  Will  and  to  chufe  are  the  fame 
Thing)  without  Choice,  and  prefers  without  Preference,  in 
order  to  caufe  or  produce  the  Beginning  of  a  Preference,  or 
the  firft  Choice.  And  that  is,  that  the  nrft  Choice  is  exerted 
without  Choice,  in  order  to  produce  itfelf. 


Se&.VII.  Of  Liberty's  lying  in  a  Power,  <kc.      70 

If  any*  to  evade  thefe  Things,  Ihould  own,  that  a  State  of 
Liberty,  and  a  State  of  Indifference  are  not  the  fame,  and 
that  the  former  may  be  without  the  latter  ;  But  mould  fay, 
that  Indifference  is  ilill  ejpcntial  to  the  Freedom  of  an  Act  of 
Will,  in  fome  Sort,  namely,  as  'tis  neceflary  to  go  imme 
diately  before  it  °  It  being  eflential  to  the  Freedom  of  an  Act 
of  Will  that  it  ihould  directly  and  immediately  arife  out  of 
a  State  of  Indifference:  Hill  this  will  not  help  the  Caufe  of 
Arminian  Liberty,  or  make  it  confident  with  itfelf.  For  if 
the  Ad  fprings  immediately  out  of  a  State  of  Indifference, 
then  it  does  not  arife  from  antecedent  Choice  or  Preference.  But 
if  the  Act  arifes  directly  out  of  a  State  of  Indifference,  with 
out  any  intervening  Choice  to  chufe  and  determine  it,  then 
the  Aft  not  being  determined  by  Choice,  is  not  determined 
t>y  the  Will ;  the  Mind  exercifes  no  free  Choice  in  the 
Affair,  and  free  Choice  and  free  Will  have  no  Hand  in  the 
Determination  of  the  Act  :  Which  is  entirely  inconfiftent  with 
their  Notion  ef  the  Freedom  of  Volition. 

If  any  mould  fuppofe,  that  thefe  Difficulties  and  Abfurdi- 
ties  may  be  avoided,  by  faying,  that  the  Liberty  of  the  Mind 
coniifts  in  a  Power  to  fufpend  the  Act  of  the  Will,  and  fo  to 
keep  it  in  a  State  of  Indifference •,  'till  there  has  been  Oppor 
tunity  for  Confideration ;  and  fo  mail  fay,  that  however 
Indifference  is  not  efiential  to  Liberty  in  fuch  a  Manner,  that 
the  Mind  muft  make  its  Choice  in  a  State  of  Indifference, 
which  is  an  Inconfiftency,  or  that  the  Act  of  Will  muft 
fpring  immediately  out  of  Indifference  ;  yet  Indifference  may 
be  eilential  to  the  Liberty  of  Acts  of  the  Will  in  this  Refpect  ; 
«y/z.  That  Liberty  confifts  in  a  Power  of  the  Mind  to  for 
bear  to  fufpend  the  Act  of  Volition,  and  keep  the  Mind  in 
a  State  of  Indifference  for  the  prefent,  'till  there  has  been 
Opportunity  for  proper  Deliberation  :  I  fay,  if  any  one 
imagines  that  this  helps  the  Matter,  it  is  a  great  Miftake  :  It 
reconciles  no  Inconfiftency,  and  relieves  no  Difficulty  which 
the  Affair  is  attended  with. — — For  here  the  following  Things 
muft  be  obferved, 

i .  That  tins  fuf pending  of  Volition,  if  there  be  properly  any 
fiich  Thing,  is  itfelf  an  Act  of  Volition.  If  the  Mind  de 
termines  to  fufpend  its  Act,  it  determines  it  voluntarily  ;  it 
chufes,  on  fome  Confideration,  to  fufpend  it.  And  this 
Choice  or  Determination,  is  ah  Act  of  the  Will :  And  in 
deed  it  is  fuppofed  to  be  fo  in  the  very  Hypothefis ;  for  'tis 
fuppofed,  that  the  Liberty  of  the  Will  confifts  in  its  Power 

L  to 


7"!         Of  Liberty's  lying  in  a  Power       Part  IL 

to  do  thus,  and  that  its  doing  it  is  the  very  Thing  wherein 
the  If  ill  exercifes  its  Liberty.  But  how  can  the  Will  exercife 
Liberty  in  it,  if  it  be  not  an  Aft  of  the  Will  ?  the  Liberty 
of  the  Will  is  not  exercifed  in  any  Thing  but  what  the  Will 
does. 

2.  -This  determining  .to  fufpend  afting  is- not  only  an  Aft 
of  the  Will,  but  'tis  fuppofed  to  be  the  only  free  Aft  of 
the  Will ;  becaufe  it  is  faid,  that  this  is  the  Thing  wherein  the 

Liberty  of  the  Will  confifts. Now  if  this  be  fo,  then  this  is 

all  the  Aft  of  Will  that  we  have  to  confider  in- this  Contro- 
verfy,  about  the  Liberty  of  Wrill,  and  in-  our  Inquiries^ 
wherein  the  Liberty  of  Man  cor.fifts.  And  now  the  fore* 
mentioned  Difficulties  remain  :  the  former  Queftion  returns 
upon  us •:  <r/£s.  Wherein  confifts  the  Freedom  of  the  Will  in 
thofc  A8s-  wherein  it 'is  free  ?  And  if  this  Aft  of  determining 
a  Sufpenfion  be  the  only  Aft  in  which  the  Will  is  free,  then 
wherein  confifts  the  Will's  Freedom  with  Refpeft  to  this  Aft 
of  Sufpenfion  ?  And  how  is  Indifference  eflential  to  this  Aft  ? 
The  Anfwer  muft  be,  according  to  what  is  fuppofed  in  the 
Evafion  under  Confider  a  tionr  That  the  Liberty  of  the  Will 
in  this  Aft  of  Sufpenfion,  confifts  inva  Por.'er  to  fufpend  even 
this -Aft,  'till  there -has  been  Opportunity  fop  thorough  Deli 
beration.  But  this  will  be*o  plunge  direftly  into  the  groflefl 
Nonfenfe  :  for  'tis  the  Aft  of  Sufpenfion  itfelf  that  we  are 
fpeakmg  of ;  .and  there  is  no  Room  for  a  Space  of  Delibe* 
ration  and  Sufpenlion,  in  order  to.  determine  whether  we 
will  fufpend  or  no.  For  that  fuppofes,  that  even  Sufpenfion 
itfelf  may  be  defer'd-:  Which  is  abfurd;  for  the  very  de-- 
ferring  the  Determinaiion  of  Sufpenfion,  to  confider  whe 
ther  we  will  Tufpend  or  no,  will  be  actually  fufpending..  For 
during  the  Sp?.ce  of  Sufpenfion,  to  confider  whether  to  fu& 
pend,  the- Aft  is  ipfo  fafio  fufpended.  -  There  is  no  Medium 
between  Aifpending  to  aft,  , and  immediately  afting;  an.d 
therefore  no  Poffibility  of  avoiding  either  trie-one  or  the  other 
one  Moment;  and  fo  no  Room  for  Qeliberation  before  \ve 
do  either  of  them. 

Arid  bdides,  tnis  is  attended  with  ridiculous  Abfurdity 
another  Way  :  For, now  it  is  come  to  that,  that  Liberty  cori-- 
iifts  wholly  in  the  Mind's  having  Power  to  fufpend  its  Deter 
mination  whether  to  fufpend  or  no ;  that  there  may  be 
Time  for  Coniideration,  whether  it  be  beft  to  fufpend.  And 
•If  Liberty  confifts  in  this  only,  then  this  is  the  Liberty  under 
Oonfideration ;  We  have  to  inquire  now^  how  Liberty  with 


'Sect.  VII.         Jto.  fuKpen'd   Vditiw.  72 

Refpect  to  this  Aft  of  fufpending  a  Determination  of  Suf- 
penlion,  confifts  in  Indifference,  or  how  Indifference  '  is 
eifential  to  it.  The  Anfwer,  according  to  the  Hypothecs  we 
are  upon,  muft  be,  that  it  confifts  in  a  Power  of  fufpending 
even  this  lad  mentioned  Aft,  to  have  Time  to  confider  whe 
ther  to  fufpend  that.  And  then  the  fame  Difficulties  -and 
Inquiries  return  over  again  with  Refpect  to  that  ;  and  fo  on 
forever.  Which,  if  it  would  (hew  any  Thing,  would  {hew 
only  that  there  is  no  fuch  Thing  as  a  free  Act.  It  drives  the 
Exercife  of  Freedom  back  in.  infnitam  ,-  and  that,  is  .to  drive 
it.  out  of  the*  World. 

And  befides  all  this,  there  is  a  Delu'fion,  and  a  latent  grdfs 
Contradiction  in  the  Affair  another  Way  ;  in*  as  much  as  m 
explaining  how,  or  in  what  Refpect  the  Will  is  free  with 
Regard  to  a  particular  Act  of  Volition,  'tis  faid,  that  its 
Liberty  confifts  in  a  Power  to  determine  to  fufpend  that  A£i* 
which  places  Liberty  not  in  that  Ad  of  Volition  which  the 
Inquiry  is  about,  but  altogether  in  another  antecedent  Act  : 
Which  contradicts  the  Thing  fuppdfed  in  ""both  the  Queftiom 
and  Anfwer.  The  Queftion  is,  wherein  confifts  the  Mind's 
Liberty  in  any  particular  A&  of  Volition  ?  And  the  Anfwer,  in 
pretending  to  mew  wherein  lies  the  Mind's  Liberty  in  thai 
Aft>  in  Effect  fays,  it  don't  lie  in  that  Act  at  all,  but  in  ano 
ther,  viz,  a  Volition  to  fufpend  that  Aft  :  And  therefore  the 
Anfwer  is  both  contradictory,  and  altogether  impertinent  and 
befide  the  Purpofe.  For  it  don't  mew  wherein  the  Liberty 
of  the  Will  confifts  in  the  Act  in  Queftion  :  Inftead  of  that, 
it  fuppofes.it  don't  confift  in^  that  Act  at,  all,  but  in  Another 
diftinct  from  it,  even  a  Volition  to  fufpend  that  Act,  -and  -take 
Time  to  confider  ,  of  it.  .And  no  Account-  is  pretended  to  be 
given  wherein  the  Mind  is  free  with  Refpect  to  that  Act, 
wherein  -this  Anfwer  fuppofes  the;  Liberty  of  the  Mind  in- 
deed  coniifts,  <z//s.  the  Act  >  of  Sufpenfion,  x>r  of  determining 
the  Sufpenfion. 

On  the  Whole,  'tis  exceeding  manifeft,  that  the  Liberty  of 
the  Mind  does  not  confnl  in  Indifference,  and  that  Indiffe 
rence  is  not  effential  or  necefiary  to  it,  or  at  all  belonging  to 
it,  as'the  Ar?mnians  fuppofe  ;  that  Opinion  being  full  of  No 
thing  but  Abfurdity  and  Self-contradiction. 


S.E  C  T.I  GMT 


73          Of  Liberty  without  Neceffity. ;        Part  II. 
j 

<f$$oooe><$<>J^ 

SECTION     VIII. 

Concerning  the  fuppofed  Liberty  of  the  Will,   as  op- 
pofite  to  all  Neceffity. 

2'  I  ^IS  a  Thing  chiefly  infilled  on  \ty4rminianSf  in  tHs 
JL  Controversy,  as  a  Thing  moft  important  and  efien- 
tial  in  human  Liberty,  that  Volitions,  or  the  Ads  of  the  Will, 
are  contingent  Events  ;  underftanding  Contmgence  as  oppcfite, 
riot  only  to  Conftraint,  but  to  all  Neceffity  :  Therefore  I 
would  particularly  conlider  this  Matter.  And, 

1.  I  would  inquire,  whether  there  is,  or  can  be  any  fuch 
Thing,  as  a  Volition  which  is  contingent  in  fuch  a  Senfe, 
as  not  only  to   come  to  pafs  without  any  Neceffity  of  Con 
ftraint  or  Co-action,  but  alfo  without  a  Neccjfity  of  Confluence y 
or  an  infallible  Connection  with  any  Thing  foregoing. 

2.  Whether,  if  it  were  fo,  this  would  at  all  help  the  Caufe 
of  Liberty. 

I.  I  would  confider  whether  Volition  is  a  Thing  that  ever 
does,  or  can  come  to  pafs,  in  this  Manner,  contingently. 

And  here  it  muft  be  remembered,  that  it  has  been  already 
(hewn,  that  Nothing  can  ever  come  to  pafs  without  a  Caufe, 
or  Reafon  why  it  exifts  in  this  Manner  rather  than  another  ; 
and  the  Evidence  of  this  has  been  particularly  applied  to 
the  Acts  of  the  Will.  Now  if  this  be  fo,  it  will  demon- 
ftrably  follow,  that  the  Acts  of  the  Will  are  never  contingent, 
or  without  Neceflity,  in  the  Senfe  fpoken  of;  in  as  much  as 
thofe  Things  which  have  a  Caufe,  or  Reafon  of  their  Exiftence, 
muft  be  connected  with  their  Caufe.  This  appears  by  the  fol 
lowing  Confiderations. 

i.  For  an  Event  to  have  a  Caufe  and  Ground  of  its  Ex 
iftence,  and  yet  not  to  be  connected  with  its  Caufe,  is  an' 
Inconfiftence.  For  if  the  Event  be  not  connected  with  the 
Caufe,  it  is  not  dependent  on  the  Caufe;  its  Exift 
ence  is  as  it  were  loofe  from  its  Influence,  and  may  at 
tend  it,  or  may  not ;  it  being  a  mere  Contingence.  whe 
ther  it  follows  or  attends  the  Influence  of  the  Caufe, 
or,  not ;  And  that  is  the  fame  Thing  as  not  to  be  depen 
dent 


Sea. VIII.    Of  the  fuppofed  Liberty,  &c.  74 

dent  on  it.  And  to  fay,  the  Event  is  not  dependent  on  its 
Caafe,  is  abfurd  :  'Tis  the  fame  Thing  as  to  fay,  it  is  not  its 
Caufe,  nor  the  Event  the  Effect  of  it  :  For  Dependence  on 
the  Influence  of  a  Caufe,  is  the  very  Notion  of  an  Effect.  If 
there  be  no  fuch  Relation  between  one  Thing  and  another* 
confifting  in  the  Connection  and  Dependence  of  one  Thing 
on  the  influence  of  another,  then  it  is  certain  there  is  no 
fuch  Relation  between  them  as  is  iignined  by  the  Terms 
Caufe  and  Effefi.  So  far  as  an  Event  is  dependent  on  a  Caufe, 
and  connected  with  it,  fo  much  Caufality  is  there  in  the  Cafe, 
and  no  more.  The  Caufe  does,  or  brings  to  pafs  no  more  in 
any  Event,  than  is  dependent  on  it.  If  we  fay,  the  Con 
nection  and  Dependence  is  not  total,  but  partial,  and  that  the 
Effect,  tho'  it  has  fome  Connection  and  Dependence,  yet  is 
not  entirely  dependent  on  it ;  That  is  the  fame  Thing  as  to 
fay,  that  not  all  that  is  in  the  Event  is  an  Effect  of  that  Caufe, 
but  that  only  Part  of  it  arifes  from  thence,  and  Part  fome 
other  Way. 

2.  If  there  are  fome  Events  which  are  not  neceflfarily  con 
nected  with  their  Caufes  then  it  will  follow,  that  there,  are 
fome  Things  which  corne  to  pafs  without  any  Caufe,  contra 
ry  to  the  Suppofition.  For  if  there  be  any  Event  which  was 
not  neceifarily  connected  with  the  Influence  of  the  Caufe  un 
der  fuch  Circumftances,  then  it  was  contingent  whether  it 
would  attend  or  follow  the  Influence  of  the  Caufe,  or  no:  It 
might  have  followed,  and  it  might  not,  when  the  Caufe  was 
the  fame,  its  Influence  the  fame,  and  under  the  fame  Circum 
ftances.  And  if  fo,  why  did  it  follow,  rather  than  not  follow  ? 
There  is  no  Caufe  or  Reafon  of  this  :  Therefore  here  is  fome- 
thing  without  any  Caufe  or  Reafon  why  it  is,  viz.  the  follow 
ing  of  the  Effect  on  the  Influence  of  the  Caufe,  with  which 
it  was  not  neceffarily  connected,  If  there  be  a  neceffary 
Connection  of  the  Effect  on  any  Thing  antecedent,  then  we 
may  fuppofe  that  fometimes  the  Event  will  follow  the  Caufe, 
and  fometimes  not,  when  the  Caufe  is  the  fame,  and  in 
every  Refpect  in  the  fame  State  and  Circumftances.  And  what 
can  be  the  Caufe  and  Reafon  of  this  ftrange  Phenomenon, 
even  this  Diverfity,  that  in  one  Inftance,  the  Effect  ihould 
follow,  in  another  not  ?  'Tis  evident  by  the  Suppofition, 
that  this  is  wholly  without  any  Caufe  or  Ground.  Here  is 
fomething  in  the  prefent  Manner  of  the  Exiftence  of  Things, 
and  State  of  the  World,  that  is  absolutely  without  a  Caufe  : 
Which  is  contrary  to  the  Suppofition^  and  contrary  to  what 
has  beer*  before  demonftrated, 

*.  To 


7S  ty  the  fuppofed  Liberty  Tart  H. 

3.  To  fuppofe  there  are  fome  Events  which  have  a 
Cauffe  and  Ground  of  their  Exigence,  that  yet  are  not  ne- 
ceffarily  connected  with  their  Caufe,  is  to  fuppofe  that  they 
have  a  Caufe  which  is  not  their  Caufe.  Thus ;  If  the  Effect 
i>e  not  neceifarily  -  connected  with  the  Caufe,  with  its  Influ 
ence,  and  influential  Circumftances ;  then,  as  I  obferved 
before,  'tis  a  Thing  poflible  and  fuppofable,  that  the  Caufe 
may  fometimes  exert  the  fame  Influence,  under  the  fame 
Circumftances,  and  yet  the  Effect  not  follow.  And  if  this 
actually  happens  in  any  Inftance,  this  Inftance  is  a  Proof,  in 
Fadt,  that  the  Influence  of  the  Caufe  is  not  fufficient  to  pro 
duce  the  Effect.  For  if  it  had  been  fufHcierrt,  it  would  have 
done  it.  And  yet,  by  the  Suppofition,  in  another  Inftance, 
the  -fame  Caufe,  with  perfectly  the  fame  Influence,  and 
when  all  Circumltences  which  have  any  Influence,  are  the 
fame,  it  was  followed  with  the  Effect.  By  which  it  is  mani- 
feft,  that  the  Effect  in  this  laft  Inftance  was  not  owing  to 
the  Influence  of  the  Caufe,  but  muft  come  to  pafs  fomt, 
other  Way.  For  it  was  proved  before,  that  the  Influence 
of  the  Caufe  was  not  fufficient  to  produce  the  Effect.  And 
if  it  was  not  fufficient  to  produce  it,  -then  the  Production 
of  it  could  not  be  owing  to  that  Influence,  but  muft  be 
ewing  to  fornething  elfe,  or  owing  to  Nothing.  And  if  the 
Effect  be  not  owing  to  the  Influence  of  the  Caufe,  trten  H 
is  not  the  Caufe.  Which  brings  us  to  the  Contradiction, 
of  a  Caufe,  and  no  Caufe,  that  which  is  the  Ground  and 
Reafon  of  the  Exiftence  of  a  Thing,  and  at  the  fame  Time 
is  not  the  Ground  and  Reafon  of  its  Exifteqee,  nor  i§ 
fufficient  to  be  fo. 

If  the  Matter  be  not  already  fo  plain  as  to  render  any 
further  Reafoning  upon  it  impertinent,  I  would  fay,  that 
that  which  feems  to  be  the  Caufe  in  the  fuppofed  Cafe,  can 
be  no  Caufe,  its  Power  and  Influence  having,  on  a  full 
Trial,  proved  infufficient  to  produce  fuch  an  Effect  :  and  if 
it  be  not  fufficient  to  .produce  it,  then  it  don't  produce  it. 
To  fay  otherwife,  is  to  fay,  there  is  Power  to  do  that  which 
there  is  not  Power  to  .do.  If  there  be  in  a  Caufe  fufficient 
Power  exerted,  and  in  Circumftances  fufficient  to  produce  an 
Effeft,  and  fo  the  Effect  be  actually  produced  at  one  Time ; 
Thefe  Things  all  concurring,  will  produce  the  Effect  at  all 
^Time-s.  And  fo  we  may  turn  it  the  other  Way  ;  That  which 
proves  no.t  fufficient  at  one  Time,  cannot  be  fuificient  at 
aaother,  \vith  .precifely  the  fame  influential  Circumftances  : 
And  therefore  if  the  Effeft  follows,  it  is  not  owing  to  that 

Caufe  *, 


Sedl.VHI.          without  all  Necefiity.  76- 

Caufe ;  unlefs-  the  different  Time  be  a  Circuroftance^  which 
has  Influence  :  But-  that  is  contrary  to  the  Suppofition ;  for 
'tis  fuppofed  that  all  Circumftances  that  have  Influence,  are 
the  fame.  And  befides,  this  avould  be  to  fuppofe  the  Time. 
to  be  the  Caufe  ;  which  is  contrary  to  the  Suppofition  of 
die  other  Thing's  being  the  Caufe.  But  if  merely  Diverfity 
of  Time  has  no  Influence,  .then  'tis  evident  th.it  it  is  as 
much  of  an  Abfurdity  to  fay,  the  Caufe  was  fufficient  ta 
produce  the  Effect  at  one  Time,  and  not  at  another;  as  to 
fay,  that  it  is  fufficient  to  produce  the  Effect  at  a  certain  Time,, 
and  yet  not  fufficienl  to  produce  the  fame  Effect  at  that  fame 
Tim«. 

On.  the  Whole,  it  is  clearly  manifeft,  that  every  Effect  has 
a  neceffary  Connection  with  its  Caufe,  or  with  that  which 
is  the  tr«e  Ground  and  Reafon  of  its  Exiftence.  An<& 
therefore  if  there  be  no  Event  without  a  Caufe,  as  was 
proved  before,  then  no  Event  whatfoever  is  contingent  in 
the  Manner  that  .Arminiam  fupp.ofe  the  free  Acts  of  the.WiH- 
to  be  contingent. 


SECT  i  o  N-     IX. 

Of  the  Connexion  of  the  A%s  of  the  Will 
the  Dilates  of  the  Underilanding. 

I'  T  is    manifeft,    that  the  Acts   of  the  Will   are  none  of 
them   contingent  in   fuch   a   Senfe   as   to  be  without  all 
Neceflity,    or    fo   as   not   to  be.  nscefiary  with   a    Neceflity 
of   Confequence    and    Connection  ;.  becaule    every    Act   of 
the  Will  is   fome  Way   connected   with   the   Underftandingj, 
and  is  as  the  greateft  apparent  Good  is,  in  the  Manner  which 
has  already  been  explained ;    namely,    that  the  Soul   always 
wills  or  chufes  that  which,  in  the  prefent  View  of  the  Mind, 
confidered  in   the  Whole  of  that  View,  and  all  that  belongs 
>  it,  appears  moft  agreeable.     Becaufe,  as  was  obferved  be<- 
>re,  Nothing  is  more  evident  than  that,  when  Men  act  vt>- 
mtarilj,  and  do  what  they  pleafe,    then  they  do  what  ap~ 
lars  moft  agreeable  to  them  -3    and  to  fay  otherwife^  wou-ld 

be 


77         Of  the  Conhedion  of  the  Will        Part  IL 

be  as  much  as  to  affirm,  that  Men  don't  chufe  what  ap 
pears  to  fuit  them  bed,  or  what  feems  moft  pleafmg  to 
them;  or  that  they  don't  chufe  what  they  prefer:  Which 
brings  the  Matter  to  a  Contradiction. 

,  As  'tis  very  evident  in  itfelf,  that  the  Acls  of  the  Will 
have  fome  Connection  with  the  Dictates  or  Views  of  the 
Underftanding,  fo  this  is  allowed  by  fome  of  the  chief  of 
the  Arminian  Writers,  particularly  by  Dr.  Whitby  and  Dr. 
Samuel  Clark. — : — Dr.  Turnbull,  tho'  a  great  Enemy  to  the 
Doclrine  of  Neceffity,  allows  the  fame  Thing.  In  his 
Cbriftian  Philofophy,  (P.  196,)  He  with  much  Approbation 
cites  another  Philofopher,  as  of  the  fame  Mind,  in  thefe 
Words :  "  No  Man,  (fays  an  excellent  Philofopher)  fets 
"  himfelf  about  any  Thing,  but  upon  fome  View  or  other., 
•'  which  ferves  him  for  a  Reafon  for  what  he  does;  and 
"  whatfoever  Faculties  he  employs,  the  Underftanding,  with 
•c  fuch  Light  as  it  has,  well  or  ill  informed,  conftantly 
«*  leads  ;  and  by  that  Light,  true  or  falfe,  all  her  operative 
"  Powers  are  directed.  The  Will  itfelf,  how  abfolute  and 
*c  incontrolable  foever  it  may  be  thought,  never  fails  in 
"  its  Obedience  to  the  Dictates  of  the  Underftanding. 
tc  Temples  have  their  facred  Images ;  and  we  fee  what  In- 
'^flutjice  they  have  always  had  over  a  great  Part  of  Man- 
'f  kind;  But  in  Truth,  the  Ideas  and  Images  in  Men's 
"  Mmds  -are  the  invifible  Powers  that  conftantly  govern 
tf  them  ;  and  to  thefe  they  all  pay  univerfally  a  ready  Sub- 
fc  million. " 

But  whether  this  be  in  a  juft  Confiftence  with  Themfelves, 
and  their  own  Notions  of  Liberty,  I  defire  may  now  be  im 
partially  confidered. 

Dr.  Whitly  plainly  fuppofes,  that  the  Acls  and  Determina 
tions  of  the  Will  always  follow  the  Underftanding's  Appre- 
henfion  or  View  of  the  greateft  Good  to  be  obtain'd,  or  Evil 
to  be  avoided ;  or  in  other  Words,  that  the  Determinations 
of  the  Will  conftantly  and  infallibly  follow  thefe  two  Things 
in  the  Underftanding  :  i.  The  Degree  of  Good  to  be  obtained, 
and  Evil  to  be  avoided,  propofed  to  the  Underftanding, 
and  apprehended,  viewed,  and  taken  Notice  of  by  it. 
2.  The  Degree  of  the  Understandings  View,  Notice  or  Appre- 
henfion  of  that  Good  or  Evil ;  which  is  increafed  by  Atten 
tion  and  Confideration.  That  this  is  an  Opinion  he  is  ex 
ceeding  peremptory  in,  (as  he  is  in  every  Opinion  which  he 
maintains  in  his  Controverfy  with  the  Galvinigt]  with  Dif- 

dain 


Sea,  IX.  with  the  Underftanding.  78 

•dam  of  the  contrary  Opinion,  as  abfurd  and  Self-contra- 
didory,  will  appear  by  the  following  Words  of  his,  in  his 
Difcourfe  on  the  rive  Points.  * 

'«•  Now,  'tis  certain,  that  what  naturally  makes  the  Un- 
«'  demanding  to  perceive,  is  Evidence  propofed,  and  appre- 
««  hended,  ccniidered  or  adverted  to:  for  Nothing  elfe  can 
be  requifite  to  make  us  come  to  the  Knowledge  of  the 

Truth. Again,  what  makes   the  V/ill   chufe,  is   fome- 

thing  approved  by  the  Undemanding ;  and  consequently 
appearing  to  the  Soul  as  Good.  And  whatfoever  it  re- 
fufeth,  is  fomething  reprefented  by  the  Understanding, 
and  fo  appearing  to  the  Will,  as  Evil.  Whence  all  that 
God  requires  of  us  is,  and  can  be  only  this ;  to  refufe  the 
if  Evil,  and  chufe  the  Good;  Wherefore,  to  fay  that  Evi- 
'«  dence  propofed,  apprehended  and  confidered,  is  not  fuffi- 
'««  cient  to  make  the  Undemanding  approve  j  or  that  the 
t(  greateft  Good  propofed,  the  greateft  Evil  threatned,  when 
'"  equally  bcliev'd  and  reflected  on,  is  not  fufficierit  to  cn- 
<<  gage  the  Will  to  chufe  the  Good  and  refufe  the  Evil,  is 
"  in  Effect  to  fay,  that  which  alone  doth  move  the  Will  to  chufe 
".  or  to  refufe,  is  not  fufacient  to  engage  it  fo  to  do ;  which 
««  being  contradictory  to  itfelf,  mult  of  Necefiity  be  falfe. 
«*  Be  it  then  fo,  that  we  naturally  have  an  Averfation  to 
the  Truths  propofed  to  us  in  the  Gofpel ;  that  only  can 
make  us  iridifpofed  to  attend  to  them,  but  cannot  hinder 
our  Conviction*  when  we  do  apprehend  them,  and  attend 

to  them.- Be  it,  that  there  is  in  us  alfo  a  Renitency  to 

the  Good  we  are  to  chufe ;  that  only  can  indifpofe  us  to 
believe  it  is,  and  to  approve  it  as  our  chiefeil  Good.  Be 
*e  it,  that  we  are  prone  to  the  Evil  that  we  mould  decline  ; 
*'  that  only  can  render  it  the  more  difficult  fcr  us  to  be- 
"  lieve  it  is  the  worft  of  Evils.  But  yet,  what  we  do  really 
<e  believe  to  be  our  chief  eft  Good,  willftill  be  chofen  ;  and  what  we 
*e  apprehend  to  be  the  worft  of  Evils,  will,  wbiljl  we  do  continue. 
t(  under  thai  Conviction,  be  refufed  by  us.  ,  It  therefore  can  be 
only  requifite,  in  order  to  thefe  Ends,  that  the  Good  Spi 
rit  mould  fo  illuminate  our  Underflandings,  that  we  at 
tending  to,  and  confidering  what  lies  before  us,  mould 
apprehend,  and  be  convinced  of  our  Duty ;  and  that  the 
Bleffiags  of  the  Gcfpel  ihould  be  fo  propounded  to  us,  as 
that  we  may  difcern  them  to  be  our  chiefeft  Good ;  and 
the  Miferies  it  threateneth,  fo  •  we  may  be  convinced 
"  they  are  the  worft  of  Evils  j  that  we  may  chufe  the  one, 
<e  and  refufe  the  other. 5> 

3V!  Her? 

*  SdU,  2d.  P.  211,  :m,  213, 


79         Of  the  Connexion  of  the  Will      Part  It 

Here  let  it  be  obferved,  how  plainly  and  peremptorily  it  is 
afferted,  that  the  great  <fi  Good  propofed,  and  the  greattji  Evil 
threatened,  when  equally  believed  and  refietted  on,  is  fufficient  to 
engage  the  Will  to  chitfe  the  Good,  and  refufe  the  Evil,  and  is  that 
alone  which  djth  move  the  Will  to  chuj'e  or  to  refufe  ;  and  that  it  is 
contradictory  to  iff  elf,  to  fuppofe  otherwife;  and  therefore  muft  of 
Necejfity  be  falfe  ;  and  then  what  we  do  really  believe  to  be  our  chief- 
eft  Goodwill ftill'be  chofen,  and  what  we  ap'prehendto  be  the  worft 
cf  Evils,  wiliywki'fj}  we  continue  under  that  Convi&ion,  be  refufed 
by  us.  Nothing  could  have  been  faid  more  to  the  Purpofe, 
fully  to  fignify  and  declare,  that  the  Determinations  of  the 
Will  muft  evermore  follow  the  Illumination,  Conviftion  and 
.Notice  of  the  Understanding,  with  Regard  to  the  greateil 
Good  and  Evil  propofed,  reckoning  both  the  Degree  of 
Good  and  Evil  underftood,  and  the  Degree  of  Underftand- 
ing,  Notice  and  Conviftion  of  that  propofed  Good  and  Evil  ;, 
and  that  it  is  thus  neceffarily,  and  can  be  otherwife  in  no  In- 
ftance  :  becaufe  it  is  afierted,  that  it  implies  a  Contradiction, 
to  fuppofe  it  ever  to  be  otherwife. 

I  am  fenfible,  the  Doctor's  Aim  in  thefe  AiTertions  is  againft 
the  Cafoinifo;  to  fhew,  in  Oppofition  to  them,  that  there  is 
no  Need  of  any  phyfical  Operation  of  the  Spirit  of  God  on 
the  Will,  to  change  and  determine  that  to  a  good  Choice, 
but  that  God's  Operation  and  Affiftance  is  only  moral', 
fuggefting  Ideas  to  the  Undcrftanding  ;  which  he  fuppofes  to 
be  enough,  if  thofe  Ideas  are  attended  to,  infallibly  to  ob 
tain  the  End.  Bar  whatever  his  Defign  was,  Nothing  can 
more  direftly  and  fully  prove-,  that  every  Determination  of 
the  Will,  in  chufing  and  refufing,  is  neceffary ;  direftly  con- 
trarj'  to  his  own  Notion  of  the  Liberty  of  the  Will.  For  if 
the  Determination  of  the  Will,  evermore,  in  this  Manner, 
follows  the  Light,  Conviction  and  View  of  the  Underftand- 
in^,  concerning  the  greateft  good  and  Evil,  and  this  be  that 
alone  which  moves  the  Will,  and  it  be  a  Contracficlion  to 
fuppofe  otherwife  ;  tlrcn  it  is  neceffarily  fo,  the  Will  neceflarily 
follows  this  Light  or  View  of  the  Underftanding,  not  only 
in  fome  of  its  Acls,  but  in  every  Aft  of  chufing  and  refu 
fing.  So  that  the  Will  don't  determine  itfelf  in  any  one  of 
its  own  Afts ;  "but  all  its  Afts,  every  Aft  of  Choice  and  Re- 
>fufal,  depends  on,  and  is  neceffarily  connefted  with  fome  an 
tecedent  Caufe  ;  which  Caufe  is  not  the  Will  itfelf,  nor  any 
Aft  of  its  own,  nor  any  Thing  pertaining  to  that  Faculty, 
fout  fomething  belonging  to  another  Faculty,  whofe  Afts  go 
?Dcfore  the  Will,  in  all  its  Afts*  and  govern  and  determine 
them  <;v^ry  one» 

Here,, 


•'Seel.  IX.        '-with  the  Underftandiiig.  5os 

Here,  if  it  mould  be  replied,  -that  altho' it  be  true,  that 
according  to  the  Doctor,  the  final  Determination  of  the  Will 
always  depends  upon,  and  is  infallibly  connefted  with  the 
'Underftanding  s  Conviction,  and  Notice  of  the  greateft 
Good ;  yet  the  Acts  of  the  Will  are  not  neceflary ;  becaufe 
that  Conviction  and  Notice  of  the  Underftanding  is  firft  de 
pendent  on  a  preceding  Aft  of  the  Will,  in  determining  to 
attend  to,  and  take  Notice  of  the  Evidence  exhibited ;  by 
which  Means  the  Mind  obtains  that  Degree  of  Conviction 
which  is  fufficient  and  effectual  to  determine  the  confequent 
and  ultimate  Choice  of  the  Will ;  and  that  the  Will  with 
'Regard  to  that  preceding  Ad,  whereby  it  determines  whe 
ther  to  attend  or  no,  is  not  neceflary  ;  and  that  in  this,  the 
Liberty  of  the  Will  confifts,  that  when  God  holds  forth 
fufficient  objective  Light,  the  Will  is  at  Liberty  whether  to 
command  the  attention  of  the  Mind  to  it. 

Nothing  can  be  more  weak  and  inconfiderate  than  fuch  a 
Heply  as  this.  For  that  preceding  Aft  of  the  Will,  in  de 
termining  to  attend  and  confider,  ft  ill  is  as  an  A&  of  the  IV ill  y 
(it  is  fo  to  be  fure,  if  the  Liberty  of  the  Will  coniifts  in  it,  as 
is  fuppofed)  and  if  it  be  an  Aft  of  the  Will,  it  is  an  Act 
of  Choice  'or  Refufal :  And  therefore,  if  what  the  Doctor 
aflerts  be  true,  it  is  determined  by  fome  antecedent  Light  in 
the  Underftanding  concerning  the  greateft  apparent  Good  or 
Evil.  For  he  afferts,  "it  is  that  Light  'which  alone  doth  move  the 
Will  to  chufe  or  refufe  :  And  therefore  the  Will  muft  be  movec! 
by  that  in  chuiing  to  attend  to  the  objective  Light  offered,  in 
order  to  another  confequent  Act  of  Choice ;  fo  that  this  Act 
is  no  lefs  necefTary  than  the  other.  And  if  we  fuppofe  ano 
ther  Act  of  the  Will,  ftill  preceding  both  thefe  mention 'd,  to 
determine  both,  ftill  that  alfo  muft  be  an  Act  of  the  Will,  and  an 
Act  of  Choice ;  and  fo  rrmft,by  the  fame  Principles,  be  infallibly 
determin'd  by  fome  certain  Degree  of  Light  in  the  Underftanding 
concerning  the  greateft  Good.  And  let  us  fuppofe  as  many 
Acts  of  the  Will,  one  preceding  another,  as  we  pleafe,  yet 
they  are  every  one  of  them  neceflarily  determined  by  a  cer 
tain  Degree  of  Light  in  the  Underftanding,  concerning  the 
greateft  and  moft  eligible  Good  in  that  Cafe ;  and  fo,  not 
one  of  them  free  according  to  Dr.  Whitby's  Notion  of  Free 
dom.  And  if  it  be  faid,  the  Reafon  why  Men  don't  attend 
to  Light  held  forth,  is  becaufe  of  ill  Habits  contracted  by 
e-.'il  Acts  committed  before,  whereby  their  Minds  are  in- 
ijifpofed  £o  attend  to,  and  confider  of  the  Truth  held  forth 
M  3  to 


$i         Of  the  Connexion  of  the  mil        Part  1 T . 

to  them  by  God,  the  Dfficulty  is  net  at  all  avoided :  ftitl 
the  Queftion  returns,  What  determined  the  Will  in  thofe 
preceding  evil  Ads  ?  It  rnuft,  by  Dr.  Wbitlfs  Principles, 
itill  be  the  View  of  the  Underftanding  concerning  the 
greateft  Good  and  Evil.  If  this  View  of  the  Underftanding 
be  ikat  alone  which  doth  move  the  Will  to  chufe  or  refufey  as  the 
Doftor  aiTerts,  then  every  Aft  of  Choke  or  Refufal,  from  a 
Man's  firft  Exiftence,  is  moved  and  determined  by  this  View  j 
and  this  View  of  the  Underftanding  exciting  and  governing 
the  Aft,  muft  be  before  the  Aft :  And  therefore  ths  Will  is 
neceflarily  determined,  in  every  one  of  its  Acts,  from  a  Man's 
£rft  Exiftence,  by  aCaufe  befide  the  Will,  and  a  Caufe  that  don't 
proceed  from,  or  depend  on  any  Ad  of  the  Will  at  all ;  which 
at  once  utterly  abolifhes  the  Doctor's  whole  Scheme  of  Li 
berty  of  Will :  and  he,  at  one  Stroke,  has  cut  the  Sinews 
of  all  his  Arguments  from  the  Goodnefs,  Righteoufnefs, 
Faithfulnefs  and  Sincerity  of  God,  in  his  Commands,  Pro- 
mifes,  Threatnings,  Calls,  Invitations,  Expoftulations, 
which  he  makes  Ufe  of,  under  the  Heads  of  Reprobation, 
Election,  Univerfal  Redemption,  fufficierjt  and  effectual 
Grace,  and  the  Freedom  of  the  Will  of  Man ;  and  has 
enervated  and  made  vain  all  thcfe  Exclamations  againft 
the  Dodrine  of  the  Cafaitiiftf ,  as  charging  God  with  mani- 
feft  Unrighteoufnefs,  Unfaithfulnefs,  Rypocrify,  Fallacy 
oufnefs,  and  Cruelty ;  which  he  has  over,  and  over,  and  over 
again,  numberlefs  Times  in  his  Book, 

Dr.  Samuel  Clark,  in  his  Demonftration  of  the  Being  and 
Attributes  of  God,  §  to  evade  the  Argument  to  prove  the 
Nfceflity  of  Volition,  from  its  neceffary  Connexion  with  the 
laft  Dictate  of  the  Underftanding,  fuppofes  the  latter  not 
to  be  diverfe  from  the  Aft  of  the  Will  itfelf.  But  if  it  be 
fo,  it  will  not  alter  the  Cafe  as  to  the  Evidence  of  the  Ne- 
ccffity  of  the  Aft  of  the  Will.  If  the  Diftate  of  the  Under 
ftanding  be  the  very  fame  with  the  Determination  of  the 
Will  "or  Choice,  as  Dr.  Clark  fuppofes,  then  this  Determi 
nation  is  no  Fruit  or  EffeS  of  Choice :  And  if  fo,  no  Liberty 
of  Choice  has  any  Hand  in  it :  As  to  Volition  or  Choice,  it 
is  nec'efiary;  That  is,  Choice  can't  prevent  it.  If  the  laft 
Dictate  of  the  Underftanding  be  the  fame  \vith  the  Deter 
mination  of  Volition  itfelf,  then  the  Exiftence  of  that  De 
termination  muft  be  necefiary  as  to  Volition ;  in  as  much 
as  Volition  can  have  no  Opportunity  to  determine  whether 
it  fhall  exift  or  no,  it  having  Exiftence  already  before  Voli 
tion, 
^  Edit.  6.  P.  93. 


Seft,  IX.  with  the  Underftanding.  82 

tion  has  Opportunity  to  determine  any  Thing.  It  is  itfelf 
the  very  Rile  and  Exiftence  of  Volition.  But  a  Thing,  af- 
ier  it  exifts,  has  no  Opportunity  to  determine  as  to  its  own 
Exigence  ;  it  is  too  late  for  that. 

If  Liberty  confifts  in  that  which  Armr-nians  fuppofe,  <vtz* 
in  the  Will's  determining  its  own  Afts,  having  free  Oppor 
tunity,  and  being  without  all  Neceflity ;  This  is  the  fame 
as  to  fay,  that  Liberty  conlifts  in  the  Soul's  having  Power 
and  Opportunity  to  have  what  Determinations  of  the  Will 
it  pleafes  or  chufes.  And  if  the  Determinations  of  the  Will, 
and  the  laft  Dictates  of  the  Underftanding  be  the  fame 
Thing,  then  Liberty  confifts  in  the  Mind's  having  Power  to 
have  what  Dilates  of  the  Underftanding  it  pleafes,  having 
Opportunity  to  chufe  its  own  Dictates  of  LJnderllanding*. 
But  this  is  abfurd ;  for  it  is  to  make  the  Determination  of 
Choice  prior  to  the  Dictate  of  Underftanding,  and  the 
Ground  of  it;  which  can't  confift  with  the  Dictate  of  Un- 
derftanding's  being  the  Determination  of  Choice  itfelf. 

Here  is  no  Way  to  do  in  this  Cafe,  but  only  to  recur  to 
the  old  Abfurdity,  of  one  Determination  before  another, 
and  the  Caufe  of  it ;  and  another  before  that,  determining 
that ;  and  fo  on  in  infinitum.  If  the  laft  Dictate  of  the  Un 
derftanding  be  the  Determination  of  the  Will  itfelf,  and  the 
Soul  be  free  with  Regard  to  that  Dictate,  in  the  Arminian 
Notion  of  Freedom  ;  then  the  Soul,  before  that  Dictate  of 
its  Underftanding  exifts,  voluntarily  and  according  to  its 
own  Choice  determines,  in  every  Cafe,  what  that  Dictate 
of  the  Underftanding  fhall  be ;  otherwife  that  Dictate,  as  to 
the  Will,  is  nece'flary ;  and  the  Acts  determined  by  it,  muft 
alfo  be  neceffary.  So  that  here  is  a  Determination  of  the. 
Mind  prior  to  that  Dictate  of  the  Underftanding,  an  Act  of 
Choice  going  before  it,  chufing  and  determining  what  that 
Dictate  of  the  Underftanding  lhall  be :  and  this  preceding 
Act  of  Choice,  being  a  free  Act  of  Will,  muft  alfo  be  the 
fame  with  another  laft  Dictate  of  the  Underftanding  :  And 
if  the  mind  alfo  be  free  in  that  Dictate  of  Underftanding,  that 
muft  be  determined  ftili  by  another ;  and  fo  on  forever. 

Befides,  if  the  Dictate  of  the  Underftanding,  and  De 
termination  of  the  Will  be  the  fame,  this  confounds  the  Un 
derftanding  and  Will,  and  makes  them  the  fame.  Whether 
they  be  the  fame  or  no,  I  will  not  now  difpute ;  but  only 
would  obferve,  that  if  it  be  fo-  and  the  Amixian  Notion  of 

Libert  v 


8j     Oftbe  Connexion  of  the  Will,  &c.     Part  K. 

Xiberty  confifts  in  a  Self-determining  Power  in  the  Under- 
.itanding,  free  of  all  Neceffity;  being  independent,  unde 
termined  by  any  Thing  prior  to  its  own  Ads  and  Determi 
nations  ;  and  the  more  the  Underftanding  is  thus  indepen 
dent,  and  fovereign  over  its  own  Determinations,  the  mo:e 
free.  By  this  therefore  the  Freedom  of  the  Soul,  as  a  moral 
Agent,  muft  confift  in  the  Independence  of  the  Underftand- 
.ing  on  any  Evidence  or  Appearance  of  Things,  or  any 
Thing  whatfoever  that  ftands  forth  to  the  View  of  the  Mind,, 
prior  to  the  Underftanding 's  Determination.  And  what  a 
Sort  of  Liberty  is  this !  confuting  in  an  Ability,  Freedom 
and  Eafinefs  of  judging,  either  according  to  Evidence,  or  a- 
gainft  it ;  having  a  fovereign  Command  over  itfelf  at  all 
Times,  to  judge,  either  agreeably  or  difagreeably  to  what  is 
plainly  exhibited  to  its  own  View.  Certainly,  'tis  no  Li 
berty  that  renders  Perfons  the  proper  Subjects  of  perfwafive 
Reafoning,  Arguments,  Expoftulations,  and  .fuch-like  moral 
Means  and  Inducements.  The  Ufe  of  which  with  Mankind, 
is  a  main  Argument  of  the  Arminiam,  to  defend  their  Notion 
of  Liberty  without  all  Neceffity.  For  according  to  this, 
the  more  free  Men  are,  the  lefs  they  are  under  the  Govern 
ment  of  fuch  Means,  lefs  fubjedl  to  the  Power  of  Evidence 
and  Reafon,  and  more  independent  on  their  Influence,  in  their 
Determinations. 

And  whether  the  Underftanding  and  Will  are  the  fame  or 
no,  as  Dr.  Clark  feems  to  fuppofe,  yet,  in  order  to  maintain 
the  Arminian  Notion  of  Liberty  without  Neceffity,  the  free 
Will  is  not  determined  by  the  Underftanding,  nor  neceflarily 
connected  with  the  Underftanding;  and  the  further  from 
fuch  Connection,  the  greater  the  Freedom.  And  when 
the  Liberty  is  full  and  complete,  the  Determinations  of  the 
Will  have  no  Conneclion  at  all  with  the  Dictates  of  the 
Underftanding.  And  if  fo,  in  vain  are  all  Applications  to 
the  Underftanding,  in  order  to  induce  to  any  free  virtuous 
Act  ;  and  fo  in  vain  are  all  Inftructions,  Counfels,  Invitati 
ons,  Expoftulations,  and  all  Arguments  and  Perfwafives  what 
foever  :  For  thefe  are  but  Applications  to  the  Underftanding, 
and  a  clear  and  lively  Exhibition  of  the  Objects  of  Choice  to 
the  Mind's  View.  But  if,  after  all,  the  Will  muft  be  felf-de- 
termined,  and  independent  on  the  Underftanding,  to  what  Pur- 
pofe  are  Things  thus  reprefented  to  the  Underftanding,  in  order, 
to  determine  the  Choice  ? 

3c^^ 

SECTION 


SecLX.  Afts  of  the  Will  connecJed  with  Motives.  84 

(XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX) 
SECTION     X. 

Volition  neceffarily  conneRed  with  the  Influence  of 
Motives ;  with  particular  Obfervations  on  the 
great  Inconfiftence  of  Mr.  Chubb V  After t  ions  and 
ReafoningSy  about  the  Freedom  of  the  Will.. 

THAT  every  Aft  of  the  Will  has  fome  Caufe,  and 
confequently  (by  what  has  been  already  proved)  has 
a  neceflary  Connection  with  its  Caufe,  and  fo  is  ne- 
ceflary  by  a  Neceflity  of  Connection  and  Confequence,  is 
evident  by  this,  That  every  Aft  of  the  Will  whatfoever,  is. 
excited  by  fbmer  Motive  :  Which  is  mamfeft,  becaufe,  if  the 
Will  or  Hindi  in  willing  and  chufing  after  the  Manner  that 
it  does,  is  excited  fo  to  do  by  no  Motive  or  Inducement,, 
then  it  has  no  End  which  it  propofes  to  itfelf,  or  purfue* 
in  fo  doing ;  it  aims  at  Nothing,  and  feeks  Nothing.  And: 
if  it  feeks  Nothing,  then  it  don't  go  after  any  Thing,  or  ex 
ert  any  Inclination  or  Preference  towards  any  Thing  ;  which 
brings  the  Matter  to  a  Contradiction  :  Becaufe  for  the  Mind  to 
will  Something,  and  for  it  to  go  after  Something  by  an  Aft  of 
Preference  and  Inclina-tion,  are  the  fame  Thing. 

But  if  every  Aft  of  the  Will  is  excited  by  a  Motive,  then 
that  Motive  is  the  Caufe  of  the  Aft  of  the  Will.  If  the  AOs 
of  the  Will  are  excited  by  Motives,  then  Motives  are  the 
Caufes  of  their  being  excited  ;  or,  which  is  the  fame  Thing,, 
the  Caufe  of  their  being  put  forth  into  Aft  and  Exiftence.  And 
if  fo,  the  Exiftence  of  the  Afts  of  the  Will  is  properly  the  Ef~ 
feft  of  their  Motives.  Motives  do  Nothing  as  Motives  or  In 
ducements,  but  by  their  Influence  ;  and  fb  much  as  is  done  by 
their  Influence,  is  the  EfFeft  of  them.  For  that  is  the  Notion 
of  an  Effeft,  fomething  that  is  brought  to  pafs  by  the  Influence 
of  another  Thing. 

And  if  Volitions  are  properly  the  EfFefts  of  their  Motives, 
then  they  are  neceffarily  connected  with  their  Motives.  Every 
EiFeft  and-  Event  being,  as  was  proved  before,  neceffariljr 
connefted  with  that  which  is  the  proper  Ground  and  Reafon 
of  its  Exiftence*  Thus  it  is  manifeft,  that  Volition,  is  ne~ 


g^  Acts  of  the  Will  comiefiedwitb  Motives.  Part.  iL 

ceflary,  and  is  not  from  any  Self-determining  Power  in  the 
Will :  The  Volition  which  is  caufed  by  previous  Motive  and 
Inducement,  is  not  caufed  by  the  Will  exercifmg  a  ibvereign 
Power  over  itfelf,  to  determine,  caufe  and  excite  Volitions 
in  itfelf.  This  is  not  confident  with  the  Will's  aciing  in  a 
State  of  Indifference  and  Equilibrium,  to  determine  itfelf  to 
a  Preference;  for  the  Way  in  which  Motives  operate,  is  by 
Mailing  the  Will,  and  giving  it  a  certain  Inclination  or  Pre~ 
yonderation  one  Way. 

Here  it  may  be  proper  to  obferve,  that  Mr.  Chubb,  in  his 
Collection  of  Trads  on  various  Subjects,  has  advanced  a 
Scheme  of  Liberty,  which  is  greatly  divided  againft  itfelf, 
and  thoroughly  fubverfive  of  itfelf ;  and  that  many  Ways. 

I.  He  is  abundant  m  afferting,  that  the  Will,  in  all  it:. 
Acts,  js  influenced  by  Motive  and  Excitement  j  and  that 
this  is  the  previous  Ground  and  Reafon  of  all  its  Acls,  and 
that  it  is  never  otherwife  in  any  Inflance.  He  fays,  (P.  262.} 
No  Action  can  take  place  without  fame  Motive  to  excite  it.  And 
in  P.  263.  Volition  cannot  take  place  without  fame  PREVIOUS  Rea 
fon  or  Motive  to  induce  it.  And  in  P.  310.  Afiion  would  not  take 
Place  without  fame  Reafon  or  Motive  to  induce  it ;  it  being  abfurd  to 
fuppofe,  that  the  active  Faculty  would  be  exerted  without  fame 
PREVIOUS  Reafon  to  difpofe  the  Mind  to  Aaion.  So  alfo  P.  2  57, 
And  he  fpeaks  of  thefe  Things  as  what  we  may  be  abfoiutely 
certain  of,  and  which  are  the  Foundation,  the  only  Foundation 
we  have  of  a  Certainty  of  the  moral  Perfections  of  God.  P. 
252,  253,  254,  255,  261,  262,  263,  264, 

And  yet  at  the  fame  Time,  by  his  Scheme,  the  Influence 
of  Motives  upon  us  to  excite  to  Action,  and  to  be  actually  a 
Ground  of  Volition,  is  confequent  on  the  Volition  or  Choice  of  the 
Mind.  For  he  very  greatly  infills  upon  it,  that  in  all  free  Actions, 
before  the  Mind  is  the  Subject  of  thofe  Volitions  which  Motives 
excite,  it  chufes  to  be  fo.  It  chufes  whether  it  will  comply 
with  the  Motive,  which  prefents  itfelt  in  View,  or  not ;  and 
when  various  Motives  are  prefented,  it  chufes  which  it  will 
yield  to,  and  which  it  will  reject.  So  P.  256.  Every  Man  has 
Power  to  aft,  or  to  refrain  from  aBing  agreeably  with,  or  contrary 
iiy  any  Motive  that  prefents.  P.  257.  Every  Man  is  at  Liberty  to 
a£ly  or  refrain  from  acJing  agreeably  with,  or  contrary  to,  what  each 
of  thefe  Motives ,  conjideredfingly,  would  excite  him  to. — Man  has 
Power,  and  is  as  much  at  Liberty  to  rejecJ  the  Motive  that  doe~ 
prevail,  as  he  hat  Power;  and  it  fit  Liberty  to  rejeft  thofe  Motives 

that 


Sed.  X.    incanjtfttnce  of  Mr.  Chubb V,  &e.         86 

that  do  not.  And  fo  P.  3 1  o,  311.  In  order  to  conjlitute  a  moral 
Agentt  it  is  'neceffary,  that  hejhould  have  Power  to  aft,  or  to  re 
frain  from  'aft ing  y  upon  fuch  moral  Motives  as  he  pleafes.  And  to 
the  like  Purpofe  in  many  other  Places.  According  to  thefe 
Things,  the  Will  acts  tirft,  and  chufes  or  refufes  to  com 
ply  with  the  Motive  that  is  presented,  before  it  falls  under 
its  prevailing  Influence :  Arid  'tis  firft  determined  by  the 
Mind's  Pleafure  or  Chdice,  what  Motives  it  will  be  induced 
by,  before  it  is  induced  by  them. 

Now,  how  can  thefe  Things  hang  together  ?  How  'can  the 
Mind  h'rft  act,  and  by  its  Act  of  Volition  ana  Choice  determine 
what  Motives  {hall  be  the  Ground  and  Reafon  of  its  Volition 
tind  Choice?  For  this  fuppofes,  the  Choice  is  already  made, 
before  the  Motive  has  its  Effect ;  and  that  the  Volition  is  al 
ready  exerted,  before  the  Motive  prevails,  fo  as  actually  to  be 
the  Ground  of  the  Volition  ;  and  makes  the  prevailing  of  the 
Motive,  the  Confequence  of  the  Volition,  which  yet  it  is  the 
Ground  of.  If  the  Mind  has  already  choferi  to  comply  with 
2.  Motive,  and  to  yield  to  its  Excitement,  it  don't  need  to 
yield  to  it  after  this  :  for  the  Thing  is  effected  already,  that 
the  Motive  would  excite  to,  and  the  Will  is  before-hand 
with  the  Excitement ;  and  the  Excitement  comes  in  too  late, 
and  is  needlefs  and  in  vain  afterwards.  If  the  Mind  has 
already  chofen.  to  yield  to  a  Motive  which  invites  to  a  Thing, 
that  implies  and  in  Fact  is  a  chuiing  the  Thing  invited  to  ; 
and  the  very  Act  of  Choice  is  before  the  Influence  of  the 
Motive  which  induces,  and  is  the  Ground  of  the  Choice  ; 
the  Son  is  before-hand  with  the  Father  that  begets  him  : 
The  Choice  is  fuppofed  to  be  the  Ground  of  that  Influence 
of  the  Motive,  w;hieh  very  Influence  is  fuppofed  to  be  the 
Ground  of  the  Choice.  And  fo  Vice  verfa,  The  Choice  is 
fuppofed  to  be  the  Confequence  of  the  Influence  of  the  Mo 
tive,  which  Influence  of  the  Motive  is  the  Confequence  of  that 
very  Choice. 

And  befide's,  if  the  Will  acts  firft  towards  the  Motive  before 
it  falls  under  its  Influence,  and  the  prevailing  of  the  Motive 
upon  it  to  induce  it  to  act  and  chufe,  be  the  Fruit  and  Con 
fequence  of  its  Act  and  Choice,  then  how  is  the  Motive  a. 
PREVIOUS  Ground  and  Reafon  of  the  Aft  and  Choice*  fo  that 
in  the  Nature  of  the  Thing,  Volition  cannot  take  Place  without  fame 
PREVIOUS  Reafon  and  Motive  to  induce  it  ;  and  that  this  Act 
is  confequent  upon,  and  follows  the  Motive  ?  Which  Things 
Mr.  Chubb  often  aflerts,  as  of  certain  and  undoubted  Truth. 

N  SQ 


Sy  Inconfiftence  of  MY.  Chubb  V  Part  II. 

So  that  the  very  fame  Motive  is  both  previous  and  confequent^ 
both  before  and  after,  both  the  Ground  and  Fruit  of  the 
very  fame  Thing  ! 

II.  Agreeable  to  the  fore-mention'd  inconfiftent  Notion  of 
the  Will's  tirft  acting  towards  the  Motive,  chufing  whether 
it  will  comply  with  it,  in  order  to  its  becoming  a  Ground  of 
the  Will's  acting  *  before  any  Act  of  Volition  can  take 
Place,  Mr.  Chubb  frequently  calls  Motives  and  Excitements 
to  the  Action  of  the  Will,  the  pajfive  Ground  or  Reafon  of  that 
Aflion.  V/hich  is  a  remarkable  Phrafe  ;  than  which  I  pre- 
fume  there  is  none  more  unintelligible,  and  void  of  diftinct 
and  confident  Meaning,  in  all  the  Writings  of  Duns,  Scotus, 
or  Thomas  Aquinas.  When  he  reprefents  the  Motive  to 
Afticn  or  Volition  as  paffivej  he  muft  mean  —  paffive  in  that 
Affair,  or  paffive  with  Refpeft  to  that  Aftion  which  he 
fpeaks  of  ;  otherwife  it  is  Nothing  to  his  Purpofe,  or  relating 
to  the  Defign  of  his  Argument:  He  muft  mean  (if  that 
can  be  called  a  Meaning)  that  the  Motive  to  Volition  is  firft 
afted  upon  or  towards  by  the  Volition,  chuiing  to  yield  to  it, 
making  it  a  Ground  of  Aftion,  or  determining  to  fetch  its 
Influence  from  thence;  and  fo  to  make  it  a  previous 
Ground  of  its  own  Excitation  and  Exiftence  :  Which  is 
the  fame  Abfurdity,  as  if  one  mould  fay,  that  the  Soul  of 
Man,  or  any  other  Thing  mould,  previous  to  its  exifting, 
chafe  what  Caufe  it  would  come  into  Exiften.ce  by,  and 
ihould  aft  upon  its  Caafe,  to  fetch  Influence  from  thence, 
to  bring  it  into  Being  j  and  fo  its  Caufe  fhould  be  a  paffive 
Ground  of  its  Exiftence  ! 


does  very  plainly  fuppofe  Motive  or  Excitement 
to  be  the  Ground  of  the  Being  of  Volition.  He  fpeaks  of  it  as 
the  Ground  or  Reafon  of  the  EXERTION  of  an  Aft  of 
the  Will,  P.  391.  &  392  ;  and  exprefly  fays,  that  Volition 
cannct  TAKE  PLACE  without  fome  previous  Ground  or  Mo 
tive  to  induce  it,  P.  363.  And  he  fpeaks  of  the  Aft  as  FROM 
the  Motive,  and  FROM  THE  INFLUENCE  of  the  Motive, 
P.  352,.  and  from  the  Influence  that  the  Motive  has  on  the 
Men,  for  the  PRODUCTION  of  an  Afiion,  P.  317.  Certain- 
ly,  there  is  no  Need  of  multiplying  Words  about  this  : 
'Tis  eafily  judged,  whether  Motive  can  be  the  Ground  of 
Volition's  being  exerted  and  taking  Place,  ib  that  the 
very  Production  of  it  is  from  the  Influence  of  the  Motive, 
and  yet  the  Motive,  before  it  becomes  the  Ground  of  the 
Volition,  is  paiTive,  or  afted  upon  by  the  Volition.  But 

this 


Sedt  X,  Scheme  of  Liberty,  &c,  3§ 

this  I  will  fay,  That  a  Man  who  infifts  fo  much  on  Clear- 
siefs  of  Meaning  in  others,  and  is  fo  much  in  blaming 
their  Confufion  and  Inconfiftence,  ought,  if  he  was  able,  to 
have  explained  his  Meaning  in  this  Phrafe  of  paj/vve  Ground 
of  Aftion,  fo  as  to  fhew  it  not  to  be  confufed  and  incon- 
fiftent. 

If  any  fiiould  fuppofe,  that  Mr.  Chubb  t  when  he  fpeaks  o'f 
Motive  as  a  paffive  Ground  cf  Attion,  don't  mean  paffive 
with  Regard  to  that  Volition  which  it  is  the  Ground  of,  but 
fome^  other  antecedent  Volition,  (tho'  his  Purpofe  and  Ar 
gument,  and  whole  Difcourfe,  will  by  no  Means  allow  of 
fuch  a  Suppofition)  yet  it  would  not  help  the  Matter  in  the 
leaft.  For,  (i.)  If  we  fuppofe  there  be  an  Ad  of  Volition 
or  Choice,  by  which  the  boul  chufes  to  yield  to  the  Invi 
tation  of  a  Motive  to  another  Volition,  by  which  the  Soul 
chufes  fomething  elfe ;  both  thefe  fuppofed  Volitions  are  i$ 
Efteft  the  very  fame.  A  Volition,  or  chufmg  to  yield  to 
the  Force  of  a  Motive  inviting  to  chufe  fomething,  comes  to 
juft  the  fame  Thing  as  chufmg  the  Thing  which  the  Mo 
tive  invites  to,  as  I  obferved  before.  So  that  here  can  be  no 
Room  to  help  the  Matter,  by  a  Diftindion  of  two  Volitions. 
(2.)  If  the  Motive  be  paffive  with  Refped,  not  to  the  fame 
Volition  that  the  Motive  excites  to,  but  one  truly  .diftin& 
and  prior ;  yet,  by  Mr.  Chubb,  that  prior  Volition  can'j 
take  Place,  without  a  Motive  o.r  Excitement,  as  a  previous. 
•Ground  of  its  Exiflence.  For  he  infifts,  that  it  is  abfurd  to 
Juppofe  c?y  Volition  Jbould  take  Plate  without  fame  previous 
Motive  to  induce  it.  So  that  at  Jail  it  comes  to  juft  the  lame 
Abfurdity  :  for  if  every  Volition  mi:  ft  liave  a  previous  Mo 
tive,  then  the  very  frft  in  the  whole  Series  muft  be  excited 
by  a  previous  Motive ;  and  yet  the  Motive  to  'teat  firft  Vo 
lition  is  paffive  ;  -but  can't  be  paffive  with  Regard  to  ano 
ther  antecedent  Volition,  beeaufe,  by  the  Suppofition,  it  is 
the  very  firft:  Therefore  if  it  be  paffive  with  Refped  to 
any  Volition,  it  muft  be  fo  with  Regard  to  that  very  Vo 
lition  that  it  is  tiie  Ground  of,  and  that  is  excited  by  it. 

III.  Tho'  Mr,  Chubb  aflerts,  as  above,  that  every  VolitioiH 
|ias  fome  Motive,  and  that,  in  the  Nature  of  the  Thing,  no 
ydition  can  take  Place  without  fome  Motive  to  induce  it ;  yet  he 
aflferts,  that  Volition  does  not  always  follow  the  ftrongeft  Mo 
tive  ;  or  in  other  Words,  is  not  governed  by  any  fuperipur 
Strength  of  the  Motive  that  is  followed,  beyond  Motives  to- 
the  contrary,  previous  to  the  Volition  itfelf*  His  own 

N  3  Words, 


89  Inconjifie»ce  of  Mr,  Chubb'*         Part  !L 

Words,  P.  258,  are  as  follows :  "  Tho'  with  regard  to  phyii- 
<s  csl  Caufes,  that  which  is  ftrongeft  always  prevails, 
*'  yet  it  is  otherwife  with  regard  to  moral  Caufes.  Of 
"•'  thefe,  fometimes  the  llronger,  fometimes  the  weaker, 
*'  prevails.  And  the  Ground  of  this  DifFerence  is  evident, 
v  namely,  that  what  we  call  moral  Caufes,  ftrictly  fpeak- 
*'  ing,  are  no  Caufes  at  all,  but  barely  paffive  Reafons  of, 
"  or  Excitements  to  the  Action,  or  to  the  refraining  from 
*'  acting :  which  Excitements  we  have  Power,  or  are  at; 
'-'  Liberty  to  comply  with  or  reject,  as  I  have  {hewed  above." 
And  fo  throughout  the  Paragraph,  he,  in  a  variety  of 
Phrafes,  infifts,  that  the  Will  is  not  always  determined  by  the 
ftrongeft  Motive,  unlefs  by  ftrongeft  we  prepofteroufly  mean 
actually  prevailing  in  the  Event  j  which  is.  not  in  the  Mo 
tive,  but  in  the  Will ;  but  that  the  Will  is  not  always  de 
termined  by  the  Motive  which  is  ftrongeft,  by  any  Strength 
previous  to  the  Volition  itfelf.  And  he  elfewhere  dees  a- 
bundantly  aflert,  that  the  Will  is  determined  by  no  fuperiour 
Strength  or  Advantage  that  Motives  have,  from  any  Conftitu- 
tion  or  State  of  Things,  or  any  Circurnftances  whatfoever, 
previous  to  the  actual  Determination  of  the  WTill.  And  in 
deed  his  whole  Difcourfe  on  human  Liberty  implies  it,  his 
whole  Scheme  is  founded  upon  it. 

But  thefe  Things  cannot  ftand  together. -There  is, 

fuch  a  Thing  as  a  Diverfity  of  Strength  in  Motives  to  Choice, 
previous  to  the  Choice  itfelf.  Mr.  Chubb  himfelf  fuppofes, 
that  they  do  preyioufy  invite,  induce,  excite  and  dijpofe  the  MinJ 
to  Aftion.  This  implies,  that  they  have  fomething  in  them- 
felves  that  is  inviting,  fome  Tendency  to  induce  and  difpoft. 
to  Volition,  previous  to  Volition  itfelf.  And  if  they  have 
in  themfelves  this  Nature  and  Tendency,  doubtlefs  they  have 
it  in  certain  limited  Degrees,  which  are  capable  of  Diver- 
iity;  and  fome  have  it  in  greater  Degrees,  others  in  lefs  ; 
and  they  that  have  rnoft  of  this  Tendency,  confidered  with 
all  their  Nature  arid  Circumftances,  previous  to  Volition, 
they  are  the  ftrongeft  Motives ;  and  thofe  that  have  leaft,  are 
the  weakeft  Motives. 

Now  if  Volition  fometimes  don't  follow  the  Motive  which 
is  ftrongeft,  or  has  moft  previous  Tendency  or  Advantage,  all 
Things  confidered,  to  induce  or  excite  it,  but  follows  the 
weakeft,  or  that  which  as  it  ftands  previoufly  in  the  Mind's 
View,  has  leaft  Tendency  to  induce  it ;  herein  the  Will  ap 
parently  acts  wholly  without  Motive,  without  any  previous 
Jleafon  to  difpofe  the  Mind  to  it,  contrary  to  what  the  iame 

Autho? 


Sect.  X.  Scheme  of  Liberty,  &c.  90 

Author  fuppofes.  The  Aft  wherein  the  Will  muft  proceed 
•without  previous  Motive  to  induce  it,  is  the  Aft  of  prefer 
ring  the  weakeft  Motive.  For  how  abfurd  is  it  to  fay,  The 
Mind  fees  previous  Reafon  in  the  Motive,  to  prefer  that 
Motive  before  the  other ;  and  at  the  fame  Time  to  fuppofe, 
that  there  is  Nothing  in  the  Motive,  in  its  Nature,  State,  or 
any  Circumftances  of  it  whatfoever,  as  it  Hands  in  the  pre 
vious  View  of  the  Mind,  that  gives  it  any  Preference  ;  but 
on  the  contrary,  the  other  Motive  that  ftands  in  Competition 
with  it,  in  all  thefe  Refpefts,  has  moft  belonging  to  it,  that 
is  inviting  and  moving,  and  has  molt  of  a  Tendency  to 
Choice  and  Preference  ?  This  is  certainly  as  much  as  to 
fay,  there  is  previous  Ground  and  Reafon  in  the  Motive  for 
the  Aft  of  Preference,  and  yet  no  previous  Reafon  for  it.  By 
the  Suppofition,  as  to  all  that  is  in  the  two  rival  Motives 
which  tends  to  Preference,  previous  to  the  Aft  of  Preference, 
it  is  not  in  that  which  is  prefer'd,  but  wholly  in  the  other  : 
becaufe  appearing  fuperiour  Strength,  and  all  appearing  Pre- 
ferableriefs  is  in  that ;  and  yet  Mr.  Chubb  fuppofes,  that  the 
Aft  of  Preference  is  from  previous  Ground  and  Reafon  in  the 
Motive  which  is  preferred.  But  are  thefe  Things  confiftent  £ 
Can  there  be  previous  Ground  in  a  Thing  for  an  Event 
that  takes  Place,  and  yet  no  previous  Tendency  in  it  to  that 
Event  ?  If  one  Tiling  follows  another,  without  any  previ 
ous  Tendency  to  its  following,  then  I  fhould  think  it  very 
plain,  that  it  follows  it  without  any  Manner  of  previous  Rea- 
ton  why  it  ftxould  follow. 

Yea,  in  this  Cafe,  Mr.  Ckubb  fuppofes,  that  the  Event 
follows  an  Antecedent  or  a  previous  Thing,  as  the  Ground 
of  its  Exiftence,  not  only  that  has  no  Tendency  to  it,  but  a 
contrary  Tendency.  The  Event  is  the  Preference  which  the 
Mind  gives  to  that  Motive  which  is  weaker,  as  it  ftands  in 
the  previous  View  of  the  Mind  j  the  immediate  Antecedent 
is  the  View  the  Mind  has  of  the  two  rival  Motives  con- 
junftly  ;  in  which  previous  View  of  the  Mind,  all  the  Pre- 
ferablenefs,  or  previous  Tendency  to  Preference,  is  fuppofed 
to  be  on  ,the  other  Side,  or  in  the  contrary  Motive;  and  all 
the  Unworthinefs  of  Preference,  and  fo  previous  Tendency 
to  Comparitive  Negleft,  Rejection  or  Undervaluing,  is  on 
that  Side  which  is  prefer'd  :  And  yet  in  this  View  of  the 
Mind  is  fuppofed  to  be  the  previous  Grounder  Reafon  of  this 
Aft  of  Preference,  exciting  it,  and  difpcjing  the  Mind  to  it : 
Which,  I  leave  the  Reader  to  judge,  whether  it  be  abfurd 
^pr  not,  If  it  be  net,  then  it  is  not  abfurd  to  fay,  that  the 

previous 


9 1  Inconfiftence  of  Mr.  Chubb V          Part  I L 

previous  Tendency  of  an  Antecedent  to  a  Confequent,  is  the 
Ground  and  Reafon  why  that  Confequeht  does  not  follow  j 
.and  the  Want  of  a  previous  Tendency  to  an  Event,  yea,  a 
Tendency  to  the  Contrary,  is  the  true  Ground  and  Reafon 
why  that  Event  does  follow* 

An  Acl:  of  Choice  or  Preference  is  a  comparative  Acl, 
wherein  the  Mind  ads  with  Reference  to  two  or  more  Things 
that  are  compared,  and  ftand  in  Competition  in  the  Mind's 
View.  If  the  Mind,  in  this  comparative  A6t,  prefers  that 
which  appears  inferiour  in  the  Comparifon-,  then  the  Mind 
herein  acts  abfolutely  without  Motive,  or  Inducement,  or 
any  Temptation  whatsoever.  Then,  if  a  hungry  Man  has 
the  Offer  of  two  Sorts  of  Food,  both  which  he  finds  an  Ap 
petite  to,  but  has  a  ftronger  Appetite  to  one  than  the  other ; 
and  there  be  no  Circumftances  or  Excitements  whatfoever  in 
the  Cafe  to  induce  him  to  take  either  one  or  the  other,  but 
merely  his  Appetite:  If  in  the  Choice  he  makes  between 
them,  he  chufes  that  which  he  has  leaft  Appetite  "to,  and 
jefufes  that  to  which  he  has  the  ftrongeft  Appetite,  this  is 
a  Choice  made  abfolutely  without  previous  Motive,  Excite 
ment,  Reafon  or  Temptation,  as  much  as  if  he  were  perfectly 
without  all  Appetite  to  either :  fiecaufe  his  Volition  in 
this  Cafe  is  a  comparative  Aft,  attending  and  following  a 
comparative  View  of  the  Food  which  he  chufes,  viewing  it 
as  related  to,  and  compared  with  the  other  Sort  of  Food,  in 
which  View  his  Preference  has  abfolutely  no  previous 
Ground,  yea,  is  againft  all  previous  Ground  and  Motive. 
And  if  there  be  any  Principle  in  Man  from  whence  an  A£t 
of  Choice  may  arife  after  this  Manner,  from  the  fame 
Principle  Volition  may  arife  wholly  without  Motive  on  ei 
ther  Side.  If  the  Mind  in  its  Volition  can  go  beyond  Mo 
tive,  then  it  can  go  without  Motive  :  for  when  it  is  be 
yond  the  Motive,  it  is  out  of  the  Reach  of  the  Motive, 
out  of  the  Limits  of  its  Influence,  and  fo  without  Motive. 
If  Volition  goes  beyond  the  Strength  and  Tendency  of  Mo 
tive,  and  efpecially  if  it  goes  againft  its  Tendency,  this 
demonftrates  the  Independence  of  Volition  or  Motive.  And  if 
fo,  no  Reafon  can  be  given  for  what  Mr.  Chubb  fo  often  afr 
ferts,  even  that  in  the  Nature  of  Things  Volition  c#nnt)t  takg 
Place  'without  a  Motive  to  induce  it. 

If  the  moft  High  mould  endow  a  Balance  with  Agency 
or  Activity  of  Nature,  in  fuch  a  Manner,  that  when  une 
qual  Weights  are  put  into  the  Scales,  its  Agency  could  enable 


Seel.  X.          Scheme  of  Liberty  y  &c.-  92 

it  to  caufe  that  Scale  to  defcend  which  has  the  leaft  Weight^ 
and  fo  to  raife  the  greater  Weight  ;  this  would  clearly  de- 
monftrate,  that  the  Motion  of  the  Balance  does  not  depend 
on  Weights  in  the  Scales,  at  leaft  as  much,  as  if  the  Ba 
lance  fhould  move  itfelf,  when  there  is  no  Weight  in  ei 
ther  Scale.  And  the  Activity  of  the  Balance  which  is 
fufficient  to  move  itfelf  againft  the  greater  Weight,  muft  cer 
tainly  be  more  than  fufficient  to  move  it  when  there  is  no 
Weight  at  all. 

Mr.  Chubb  fuppofes,  that  the  Will  can't  ftir  at  all  without 
fbme  Motive  ;  and  alfo  fuppofes,  that  if  there  be  a  Motive 
to  one  Thing,  and  none  to  the  contrary,  Volition  will  in-* 
fallibly  follow  that  Motive.  This  is  virtually  to  fuppofe  an 
entire  Dependence  of  the  Will  on  Motives  :  If  it  were  not 
wholly  dependent  on  them,  it  could  fu  rely  help  itfelf  a  little 
without  them,  or  help  itfelf  a  little  againft  a  Motive,  with 
out  help  from  the  Strength  and  Weight  of  a  contrary  Mo 
tive.  And  yet  his  fuppoiing  that  the  Will,  when  it  has  be 
fore  it  various  cppoiite  Motives,  can  ufe  them  as  it  pleafes, 
and  chute  its  own  Influence  from  them,  and  neglect  the 
ftrongeft,  and  follow  the  weakeft,  fuppofes  it  to  be  wholly  in 
dependent  on  Motives. 

It  further  appears,  on  Mr.  Ckubb's  Suppofition,  that  Vo 
lition  muft  be  without  any  previous  Ground  in  any  Motive,. 
thus  :  If  it  be  as  he  fuppofes,  that  the  Will  is  not  deter 
mined  by  any  previous  fuperiour  Strength  of  the  Motive, 
but  determines  and  chufcs  its  own  Motive,,  then,  when  the 
rival  Motive  are  exactly  equal  in  Strength  and  Tendency  to 
induce,  in  all  Refpects3  it  may  follow  either  ;  and  may  ir* 
fuch  a  Cafe,  fometimes  follow  one,  fometimes  the  other,. 
And  if  fo,  this  Diverfity  which  appears  between  the  Ads 
of  the  Will,  is  plainly  without  previous  Ground  in  either 
of  the  Motives  ;  for  all  that  is  previoufly  in  the  Motives,  is 
fuppofed  precifely  and  perfectly  the  fame,  without  any  Di 
verfity  whatfoever.  Now  perfect  Identity,  as  to  all  that  is 
previous  in  the  Antecedent,  can't  be  the  Ground  and  Rea- 
fon  of  Diverfity  in  the  Confequent.  Perfect  Identity  in  the 
Ground  can't  be  a  Reafon  why  it  is  not  followed  with  the  fame 
Confequence  :  And  therefore  the  Source  of  this  Diverfity  of 
Confequence  muft  be  fought  for  elfewhere* 


And  laftly,  it  may  be  obferved,  that  however  Mr. 
does  much  infift   that  no  Volition  can  take  Place  without 

fome 


93  Inconfifience  of  Mr.  Chubb'*         Part  IL 

ibme  Motive  to  induce  it,  which  previoufly  difpofes  the 
Mind  to  it ;  yet,  as  he  alfo  infifts  that  the  Mind  without 
Reference  to  any  previous  fuperiour  Strength  of  Motives, 
picks  and  chufes  for  its  Motive  to  follow  ;  He  himfelf  here 
in  plainly  fuppofes,  that  with  Regard  to  the  Mind's  Prefe 
rence  of  one  Motive  before  another,  it  is  not  the  Motive  that 
difpofes  the  Will,  but  the  Will  difpofes  itfelf  to  follow  the 
Motive. 

IV.  Mr.  Chubb  fuppofes  Neceflity  to  be  utterly  inconfift- 
em  with  Agency  ,*  and  that  to  fuppofe  a  Being  to  be  an  Agent 
in  that  which  is  neceffary,  is  a  plain  Contradiction.  P.  311* 
and  throughout  his  Difcourfes  on  the  Subject  of  Liberty,  he 
fuppofes,  that  Neceffity  cannot  confift  with  Agency  or  Freed  o'm ; 
and  that  to  fuppofe  otherwife,  is  to  make  Liberty  and  Ne 
ceffity,  Action  and  Paflion,  the  fame  Thing.  And  fo  lie 
feems  to  fuppofe,  that  there  is  no  Action  ftrictly  ipeaking, 
but  Volition ;  and  that  as  to  the  Effects  of  Volition  in 
Body  or  Mind,  in  themfelves  confidered,  being  neceffary, 
they  are  faid  to  be  free,  only  as  they  are  the  Effects  of  an  Act 
that  is  not  neceffary. 


And  yet,  according  to  him,   Volition   itfelf  is  the 
of  Volition ;    yea,    every   Act  of  free  Volition  :  and  therefore 
every  Act  of  free  Volition  muft,  by  what  has  now  been  ob- 
ferved   from    Him,    be   neceffary.     That   every  Act   of   free 
Volition  is  itfelf  the  Effect  of  Volition,  is  abundantly  fup- 
pofed  by  Him.     In   P.    341,  he  fays,  "If  a   Man  is  fuch  a 
*  Creature  as  I  have  above  proved  him  to  be,    that   is,  if  he 
s  has  in  him  a  Power  or  Liberty  of  doing  either  Good  or 
f  Evil,  and  either  of  thefe  is  the  Subject   of  his   own  free 
«  Choice,    fo  that  he   might,    IF    HE  HAD  PLEASED, 
«  have  CHOSEN  and  done  the  contrary/' Here  He  fup 
pofes,  all  that  is  Good  or  Evil  in  Man  is  the  Effect  of  his 
Choice  ;  and  fo   that  his   good   or  evil  Choice  itfelf  is  the 
Effeft  of  his  Pleafure  or  Choice,    in  thefe  Words,  He  might 
if  be  bad  PLEASED,  haw  CHOSEN  the  contrary.  So  in  P.  356, 
"  Tho'  it  be  highly  reafonable,  that  a  Man  mould  always 

fs  chufe  the  greater  Good, yet  he  may,  if  he  PLEASES, 

"  CHUSE  otherwife/'  Which  is  the  fame  Thing  as  if  he 
had  faid,  He  may,  if  he  chufes,  chufe  othernvi/e.  And  then  he 
goes  on,  " — that  is,  he  may,  if  be  phafes,  chufe  what  is 
good  for  himfelf,"  &c.  And  again,  in  the  fame  Page,  '*  The 
*'  Will  is  not  confined  by  the  Underftanding  to  any  parti- 
"  cular  Sort  of  Good,  whether  greater  or  lefs  -}  but  is  at 

«  Liberty 


Se<ft  X.          Scheme  of  Uterty,  &c.  94 

*'  Liberty  to  chu/e  what  Kind  of  Good  it  pleafes" If  there 

be  any  Meaning  in  thefe  laft  Words,  the  Meaning  muft  be 
this,  that  the  Will  is  at  Liberty  to  chufe  what  Kind  of  Good  it 
chufes  to  chufe;  fuppolmg  tlie  Aft  of  Choice  itfelf  deter 
mined  by  an  antecedent  Choice.  The  Liberty  Mr.  Chubb 
fpeaks  of,  is  not  only  a  Man's  having  Power  to  move  his 
Body  agreeably  tp  an  antecedent  Act  of  Choice,  but  to  ufe 
or  exen  the  Faculties  of  his  Soul.  Thus,  in  P.  379,  fpeaking 
of  the  Faculties  of  his  Mind,  he  fays,  "  Man  has  Power,  and 
**  is  at  Liberty  to  neglect  thefe  Faculties,  to  ufe  them  aright, 
<f  or  to  abufe  them,  as  he  pleqfes."  And  that  he  fuppofes  an 
Aft  of  Choice,  or  Exercife  of  Pkafure,  prqperly  diftinft 
from,  and  antecedent  to  thofe  Afts  thus  chofen,  direfting, 
commanding  and  producing  the  chofen  Afts,  -and  even  the 
Afts  of  Choice  themfeives,  is  very  plain  in  P.  283.  "  He 
s*  can  commend  kit  Aflions  ;  and  herein  confiils  his  Liberty  : 
<f  He  can  give  or  deny  himfelf  that  Pleafure  as  he  pleafes.'" 

And  P*    377,   **   If  the  Aftions  of  Men- are  not  the  Pro- 

"  duce  of  a  free  Choice,  or  Eleftion,  but  fpring  from  a  Neceffity 

"  of  Nature, he  cannot  in  Reafon  be  the  Objeft  of  Re- 

*'  ward  or  Punifcment  on  their  Account.  Whereas,  if 
"  Action  in  Man,  whether  Good  or  Evil,  is  the  Produce  of 
*«  Will  or  free  Choice  ;  fo  that  a  Man  in  either  Cafe,  had  it 
<e  in  his  Power,  and  was  at  Liberty  to  have  CHOSEN  the 
*'  contrary/  he  is  the  proper  Objeft  of  Reward  or  Punifh- 
f(  rnent,  according  as  he  CHUSES  to  behave  Himfelf." 
Here  in  thefe  laft  Words,  he  fpeaks  of  Liberty  of  CHUSING, 
according  as  he  CHUSES.  So  tiiat  the  Behaviour  which  he 
fpeaks  of  as  fubjeft  to  his  Choice,  is  his  ch/Jtng  itfelf,  as 
well  as  his  external  Conduft  confequent  upon  it.  And 
therefore  'tis  evident,  he  means  not  only  external  Aftions,  but 
•the  Afts  of  Choice  themfeives,  when  he  fpeaks  of  all  free 
Aaions*  as  the  PRODUCE  of  fret  Choice,  And  this  is  abun 
dantly  evident  in  what  he  fays  in  P.  372*  &  373. 

Nor/  thefe  Things  imply  a  twofold  great  Abfurdity  and 
Isconfiftencc. 

i.  To  fuppofe,  as  Mr.  Chubb  plainly  does,  that  every 
free  Aft  of  Choice  is  commanded  by,  and  is  the  Produce  of  free 
Choice,  is  to  fuppofe  the  firft  free  Aft  of  Choice  belonging  to 
the  Cafe,  yea,  the  firft  free  Aft  of  Choice  that  ever  Man  ex 
erted,  to  be  the  Produce  of  an  antecedent  Aft  of  Choice.  But 
I  hope  I  need  not  labour  at  all  to  convince  my  Pleaders,  that  'tis 
an  Abfurdity  to  fay,  the  very  frf  Aft  is  the  Produce  of  ano 
ther  Aft  that  went  before  it. 

O  3.  If 


9'j;  Incmfifiencc  of  Mr.  Chubb'j  Part  IL 

2.  If  it  were  both  poffible  and  real,  as  Mr.  Chubb  inhfts, 
that  every  free  Aft  of  Choice  were  the  Produce  or  the  Effect 
of  a  free  Ad  of  Choice ;  yet  even  then,  according  to 
his  Principles,  no  one  Aft  of  Choice  would  be  free,  but  every 
one  necelfary ;  becaufe,  every  Aft  of  Choice  being  the  Effect 
of  a  foregoing  Aft,  every  Aft  would  be  nece'flarily  con 
nected  with  that  foregoing  Caufe.  For  Mn  Chubb  himfelf 
fays,  P.  389,  "  "When  the  Self- moving  Power  is  exerted,  it 

"  becomes  the  neceflary  Caufe  of  its  Effects." So  that  his 

Notion-of  a  free  Aft,  that  is  rewardable  or  punifhable,  is  a 
Heap  of  Contradictions.  It  is  a  free  Act,  and  yet,  by  his 
own  Notion  of  Freedom,  is  neceflary ;  and  therefore  by  him 
it  is  a  Contradiction,-  to  fuppofe  it  to  be  free.  According  to 
him,  every  free  Act  is  the  Produce  of  a  free  Act ;  fo  that 
there  muft  be  an  infinite  Number  of  free  Acts  in  Succeffionj 
without  any  Beginning,  in  an  Agent  that  has  a  Beginning  : 
And  therefore  here  is  an  infinite  Number  of  free  Acts, 
every  one  of  them  free ;  and  yet  not  any  one  of  them  free, 
but  every  Act  in  the  whole  infinite  Chain  a  neceflary  Effect. 
All  the  Acts  are  rewardable  or  punifhable,  and  yet  the  Agent 
cannot,  in  Reafon,  be  the  Object  of  Reward  or  Punimment,  on 
Account  of  any  one  of  thefe  Actions.  He  is  active  in  them 
all,  and  paffive  in  none ;  yet  active  in  none,  but  paflive  in. 

all,  e^v., 

V.  Mr.  Chubb  does  moft  ftrenuoufiy  deny,  that  Motives 
are  Caufes  of  the  Acts  of  the  Will ;  or  that  the  moving 
Principle  in  Man  is  moved,  or  caufed  to  be  exerted 'by  Motives. 
His  Words-?.  3^8  &  389,  are,  "  If  the  moving  Principle  in 
«  Man  is  MOVED,  or  CAUSED  TO  BE  EXERTED, 
'*  by  fomething  external  to  Man,  which- all  Motives  are,  then 
ft  it  would  not  be  a  Self-moving  Principle,  feeing  it  would  be 
**  moved  by  a  Principle  external  to  itfelf.  And  to  fay,  that  a 
"  Self-moving  Principle  is  MOVED,  or  CAUSED'TO  BE 
"  EXERTED,  by  a  Caufe  external  to  itfelf,  is  abfurd  and 
**  a  Contradiction,  &c." And  in  the  next  Page,  'tis  particu 
larly  and  largely  infilled,  that  Motives  are  Caufes  in  no  Cafs, 
that  they  are  merely  pajji^ve  in  the  Production  of  Action,  and  ha<ue 
•no  Caufality  in  the  Production  of  it,- — no  Caufality,  to  be  the  Cauje 
of  the  Exertion  of  the  Will* 

Now  I  defire  it  may  be  confidered,  how  this  can  poflibly 
coafiit  with  what  he  fays  in  other  Places*  Let  it  b&  noted 
here,, 


X.  Scheme  of  Liberty >  &c.  c6 

j.  Mr.  Chubb  abundantly  fpeaks  of  Motives  as  .£»- 
fitements  of  the  AcJs  of  the  Will ;  and  fays,  that  Motives  do 
excite.  Volition,  and  induce  it,  and  that  they  are ,  necefiary  to 
this  End  ;  that  in  the  Reafon  and  Nature  of  Things,  Volition  can" 
vit  take  Place  without  Motives  to  excite  it.  But  now  if  Motives 
excite  the  Will,  they  move  it ;  and  yet  he  fays,  'tis  abfurd  to  fay, 
the  Will  is  moved  by  Motives.  And  again,  (if  Language  is 
of  any  Significancy  at  all)  If  Motives  excite  Volition,  then 
they  are  the  Caufe  of  its  being  excited  -}  and  to  caufe  Voli 
tion  to  be  excited,  is  to  caufe  it  to  be  put  forth  or  exerted. 
Yea,  Mr.  Chubb  fays  himfelf,  P.  317,  Motive  is  neceffary 
to  the  Exertion  of  the  adive  Faculty.  To  excite,  is  pofi tively 
to  do  fomething ;  and  certainly  that  which  -does  fomething,  is 
the  Caufe  of  the  Thing  done  by  it.  To  create,  is  to  caufe  ta 
be  created ;  to  make,  is  to  caufe  to  be  made ;  to  kill,  is  to 
caufe  to  be  killed  ;  to  quicken,  is  to  caufe  to  be  quickened  ; 
and  to  excite,  is  to  caufe  to  be  excited.  To  -excite,  is  to  be  a 
Caufe,  in  the  moft  proper  Senfe.,  not  merely  a  negative 
Occafion*  but  a  Ground  of  Exiftence  by  politive  Influence., 
The  Notion  of  exciting.,  is  exerting  Influence  to  caufe  the 
pffed  to  arife  or  come  forth  into  Exiftence, 

2.  Mr.  Chubb   himfelf,  P.  317,  fpeaks  of  Motives  as  the 
Ground  and  Reafon   of  Aftion  BY  INFLUENCE,  and  BY 
PREVAILING  INFLUENCE.     Now,  what  can  be  meant 
by  a  Caufe,,  but  fomething  that  is  the  Ground  and  Reafon  of 
a  Thing  by  its  Influence,,  an  Influence   that  is  prevalent  and 
fo  effectual  ? 

3.  This  Author  not  only  fpeaks  of  Motives  as  the  Ground 
and  Reafon  of  Action,  by  prevailing  Influence  -3  but  exprefly 
of  their   Influence  as  prevailing  FOR  THE  PRODUCTION 
of  an  Action,  in  the  fame  P.  317  :  which   snakes  the  Incon- 
fiftency   ftill   more   palpable   and  notorious.     The  ProdufHou. 
«f  an  Effect  is  certainly   the  Caujing  of  an  Effect  j  and  pro 
ductive  Influence   is    caufal  Influence,  if  any   Thing   is  :   And 
that  which  has  this  Influence  prevalently,  fo    as  thereby  to 
become  the  Ground   of  another  Thing,  is   a  Caufe   of  than 
Thing,  if  there  be  any  fuch  Thing  as   a  Caufe.     This  In 
fluence,  Mr.  Chubb  fays,  Motives  have  to  produce  an  Action  ; 
and  yet  he  fays,  'tis  abfurd  and  a  Contradiction,  to  fay  they 
are  Caufes. 

In  the  fame  Page,  He  once    and    again  fpeaks  of  Mo- 
as  difpojlng  the  Agent  to  Action,  by  their  Infovxc.     His 
O  3  Words 


97  In  confidence  of  Mr.  Chubb' s         Part  II. 

Words  are  thefe  :  "  As  Motive,  which  takes  Place  in  the 
**  Underftanding,  and  is  the  Produd  of  Intelligence,  is 
«  NECESSARY  to  Adicn,  that  is,  to  the  EXERTION  of 
the  adive  Faculty,  becaufe  that  Faculty  would  not  be  ex 
erted  without  fome  PREVIOUS  REASON  to  DISPOSE 
the  Mind  to  Adion;  fo  from  hence  it  plainly  appears, 
that  when  a  Man  is  faid  to  be  difpofed  to  one  Adion  ra 
ther  than  another,  this  properly  fignifies  the  PREVAIL 
ING  INFLUENCE  that  one  Motive  has  upon  a  Man 
FOR  THE  PRODUCTION  of  an  Adion,  or  for  the 
being  at  Reft*  before  all  other  Motives,  for  the  Production 
of  the  contrary.  For  as  Motive  is  the  Ground  and  Rea- 
fon  of  any  Adion,  fo  the  Motive  that  prevails ,  DISPOSES 
tc  the  Agent  to  the  Performance  of  that  Adion." 

Now,  if  Motives  difpofe  the  Mind  to  Adion,  then  they 
caufe  the  Mind  to  be  difpofed  ;  and  to  caufe  the  Mind  to  be 
difpofed,  is  to  caufe  it  to  be  willing ;  and  to  caufe  it  to  be 
willing,  is  to  caufe  it  to  will  ;  'and  that  is  the  fame  Thing 
as  to  be  the  Caufe  of  an  Ad  of  the  Will.  And  yet  this 
fame  Mr.  Chubb  holds  it  to  be  abfurd,  to  fuppofe  Motive  to  be 
a  Caufe  of  the  Ad  of  the  Will. 

And  if  we  compare  thefe  Things  together,  we  have  here 
again  a  whole  Heap  of  Inconfiflences.  Motives  are  the  previous 
Ground  and  Reafon  of  the  Ads  of  the  Will ;  yea,  the  necejfary 
Ground  and  Reafon  of  their  Exertion,  without  nuhich  they  <willnot 
be  exerted,  and  cannot  in  the  Nature  of  things  take  Place  ;  and 
they  do  excite  thefe  Ads  of  the  Will,  and  do  this  by  a  pre 
vailing  Influence  ;  yea,  an  Influence  which  prevails  for  the  Pro- 
duBion  of  the  Ad  of  the  Will,  and  for  the  difpofag  of  the  Mind 
to  it :  and  yet  'tis  abfurd,  to  fuppofe  Motive*  to  be  a  Caufe  of-aflr 
Ad  of  the  Will,  or  that  a  Principle  of  Will  is  moved  or 
caufed  to  be  exerted  by  it,  or  that  it  has  any  Caujality  in  the  Pro 
duction  of  it,  or  any  Caujality  to  be  the  Caufe  of  the  Exertion  of 
the  Will. 

A  due  Confederation  of  thefe  Things  which  Mr.  Chubb  has 
advanced,  the  flrange  Incontinences  which  the  Notion  of  Li 
berty  coniifting  in  the  Will's  Power  of  Self-determination 
void  of  all  Neceffity,  united  with  that  Didate  of  common 
Senfe,  that  there  can  be  no  Volition  without  a  Motive,  drove 
him  into,  may  be  fufficient  to  convince  us,  that  it  is  utterly  im- 
poffible  ever  to  make  that  Notion  of  Liberty  confiftent  with 
ihe  Influence  of  Motives  hi  Volition,  And  as  it  is  in  a  man 
ner 


Seel.  X.  Scheme  of  Liberty  y  S:c,  9$ 

ner  felf-evident,  that  there  can  be  no  Aft  of  Will,  Choice 
or  Preference  of  the  Mind,  without  fome  Motive  or  Induce* 
ment,  fomething  in  the  Mind's  View,  which  it  aims  at,  feeks, 
inclines  to,  and  goes  after  ;  fo  'tis  moft  manifeft,  there  is  no 
fuch  Liberty  in  the  Univerfe  as  Arndniam  infill  on  ;  nor  any 
fuch  Thing  poflible,  or  conceivable. 


SECTION     XL 

Evidence  of  GO  D's  certain  Foreknowledge  of 

the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents. 

HAT  the  Acls  of  the  Wills  of  moral  Agents  are  not 
contingent  Events,  in  that  Senfe,  as  to  be  without  all 
Neceflity,  appears  by  God's  certain  Foreknowledge  of  fuch 
Events. 

In  handling  this  Argument,  I  would  in  ti\tfirft  Place  prove, 
that  God  has  a  certain  Foreknowledge  of  the  voluntary  AO* 
of  moral  Agents  ;  andy^roW/y,  mew  the  Confequence,  or  how- 
it  follows  from  hence,  that  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents  are 
not  contingent,  fo  as  to  be  without  Necellity  of  Connection 
and  Confequence. 

FIRST,  I  am  to  prove,  that  God  has  an  abfolute  and  cer 
tain  Foreknowledge  of  the  free  Actions  of  moral  Agents. 

One  would  think,  it  ihould  be  wholly  needlefs  to  enter  on 
fuch  an  Argument  with  any  that  profcfs  themfelves  Chriftians  : 
But  fo  it  is  ;  God's  certain  Foreknowledge  of  the  free  Acls 
of  moral  Agents,  is  denied  by  fome  that  pretend  to  believe 
the  Scriptures  to  be  the  Word  of  God  ;  and  efpecially  of  late. 
I  therefore  (hall  consider  the  Evidence  of  fuch  a  Prefcience  in 
the  Moft  High,  as  fully  as  the  deiigned  Limits  of  this  Eflay 
will  admit  of;  fuppofing  myfelf  herein  to  have  to  do  with  fueh 
as  own  the  truth  of  the  Bible. 
* 

ARC.  I.  My  firft  Argument  ftiall  be  taken  from  God's 
Prediction  of  fuch  Events.  Here  I  would  ift  the  firft  Place  lay 
4'own  thefe  two  Things  as  Axioms, 


<99  GOD  certainly  foreknows          Part  IX, 

:  (i.)  If  God  don't  foreknow,  He  can't  foretel  fuch  Events; 
that  is,  He  can't  peremptorily  and  certainly  foretel  them. 
It  God  has  no  more  than  an  uncertain  Guefs  concerning 
Events  of  this  Kind,  then  He  can  declare  no  more  than  an 
uncertain  Guefs.  Pofitively  to  foretel,  is  to  profefs  to  fore 
know,  or  to  declare  pofitive  Foreknowledge. 

(2.)  If  God  don't  certainly  foreknow  the  future  Volitions 
of  moral  Agents,  then  neither  can  He  certainly  foreknow 
thofe  Events  which  are  confequent  and  dependent  on  thefe 
Volitions.  The  Exiftence  of  the  one  depending  on  the 
Exiftence  of  the  other,  the  Knowledge  of  the  Exiftence  of 
the  one  depends  on  the  Knowledge  of  the  Exiftence  of  the 
other  ;  and  the  one  can't  be  more  certain  than  the  other. 

Therefore,  how  many,  how  great,  and  how  extenfive  fo- 
ever  the  Confequences  of  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents 
nsay  be  ;  tho'  they  (hould  extend  to  an  Alteration  of  the  State 
of  Things  through  the  Univerfe,  and  fhould  be  continued 
in  a  Series  of  fucceffive  Events  to  all  Eternity,  and  mould 
in  the  Progrefs  of  Things  branch  forth  into  an  infinite  Num 
ber  of  Series,  each  of  them  going  on  in  an  endlefs  Line  or 
Chain  of  Events  ;  God  muft  be  as  ignorant  of  all  thefe  Con 
fequences,  as  He  is  of  the  Volition  whence  they  firft  take 
their  Rife  :  All  thefe  Events,  and  the  whole  State  of  Things 
depending  on  them,  how  important,  extenfive  and  vaft  fo, 
ever,  muft  be  hid  from  him. 

Thefe  Portions  being  fuch  as  I  fuppofe  none  will  deny,  J 
proceed  to  obferve  the  following  Things. 


i.  Men's  moral  Conduct  and  Qualities,  their  Virtues 
and  Vices,  their  Wjckednefs  and  good  Practice,  Things  re- 
wardable  and  punifhable,  have  often  been  foretold  by  God.  — 
Pharaoh's,  moral  Conduct,  in  refufmg  to  obey  God's  Com 
mand,  in  letting  his  People  go,  was  foretold.  God  fays  to 
Mofes,  Exod.  iii.  19.  1  amfure,  that  the  King  of  Egypt  will  not 
let  you  go.  Here  God  profeffes  not  only  to  guefs  at,  but  to 
know  Pharaoh's  future  Difobedience.  In  Chap.  vii.  4.  God 
fays,  But  Pharaoh  Jhall  not  hearken  unto  you;  that  I  may  lay 
mine  Hand  upon  Egypt,  &c.  And  Chap.  ix.  30.  Mofcs-fays  to 
Pharaoh,  As  for  thee,  and  thy  Servants,  I  KNOW  that  ye  <wift 
•not  fear  the  Lard.  See  alfo  Chap.  xi.  9.  -  The  moral  Con 
duct  of  Jofiah,  by  Name,  in  his  zealoufly  exerting  himfelf  in 
Qppofition  to  Idolatry,  in  particular  Afts  of  his,  was  foretold 

above 


fkcff.  XL        the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents*         rcx> 

-above  three  Hundred  Years  before  he  was  born,  and  th» 
Vrophecy  feal'd  by  a  Miracle,  and  renewed  and  confirm 
ed  by  the  Words  of  a  fecond  Prophet,  as  what  furely  would' 
not  fail,  i  Kings  xiii.  i, — 6,  32.  This  Prophecy  was  alfo- 
in  Effect  a  Prediction  of  the  moral  Ccnduft  of  the  People,- 
HI  upholding  their  Schifmatical  and  Wolatrous  Wcrlriip  "till- 
that  Time,  and  the  Idolatry  of  thofe  Prtefts  of  the  high 
Places,  which  it  is  foretold  Jojiah  fhould  offer  upon  that 
Altar  of  Bethel. — Micaiah  foretold  the  foolim  and  finful  Con- 
duel:  of  Ahab,  in  refuling  to  hearken  to  the  Word  of  tber 
Lord  by  him,  and  chafing  rather  fr>  hearken  to  the  falfc 
Prophets,  in  going  to  Ramoth-Gilead  to  his  Ruin,  i  Kings  xxi. 
2o, — 22. — The  moral'  Conduct  of  Hazael  was  foretold,  in 
that  Cruelty  he  mould  be  guilty  of;  on  which  Hazael  fays> 
What,  is  thy  Servant  a  Dog,  that  he  Jhould  do  this  Thing  /  The 
Prophet  fpeaks  of  the  Event  as  what  he  knew,  and  not  what 
he  conjectured.  2  Kings  viii.  12.  1 kno*w  the  Evil  thou  <wilt  ds 
unto  the  Children  0/Tfrael  :  Thou  <wiltda/h  their  Children ,  and  rip 

tip  their  Women  nvith  Child. The  moral  Conduct  of  Cyrus  is 

foretold,  long  before  he  had  a  Being,  in  his  Mercy  to  God's 
People,  and  Regard  to  the  true  God,  in  turning  the  Capti 
vity  of  the  Jews,  and  promoting  the  building  of  the  Tem 
ple.  Ifai.-xliv.  28.  &lxv.  13.  Compare  2  Chron.  xxxvi.  22,  23. 
and  Ezra  i.  i, — 4. — How  many  Inftances  of  the  moral 
Conduct  of  the  Kings  of  tie  North  and  South,  particular  Inilances 
of  the  wicked  Behaviour  of  the  Kings  of  Syria  and  Egjpt,  are 
foretold  in  the  xith  Chap,  of  Daniel?  Their  Corruption, 
Violence,  Robbery,  Treachery,  and  Lies.  And  particularly, 
how  much  is  foretold  of  the  horrid  Wickednefs  of  Antiochar--, 
Epiphanes,  called  there  a  vile  Perfony  inftead  of  Epiphanes,  or 
Illuftrious.  Ir/ that  Chapter,  and  alfo  in  Chap.  vin.  ver.  9, — \ 
14,  23,  to  the  End,  are  foretold  his  Flattery,  Deceit  and  Lies, 
his  having  his  Heart  fet  to  do  Mifchief,  and  fet  againft  the  holj 
Covenant,  his  deftroying  and  treading  under  Foot  the  holy  People? 
in  a  marvellous  Manner,  his  having  Indignation  againft  the  holy 
Covenant ',  fetting  his  Heart  againft  it,  and  confpiring  againft  it'? 
his  polluting  the  Sanfluary  of  Strength,  treading  it  under  Fooi-, 
taking  avjay  the  daily  Sacrifice,  and  placing  the  Abomination  that 
maketh  defolate  ;  his  great  Pride,  magnifying  himfelf  againft  Gods 
and  uttering  marvelous  Blafphemies  againft  Him,  'till  God  in 
Indignation  Jlwuld  dejlroy  him.  Withal  the  moral  Conduct  of 
the  Jev£,  on  Occafion  of  his  Perfecution,  is  predicted.  'Tis 
foretold,  that  he  Jhauld  corrupt  many  by  Flatteries,  Chap.  xi. 
32,— 34.  But  that  others  mould  behave  with  a  glorious 
Conilancy  and  Fortitude,  in  Oppofition  to  him,  ve-r.  jcv 

And 


ioi          GOD  certainly  foreknows         Part  IL 

And  that  fome  good  Men  fliould  fall,  and  repent,  wr.  35. 
Chrift  foretold  Peter's  Sin,  in  denying  his  Lord,  with  its  Cir~ 
cumltances,  in  a  peremptory  Manner.  And  fo,  that  great 
Sin  of  Judas ,  in  betraying  his  Mafter,  and  its  dreadful  and 
eternal  Punimment  in  Hell,  was  foretold  in  the  like  pofitive 
Manner.  Matth.  xxvi.  21, — -25.  and  parallel  Places  in  the 
other  Evangelifts. 

2.  Many  Events  have  been  foretold  by  God,  which   were 
confequent   and  dependent  on   the   moral  Conduct  of  parti 
cular  Perfons,    and  were  accomplished,   either  by  their  vir 
tuous  or  vicious  Actions. — Thus,  the  C hildren  of  I/rael's  going 
down   into  Egypt   to    dwell   there,  was  foretold   to  Abraham, 
Gen.  xv.  which  was   brought  about  by  the  Wickednefs   of 
Jofeph's  Brethren  in  felling  him,   and  the  Wickednefs  of  'Jo- 

feph's  Miftrefs,  and  his  own  fignai  Virtue  in  refilling  her 
Temptation.  The  Accomplifhment  of  the  Thing  prehgur'd 
in  Jofeph's  Dream,  depended  on  the  fame  moral  Conduct. 

Jothams  Parable  and  Prophecy,  "Judges  ix.   15, 20.  was 

accompiifhed  by  the  wicked  Conduct  of  Abimelech,  and  the 
Men  of  Shechem.  The  Prophecies  againft  the  Houfe  of  Eli, 

1  Sam.  Chap,  ii  &  iii.  were  accompiifhed  by  the  Wickednefj 
of  Doeg  the  Edomite,  in  accufmg  the  Priefts ;  and  the  great 
Impiety,    and    extreme  Cruelty    of  S^aul    in    deftroying    the 
Priefts  at  Nob.  i  Sam.  xxii. — Nathan' 's  Prophecy  againft  David, 

2  Sam.  xii.  1 1,  12.  was  fulfil'd  by  the  horrible  Wickednefs  of 
Abfolom,    in    rebelling  againft  his  Father,    feeking  his   Life, 
and  lying  with  his  Concubines  in  the  Sight  of  the  Sun.     The 
Prophecy  againft   Solomon,   i  Kings  xi.  11, — 13.   was  fulfil'd 
by  Jeroboams   Rebellion   and  Usurpation,  which  are  fpoken 
of  as  his  Wickednefs,  2  Cbron.  xiii.  5,  6.  compare  ver.  18.  The 
Prophecy   againft  Jeroboam's  Family,   i  Kings  xiv.  was  fulfil'd 
by  the  Confpiracy,  Treafon,    and  cruel  Murders  <&Baaft>at 
i  Kings  xv.  27,   &c.     The  Predictions  of  the  Prophet  Jehu 
againft  the  Houfe  of  Baajba,  j  Kings  xvi»   at  the  Beginning^ 
were  fulfil'd  by  the  Treafon  and  Parricide  of  Zimri,  i  Kings 
xvi.  9, 13,  20. 

3.  How  often  has  God  foretold  the  future  moral  Conduct 
of  Nations   and   Peoples,    of  Numbers,    Bodies,    and   Suc- 
ceffions    of    Men ;     with    God's   judicial   Proceedings,  and 
many     other    Events    confequent    and  dependent    on    their 
Virtues    and  Vices  ;     which    could   not  be   foreknown,    if 
the  Volitions  of  Men,    wherein  they  afted  as  moral  Agents, 
had  not  been  forefeen  ?  The  future  Cruelty  of  the  Egyptians 

in 


Sect.  XI      tie  Volitions  of  moral  Agents-.  103 

In  opreffing  J/rael.  and  God's  judging  and  puniftimg  them 
for  it,  was  foretold  long  before  it  came  to  pafs,  Gen.  xv» 
~>3>  H-  The  Continuance  of  the  Iniquity  of  the  Amorites^ 
and  the  Increafe  of  it  until  it  Jhould  be  full,  and  they  ripe 
for  Deftrudion,  was  foretold  above  four  Hundred  Years  be 
fore-hand,  Gen.  xv.  16.  Atl.  vii.  6,  7.  The  Prophecies  of 
the  Deftrudion  of  Jtrufale?n,  and  the  Land  <&Judaky  were 
abfolute  ;  2  Kings  xx.  17, — 19.  Chap.  xxii.  15,  to  the  End, 
It  was  foretold  in  Hezekiah's  Time,  and  was  abundantly  in- 
lifted  on  in  the  Book  of  the  Prophet  Ifaiah,  who  wrote  No 
thing  after  Hezeh'ab's  Days.  It  was  foretold  in  Jonah's  Time, 
in  the  Beginning  of  a  great  Reformation,  2  Kings  xxii.  And 
it  is  manifeft  by  innumerable  Things  in  the  Predictions  of 
the  Prophets,  relating  to  this  Event,  its  Time,  its  Cir- 
cumftances,  its  Continuance  and  End ;  the  Return  from 
the  Captivity,  the  Reiteration  of  the  Temple,  City  and  Land, 
and  many  Circumftances,  and  Confequences  of  That ;  I  fay, 
thefe  mew  plainly,  that  the  Prophecies  of  this  great  Event 
were  alfolute.  And  yet  this  Event  was  connected  with,  and 
dependent  on  two  Things  in  Men's  moral  Conduct  :  firft,  the 
injurious  Rapine  and  Violence  of  the  King  of  Babylon  and 
his  People,  as  the  efficient  Caufe  ;  which  God  often  fpeaks 
of  as  what  he  highly  refented,  and  would  feverely  punifh  ; 
and  2dly,  The  final  Obftinacy  of  the  Jews.  That  great  E- 
Vent  is  often  fpoken  of  as  fufpended.  on  this.  Jer.  iv.  i.  &  v.  i. 
vii.  i, — 7.  xi.  i, — 6.  xvii.  24,  to  the  End.  xxv.  i, — 7* 
xxvi.  i9 — 8.  13.  &  xxxviii.  17,  1 8.  Therefore  this  Deftruc- 
tion  ai>d  Captivity  could  not  be  foreknown,  unlefs  fuch  a 
moral  Conduct  of  the  Chaldeans  and  Je<uos  had  been  fore 
known.  And  then  it  was  foretold,  that  the  People  Jhould  be 
finally  objiinate,  to  the  Deftruction  and  utter  Defolation  of  the 

City  and  Land.    Ifai.  vi.  9, n.  Jer.  i.  i8>  19.  vii.  27, — 

29.  Ezek.  iii.  7.  &  xxiv.  13,  14. 

The  final  Obftinacy  of  thofe  Jews  who  were  left  in  the 
Land  of  Ifrael,  and  who  afterwards  went  down  into  Egypt,  in 
their  Idolatry  and  Rejection  of  the  true  God,  was  foretold  by 
God,  and  the  Prediction  confirmed  with  an  Oath,  Jer.  xliv. 
26,  27.  And  God  tells  the  People,  Ifai.  xlviii.  3,  4, — 8.  that  he 
had  predicted  thofe  Things  which  mould  be  confequent  on 
their  Treachery  and  Obftinacy,  becaufe  he  knew  they  would 
be  obftinate  ;  and  that  he  had  declared  thefe  Things  before 
hand,  for  their  Conviction  of  his  being  the  only  true  God,  &c» 

P  The 


G  O  D  certainly  foreknows       Fart.  IL 

The  Deftruclion  of  Babylon,  with  many  of  the  Circum- 
llances  of  it,  was  foretold,  as  the  Judgment  of  God  for  the  ex 
ceeding  Pride  and  Haughtinefs  of  the  Heads  of  that  Monar 
chy,  Nebuchadnezzar,  and  his  SuccelTors,  and  their  wickedly 
deftroying  other  Nations,  and  particularly  for  their  exalting 
themfelves  againft  the  true  God  and  his  People,  before  any 
of  thefe  Monarchs  had  a  Being  ;  Ifai.  Chap,  xiii,  xiv,  xlvii  : 
Compare  Habbak.  ii.  5,  to  the  End,  and  Jer.  Chap.  1..  and  li- 
That  Ba  'ylon'%  Deftruction  was  to  be  a  Recommence,  according  to 
the  Works  of  their  o<wn  Hands,  appears  by  Jer.  xxv.  14.  —  The 
Immorality  which  the  People  of  Babylon,  and  particularly  her 
fringes  and  great  Men,  were  guilty  of,  that  very  Night  that 
the  City  was  deftroyed,.  their  Revelling  and  Drunkennefs  at 
Idolatrous  Feaft,  was  foretold,  Jer.  !i.  39,  57. 


The  Return  of  the  Jews  from  the  Eclylonijh  Captivity  is 
often  very  particularly  foretold,  with  many  Circumftances, 
and  the  Promifes  of  it  are  very  peremptory  ;  Jer.  .  xxxi.  35, 
—  40.  and*xxxii..  6,  —  15,  41,  —  44.  and  xxxiii.  24,  —  26. 
And  the  very  Time  of  their  Return  was  prefix'd  ;  Jer.  xxv. 
ri,  12.  andxxix.  10.  n.  2  Chron.  xxxvi.  2i.-Extk.  iv.  6.  and 
Dan.  ix.  2.  And  yet  the  Prophecies  reprcfent  their  Return 
as  confequent  on  their  Repentance.  And  their  Repentance  it- 
felf  is  very  exprefly  and  particularly  foretold,  Jer.  xxix.  12, 
13,  14.  xxxi.  8,  9,  1  8,  —  31.  xxxiii.  8.  1.  4,  5..  Exek.  vi. 
8,  9,  10.  viL  1  6.,  xiv.  22,  23.  and  xx.  43,  44. 

It  was  foretold  under  the  old  Teftament,  that  the  Mefliah 
fhould  fufFer  greatly  througli  the  Malice  and  Cruelty  of  Men  ;. 
as  is  largely  and  fully  fet  forth,  Pfal.  xxii.  applied  to  Chnft 
in  the  New  Teftament,  Matt,  xxvii.  35-,  43.  Luke  xxiii,  34. 
Joh.  xix.  24.  Heb.  ii.  12.  And  likewife  in  Pfal.  Ixix.  which, 
it  is  alfo  evident  by  the  New  Teftament,  is  fpoken  of  Chrift  ;. 
John  xv.  2  £.  vii.  5,  ^r.  and  ii.  17.  Rom.  xv.  3.  Matt,  xxvii. 
34,  48.  Mark  xv.  23.  John  xix.  29.  The  fame  Thing  is  alfo 
foretold,  Ifai.  liii.  &  1.  6.  &  Mic.  v.  i.  This  Cruelty  of 
Men  was  their  Sin,  and  what  they  acl:ed  as  moral  Agents.  It 
was  foretold,  that  there  mould  be  an  Union  of  Heathen  and 
Jewifi  Rulers  againft  Chrift,.  Pfal.  ii.  F  ,  2.  compar'd  with 
Ads  iv.  25,  -  2».  It  was  foretold,  that  the  Jews  mould  ge 
nerally  reject  and  defpife  the  Mefliah,  Ifai.  xlix.  5,  6,  7.  and 
liii.  j.—  3.  Pfalm.  xxii.  6,  7.  and  Ixix.  4.,  8,  19,  20.  And  it 
was  foretold,  that  the  Body  of  that  Nation  mould  be  rejected 
in  the  Mefliah's  Days,  from  being  God's  People,  for  their 
€)bftinacy  in  Sin;  7^?/Vxlix.  4  —  7.  and  viii,  14^  15,  16.  com 

pared 


SccL  XL         the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents. 

pared  with  Ram.  x.  19.  and  If  at.  Ixv.  at  the  Beginning,  com 
pared  with  Rom.  x.  ZQ,  21.  It  was  foretold,  that  Chrift  mould 
b*j  rejeded  by  the  chief  Priefts  and  Rulers  among  the  Je<ws.» 
Pfahtt.  cxviii.  22.  compared  with  Matt.  xxi.  42.  Ads  iv.  n. 
i  Pet.  ii.  4,  7. 

Chrift  himfelf  foretold  his  being  delivered  into  the  Hands 
of  the  Elders,  chief  Priefts  and  Scribes,  and  his  being  cruel 
ly  treated  by  them,  and  condemned  to  Death,;  and  that  he 
by  them  fhould  be  delivered. to  the  Gentiles  ;  and  that  He  fhould; 
be  m<xked*  and  Jcourged,  and  crucified,  (Matt.  xvi.  21.  &  xx. 
.17,-.  — 19.  Luke  ix.  22.  John  viii.  28.)  and  that  the  Peo 
ple  fhould  be  concerned  in  and  confenting  to  his  Death,  (Luke 
xx.  13, —  1 8.)  efpecially  the  Inhabitants  of  Je rufalem  ;  Luke 
xiii.  53, — 3^.  He  foretold,  that  the  Difciples  fhould  all  be; 
offended  becaufe  of  Him  that  Night  that  he  w«s  betrayed*, 
and  fhould  forfake  him  ;  Matt.  xxvi.  31.  John  xvi.  32. 
He  foretold  that  he  fhould  be  rejected  of  that  Genera 
tion,  even  the  Body  of  the  People,  and  that  they  .fhould 
continue  obftinate,  to  their  Ruin  ;  Matt  xii.  45.  xxi.  33, — 42. 
and  xxii.  i,— -7.  Luke'yim.  16,  21,  24.  xvii.  25.  xix.  14^,  27,, 
41, 44.  xx.  13, 1&.  and  xxiii.  34,- 39. 

As  it  v/as  foretold  in  both  old  Teftament   and  new,    that 
ihe  Jews  fhould  rejecl:  the  Meffiah,  fo  it  was  foretold  that  the 
Gentiles   fhould  receive   Him,    and  fo  be  admitted    to.  the. 
Privileges   of  God's  People;    in   Places  too  many  to  be  now 
particularly  mentioned.     It   was   foretold  in  the  old  Tefta 
ment,  that  the  Jews  mould  envy  the  Gentiles  on  this  Account,; 
Deut.  xxxii.  21.  compar'd  with  Rom.  x.   19.     Chrift  Himfelf 
often   foretold,    that    the  Gentiles  would  embrace  the   true. 
Religion,  and  become  his  Followers  and  People;  Matth.  viii. 

10,  n,  1 2.  xxi.  41, 43.  and  xxii.  8, —  io.Xa£*xiii.  28.  xiv. . 

1 6, — 24.  and  xx.  16.  John  x.  16.  He  alfo  foretold  the  Jews. 
Envy  of  the  Gentiles  on  this  Occafion  ;  Matt.  xx.  12,- — 16. 
Luke  xv.  26,  to  the  End.  He  foretold,  that  they  fhoiild- conti 
nue  in  this  Oppofition  and  Envy,  and  mould  manif eft  it  in , 
cruel  Perfections  of  his  Followers,  to  their  utter  De- 
ftrudion  ;  Matt.  xxi.  33,— 42.  xxii.  6.  and  xxiii.  34,— —39. 
Luke  xi.  49, —  51.  The  Jaws  Obftinacy  is  alfo  foretold,  A&s 
xxii.  1 8.  Chrift  often  foretold  the  great  Perfecutions  his 
Followers  fhould  meet  with,  both  from  Jews  and  Gentiles  ; 
Matt.  x.  16,-- 1 8,  21,  22,  34,-~36.  and  xxiv.  9.  Mark  xiii.  9,^ 
.lukex.  3.  xii.  u,  49,— 53.  and  xxi.  12,  16,  17.  Johnw.  i&, 
and  xyi.  i., — 4.  2o,"22,  33.  He  foretold  the  Mar- 
P  3  tyrdom 


GOD  certainly  foreknows  Part  IL 

tyrdom  of  particular  Perfons ;  Matt.  xx.  23.  J«b.  xiii.  36. 
and  xxi.  18,  19,  22.  He  foretold  the  great  Succefs  of  the 
Gofpel  in  the  City  of  Samaria,  as  near  approaching ;  which 
afterwards  was  fulfilled  by  the  Preaching  of  Philip,  Joh.  iv, 
35. — 3$,  He  foretold  the  Rifing  of  many  Deceivers,  after 
Ills  Departure,  Matt.  xxiv.  4,  5,  u.  and  the  Apoftacy  of 
many  of  his  profefs'd  Followers ;  Matt,  xxiv,  10, — 12. 

The  Perfections,  which  the  Apoftle  Paul  was  to  meet  with 
in  the  World,  were  foretold ;  Afts  ix.  16. — xx.  23.  £2?  xxi.  1 1 . 
The  Apoftle  fays  to  the  Chriftian  Ephefians,  Afls  xx.  29,  30.  / 
know,  that  after  my  Departure  Jhall grievous  Wolves  enter  in  among 
you,  notfparing  the  Flock  :  Alfa  of  jour  ownfelv  esfoall  Men  arije* 
/peaking  per*verjt>  Things,  to  draw  away  Difciples  after  them. 
The  Apoftle  fays,  He  knew  this  ;  but  he  did  not  know  it,  if 
God  did  not  know  the  future  Actions  of  moral  Agents. 

4.  Unlefs  God  foreknows  the  future  Acts  of  moral  Agents* 
all  the  Prophecies  we  have  in  Scripture  concerning  the  great 
Antichrifiian  Apoftacy ;  the  Rife,  Reign,  wicked  Qualities, 
and  Deeds  of  the  Man  of  Sin,  and  his  Inftruments  and  Ad 
herents ;  the  Extent  and  long  Continuance  of  his  Domi-* 
jiion,  his  Influence  on  the  Minds  of  Princes  and  others, 
to  corrupt  them,  and  draw  them  away  to  Idolatry,  and  other 
foul  Vices  j  his  great  and  cruel  Perfections ;  the  Behaviour 
of  the  Saints  under  thefe  great  Temptations,  &c.  &c.  I  fay, 
unlefs  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents  are  forefeen,  all  thefe 
Prophecies  are  uttered  without  knowing  the  Things  foretold. 

The  Predictions  relating  to  this  great  Apoftacy  are  all  of  a 
moral  Nature,  relating  to  Men's  Virtues  and  Vices,  and  their 
Exercifes,  Fruits  and  Confequences,  and  Events  depending 
on  them ;  and  are  very  particular ;  and  moft  of  them  often 
repeated,  with  many  precife  Characterifticks,  Defcriptions,  and 
Limitations  of  Qualities,  Conduct,  Influence,  Effects,  Ex 
tent,  Duration,  Periods,  Circumftances,  final  Iflue,  &c. 
which  it  would  be  very  long  to  mention  particularly.  And 
to  fuppofe,  all  thefe  are  predicted  by  God  without  any  cer 
tain  Knowledge  of  the  future  moral  Behaviour  of  free  Agents, 
would  be  to  the  utmoft  Degree  abfurd, 

•  5.  Unlefs  God  foreknows  the  future  Afts  of  Men's  Wills, 
and  their  Behaviour  as  moral  Agents,  all  thofe  great  Things 
which  are  foretold  in  both  Old  Teftament  and  New  con 
cerning  the  Erection,  Eftablifhment,  and  univcrfal  Extent 

of 


Seel.  XL         the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents.        106 

of  the  Kingdom  of  the  MeJJlah,  were  predicted  and  pro- 
mifed  while  God  was  in  Ignorance  whether  any  of  thefe 
Things  would  come  to  pafs  or  no,  and  did  but  guefs  at 
them.  For  that  Kingdom  is  not  of  this  World,  it  don't 
conlift  in  Things  external,  but  is  within  Men,  and  confifts 
in  the  Dominion  of  Virtue  in  their  Hearts,  in  Righteouf- 
nefs,  and  Peace,  and  Joy  in  the  Holy  Ghoft;  and  in  thefe 
Things  made  manifeft  in  Practice,  to  the  Praife  and  Glory 
of  God.  The  Meffiah  came  tofave  Men  from  their  Sins,  and 
deliver  them  from  their  fpititual  Enemies  ,*  that  they  might 
ferve  Him  in  Righteovfnefs  and  Holinefs  before  Him  .*  He  gave 
Himfelf  for  us,  that  he  might  redeem  us  from  all Iniquity ,  and  pu 
rify  unto  Himfelf  a  peculiar  People ,  zealous  of  good  W  orks.  And 
therefore  his  Succefs  confifts  in  gaining  Men's  Hearts  to 
Virtue,  in  their  being  made  God's  Idling  People  in  the  Day 
of  his  Power.  His  C'onqueft  of  his  Enemies  confifts  in  his 
Vidory  over  Men's  Corruptions  and  Vices.  And  fuch 
Succefs,  fuch  Viftory,  and  fuch  a  Reign  and  Dominion  is 
often  expreily  foretold  :  That  his  Kingdom  Jhallfill  the  Earth  ,* 
that  all  People,  Nations  and  Languages  Jhould  ferve  and 
obey  Him  ;  and  fo,  that  a II  Nations  Jhould  go  up  to  the  Moun 
tain  of  the  Houfe  of  the  Lord,  that  He  might  teach  them  his 
Ways,  and  that  they  might  walk  in  his  Paths  :  And  that  all  Men 
Jhould  be  drawn  to  Chrift,  and  the  Earth  be  full  of  the  Know 
ledge  of  the  Lord  (by  which,  in  the  Style  of  Scripture,  is 
meant  true  Virtue  and  Religion)  as  the  Waters  cover  the  Seas  ; 
that  God's  Lawjhould  be  put  into  Men  s  inward  Parts ,  and  writ 
ten  in  their  Hearts  ;  and  that  God's  People  Jkould  be  all  Righ 
teous,  &c.  &c. 

A  very  great  Part  of  the  Prophecies    of  the  Old   Tefta- 

ment  is  taken  up  in  fuch  Predictions  as  thefe.- And  here 

I  would  obferve,  that  the  Prophecies  of  the  Univerfal  Preva 
lence  of  the  Kingdom  of  the  Meffiah,  and  true  Religion  of 
Jefus  Chrift,  are  delivered  in  the  moft  peremptory  Manner, 
and  confirmed  by  the  Oath  of  God,  IJai.  xlv,  22,  to  the  End, 
Look  to  me,  and  beyefaved,  all  the  Ends  of  the  Earth  ;  for  I  am 
God,  and  there  is  none  elfe.  I  ha<ve  SWORN  by  my  Self,  the 
Word  is  gone  out  of  my  Mouth  in  Right  eoufnef s ,  and  Jhall  not  re 
turn,  that  unto  Me  every  Knee  Jh all  bow  ;  and  every  'Tongue  Jhall 
fwear.  SURELT,  Jhall  one  fay,  in  the  Lord  have  I  Righte- 
oufnefs  and  Strength  :  even  to  Him  Jhall  Men  come,  &c.  But  here 
this  peremptory  Declaration,  and  great  Oath  of  the  moft 
High,  are  delivered  with  fuch  mighty  Solemnity,  to  Things 
w^ich  God  did  not  know,  if  He  did  not  certainly  forefee  the 
Volitions  of  moral  Agents, 

And 


0,0  D  certainly,  foreknow:.          Part  1L 

And  all  the  Prediflions  of  Chrift  and  his  ApoHIes,  to  the 
like  Purpofe,  rauft  be  without  Knowledge;  As  thofc  of  our 
Saviour  comparing  the  Kingdom  of  God  to  a  Grain  of 
Muftard-Seed,  growing  exceeding  great,  from  a  fmall  Begin- 
jiing  ;  and  to  Leaven,  hid  in  three  Meafures  of  Meal,  'till 

the  whole  was  leayen'd,  &c. And  the  Prophecies  in  the  E- 

fiftles  concerning  the  Reftorarion  of  the  Nation  of  the  Jews 
to  the  true  Church  of  God,  and  the  bringing  in  the  Fulnefs 
of  the  Gentiles  ;  and  the  Prophecies  in  all  the  Revelation  con 
cerning  the  glorious  Change  in  the  moral  State  of  the  World 
of  Mankind,  attending  the  Deftruction  of  Antichrift,  the 
.Kingdoms  of  the  World  becoming  the  Kingdoms  of  our  Lord  and 
cf  his  Chrift  ;  and  its  being  granted  to  the  Church  to  be  arrayed 
in  that  .fine  Linen,  white  and  clean,  which  is  the  Right  eouj'nefs 
of  Saints  3  &c. 

Carol,  i.  Hence  that  great  Promife  and  Oath  of  God  to 
Abraham,  IJaac  and  Jacob,  fo  much  celebrated  in  Scripture, 
both  in  the  Old  Teftament  and  New,  namely,  That  In  their 
Seed  all  the  Nations  and  Families  of  the  Earth  Jhould  be  blejjed, 
rauft  be  made  on  Uncertainties,  if  God  don't  certainly  fore 
know  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents,  For  the  Fulfilment 
in  this  Promife  confifts  in  that  Succefs  of  Chrift  in  the  Work 
of  Redemption,  and  that  Setting  up  of  his  fpiritual  Kingdom 
over  the  Nations  of  the  World,  which  has  been  fpoken  of. 
JVlen  are  bleffed  in  Chrift  no  otherwife  than  as  they  are  bro't 
to  acknowledge  Him,  truft  in  Him,  love  and  ferve  Him,, 
as  is  reprefented  and  predicted  in  PfaL  Ixxii.  1 1 .  All  Kings 
Jhall  fall  donjon  before  Him  ;  all  Nations  Jhall  fer=ve  Him.  With 
ver.  1 7*  Men  Jhall  be  b If/fed  in  him  ;  all  Nations  Jkall  call  him 
Blejfcd.  This  Oath  to  Jacob  and  Abraham  is  fulfilled  in  fub- 
duing  Men's  Iniquities;  as  is  implied  in  that  of  the  Prophet 
Micah,  Chap.  vii.  19,  20. 

Carol.  2.  Hence  alfo  it  appears,  That  firft  Gofpel-promife 
that  ever  was  made  to  Mankind,  that  great  Prediction  of 
the  Salvation  of  the  Mefliah,  and  his  Victory  over  Satan, 
made  to  our  firft  Parents,  Gen.  iii.  15.  if  there  be  no  certain 
Prefcience  of  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents,  muft  have  no 
better  Foundation  than  Conjecture.  For  Chrift's  Victory 
over  Satan  confifts  in  Men's  being  faved  from  Sin,  and  in 
the  Viciory  of  Virtue  and  Holinefs,  over  that  Vice  and 
Wickednefs,  which  Satan  by  his  Temptation  has  introduced, 
and  wherein  his  Kingdom  confifts. 

6.  If 


Sedl.  XL       the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents.  108 

6.  If  it  be  fo,  that  God  has  not  a  Prefcience  of  the  future' 
Aftions  of  moral  Agents,  it  will  follow,  that  the  Prophecies- 
of  Scripture  in    general    are    without  Foreknowledge.     For 
Scripture- Prophecies,  almoft  all  of  them,    if  not   univerfally 
without  any  Exception,   are  either  Prediclions  of  the  Adings 
and   Behaviours   of  moral   Agents,    or  of  Events  depending 
on  them,-  or  fome  Way  connected  with  them  ;  judicial  Dif- 
penfations,  Judgments  on  Men  for  their  Wickednefs,  or  Re 
wards  of  Virtue   and  Righteoufnefs,.   remarkable   Manifefta- 
tions  of  Favour   to  the  Righteous,  or  Manifeftations  of  fo- 
vereign  Mercy   to   Sinners,    forgiving   their    Iniquities,    and 
magnifying  the  Riches  of  divine  Grace  ;  or  Difpenfations  of 
Providence,  in  fome  Refpecl  or  other,  relating  to  the  Conduct 
of  the  Subjects  of  God's  moral  Government,  wifely  adapt 
ed  thereto  ;    either   providing   for  what  fnould  be  in  a  future 
State  of  Things,    through  the  Volitions  and  voluntary  Adti- 
ons  of  moral  Agents,  or  confequent  upon  them,    and  regu 
lated  and   ordered  according   to  them.     So  that   all  Events 
that   are  foretold,  are  either   moral  Events,  or  other  Events 
which    are    connected    with,     and   accommodated   to  moral* 
Events. 

That  the  Prediclions  of  Scripture  in  general  muft  be  with 
out  Knowledge,  if  God  don't  forefee  the  Volitions  of  Merv 
will  further  appear,  if  it  be  confidered,  that  almoft  all  E- 
vents  belonging  to  the  future  State  of  the  World  of  Man 
kind,  the  Changes  and  Revolutions  which  come  to  pafs  in 
Empires,  Kingdoms,  and  Nations,  and  all  Societies,  depend 
innumerable  Ways  on  the  Ads  of  Men's  Wills ;  yea,  on  an 
innumerable  Multitude  of  Millions  of  Millions  of  Volitions- 
of  Mankind.  Such  is  the  State  and  Courfe  of  Things  in 
the  World  of  Mankind,  that  one  fingle  Event,  which  ap 
pears  in  itfelf  exceeding  inconfiderable,  may  in  the  Progrefs  and^ 
Series  of  Things,  occafion  a  Succeffion  of  the  greateft  and  moft 
important  and  extenfive  Events  ;  caufing  the  State  of  Mankind- 
to-  be  vaftly  different  from  what  it  would  otherv/ife  have  been,, 
for  all  fucceeding  Generations. 

For  Inftance,  the  coming  into  Exiftence  of  thofe  particu 
lar  Men,  who  have  been  the  great  Conquerors  of  the  World, 
which  under  God  have  had  the  main  Hand  in  all  the  con 
fequent  State  of  the  World,  in  all  after- Ages  ;  fuch  aa 
Nebuchadnezzar,  Cyrus,  Alexander,  Pompej,  Julius  Cefar,  &c. 
undoubtedly  depended  on  many  Millions  of  Afts  of  the 
Will,  which  followed,  and  were  oecafion'd  one  by  ano 
ther^ 


IO9  G  0  D  certainly  foreknows          Part  II, 

ther,  in  their  Parents;  And  perhaps  moft  of  thefe  Volitions 
depended  on  Millions  of  Volitions  of  Hundreds  and  Thou- 
fands  of  others,  their  Contemporaries  of  the  fame  Genera 
tion  ;  and  molt  of  thefe  en  Millions  of  Millions  of  Voliti 
ons  of  others  in  preceding  Generations. As  we  go  back, 

Hill  the  Number  of  Volitions,  which  were  fome  Way  the 
Occafion  of  the  Event,  multiply  as  the  Branches  of  a  River> 
'till  they  come  at  laft,  as  it  were,  to  an  infinite  Number* 
This  will  not  feem  ftrange,  to  any  one  who  well  confiders  the 
Matter ;  if  we  recoiled  what  Philofophers  tell  us  of  the  in 
numerable  Multitudes  of  thofe  Things  which  dre  as  it  were 
the  Principi&i  or  Stamina  Vitte,  concerned  in  Generation ; 
the  Animalcula  in  Semine  mafculo^  and  the  Ova  in  the  Womb 
of  the  Female ;  the  Impregnation,  or  animating  of  one  of 
thefe  in  Diftindion  from  all  the  reft,  muft  depend  on  Things 
infinitely  minute,  relating  to  the  Time  and  Circumftances  of 
the  Ad  of  the  Parents,  the  State  of  their  Bodies,  &c. 
•which  muft  depend  on  innumerable  foregoing  Circum 
ftances  and  Occurrences ;  which  muft  depend,  infi 
nite  Ways,  on  foregoing  Acts  of  their  Wills;  which  are 
occafioned  by  innumerable  Things  that  happen  in  the 
Courfe  of  their  Lives,  in  which  their  own,  and  their  Neigh 
bour's  Behaviour,  muft  have  a  Hand,  an  infinite  Number 
of  Ways.  And  as  the  Volitions  of  others  muft  be  fo  many 
Ways  concerned  in  the  Conception  and  Birth  of  fuch  Men ; 
fo,  no  lefs,  in  their  Prefervation,  and  Circumftances  of  Life, 
their  particular  Determinations  and  Actions,  on  which  the 
great  Revolutions  they  were  the  Occafions  of,  depended.  As 
for  Initance.  When  the  Confpirators  in  Perfia,  againft 
the  Magi,  were  confulting  about  a  Succefliort  to  the  Empire, 
it  came  into  the  Mind  of  one  of  them,  to  propofe,  that  he 
whofe  Horfe  neighed  firft,  when  they  came  together  the 
next  Morning,  mould  be  King.  Now  fuch  a  Thing's  com 
ing  into  his  Mind,  might  depend  on  innumerable  Incidents, 
wherein  the  Volitions  of  Mankind  had  been  concerned. 
But  in  Confequence  of  this  Accident,  Darius,  the  Son  of 
Hiftafpes,  was  King.  And  if  this  had  not  been,  probably 
his  Succeffor  would  not  have  been  the  fame,  and  all  the 
Circumftances  of  the  Per/tan  Empire  might  have  been  far 
otherwife.  And  then  perhaps  Alexander  might  never  have 
conquered  that  Empire.  And  then  probably  the  Circum 
ftances  of  the  World  in  all  fucceeding  Ages,  might  have 
been  vaftly  otherwife.  I  might  further  infiance  in  many 
other  Occurrences ;  fuch  as  thofe  on  which  depended  Alex 
ander* 


Sedh  XL         the  Foliiions  of  moral  Agents.        1 10 

anders  Prefervation,  in  the  many  critical  Jun&ures  of  his 
Life>  wherein  a  fmall  Trifle  would  have  turned  the  Scald 
againft  him ;  and  the  Prefervation  and  Succefs  of  the  Ro 
wan  People,  in  the  Infancy  of  their  Kingdom  and  Common- 
Wealth,  and  afterwards ;  which  all  the  fucceeding  Changes  in 
their  State,  and  the  mighty  Revolutions  that  afterwards 
came  to  pafs  in  the  habitable  World,  depended  upon.  But 
thefe  Hints  may  be  fufficient  for  every  difcerhing  confide- 
rate  Perfon,  to  convince  him,  that  the  whole  State  of  the 
World  of  Mankind,  in  all  Ages,  and  the  very  Being  of  every 
Perfon  who  has  ever  lived  in  it,  in  every  Age,  fince  the 
Times  of  the  ancient  Prophets,  has  depended  on  more 
Volitions,  or  Afts  of  the  Wills  of  Men>  than  there  are 
Sands  on  the  Sea-fhore. 

And  therefore,  unlefs  God  does  moft  exaftly  and  perfect 
ly  forefee  the  future  .Afts  of  Men's  Wills,  all  the  Pre 
dictions  which  he  ever  uttered  concerning  David,  Hezekiak9 
Jojiah,  Nebuchadnezzar,  Cyrus,  Alexander;  concerning  the  four 
Monarchies,  and  the  Revolutions  in  them  ;  and  concerning 
all  the  Wars,  Commotions,  Victories,  Profperities  and  Cala 
mities,  of  any  of  the  Kingdoms,  Nations,  or  Communities 
of  the  World,  have  all  been  without  Knowledge. 

So  that,  according  to  this  Notion  of  God's  not  forefeeing 
the  Volitions  and  free  Actions  of  Men,  God  could  forefee 
Nothing  pertaining  to  the  State  of  the  World  of  Mankind 
in  future  Ages ;  hot  fo  much  as  the  Being  of  one  Perfon 
that  fhould  live  in  it ;  and  could  foreknow  no  Events,  but 
only  fuch  as  He  would  bring  to  pafs  Himfelf  by  the  extra 
ordinary  Interpofition  of  his  immediate  Power ;  or  Things 
which  (hould  come  to  pafs  in  the  natural  material  World, 
by  the  Laws  of  Motion,  and  Courfe  of'  Nature,  wherein 
that  is  independent  on  the  Actions  or  Works  of  Mankind  £ 
That  is,  as  he  might,  like  a  very  able  Mathematician  and 
Aftronomer,  with  great  Exadlnefs  calculate  the  Revolutions 
of  the  heavenly  Bodies,  and  the  greater  Wheels  of  the 
Machine  of  the  external  Creation. 

And  if  we  clofely  confider  the  Matter,  there  will  appear 
Reafon  to  convince  us,  that  he  could  not  with  any  abfo- 
lute  Certainty  forefee  even  thefe.  As  to  the  Firft,  namely 
Things  done  by  the  immediate  and  extraordinary  Interpo- 
fition  of  God's  Power,  thefe  can't  be  forefeen,  unlefs  it  can 
be  forefeen  when  there  fhall  be  Occafion  for  fuch  extraordi- 

Q^  nary 


TIJ  GOD  certainly  foreknows         Fart  IL 

nary  Interpofition.  And  that  can't  be  forcfeen,  unlefs  thcr 
State  of  the  moral  World  can  be  forefeen.  For  whenever  God 
thus  interpofes,  it  is  with  Regard  to  the  State  of  the  moral- 
World,  requiring  fuch  Divine  Interpofition.  Thus  God 
could  not  certainly  forefee  the  univerfal  Deluge,  the  Cal^ 
ling  of  Abraham,  the  Deftruftion  of  Sodom  and  Gomorrah, 
the  Plagues  on  Egypt,  and  Ifrae /'s  Redemption  out  of  it,  the 
expelling  the  feven  Nations  of  Canaan,  and  the  bringing 
Ifrae  I  into  that  Land ;  for  thefe  all  are  reprefented  as  con- 
necled  with  Things  belonging  to  the  State  of  the  moral 
World.  Nor  can  God  foreknow  the  moft  proper  and  con 
venient  Time  of  the  Day  of  Judgment,  and  general  Conflagra 
tion;  for  that  chiefly  depends  on  the  Courfe  and  State  of 
Things  in  the  moral  World* 

Nor,  Secondly,  can  we  on  this  Suppofition  reafonably  think, 
that  God  can  certainly  forefee  what  Things  mall  come  to 
pafs,  in  the  Courfe  of  Things,  in  the  natural  and  material 
World,  even  thofe  which  in  an  ordinary  State  of  Things 
might  be  calculated  by  a  good  Aftronomer.  For  the  moral 
World  is  the  End  of  the  natural  World  ;  and  the  Courfe 
of  Things  in  the  former,  is  undoubtedly  fubordinate  to  God's 
Defigns  with  Refpeft  to  the  latter.  Therefore  he  has  feen 
Caufe,  from  Regard  to  the  State  of  Things  in  the  moral  World, 
extraordinarily  to  interpofe,  to  interrupt  and  lay  an  Arreft  on 
the  Courfe  of  Things  in  the  natural  World  ;  and  even  in 
the  greater  Wheels  of  its  Motion;  even  fo  as  to  flop  the  Sun  in 
its  Courfe.  And  unlefs  he  can  forefee  the  Volitions  of  Men, 
and  fo  know  fomething  of  the  future  State  of  the  moral 
World,  He  can't  know  but  that  he  may  ftill  have  as  great 
Occafion  to  interpofe  in  this  Manner,  as  ever  He  had :  nor 
can  He  forefee  how,  or  when,  He  mall  have  Occalion  thus  to 
interpofe. 

GoroL  i.  It  appears  from  the  Things  which  have  been  ob- 
ferved,  that  unlefs  God  forefees  the  Volitions  of  moral  A- 
gents,  that  cannot  be  true  which  is  obferved  by  the  Apoftle 
James,  Aft.  xv.  18.  Known  unto  God  are  all  his  Works  from 
dhe  Beginning  of  the  World. 

CoroL  2.  It  appears  from  what  has  been  obferved,  that  unlefr 
God  foreknows  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents,  all  the  Prophe= 
cies  of  Scripture  have  no  better  Foundation  than  mere  Con- 
jeclure ;  and  That,  in  moft  Inftances,  a  Conjecture  which 
:muft  have  the  utmoft  Uncertainty  ;  depending  on  an  innu 
merable 


.  XL     ibe  Volitions  of  moral  Agents.  112 

merable,  and  as  it  were  infinite,  Multitude  of  Volitions, 
which  are  all,  even  to  God,  uncertain  Events :  However, 
thefe  Prophecies  are  delivered  as  abfolute  Predictions,  and  very 
many  of  them  in  the  moft  pofitive  Manner,  with  Afleverations.; 
and  forne  of  them  with  the  moft  folemn  Oaths. 

Carol.  3.  It  alfo  follows  from  what  has  been  obferved, 
that  if  this  Notion  of  God's  Ignorance  of  future  Volitions 
i»e  true,  in  vain  did  Chrift  fay  (after  uttering  many  great 
3nd  important  Predictions,  concerning  God's  moral  Kingdom, 
and  Things  depending  on  Men's  moral  Actions)  Matth.  xxiv. 
3  £.  Heaven  and  Earth  Jhall  pafs  away  ,•  but  my  Words  Jhall 
.not  pafs  away. 

Carol.  4.  From  the  fame  Notion  of  God's  Ignorance,  it 
would  follow,  that  in  vain  has  God  himfelf  often  fpoken  of  the 
Predictions  of  his  Word,  as  Evidences  of  his  Foreknowledge  ; 
and  fo  as  Evidences  of  that  which  is  his  Prerogative  as  GOD9 
and  his  peculiar  Glory,  greatly  diftinguifhing  Him  from  all 
other  Beings ;  as  in  If  at.  xli.  22— — z6.  xliii.  9,  i  o.  xliv  &. 
xlv.  21.  xlvi.  10.  &  xlviii.  14. 

ARGUM.  II.  If  God  don't  foreknow  the  Volitions  of  mo 
ral  Agents,  then  he  did  not  foreknow  the  Fa II  of  Man,  nor 
of  Angels,  and  fo  could  not  foreknow  the  great  Things 
which  are  confequent  on  thefe  Events ;  fuch  as  his  fending 
his  Son  into  the  World  to  die  for  Sinners.,  and  all  Things 
pertaining  to  the  great  Work  of  Redemption.;  all  the 
Things  which  were  done  for  four  Thoufand  Years  before 
Chrift  came,  to  .prepare  the  Way  for  it ;  and  the  Incarnation, 
Xife,  Death,  Refurrection  and  Afcenlion  of  Chrift ;  and  the 
fetting  Him  at  the  Head  of  the  Univerfe,  as  King  of  Hea 
ven  and  Earth,  Angels  and  Men ;  and  the  fetting  up  his 
Church  and  Kingdom  in  this  World,  and  appointing  Him 
the  Judge  of  the  World ;  and  all  that  Satan  mould  do  in 
the  World  in  Oppofition  to  the  Kingdom  of  Chrift  :  And 
the  great  Tranfactions  of  the  Day  of  Judgment,  that  Men 
and  Devils  ihall  be  the  Subjects  of,  and  Angels  concerned 
in  ;  they  are  all  what  God  was  ignorant  of  before  the  Fall. 
And  if  fo,  the  following  Scriptures,  and  others  like  them, 
•muft  be  without  any  Meaning,  or  contrary  to  Truth.  Eph* 
1.  4.  According  as  he  hath  chofen  us  in  Him  before  the  Foundation  of 
the  World,  l  Pet.  L  2O.  Who  <verily  <vuas  fore-ordained  before  the 
foundation  of  the  World,  i  Tim.  i.  9.  Who  hath  fa<ved  us  t  and 
SGtlltd,  us  with  an,  holy  Calling  ;  not  according  to  our  Works,  but 
Oil  3  according 


GOD  certainly  foreknows        Part.  II. 

according  to  his  own  Purpcfe,  and  Grace,  which  was  given  us  ift 
Lhrji'j  jits  b>fjte  the  Wzild  began.  So,  Eph.  iii.  n.  (fpeaking 
of  the  Wifdom  of  God  in  the  Work  of  Redemption)  according 
to  the  eternal  Surpje  which  he  purpofedin  Jejus  Chr'JL  Tit.  i.  2. 
In  hi.pt  (jj eternal L> >fey  which  God,  thai  cannot  liet  protnifed  before 
the  Worid  began.  Kom.  viii,  29.  Whom  he  did  foreknow,  them: 
kt  aljo  did  predtftinate^  &C.  I  Ptt*  i.  2.  Eit3y  according  to 
the  foreknowledge  of  God  the  Father* 

If  God  did  not  foreknow  the  Fall  of  Man,  nor  the  Re 
demption  by  Jefus  Chrift,  nor  the  Volitions  of  Man  fince 
the  .ball ;  thea  He  did  "not  foreknow  the  Saints  in  any  Senfe  ; 
neither  as  particular  Perfons,  nor  as  Societies  or  Nations  ; 
either  by  Eledion,  or  mere  Forefight  of  their  Virtue  or  good 
Works ;  or  any  Forefight  of  any  Thing  about  them  relating 
to  their  Salvation ;  or  any  Benefit  they  have  by  Chrift,  or 
any  Manner  of  Concern  of  their's  with  a  Redeemer. 

ARC.  III.  On  the  Suppofition  of  God's  Ignorance  of  the 
future  Volitions  of  free  Agents,  it  will  follow,  that  God 
muft  in  many  Cafes  truly  repent  what  He  has  done,  fo  as 
properly  to  wifh  He  had  done  otherwife  :  by  Reafon  that 
the  Event  of  Things,  in  thofe  Affairs  which  are  moil  impor 
tant,  <viz.  the  Affairs  of  his  moral  Kingdom,  being  uncer 
tain  and  contingent,  often  happens  quite  otherwife  than  he 
was  saware  beforehand.  And  there  would  be  Reafon  to  un-^ 
derftand  That,  in  the  moft  literal  Senfe,  in  Gen.  vi.  6.  // 
repented  the  Lord,  that  he  had  made  Man  on  the  Earthy  and  it  grieved 
him  at  his  Heart.  And  that,  j  Sam.  xv.  1 1 .  contrary  to 
that,  Numb,  xxiii,  19.  God  is  not  the  Son  of  Man,  that  he 
J/hould  repent.  And,  I  Sam.  xv.  15,  29.  Alfo  the  Sisength  of 
Jfrael  w/77  not  lie,  nor  repent  :  for  he  is  not  a  Man  that  he  Jbould 
repent.  Yea^  from  this  Notion  it  will  follow,  that  Go«i 
is  liable  to  repent  and  be  grieved  at  his  Heart,  in  a  literal 
Senfe,  continually;  and  is  always  expofed  to  an  infinite 
Number  of  real  Difappointments,  in  his  governing  the 
World ;  and  to  manifold,  conftant,  great  Perplexity  and 
Vexation  :  But  this  is  not  very  confident  with  his  Title  of 
God  over  <?//,  blejfid  for  evermore  ;  which  reprefents  Him  as 
poflfefled  of  perfect,  conftant  and  uninterrupted  Tranquillity 
and  Felicity,  as  God  over  the  Univerfe,  and  in  his  Manage-* 
ment  of  the  Affairs  of  the  World,  as  fupreme  and  univer- 
fal  Ruler,  See^a-w.  i.  25,  ix,  5.  z  Cor.  xi.  31.  i  Tim.  vi.  15, 

ARC. 


Se&.  XL         the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents.         114 

ARC.  IV.  It  will  alfo  follow  from  this  Notion,  that  as 
God  is  liable  to  be  continually  repenting  what  He  has  done  ; 
fo  he  muft  be  expofed  to  be  conftantly  changing  his  Mind  and 
Intentions,  as  to  his  future  Conduct  ;  altering  his  Meafures,  re- 
linquiming  his  old  Defigns,  and  forming  new  Schemes  and  Pro 
jections.  For  his  Purpofes,  even  as  to  the  main  Parts  of  his 
Scheme,  namely,  fuch  as  belong  to  the  State  of  his  moral 
Kingdom,  mult  be  always  liable  to  be  broken,  thro'  want 
of  Forefight ;  and  He  muft  be  continually  putting  his  Syftem 
to  rights,  as  it  gets  out  of  Order,  through  the  Contin- 
gence  of  the  Actions  of  moral  Agents :  He  muft  be  a  Being, 
\vho,  inftead  of  being  absolutely  immutable,  muft  neceffa- 
rily  be  the  Subject  of  infinitely  the  moft  numerous  Acts  of 
Repentance,  and  Changes  of  Intention,  of  any  Being  what- 
foever;  for  this  plain  Reafon,  that  his  vaftly  extenfivc 
Charge  comprehends  an  infinitely  greater  Number  of  thofe 
Things  which  are  to  Him  contingent  and  uncertain.  In 
fuch  a  Situation,  He  muft  have  little  elie  to  do,  but  to  mend 
broken  Links  as  well  as  he  can,  and  be  rectifying  his  dif- 
jointed  Frame  and  difordered  Movements,  in  the  Deft  Man 
ner  the  Cafe  will  allow.  The  fupreme  Lord  of  all  Things 
muft  needs  be  under  great  and  miferable  Difad vantages,  in 
governing  the  World  which  He  has  made,  and  has  the  Care 
of,  through  his  being  utterly  unable  to  find  out  Things 
of  chief  Importance,  which  hereafter  lhall  befal  his  Syftem  ; 
which  if  He  did  but  know,  He  might  make  feafonable  Pro- 
vifion  for.  In  many  Cafes,  there  may  be  very  great  Necefiity 
that  He  mould  make  Provifion,  in  the  Manner  of  his  order 
ing  and  difpofing  Things,  for  fome  great  Events  which 
are  to  happen,  of  vaft  and  extenfive  Influence,  and  endlefs 
Confequence  to  the  Univerfe ;  which  He  may  fee  after 
wards,  when  it  is  too  late,  and  may  wifh  in  vain  that  He 
had  known  beforehand,  that  He  might  have  ordered  his 
Affairs  accordingly.  And  it  is  in  the  Power  of  Man,  on 
thefe  Principles,  by  his  Devices,  Purpofes  and  Actions, 
thus  to  difappoint  God,  break  his  Meafures,  make  him  con 
tinually  to  change  his  Mind,  fubject  Him  to  Vexation,  and 
bring  Him  into  Confulion. 

But  how  do  thefe  Things  confift  with  Reafon,  or  with  the 
Word  of  God?  Which  reprefents,  that  all  God's  Works, 
all  that  He  has  ever  to  do,  the  whole  Scheme  and  Series 
of  his  Operations,  are  from  the  Beginning  perfectly  in  his 
View ;  and  declares,  that  whatever  Devices  and  Defigns  are 
in  the  Hearts  of  Men,  the  Coutifel  of  the  Lord  is  that  which 
flail  fland>  and  the  Thoughts  of  his  Heart  to  all  Generations. 

Prov. 


EI 5          GOD  certainly  foreknows        PartTL 

jProv.  xix.  2i.  Pfal.  xxxiii.  10,  1 1.  And  that  which  the  Lord 
of  Hofts  hath  purposed,  none  Jhall  dijannul,  Ifai.  xiv.  27.  And 
that  he  cannot  be  fruftrated  in  one  Defign  or  Thought,  Job.  xlii.  2. 
And  that  <ujbat  God  doth,  it  Jhall  be  forever,  that  Nothing  can  be  put 
to  it*  or  taken  from  it.  Ecc!.  iii.  14.  The  Stability  and  Per 
petuity  of  God's  Counfels  are  exprefly  fpoken  of  as  con 
ceded  with  the  Foreknowledge  of  God,  Ifai.  xlvi.  10.  De 
claring  the  End  from  the  Beginning,  and  from  ancient  Times  the 
Things  that  are  not  yet  dans  ;  faying,  My  Couujel  Jhallftand* 

and  I  will  do  all  mj  Pleafnre.— And  how  are  thefe  Things 

confident  with  what  the  Scripture  fays  of  God's  Immu 
tability,  which  reprefents  him  as  'without  Variableness.,  or 
Shadow  of  Turning  ;  and  (peaks  of  Him  moft  particularly  as 
unchangeable  with  Regard  to  his  Purpofes.  Mai.  iii.  6.  I  ant 
the  .Lord ;  I  change  not;  therefore  ye  Sons  of  Jacob  are  not 
conjumed*  Exod.  iii.  14.  /  AM.  THAT  1  AWL  Job  xxiii. 
13,  14.  He  is  in  one  Mind  ,*  and  who  can  turn  him  ?  And  <what 
his  Soul  dejtreth,  e<ven  that  he  doth  :  for  he  performeth  the  Thing 
that  is  appointed  for  me. 

ARG.  V.  If  this  Notion  of  God's  Ignorance  of  the  future 
Volitions  of  moral  Agents  be  thoroughly  conlidered  in  its 
Confequences,  it  will  appear  to  follow  from  it,  that  God,  after 
he  had  made  the  World,  was  Jiable  to  be  wholly  frujhatcd 
of  his  End  in  the  Creation  of  it  ;  and  fo  has  been  in  like 
Manner  liable  to  be  fruftrated  of  his  End  in  all  the  great 
Works  he  hath  wrought.  'Tis  manifeft,  the  moral  World 
is  the  End  of  the  natural :  The  reft  of  the  Creation  is 
but  an  Houfe  which  God  hath  built,  with  Furniture,  for  mo 
ral  Agents :  And  the  good  or  had  State  of  the  moral  World 
depends  on  the  Improvement  they  make  of  their  natural 
Agency,  and  fo  depends  on  their  Volitions.  And  there 
fore,  if  thefe  can't  be  farefeen  by  God,  becaufe  they 
are  contingent,  and  fubjecl  to  no  Kind  of  Neceflity,  then 
the  Affairs  of  the  moral  World  are  liable  to  go  Wrong,  to  any 
affignable  Degree ;  yea,  liable  to  be  utterly  ruined.  As  on 
this  Scheme,  it  may  well  be  fuppofed  to  be  literally  faid, 
when  Mankind,  by  the  Abufe  of  their  moral  Agency, 
became  very  corrupt  before  the  Flood,  that  the  Lord  repented 
that  he  had  made  Man  on  the  Earth,  and  it  grieved  Htm 
at  his  Heart;  fo,  when  He  made  the  Univerfe,  He 
did  not  know  but  that  He  might  be  fo  difappointed  in  it, 
that  it  might  grieve  Hirn  at  his  Heart  that  He  had  made  it. 
It  actually  proved,  that  all  Mankind  became  fmful,  and  a 
very  great  Part  of  the  Angels  apoftatized  :  And  how  could 

God 


.  XL     the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents.          116 

God  know  before-hand,  that  all  of  them  would  not  ?  And 
how  could  God  know  but  that  all  Mankind,  notwith- 
ftanding  Means  ufed  to  reclaim  them,  being  ftill  left  to  the 
Freedom  of  their  own  Will,  would  continue  in  their  Apoftacy  s. 
and  grow  worfe  and  worfe,  as  they  of  the  Old  World  before 
the  Hood  did  ? 

According  to  the  Scheme  I  am  endeavouring  to  confute,- 
neither  the  Fall  of  Men  nor  Angels,  could  be  forefeen,  and 
God  muft  be  greatly  difappointed  in  thefe  Events  ;  and  fo 
the  grand  Scheme  and  Contrivance  for  our  Redemption,, 
and  deftroying,  the  Works  of  the  Devil,  by  the  Mefiiah,  and 
all  the  great  Things  God  has  done  in  the  Profecution  of 
thefe  Defigns,  mult  be  only  the  Fruits  of  his  own  Difap- 
pointment,  a-nd  Contrivances  of  his  to  mend  and  patch  up, 
as  well  as  he  could,  his  Syftem,  which  originally:  was  all 
very  good,  and  perfectly  beautiful ;  but  was  mar'd,  broken 
and  confounded  by  the  free  Will  of  Angels  and  Men. 
And  ftill  he  muft  be  liable  to  be  totally  difappointed 
a  fecond  Time  :  He  could  not  know,  that  He  Ihould 
have  his  delired  Succefs^  in  the  Incarnation,  Life, 
Deathi  Refurredion  and  Exaltation  of  his  only  begot 
ten  Son,  and  other  great  Works  accomplifhed  to  reftore  the 
State  of  Things :  He  could  not  know  after  all,  whether 
there  would  adually  be  any  tolerable  Meafure  of  Reftora- 
tion  ;  for  this  depended  on  the  free  Will  of  Man.  There 
has  been  a  general  great  Apoftacy  of  almoft  all  the  Chriftiar* 
World,  to  that  which  was  worfe  than  Heathenifm  ;  which 
continued  for  many  Ages.  And  how  could  God,  without 
forefeeing  Men's  Volitions,  know  whether  ever  Chriftendom. 
would  return  from  this  Apoftacy  ?  And  which  way  could  He 
tell  before-hand  how  foon  it  would  begin  ?  The  Apoftle  faysr 
it  began  to  work  in  his  Time ;  and  how  could  it  be  known 
how  far  it  would  proceed  in  that  Age  ?  Yea,  how  could 
it  be  known  that  the  Gofpel,  which  was  not  effectual  for 
the  Reformation  of  the  Jews,  would  ever  be  effectual  for 
the  turning  of  the  Heathen  Nations  from  their  Heathen  Apo 
ftacy,  which  they  had  been  confirmed  in  for  fo  many  Ages  ? 

3Tis  reprefented  often  in  Scripture,  that  God  who  made 
the  World  for  Himfelf,  and  created  it  for  his  Pleafurej, 
would  infallibly  obtain  his  End  in  the  Creation,  and  in  all 
his  Works ;  that  as  all  Things  are  of  Him,  fo  they  would 
all  be  to  Him  ;  and  that  in  the  final  IfTue  of  Things,  ifi 
would  appear  that  He  is  the  frjlt  and  the  loft,  Rev.  xxi.  6. 


Ji7  Certain  Foreknowledge  Part  lL 

And  he  /aid  unto  me,  It  is  done.  I  am  Alpha  and  Omega,  the 
Beginning  and  the  End,  the  firft  and  the  lajL  But  thefe  Things 
are  not  confiftent  with  God's  being  fo  liable  to  be  difappointed 
in  all  his  Works,  nor  indeed  with  his  failing  of  his  End  in  any 
Thing  that  he  has  undertaken,  or  done. 


tOOOtXXOOOOCCtt 


SECTION     XII. 

G  0  D's  certain  Foreknowledge  of  the  future  Vo 
litions  of  moral  Agents,  inconfiftent  with  fitch  a 
Contingence  of  thofe  Volitions,  a$  is  without  all 
Neceflity. 

HAVING  proved,  that  God  has  a  certain  and  infal 
lible  Prefcience  of  the  Acts  of  the  Will  of  moral  Agents,. 
I  come  now,  in  the  Second  Place,   to  fhew  the  Confequence  ; 
to  Ihew  how  it  follows  from  hence,  that  thefe  Events  are  necef- 
fary,  with  a  Neceffity  of  Connection  or  Confequence. 

The  chief  Arminia.n  Divines,  fo  far  as  I  have  had  Oppor 
tunity  fo  obferve,  deny  this  Confequence;  and  affirm,  that 
if  fuch  Foreknowledge  be  allowed,  'tis  no  Evidence  of  any 
Neceflity  of  the  Event  foreknown.  Now  I  defire,  that  this 
Matter  may  be  particularly  and  thoroughly  inquired  into. 
I  cannot  but  think,  that  on  particular  and  full  Confideration, 
it  may  be  perfectly  determined,  whether  it  be  indeed  fo,  or 
not. 

In  order  to  a  proper  Confideration  of  this,  Matter,  I  would 
obferve  the  following  Things : 

I.  'Tis  very  evident,  with  regard  to  a  Thing  whofe  Ex- 
iftence  is  infallibly  and  indiffolubly  connected  with  fome- 
thing  which  already  hath,  or  has  had  Exiflence,  the  Exigence 
of  that  Thing  is  neceffary.  Here  may  be  noted, 

i.  3 


Seel.  XII.         infers  Tome  Neceffity.  i  1 8 

i :  I  obferved  Before,  in  explaining  the  Nature  of  Neceflity, 
that  in  Things  which  are  paft,  their  paft  Exiftence  is  now^ 
necefiary  :  having  already  made  fure  of  Exigence,  'tis  too 
late  for  any  Poffibility  of  Alteration  in  that  Refpecl  :  "Tis  nov* 
impoflible,  that  it  Ihould  be  otherwife  than  true,  that  that 
Thing  has  exifted. 

2.  If  there   be   any  fuch  Thing  as  a  divine  Forekn6*v ledge 
of  the  Volitions  of  free  Agents,  that  Foreknowledge,  by  the 
Suppoliticn,  is  a  Thing  which  already  hast  and  long  ago  had 
Exiitehce ;  and  fo,  now  its  Exiftence  is  heceflary  ;  it  is  now 
utterly  impoffible  to  be  otherwife,  than  that  this  Foreknowledge 
Ihould  be,  or  ihouid  have  been. 

3.  'Tis  alfo  very  rhamfeft,    that  thofe  Things  which  are 
mdiflblably  connected    with  other  Things  that  are  necefiary^ 
are  tkemfelves  necefiary.     As  that  Propofitiori  whofe  Truth 
is  necefiarily  connected  with    another  Propofition,    which  is 
neccffarily  true,    is   itfelf  neceflarily   true.      To    fay   other- 
wife,  would  be  a  Contradiction  ;    it  would  be  in  Effect  to 
fay,    that  the  connection  was  indilfoluble,    and  yet  was  not 
fo,  but  might  be  broken.     If  That>  whofe  Exiftcnce  is  in- 
diflblubly  connefled  with  fomething  whofe  Exiftence  is  now 
heceflarv,  is  itfelf  not  neceflary,  then  it  may  poflibly  not  exiftt 
notwithstanding  that  indiffoluble  Connection  of  its  Exiftence. 
— Whether  the   Abfwdity  be   not   glaring,    let   the    Reader 
judge. 

4.  'Tis  no   lefs  evident,   that  if  there   be   a   full;  certain 
und  infallible   Foreknowledge  of  the  future  Exiftence  of  the 
Volitions  of  moral  Agents,  then  there  is  a  certain  infallible 
and  indifiblublc  Connection,  between  thofe   Events   and   that 
Foreknowledge  :  arid  that  therefore,    by  the   preceding   Ob- 
fervations,.  thofe  Events  are  neceffary  Events  ;    being  infallibly 
and  indiffolubly  connected  with  that  whofe  Exiftence  already  is, 
and  fo  is  now  neceffary,  and  can't  but  have  been. 

To  fay,  the  Foreknowledge  is  certain  and  infallible,  and  yet 
the  Connection  of  the  Event  with  that  Foreknowledge  is 
not  indilfoluble,  but  difibluble  and  fallible,  is  very  abfurd. 
To  affirm*  it,  would  be  the  fame  Thing  as  to  affirm,  that 
there  is  •  no  neceflary  Connection  between  a  Propofition's 
being  infallibly  known  to  be  true,  and  its  being  true  in 
deed.  So  that  it  is  perfectly  demonftrable,  that  if  there  be 
ftny  infallible  Knowledge  of  future  Volitions,  the  Event  is 

"R  neceffary ; 


Certain  Foreknowledge  Part.  IF0 

neceffary ;  or,  in  other  Words,  that  it  is  impoffible  but  die 
Event  ftiould  come  to  pafs.  For  if  it  be  not  impoffible* 
but  that  it  may  be  otherwife,  then  it  is  not  impoffible  but 
that  the  Propoiition  which  affirms  its  future  coming  to 
pafs,  may  not  now  be  true.  But  how  abfurd  is  that,  on  the 
Supposition  that  there  is  now  an  infallible  Knowledge  ( i.  e. 
Knowledge  which  it  is  impoffible  fhould  fail)  that  it  is  true. 
There  is-  this  Abfiirdity  in  it,  that  it  is  not  impoffible  but 
that  there  now  Ihould  be  no  Truth  in  that  Proportion,; 
which  is  now  infallibly  known  to-be  true. 

II.  Tha.t  no  future  Event  can  be  certainly  foreknown, 
whofe  Exigence  is  contingent,  and  without  all  Neceffity, 
may  be  proved  thus ;  "Tis  impoffible  for  a  Thing  to  be 
certainly  known-  to  any  Intellect  without  Evidence.  To 
fuppofe  otherwife,  implies  a  Contradiclion  :  Becaufe  for  a- 
Thing  to  be  certainly  known  to  any  Undemanding,  is  for 
it  to  be  evident-  to  that  Undemanding :  And  for  a  Thing 
to  be  evident  to  any  Underftanding,  is  the  fame  Thing,  as 
for  that  Underfianding  to  fee  Evidence  of  it :  But  no  Un- 
derftanding,.  created  or  increated,  can  fee  Evidence  where 
there  is  none:  For  that  k  the  fame  Thing,  as.  to  fee  that  to 
be,  which  is  not.  And  therefore,  if  there  be  any  Truth, 
which  is  absolutely  without  Evidence,  that  Truth  is  abfo- 
lutely  unknowable,  infomuch  that  it  implies  a  Contradiction- 
to  fuppofe  that  it  is  known. 

But  if  there  be  any  future  Event,  whofe  Exiftence  is 
contingent,  without  all  Necelilty, -the  future  Exiftence  of 
that  Event  is  abfolutely  <witkwt  Evidence.  If  there  be  any- 
Evidence  of  it,  it  mud  be  one  of  thefe  two  Sorts,  either 
Self- Evident  ?>-  or  Proof\  for  there-  can  be  no  cither  Sort  o£ 
Evidence  but  one  of  thefe  two  ;  an  evident  Thing  muil  be 
either  evident  in  iifelf,  or  evident  in  fomething  elje  j  that  is, 
evident  by  Connection  with  fomething  elfe.  But  &  future 
Thing,  whofe  Exiftence  is  without  all  Neceffity,  can  havQ 
neither  of  thefe  Sorts  of  Evidence.  It  can't  be  Self-evident : 
¥or  if  it  be,  it  may  be  now  known  by  what  is  now  to 
be  feen  in  the  Thing  itfelf ;.  either-  its  prefent  Exiftence, 
or  the  Neceffity  of  its  Nature:  But  both  thefe  are  con 
trary  to  the  Suppcfition.  It  is  fuppofed,  both  that  the 
Thing  has  no  prefent  Exiftence  to  be  feen ;  -  and  alfo 
that  it  is  not  of  fuch  a  Nature  as  to  be  neceffa- 
rily  exiftent  for  the  future:  So  that  its  future  Ex- 
is  not  Self-evident,  And,  fecondly,  neither  is  there 

any 


Sect.  XII.  infers  fome  'Neceflity. 

any  Proof,  or  Evidence  in  any  Thing  elfe,  or  Evidence  of 
Connection  with  fomething  elfe  that  is  evident :  For  this 
alfo  is  contrary  to  the  Suppofition.  'Tis  fuppofed,  that 
there  is  now  Nothing  exiftent,  with  which  the  future  Ex 
igence  of  the  contingent  Event  is  connected.  For  fuch  a 
Connection  deftroys  its  Contingence,  and  fuppofes  Neceflity. 
Thus  'tis  demonftrated,  that  there  is  in  the  Nature  of  Things 
abfolutely  no  Evidence  at*sll  of  the  future  Exigence  of 
that  Event,  which  is  contingent,  without  all  Neceffity  (ft 
any  fuch  Event  there  be)  neither  Self-Evidence  nor  Proof, 
And  therefore  the  Thing  in  Reality  is  not  evident ;  and 
fo  can't  be  feen  to  be  evident,  or,  which  is  the  fame 
Thing,  can't  be  known. 

Let  us  confider  this  in  an  Example.  Suppofe  that  five 
Thoufand  feven  Hundred  and  fixty  Years  ago,  there  was 
no  other  Being  but  the  divine  Being ;  and  then  this 
World,  or  fome  particular  Body  or  Spirit,  all  at  once 
ftarts  out  of  Nothing  into  Being,  and  takes  on  itfelf  a 
particular  Nature  and  Form  ;  all  in  afyolute  Contingence, 
without  any  Concern  of  God,  or  any  other  Caufe,  in  the 
Matter ;  without  any  Manner  of  Ground  or  Reafon  of 
Its  Exiftence;  or  any  Dependence  upon,  or  Connection 
at  all  with  any  Thing  foregoing:  I  fay,  that  if  this  be 
fuppofed,  there  was'  no  Evidence  of  that  Event  before 
hand.  There  was  no  Evidence  of  it  to  be  fecn  in  the 
Thing  Itfelf;  for  the  Thing  itfelf,  as  yet,  was  not.  And 
there  was  no  Evidence  of  it  to  be  feen  in  any  Thing  elfe ; 
for  Evidence  in  ibmething  elfe,  is  Connexion  with  fomething 
elfe :  But  fuch  Connection  is  contrary  to  the  Suppofition. 
There  was  no  Evidence  before,  that  this  Thing  'would  hap- 
pen;  for  by  the  Suppofition,  there  was  no  Reafon  why  it 
Jbiuld  happen^  rather  than  fomething  elfe,  or  rather  than 
Nothing.  And  if  fo,  then  all  Things  before  were  exactly 
equal,  and  the  fame,  with  Refpect  to  that  and  other  poffi- 
ble  Things ;  there  was  no  Preponderation,  no  fuperiour 
Weight  or  Value ;  and  therefore  Nothing  that  could  be 
of  any  Weight  or  Value  to  determine  any  Underflanding. 
The  Thing  was  abfolutely  without  Evidence,  and  abfo- 
lutely  unknowable.  An  Increafe  of  Undemanding,  or  of 
the  Capacity  of  Difcerning,  has  no  Tendency,  and  makes 
no  Advance,  to  a  difcerning  any  Signs  or  Evidences  of  it* 
let  it  be  i?creafed  never  fo  much ;  yea,  if  it  be  increafed 
infinitely.  The  Increafe  of  the  Strength  of  Sight  may  have 
$  Tendency  to  enable  to  difcern  the  Evidence  which  is 

R  3  &r 


i2i  Certain  Foreknowledge  Fi:t  IJL 

far  off,  and  very  much  hid,  and  deeply  involved  in  Clouds 
and  Darknefs ;  but  it  has  no  Tendency  to  enable  to  difcern. 
Evidence  where  there  is  none.  If  the  Sight  be  infinitely 
ftrong,  and  the  Capacity  of  Difcerning  infinitely  great,  it 
will  enable  to  fee  all  that  there  is,  and  to  fee  it  perfectly, 
and  with  Eafe;  yet  it  has  no  Tendency  at  all  to  enable. a 
Being  to  difcern  that  Evidence  which  is  not :  But  on  the 
contrary,  it  has  a  Tendency  to  enable  to  difcern  with  great 
Certainty  that  there  is  none. 

III.  To  fuppofe  the  /uture  Volitions  of  moral  Agents  not 
to  be  neceflary  Events ;  or,  which  is  the  fame  Thing,  Events 
which  it  is  not  impoffible  but  that  they  may  not  come  to 
pafs ;  and  yet  to  fuppofe  that  God  certainly  foreknows 
them,  and  knows  all  Things  j  is  to  fuppofe  God's  Know 
ledge  to  be  inconfiftent  with  itfelf.  For  to  fay,  that  God 
certainly,  and  without  all  Conjecture,  knows  that  a  Thing 
will  infallibly  be,  which  at  the  fame  Time  he  knows  to  be 
fo  contingent,  that  it  may  poffibly  not  be,  is  to  fuppofe  his 
Knowledge  incdnfiftent  with  itfelf ;  or  that  one  Thing 
that  he  knows  is  utterly  inconfiftent  with  another  Thing 
that  he  knows.  'Tis  the  fame  Thing  as  to  fay,  He  now 
knows  a  Proportion  to  be  of  certain  infallible  Truth, 
which  he  knows  to  be  of  contingent  uncertain  Truth.  If 
a  future  Volition  is  fo  without  all  Neceflity,  that  there  is  no 
thing  hinders  but  that  it  may  not  be,  then  the  Prcpofition 
which  aflerts  its  future  Exiftence,  is  fo  uncertain,  that  there 
is  Nothing  hinders  but  that  the  Truth  of  it  may  entirely 
fail.  And  if  God  knows  all  Things,  He  knows  this  Pro- 
poiition  to  be  thus  uncertain.  And  that  is  inconfiftent 
with  his  knowing  that  it  is  infallibly  true ;  and  fo  incon 
fiftent  with  his  infallibly  knowing  that  it  is  true.  If  the 
Thing  be  indeed  contingent,  God  views  it  fo,  and  judges 
it  to  be  contingent,  if  he  views  Things  as  they  are.  If  the 
Event  be  not  neceffary,  then  it  is  pomble  it  may  never  be  : 
And  if  it  be  poffible  it  may  never  be,  God  knows  it  may 
poffibly  never  be  ;  and  that  is  to  know  that  the  Propofition 
which  affirms  its  Exiftence,  may  poffibly  not  be  true  ;  and 
that  is  to  know  that  the  Truth  of  it  is  uncertain  ;  which 
furely  is  inconfiftent  with  his  knowing  it  as  a  certain 
Truth.  If  Volitions  are  in  Themfelves  contingent  Events, 
without  all  Neceffity,  then  'tis  no  Argument  of  £erfeftion 
of  Knowledge  in  any  Being  to  determine  peremptorily 
that  they  will  be ;  but  on  the  contrary,  an  Argument  of 
Ignorance  and  Miftake :  Becaufe  it  would  ar^ue,  that 

he. 


• 


.  XII.  ,      infers  fome  Neceffity.  1 23 

he  fuppofes  -that  Proportion  to  be  certain,  which  in  its 
own  Nature,  and  all  Things  confidersd,  is  uncertain  and 
contingent.  To  fay  in  fuch  a  Cafe,  that  God  may  have 
Ways  of  knowing  contingent  Events  which  we  can't  con 
ceive  of,  is  ridiculous  ;  as  much  fo,  as  to  fay,  that  God 
may  knov/  Contradictions  to  be  true,  for  ought  we  know, 
or  that  he  may  know  a  Thing  to  be  certairl,  and  at  the  fame 
Time  know  it  not  to  be  certain,  tho'  we^an't  conceive  how  \ 
becaufe  he  has  Ways  of  knowing,  which  we  can't  com 
prehend. 

Cord.  i.  From  what  has  been  obferved  it  is  evident,  thai 
ihe  abfolute  Decrees  of  God  are  no  more  inconiiftent  with 
human  Liberty,  on  Account  of  any  Neceffity  of  the  Event 
which  follows  from  fuch  Decrees,  than  the  abfolute 
Foreknowledge  of  God.  Becaufe  the  Connection  between 
the  Event  and  certaiij  Foreknowledge,  is  as  infallible  and 
indiflbluble,  as  between  the  Event  and  an  abfolute  Decree. 
That  is,  'tis  no  more  impoffible  that  the  Event  and  Decree 
ihould  not  agree  together,  than  that  the  Event  and  abfolute 
Knowledge  fhould  difagree.  The  Connection  between  the 
Event  and  Foreknowledge  is  abfolutely  perfeft,  by  the  Suppo- 
iition  :  becaufe  it  is  fuppofed,  that  the  Certainty  and  Infallibi 
lity  of  the  Knowledge  is  abfolutely  perfect.  And  it  being  fo, 
the  Certainty  can't  be  increafed  j  and  therefore  the  Con 
nection  between  the  Knowledge  and  Thing  known,  can't  be 
increafed  ;  fo  that  if  a  Decree  be  added  to  the  Foreknow 
ledge,  it  don't  at  all  increafe  the  Connection,  or  make  it 
more  infallible  and  indiflbluble.  If  it  were  not  fo,  the 
Certainty  of  Knowledge  might  be  increafed  by  the  Ad 
dition  of  a  Decree ;  which  is  contrary  to  the  Suppofition,  < 
which  is,  that  the  Knowledge  is  abfolutely  perfect,  or  perfeft 

to  the  higheft  poflible  Degree, 

»• 

There  is  as  much  of  an  Impdffibility  but  that  the  Things 
which  are  infallibly  foreknown,  mould  be,  or  (which  is  the 
fame  Thing)  as  great  a  Neceffity  of  their  future  Exiftence, 
as  if  the  Event  were  already  written  down,  and  was  known 
and  read  by.  all  Mankind,  thro'  all  preceding  Ages,  and 
there  were  the  mcft  indiflbluble  and  perfect  Connection 
poflible,  between  the  Writing,  and  the  Thing  written. 
In  fuch  a  Cafe,  it  would  be  as  impoffible  the  Event  mould 
fail  of.  Exiftence,  as  if  it  had  exifted  already;  and  a 
Pecree  can't  make  an  Event  furer  or  more  neceflary  than 


f  23       Foreknowledge  infers  Necejjiiy       Fart.  IL 

And  therefore,  if  there  be  any  fuch  Foreknowledge,  as 
it  has  been  proved  there  is,  then  Neceffity  of  Cormeclion 
.and  Confeqiaence,  is  not  at  all  inconfiftent  with  any  Li 
berty  which  Man,  or  any  other  Creature  enjoys.  And 
from  hence  it  may  be  infer'd,  that  abfolute  Decrees  of 
God,  which  don't  at  all  increafe  the  Neceffity,  are  not  at  all 
inconliftent  with  the  Liberty  which  Man  enjoys,  on  any 
fuch  Account,  as  that  they  make  the  Event  decreei  neceflary, 
and  render  k  utterly  impoffible  but  that  it  fhouid  come  to 
pafs.  Therefore  if  abfolute  Decrees  are  inconfiftent  with 
Man's  Liberty  as  a  moral  Agent,  cr  his  Liberty  in  a  State 
pf  Probation,  or  any  Liberty  whatfoever  that  he  enjoys,  it 
is  not  on  Account  of  any  Neceffity  which  abfolute  De- 
jcrees  infer, 

Dr.  Whitby  fuppofes,  there  is  a  great  Difference  between 
God's  Foreknowledge,  and  his  Decrees,  with  Regard  to 
Neceffity  of  future  Events.  In  his  Difcourfe  on  the  five 
Points,  P.  474,  £c.  He  fays,  "  God's  Prefcience  has  no 

fe  Influence  at  all  on  our  Aclions, Should  God  (fays  he) 

ff  by  immediate  Revelation,  give  me  the  Knowledge  of  the 
cs  Event  of  any  Man's  State  or  Aciions,  would  my  Know- 
f f  ledge  of  them  have  any  Influence  upon  his  Aciions  ? 

"  Surely   none   at   all. Our  Knowledge   doth   not   affecl 

<f  the  Things  we  know,  to  make  them  more  certain,  or 
"  more  future,  than  they  would  be  without  it.  Now  Fore- 
'.*  knowledge  in  God  is  Knowledge.  As  therefore  Know- 
"  ledge  has  no  Influence  on  Things  that  are,  fo  neither  has 
(t  Foreknowledge  on  Things  that  lhall  be.  And  confe- 
gs  quently,  the  Foreknowledge  of  any  Aclion  that  would  be 
<(  otherwife  free,  cannot  alter  or  diminifh  that  Freedom. 
"  Whereas  God's  Decree  of  Election  is  powerful  and  aclive, 
"  and  comprehends  the  Preparation  and  Exhibition  of  fuch 

"  Means,  as   mail  unfruftrably  produce  the  End. Hence 

(t  God's  Prefcience  renders  no  Aciions  neceflary."  And  to 
this  Purpofe,  P.  473.  he  cites  Origen,  where  he  fays,  God's 
Prefcience  is  not  the  Caufe  of  Things  future y  but  tkcir  being  fu 
ture  is  the  Caufe  of  God's  Prefcience  that  they  will  be  :  And 
Le  Blanc,  where  he  fays,  This  is  the  trueft  Refolution  of  this 
Difficulty ,  that  Prefcience  is  not  the  Caufe  that  Things  are  future  ,* 
but  their  being  future  is  the  Caufe  they  are  forefeen.  In  like 
Manner  Dr.  Glark,  in  his  Demonftration  of  the  Being  and 

Attributes   of  God,    P,  99, 99.     And     the   Author    of 

the  Freedom  of  Will,  in  God  and  the  Creature,  fpeaking  to  the 
;ike  Purpofe  with  Dr,  Whiffy,  reprefents  Foreknowledge  <4 

having 


XII.  as  much  as  ^Decree! 

having  no  more  Influence  an  'Things  known ,  to  make  them   necejja~ 
rj,  than  After- Knowledge,  or  to  that  Purpofe. 

To  all  which  I  would  fay ;  That  what  is  faid  about 
Knowledge,  its  not  having  Influence  on  the  Thing  known 
to  make  it  neceffary,  is  Nothing  to  the  Purpofe,  nor  does 
it  in  the  Jeaft  aft'eft  the  foregoing  Reafoning.  Whether 
Prefcience  be  the  Thing  that  makes  the  Event  neceffary  or  no, 
it  alters  not  the  Cafe,  Infallible  Foreknowledge  may  pro<ve 
the  Neceffity  of  the  Event  foreknown,  and  yet  not  be  the 
Thing  which  caufes  the  Neceffity.  If  the  Foreknowledge  be 
abfolute,  this  proves  the  Event  known  to  be  nccefTary,  or 
proves  that  'tis  impoffible  but  that  the  Event  mould  be, 
by  fome  Means  or  other,  either  by  a  Decree,  or  fome 
other  Way,  if  there  be  any  other' Way  :•  Becaufe,  as  was  faid 
before,  'tis  abfurd  to  fay,  that  a  Propofition  is  known  to 
be  certainly  and  infallibly  true,  which  yet  may  poffibly  prove 
not  true..  A 

The  Whole  of  the  feeming  Force  of  this  Evafion  lies  in 
this ;  that,  in  as  much  as  certain  Foreknowledge  don't 
canfi  an  Event  to  be  nece'flary,  as '  §*Deoree  does;  therefore 
it  don't  pr&ve  it  to  be  neceflary,  as  a  Decree  does.  But  there' 
5s  no  Force  in  this  arguing  :  For  it  is  built  wholly  on  this 
Suppofition,  that  Nothing  can  prove  or  be  an  Evidence  of  a 
Thing's  being.  necciTary,  but  that  which  has  a  caufal  In 
fluence  to  -make  it  fa.'  But  this  can  never  be  maintained. 
If  certain  Foreknowledge  of  the  future  exifting  of  an  E- 
vent,  be  not  the  Thing  which  firft  makes  it  irnpoffible  that- 
it  mould  fail  of  Exigence  ,-  yet  it  may,  and  certainly  does- 
demonftrate>  that  it  is  irnpoffible  it  mould  fail  of  it,  how 
ever  that  Impoffibility  comes.  If  Foreknowledge  be  4hot 
the  Caufe,  but  the  Efieft  of  this  Impoffibility,  it  may  prove 
that  there  is  fuch  an  Impoffibility,  as  much  as  if  it  were  the 
Caufe.  It  is  as  ftrong  arguing  from  the  Effect  to  the 
Caufe,  as  from  the  Caufe  to  the  Effect.  'Tis  enough,  that 
an  Exiftence  which  is  infallibly  foreknown,  cannot  fail,  whe 
ther  that  impoffibility  arifes  from  the  Foreknowledge,  or  is 
prior  to  it.  '"Tis  as  evident,  as  'tis  poffible  any  Thing  mould, 
be,  that  it  is  irnpoffible  a  Thing  which  is  infallibly 
known  to  be  true,  mould  prove  net  to  be  true:  therefore 
there  is  a  Necejfity  that  it  mould  be  otherwife ;  whether  the 
Knowledge,  be  the  Caufe  of  this  Neceffity,  or  the  Neceffity 
the  Caufe  of  the  Knowledge. 

All  certain .  Knowledge  whether  it  be    Foreknowledge   or 
After-Knowledge,    or    concomitant  Knowledge,  proves    th^ 

Thine 


i25       Foreknowledge  infers  Neccffity       Part.  II 

Thing  known  now  to  be  neceflary,  by  fome  Means  or  other  ; 
or  prove,  that  it  is  impoflible  it  mould  now  be  other- 
wife  than  true.- 1  freely  allow,  that  Foreknowledge  don't 

prove  a  Thing  to  be  necelTary  any  more  than  After-Know 
ledge  :  But  then  After-Knowledge  which  is  certain  and  infalli 
ble,  proves  that  'tis  now  become  impoflible  but  that  the 
Propofition  known  ihould  be  true.  Certain  After-Knowledge 
proves  that  it  is  now,  in  the  Time  of  the  Knowledge,  by 
fome  Means  or  other,  become  impoflible  but  that  the  Propo 
fition  which  predicates  paft  Exigence  on  the  Event,  ihould 
be  true.  And  fo  does  certain-  Foreknowledge  prove,  that 
iiow,  in  the  Time  of  the  Knowledge,  it  is  by  fome  Means 
or  other,  become  impoflible  but  that  the  Propofition  which 
predicates  future  Exiltence  on  the  Event,  mould  be  true. 
The  Neceflity  of  the  Truth  of  the  Proportions,  confuting 
in  the  prefent  Impoffibility  of  the  Non-Exiftence  of  the  Event 
affirmed,  in  both  Cafes,  is  the  immediate  Ground  of  the 
certainty  of  the  Knowledge  ;  there  can  be  no  Certainty  oi 
Knowledge  without  it. 

There  mud  be  a  Ctfri&mty  in  Things  themfelves,  before 
they  arc  certainly  known,  or  (which  is  the  fame  Thing) 
known  to  be  certain.  For  Certainty  of  Knowjedge  is  no 
thing  elfe  but  knowing  or  difcerning  the  Certainty  there  is 
in  the  Things  themfelves  which  are  known.  Therefore 
there  mud  be  a  Certainty  in  Things  to  be  a  Ground  of  Cer 
tainty  of  Knowledge,  and  to  render  Things  capable  of  be 
ing  known  to  be  certain.  And  this  is  Nothing  but  the  Nc- 
ceility  of  the  Truth  known,  or  its  being  impoflible  but  that 
it  ^htould  be  true ;  or,  in  other  Words,  the  firm  and  infalli- 
ble^Connection  between  the  Subject  and  Predicate  of  the 
Propofuion  that  contains  that  Truth.-  All  Certainty  cf 
Knowledge  confifts  in  the  View  of  the  Firmnefs  of  that 
Connection.  So  God's  certain  Foreknowledge  of  the  fu 
ture  Exiftence  of  any  Event,  is  his  View  of  the  firm  anct  in- 
diffoluble  Connection  of  the  Subject  and  Predicate  of  the 
Proportion  that  aifirms  its  future  Exiftence.  The  Subject  is 
that  pofiible  Event ;  the  Predicate  is  its  future  exifting  r 
Eut  if  future  Exiftence  be  firmly  and  indiflblubly  connected 
with  that  Event,  then  the  future  Exiftence  of  that  Event 
is  neceffary.  If  God  certainly  knows  the  future  Exiftence 
of  an  Event  which  is  wholly  contingent,  and  may  poflibly 
never  be,  then  He  fees  a  firm  Connection  between  a  Sub 
ject  and  Predicate  that  are  not  firmly  connected  ,•  which  is 
a  Contradiction, 


Sect.  XII.  as  much  as  a  Decree.  126 

I  allow  what  Dr.  Whitby  fays  to  be  true,  That  mere 
Knowledge  don't  affeft  the  Thing  known ,  to  make  it  more  certain, 
or  more  future.  But  yet,  I  fay,  it  fuppofrs  and  proves  the 
Thing  -to  be  already,  both  future,  and  certain ;  i.  e.  necefla- 
rily  future.  Knowledge  of  Futurity ,  fuppofes  Futurity  ;  and 
a  certain  Knowledge  of  Futurity,  fuppofes  certain  Futurity,  an 
tecedent  to  that  certain  Knowledge.  But  there  is  no  other 
certain  Futurity  of  a  Thing,  antecedent  to  Certainty  of 
Knowledge,  than  a  prior  Impoffibility  but  that  the  Thing 
ihould  prove  true;  or  (which  is  the  fame  Thing) -the 
Neceflity  of  the  Event. 

I  would  obferve  one  Thing  further  concerning  this  Mat 
ter,  and  it  is  this ;  That  if  it  be  as  thofe  foremen tion'd 
Writers  fuppofe,  that  God's  Foreknowledge  is  not  the 
Gaufe,  but  the  Effeft  of  the  Exiftence  of  the  Event  fore 
known;  this  is  ib  far  from  {hewing  that  this  Foreknowledge 
don't  infer  the  Neceflity  of  the  Exiftence  of  that  Event,  that 
it  rather  (hews  the  contrary  the  more  plainly.  Becaufe  it 
{hews  the  Exittence  of  the  Event  to  be  fo  fettled  and  firm,  that 
it  is  as  if  it  had  already  been  ;  in  Is*  much  as  in  Effect  it 
actually  exifts  already ;  its  future  Exiftence  has  already 
had  actual  Influence  and  Efficiency,  and  has  produced  an  Effeft* 
viz.  Prefcience :  The  Eifeft  exifts  already ;  and  as  the 
Efrecl  fuppofes  the  Caufe,  is  connected  with  the  Caufe,  and 
depends  entirely  upon  it ;  therefore  it  is  as  if  the  future  E- 
vent,  which  is  the  Caufe,  had  exifted  already.  The  Eifed 
is  firm  as  poiTibk,  it  having  already  the  Poffeffion  of  Ex 
iftence,  and  has  made  fure  of  it.  But  the  Effect  can't  be; 
more  firm  and  ftable  than  its  Caufe,  Ground  and  Reafon. 
The  Building  can't  be  firmer  than  the  Foundation. 

To  illuftrate  this  Matter,  let  as  fuppofe  the  Appearances 
and  Images  of  Things  in  a  Glafs  ;  for  Inftance,  a  reflecting 
Telefcope  to  be  the  real  Effects  of  heavenly  Bodies  (at 
2  Diftance,  and  out  of  Sight)  which  they  refemble : 
If  it  be  fo,  then,  as  thefe  Images  in  the  Telefcope  have 
had  a  paft  actual  Exiftence,  and  it  is  become  utterly 
impolTible  now  that  it  mould  be  otherwife  than  that 
they  have  exifted ;  fo  they  being  the  true  Effecls  of  the 
heavenly  Bodies  they  refemble,  this  proves  the  exifting  of 
thofe  heavenly  Bodies  to  be  as  real,  infallible,  firm  and 
neceflary,  as  the  exifting  of  thefe  Effecls ;  the  one  being 
connected  with,  and  wholly  depending  on  the  other. 
Now  let  us  fuppofe  future  Exiftences  fome  Way  or  other 

S  to 


Foreknowledge  infers  Neceffity      Part  IL 

to  b.ive  Influence  back,  to  produce  Effects  before-hand, 
a-nd  caafe  exact  and  perfect  Images  of  themfelves  in  a  Glafs, 
u  Thoufand  Years  before  they  exift,  yea,  in  ail  preced 
ing  Ages  ;  But  yet  that  thefe  Images  are  real  Effects  of 
tbefe  tutu  re  Exigences,  perfectly  dependent  on,  and  con 
nected  with  their  Caufe ;  thcfc  Effects  and  Images,  having' 
already  had  aftual  Exiflence,  rendering  that  Matter  of  their 
Kxifting  perfectly  firm  and  liable,  and  utterly  impoflible 
to  be  otherwife ;  this  proves  in  like  Manner  as  in  the 
other  Inrlance,  that  the  Exiftence  of  the  Things  which 
are  their  Causes,  is  alfo  equally  fure,  firm  and  neceffary ; 
and  that  it  is  alike  impofiible  but  that  they  fnould  be,  as 
if  thfey  had  been  already,  as  their  Effefts  have.  And  if, 
initead  of  Images  in  a  Glafs,  we  fuppofc  the  antecedent 
Effects  to  be  perfeift  Ideas  of  them  in  the  divine  Mind* 
which  have  exited  there  from  all  Eternity,  which  are  as 
properly  Effects,-  as  truly  and  properly  connected  with  their 
Caufc,  the  Cafe  is  not  altered. 

Another  Thing  which,  has  been  faid  by  fome  Arminiam", 
to  take  off  the  Force  df  whnt  is  urged  from  God's  Pre- 
fcience,  agair.it  the  Contingence  of  the  Volitions  of  moral 
Agents,  is  to  this  Purpofe  ;  <<r  That  when  we  talk  of 
"Foreknowledge  in  God»  there  is  no  ftricl  Propriety  in 
"  our  fo  Speaking;  and  that  altho'  it  be  true,  that  there  is 
(C  in  God  tli.e  moil  perfect  Knowledge  of  all  Events  from 
tl  Eternity  to  Etcinity,  yet  there  is  ho  fuch  Thing  as 
f(  before  and  after  in  God,  but  He  fees  all  Things  by 
"  one  pefeft  unchangeable  View,  without  any  Succeifion.'* 
^ '{.'o.  this  I  anfwer, 

i.  It  has  been  already  (hewn,  that  all  certain  Knowledge 
proves  the  Neceffity  t)f  the  Truth  known  ;  whether  it  be 

before,  afier,  or  at  the  fa^-e  Time. Tho'    it   be    true,    that 

there  is  no  Succeliion  in  God's  Knowledge,  and  the  Manner 
of  his  Knowledge  is  to  us  inconceivable,  yet  thus  much 
\ve  knew  concerning  it$  that  there  is  no  Event,  paft, 
prefcnt,  or  to  come,  that  God  is  ever  uncertain  of  :  He 
never  is,  never  was,  and  never  will  be  without  infallible. 
Knowledge  of  it :  He  always  fees  the  Exifterice  of  it  to 
be  certain  and  infallible.  And  as  he  always  fees  Things 
luft  as  they  are  in  Truth  ;  hence  there  never  is  in  Reality 
any  Thing  contingent  in  fuch  a  Senfe,  as  that  poffibly  it 
may  happen  never  to  exift.  If,  ftriclly  fpeaking,  there  is  na 
JFoieknowlcnge  in  Gad,  'tis  becaufe.  thofe  Thing*,  which 

arc 


.  XI I.         as  much  as  a  Decree. 

are  future  to  us,  are  as  prefent  to  God,  as  if  they  already 
had  Exiftence  :  and  that  is  as  much  as  to  fay,  that  iutme 
Events  are  always  in  God's  View  as  evident,  clear,  fure 
and  neceiTary,  as  if  they  already  were.  If  there  never  is 
a  Time  wherein  the  Exiitence  of  the  Event  is  not  preieht 
with  God,  then  there  never  is  a  Time  wherein  it  is  not 
as  much  impofiible  for  it  to  fail  of  Exiftence,  a:;  if  its 
Exiftence  were  prefent,  and  were  already  come  to  pafs. 

God's  viewing  Things  fo  perfectly  and  unchangeably  as  tha't 
there  is  no  Succeifion  in  his  Ideas  or  judgment,  don't  hinder 
but  that  there  is  properly  now,  in  the  Mind  of  God,  a  certain 
and  perfect  Knowledge  of  the  moral  Actions  of  Men,  which  td 
us  are  an  Hundred  \rears  hence  :  yea  the  Objection  fuppofes 
this ;  and  therefore  it  certainly  don't  hinder  but  that,  by  the 
foregoing  Arguments,  it  is  now  impoffible  thefe  moral  Actions 
(hould  not  come  to  pafs. 

We  know,  that  God  knows  the  future  voluntary  Actions 
of  Men.  in  fuch  a  Senfe  before-hand,  as  that  he  is  able  par 
ticularly  to  declare,  and  foretel  them,  and  write  them, 
or  caufe  them  to  be  written  down  in  a  Book,  r.s  He  often 
has  done ;  and  that  therefore  the  neccflary  Connection 
which  there  is  between  God's  Knowledge  and  the  Event 
known,  does  as  much  prove  the  Event  to  be  neceiTary 
before-hand,  as  if  the  divine  Knowledge  were  in  the  fame 
Seife  before  the  Event,  as  the  Predidion  or  Writing  is. 
If  it  he  Knowledge  be  infallible,  then  the  Exprefiion  of  it  in 
the  written  Prediction  is  infallible  ;  that  is,  there  is  a'n 
infallible  Connection  between  that  written  Prediction  and 
the  Event.  And  if  fo,  then  it  is  impofiible  it  fnould 
ever  be  othenvife,  than  that  that  Prediction  and  Event 
Should  agree  :  And  this  is  the  fame  Thing  as  to  fay, 
Jtis  impoiiible  but  that  the  Event  mould  come  to  pafs  : 
And  this  is  the  fame  as  to  fay,  that  its  coming  to  pafs 

is  neceffary. So   that   it  is   manifeft,  that  there   being  no 

proper  Succeffion  in  God's  Mind,  makes  no  Alteration  as 
io  the  Neceffity  of  the  Exiilence  of  the  Events,  which  God 
knows.  Yea, 

2.  This  is  fo  far  from  weakening  the  Proof,  which  has. 
been  given  of  the  Impoffibility  of  the  not  coming  to  pafs  of 
future  Events  known,  as  that  it  eftablifiies  that  wherein  the 
Strength  of  the  foregoing  Arguments  coalifts-,  snd  {hews, 
the  Ciearnefs  of  the  Evidence.  For, 

83  (i.) 


1 29  CertainToYtkno\\izdgcmfersfjffleNec£ffity.I*.II. 

(i»)  The  very  Reafon  why  God's  Knowledge  is  with 
out  Succeffion.,  is,  becaufe  it  is  abfolutely  perrefl,  to  the 
higheft  poifible  Degree  of  Clearnefs  and  Certainty  :  All 
Things,  whether  paft,  prefent  or  to  come,  being  view'd 
v/ith  equal  Evidence  and  Fulnefs  ;  future  Things  being 
feen  with  as  much  Clearnefs,  as  if  they  were  prefent  ; 
.the  View  is  always  in  abfolute  Perfection  ;  and  abfolute 
conftant  Perfection,  admits  of  no  Alteration,  and  fo  no 
Succeffion  :  the  aftual  Exiftence  of  the  Thing  known,  don't 
at  all  increafe,  or  add  to  the  Clearnefs  or  Certainty  of 
the  Thing  known  :  God  calls  the  Things  that  are  not,  as 
tho5  they  were  ;  they  are  all  one  to  Him  as  if  they 
had  already  exifted.  But  herein  confifts  the  Strength  of 
the  Demonstration  before  given,  of  the  Impoffibility  of  the 
not  exitting  of  thofe  Things  who'fe  Exiftence  God  knows  ; 
That  it  is  as  impoffible  they  ihould  fail  of  Exiftence,  as  if 
they  exifted  already.  This  Objection,  inftead  of  weakening 
this  Argument,  fets  it  in  the  cleareft  and  ftrongeft  Light  ; 
for  it  fuppofes  it  to  be  fo  indeed,  that  the  Exiftence  of 
iiiture  Events  is  in  God's  View  fo  much  as  if  it  already 
had  been,  that  when  they  come  actually  to  exift,  it  makes 
not  the  leaft  Alteration  or  Variatioa  in  his  View  or 
Knowledge  of  them. 

(2.)  The  Objection  is  founded  on  the  Immutability  of  God's 
Knowledge :  For  'tis  the  Immutability  of  Knowledge  makes 
his  Knowledge  to  be  without  Succeflion,  But  this  mcft 
directly  and  plainly  demonftrates  the  Thing  I  infift  on, 
•viz.  That  'tis  utterly  impoffible  the  known  Events  mould 
fail  of  Exiftence.  For  if  that  were  poffible,  then  it  would 
be  poffible  for  there  to  be  a  Change  in  God's  Knowledge 
and  View  of  Things.  Fot  if  the  known  Event  mould 
fail  of  Exiftence,  and  not  come  into  Being,  as  God  expefted, 
then  God  would  fee  it,  and  fo  would  change  his  Mind, 
and  fee  bis  former  Miftake ;  and  thus  there  would  be 
Change  and  Succeffion  in  his  Knowledge.  But  as  God  is 
immutable,  and  fo  it  is  utterly  and  infinitely  impoffible 
that  his  View  mould  be  changed ;  fo  'tis,  for  the  fame 
Reafon,  juft  fo  impoffible  that  the  fore-known  Event  mould 
not  exift :  And  that  is  to  be  impoffible  in  the  higheft 
Degree  :  and  therefore  the  contrary  is  neceflary.  Nothing 
3s  more  impoffible  than  that  the  immutable  God  mould 
be  changed,  by  the  Succeffion  of  Time ;  who  compre 
hends  all  Things,  from  Eternity  to  Eternity,  in  one,  moft 

pcrfeft* 


Se&.XII.  Foreknowledge  .proves  NeceJJity.         130 

perfect,    and  unalterable  View  ;    fo    that  his  whole   eternal 
Duration  is  Vitte  interminabilis,  lota,Jimul,  £3*  perfefla  Pajjlffio. 

On  the  Whole,  I  need  not  fear  to  fay,  that  there  is  no 
Geometrical  Theorem  or  Proportion  whatfoever,  more  capa 
ble  of  ftrict  Demonft  ration,  than  that  God's  certain  Pre- 
fcience  of  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents  is  inconfiftent  with 
fuch  a  Condngence  of  thefe  Events,  as  is  without  all 
Isleceffity  ;  and  fo  is  ineonfiftent  with  the  Arminian  Notion  of 
liberty. 

Carol.  2.  Hence  the  Doctrine  of  the  Cal-vinifts,  concerning 
the  abfolute  Decrees  of  God,  does  not  at  all  infer  any 
more  Fatality  of  Things,  than  will  demonftrably  follow  from 
the  Doctrine  of  moft  Arminian  Divines,  who  acknowledge 
God's  Omnifcience,  and  univerfal  Preference.  Therefore 
all  Objections  they  make  againft  the  Doctrine  of  the  Calvinifts, 
as  implying  Hobbes's  Doctrine  of  Neceffity,  or  the  Stoical 
Doctrine  of  Fate,  lie  no  more  againft  the  Doctrine  of 
Cahinifts,  than  their  own  Dodrine:  And  therefore  it  don't 
become  thofe  Divines,  to  raife  fuch  an  Out-cry  againft  the 
S)  on  this  Account. 


Carol.  3.  Hence  all  arguing  from  Neceffity,  againft  the 
Doctrine  of  the  Inability  of  unregenerate  Men  to  perform 
the  Conditions  of  Salvation,  and  the  Commands  of  God 
requiring  fpiritual  Duties,  and  againft  the  Calviniftic  Doctrine 
of  efficacious  Grace  ;  I  fay,  all  Arguings  of  Arminiam 
(fuch  of  them  as  own  God's  Omnifcience)  againft  thefe 
Things,  on  this  Ground,  that  thefe  Doctrines,  tho'  they 
don't  fuppofe  Men  to  be  under  any  Conftraint  or  Coaction, 
yet  fuppofe  them  under  Neceffity,  with  Refpect  to  their  moral 
Actions,  and  thofe  Things  which  are  required  of  them  in  Order 
to  their  Acceptance  with  God  ;  and  their  arguing  againft 
the  Neceffity  of  Men's  Volitions,  taken  from  the  Reafon- 
ablenefs  of  God's  Commands,  Promifes,  and  Threatenings, 
and  the  Sincerity  of  his  Counfels  and  Invitations  ;  and  all 
Objections  againft  any  Doctrines  of  the  Cal<vMfts  as  being 
inconfiftent  with  human  Liberty,  becaufe  they  infer  Neceffity  ; 
I  fay,  all  thefe  Arguments  and  Objections  muft  fall  to 
the  Ground,  and  be  juftly  efteem'd  vain  and  frivolous, 
as  coming  from  them  ;  being  maintain'd  in  an  inconfiftence 
with  themfelves,  and  in  like  Manner  levelled  againft  their  owa 
IDoctrine,  as  againft  the  Doctrine  of  the  Cal*oiriifts\ 

SECTION 


Both  Neceffity  and  Contingency       Fart.  II, 

(XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX) 

SECTION     XIIL 

Whether  we  fuppofe  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents 
to  be  connected  with  any  Thing  antecedent,  or 
wt>  yet  they  muft  be  neceffary  in  Juch  a  Senfe 
as  to  overthrow  Arminian  Liberty. 

EVERY  Aft  of  the  Will  has  a  Caufe,  or  it  has  not, 
If  it  has  a  Caufe,  then,  according  to  what  has 
already  been  (Jemonftrated,  it  is  not  contingent,  but 
neceflary ;  the  EiFeft  being  neceffarily  dependent  and  con- 
fequent  on  its  Caufe;  and  that,  let.  the  Caufe  be  what 
it  will.  If  the  Caufe  is  the  Will  itfelf,  by  antecedent 
Afts  chufing  and"  determining";  ftill  the  determined  and 
caufed  Aft  muft  be  a  necerfary  Effect.  The  Act  that 
is  the  determined  Effect  of  the  foregoing  Act  which  is  its 
Caufe,  can't  prevent  the  Efficiency  of  its  Caufe ;  but  muft 
be  .wholly  Subject  to  its  Determination  and  Command, 
as  much  as  the  Motions  of  the  Hands  and  Feet :  The 
confequent  commanded  Acts  of  the  Will  are  as  paflive 
and  as  neceflary,  with  Refpect  to  the  antecedent  determining 
Acts,  as  the  Parts  of  the  Body  are  to  the  Volitions 
which  determine  and  command  them.  And  therefore,  it 
all  the  free  Acts  of  the  Will  are  thus,  if  they  are  -all 
determined  Effects,  determined  by  the  Will  itfelf,  that 
is,  determined  by  antecedent  Choice,  then  they  are  all 
neceflary;  they  are  all  fubject  to,  and  decifively  fixed  by 
the  foregoing  Act,  which  is  their  Caufe  :  Yea,  even  the 
determining  Act  itfelf;  for  that  muft  be  determined  and 
fixed  by  another  Act,  preceding  that,  if  it  be  a  free  and 
voluntary  Act ;  and  fo  muft  be  neceffary.  So  that  by  this 
all  the  free  Acts  of  the  Will  are  neceflary,  and  can't  be 
free  unlefs  they  are  neceffary  :  Becaufe  they  can't  be  free, 
according  to  the  Arminian  Notion  of  Freedom,  unlefs  they 
are  determined  by  the  Will ;  which  is  to  be  determined 
by  antecedent  Choice ;  which  being  their  Caufe,  proves 
them  neceflary.  And  yet  they  fay,  Neceffity  is  utterly  mcon- 

fiftent 


Sevft.  XIIJL.  inco?i/t fieri  witb  Arniinian  Liberty.  132 

fiftent  with  Liberty.  So  that,  •  by  their  Scheme,  the  Acts 
of  the  Will  can't  be  free  unicfs  the/  are  necefTary,  and 
yet  cannot  be  tree  if  they  be  not  neceilary  ! 

But  if  the  other  Part  of  the  Dilemma  be  taken,  and 
it  be  affirmed  that  the  free  Acts  .  of  the  Will  have  no 
Caufe,  and  are  connected  with  nothing  whatfoever  that 
goes  before  t;hem  and  determines  them,  in  order  to  maintain 
their  proper  and  abfolute  Ccntingence,  and  this  fhould  be 
allowed  to  be  ppffible ;  ftill  it  will  not  ferve  their  Turn. 
For  if  the  Volition  comes  to  pafs  by  perfect  Contingence, 
and  without  any  Caufe.  at  all,  then  it  is  certain,  no  Act 
of  the  Will,  no  prior  Act  of  the  Soul  was  the  Caufe,  no 
Determination  or  Choice  of  the  Scul,  had  any  Hand  in 
it.  The  Will,  or  the  Soul,  was  indeed  the  Subject  of  what 
happened  to  it  accidentally,  but  was  not  the  Caufb.  The 
"Will  is  cot  active  in  caullng  -or  determining,  but  pu 
the  'paftlve  Subject ;  at  leaft  according  to  their  Notion  of 
Action  and  Pafilon.  In  this  Cafe,  Contingence  doei 
much  .prevent  the  Determination  of  the  Will,  as  a  proper! 
Caufe  ;  and  as  to  the  Will,  it  was  r.ece-Tary,  and  could  be 
no  otherwife.  For  to  fuppofe  that  it  could  have  been, 
other  wife,  if  the  Will  or  Soul  had  pleafed,  is  to  fuppofe 
that  the  Aft  is  dependent  on  fome  prior  AcY  of  Choice  or 
FJeafure ;  contrary  to  what  now  is  fuppofed  :  It  is  to  fup-- 
pofe  that  it  might  have  been  otherwife,  if  its  Caufe  had. 
made  it  or  ordered  it  ctherwife.  But  this  don't  agree  to 
its  having  no  Caufe  or  Orderer  at  all.  That  mult  be 
rieceflary  as  to  the  Soul,  which  is  dependent  on  no  free 
Aft  of  the  Scul  :  But  that  which  is  without  a  Caufe,  is  de 
pendent  on  no  free  Aft  of  the  Soul :  becaufe,  by  the  Sup- 
pofition,  it  is  dependent  on  Nothing,  and  is  connefted  with 
Nothing.  In  fuch  a  Cafe,  the  Soul  is  neceiTariiy  fubjefted 
to  what  Accident  brings  to  pafs,  from  Time  to  Time,  as 
much  as  the  Earth,  that  is  inactive,  is  neceffarily  fub 
jefted  to  what  falls  upon  it.  But  this  don't  confift  with 
the  Arminian  Notion  of  Liberty,  which  is  the  Will's  Power 
of  determining  itfelf  in  its  own  Afts,  and  being  wholly 
active  in  it,  without  Paffivenefs,  and  without  being  fubject 

to  Neceffity. Thus,  Contingency  belongs  to  the  Arminicui 

Notion  of  Liberty,  and  yet  is  ineonfiftent  with  it. 

.  I  would  here  obferve,  that  the  Author  of  the  Ejfay  m 
the  Freedom  of  Will,  in  God  and  the  Creature,  Page  76,  77. 
%s  as  follows,  "  The  Wcrd  Gkame  ghvays  means  feme- 

f(  thing 


J33  -Both  Neceffi.  and  Conimgcnceinconft.  wtib,&&  P.IL 

thing  done  without  Defign.  Chance  and  Defign  ftand 
in  direct  Oppofition  to  each  other :  and  Chance  can 
never  be  properly  applied  to  the  Acts  of  the  Will, 
which  is  the  Spring  of  all  Defign,  and  which  defigns 
to  chufe  whatfoever  it  doth  chufe,  whether  there  be  any 
fuperiour  Fitnefs  in  the  Thing  which  it  chufes,  or  no ; 
and  it  defigns  to  determine  itfelf  to  one  Thing,  where 
two  Things  perfectly  equal  are  propcfed,  merely  becaufe  is 
will."  But  herein  appears  a  very  great  Inadvertence  in  this 
Author.  For  if  the  Will  be  the  Spring  of  all  Defign,  as  he 
fays,  then  certainly  it  is  not  always  the  Effefi  of  Defign  ; 
and  the  Acts  of  the  Will  themfelves  muft  fometimes  eome 
to  pafs  when  they  don't  fpring  from  Defign ;  and  confe- 
quently  come  to  pafs  by  Chance,  according  to  his  own 
Definition  of  Chance.  And  if  the  Will  defigns  to  chufe  what- 
foever  it  does  chufe,  and  defegns  to  determine  itfelf,  as  he  faysy 
then  it  defigns  to  determine  all  its  Defigns.  Which 
carries  us  back  from  one  Defign  to  a  foregoing  Defign 
determining  that,  and  to  another  determining  that;  and 
fo  on  in  infinitum.  The  very  firft  Defign  muft  be  the 
Eflfeft  of  foregoing  Defign,  or  elfe  it  muft  be  by  Chance, 
in  his  Notion  of  it* 

Here  another  Alternative  may  be  propofed,  relating  to 
the  Connection  of  the  Acts  of  the  Will  with  fomething 
foregoing  that  is  their  Caufe,  not  much  unlike  to  the  other  5 
which  is  this :  Either  human  Liberty  is  fuch  that  it  may 
well  ftand  with  Volitions  being  neceflarily  connected  with 
the  Views  of  the  Underftanding,  and  fo  is  confiftent  with 
Neceffity ;  or  it  is  inconfiftent  with,  and  contrary  to  fuch 
a  Connection  and  Neceffity*  The  former  is  directly  fub- 
verfive  of  the  Arminian  Notion  of  Liberty,  cpnfifting  in  Free 
dom  from  all  Neceffity.  And  if  the  latter  be  chofen,  and  it 
be  faid,  that  Liberty  is  inconfiftent  with  any  fuch  neceflary 
Connection  of  Volition  with  foregoing  Views  of  the  Under 
ftanding,  it  confiding  in  Freedom  from  any  fuch  Neceffity 
of  the  Will  as  that  would  imply  ;  then  the  Liberty  of 
the  Soul  confifts  (in  Part  at  leaft)  in  the  Freedom  from 
Reftraint,  Limitation  and  Government,  in  its  actings,  by  the 
Underftanding,  and  in  Liberty  and  Liablenefs  to  act  contrary 
to  the  Underftanding's  Views  and  Dictates :  and  confe- 
quently  the  more  the  Soul  has  of  this  Difengagednefs,  in 
its  acting,  the  more  Liberty.  Now  let  it  be  confidered 
what  this  brings  the  noble  Principle  of  human  Liberty  to, 
particularly  when  it  is  poffeffed  and  enjoyed  in  its 


5e<a.  Xlil.    Armiman  Liberty  incmfiflent.         134 

'«y/z.  'a  full  and  perfeft  Freedom  and  Liablenefs  to  aft 
altogether  at  Random,  without  the  leaft  Connexion  with, 
or  Keilfaint  or  Government  by,  2ny  Diftate  of  Reafon, 
or  any  Thing  whatsoever  apprehended,  confidered  or  viewed 
by  the  UnderHanding  •;  "as  being  iriconfiftent  with  the  full 
and  perfeft  Sovereignty  of  the  Will  over  its  own  Determina 
tions. The  Notion  Mankind  have  conceived  of  Liberty,  is 

fome  Dignity  or  Privilege,  fomething  worth  claiming.  But 
what  Dignity  or  Priviledge  is  there,  in. being  given  up  to  fuch 
a  wild  Contingence  as  this,  to  be  perfectly  and  conftantly  liable 
to  aft  unintelli gently  and  unreafonably,  and  as  much  without 
the  Guidance  oi  Underftanding,  as  if  we  had  none,  or  were  as 
deftitute  of  Perception  a«  the  Smoke  that  is  driven  by  the 
Wind  I 


PART 


^^^ 


PART       III. 

Wherein  is  inquired,  whether  any  fuch 
Liberty  of  Will,  as  Arminians  hold^ 
be  neceffary  to  MORAL  AGENCY, 
VIRTUE  and  VICE,  PRAISE,  and 
DISPRAISE,  &c. 


SECTION     I. 

G  O  D's  moral  Excellency  neceflary,  yet  virtuous 
and  Praife-ivorlhy. 


AVING  confidered  the/^tf  Thin*  that  was  pro. 
M{  pofed  to  be  inquired  into,  relating  to  that  Freedom 
wV  Vjjj  of  Will  which  Arminians  maintain  ;  namely,  Whe- 
^  -^^  ^  ther  any  fuch  Thing  does,  ever  did,  or  ever  can 
S&.JR.  &JK  exift,  or  be  conceived  of;  I  come  now  to  t\\Qfecond 
Thing  propofed  to  be  the  Subjeft  of  Inquiry,  viz.  Whether 
any  fuch  Kind  of  Liberty  be  requifite  to  moral  Agency,  Virtue 
and  Vice,  Praife  and  Blame,  Reward  and  Punifhment,  &c+ 

I  (hall  begin  with  fome  Confi  deration  of  the  Virtue  and 
Agency  of  the  Supreme  moral  Agent,  and  Fountain  of  all 
Agency  and  Virtue, 

Dr.  Whitfy,  in  his  Difcourfe  on  the  five  Points,  P.  14.  fays, 

f  If  all  human  Actions  are  neceffary,  Virtue*  and  Vice  muft 

[\  be  empty  Names  3    we  being  capable  of  Nothing  that  is 

T  **  blame* 


136     God's  moral  Excellency  yeceffary,     Part  HL 

"  blame-worthy,  or  deferveth  Fraife ;  Fcr  who  can  blame 
'••'  a  Perfon  for  doinjj  only  what  he  could  not  help,  or  judga. 
ce  that  he  deferveth  rraife  only  for  what  he  could  not  avoid  r" 
To  the  like  Purpofe  he  fpeaks  in  Places  innumerable;  efpe- 
cially  in  his  Difcourfe  on  the  Freedom  of  the  Will ;  conftantly 
maintaining,  that  a  Freedom  not  only  from  Coaftion,  but  Neceffity, 
is  abfolutely  requifite,  in  order  to  Aclicns  beiug  either  wor 
thy  of  Blame,  or  deferving  of  Praife,  And  to  this  agrees,  as 
is  well  known,  the  current  Doctrine  of  Ar.minian  Writers ; 
who  in  general  hold,  that  there  is  no  Virtue  or  Vice,  Reward 
or  PunifEment,  nothing  to  be  commended  or  blamed,  with 
out  this  Freedom.  And  yet  Dr.  Whitby,  P.  300,  allows,  that 
God  is  without  this  Freedom ;  And  Armenians  t  fo  far  as  I 
have  had  Opportunity  to  obferve,  generally  acknowledge, 
that  God  is  necefTarily  holy,  and  his  Will  rieceflarily  deter 
mined  to  that  which  is  Good. 

So  that,  putting  thefe  Things  together,  the  infinitely  holy 
God,  who  always  ufed  to  be  efteemed  by  God's  People,  not 
only  virtuous,  but  a  Being  in  whom  is  all  poffible  Virtue, 
and  every  Virtue  in  the  moft  abfolute  Purity  and  Perfection, 
and  in  infinitely  greater  Brightnefs  and  Amiablenefs  than  in 
any  Creature ;  the  moft  perfed  Pattern  of  Virtue,  and  the 
Fountain  from  whom  all  others  Virtue  is  but  as  Beams  from 
the  Sun;  and  who  ha*  been  fuppofed  to  be,  on  the  Ac 
count  of  his  Virtue  and  Holinefs,  infinitely  more  worthy 
to  be  efteemed,  loved,  honoured,  admired,  commended, 
extoll'd  and  praifed,  than  any  Creature ;  and  He  who  is 
thus  every  where  reprefented  in  Scripture ;  I  fay,  this  Being, 
according  to  this  Notion  of  Dr.  Whitby,  and  other  Arminians, 
has  no  Virtue  at  all ;  Virtue,  when  afcribed  to  Him,  is  but 
fin  empty  Name  ;  and  he  is  deferving  of  no  Commendation  or 
Praife;  becaufe  he  is  uncler  Neceflity,  He  can't  avoid  being 
holy  and  good  as  he  is ;  therefore  no  Thanks  to  him  for  it. 
It  feems,  the  Holinefs,  Juftice,  Faithfulnefs,  &c.  of  the  moft 
High,  muft  not  be  accounted  to  be  of  the  Nature  of  that 
which  is  virtuous  and  Praife-worthy.  They  will  not  deny, 
that  thefe  Things  in  God  are  good  ;  But  then  we  muft  un- 
derftand  them,  that  they  are  no  more  virtuous,  or  of  the 
Nature  of  any  Thing  commendable,  than  the  Good  that  is 
in  any  other  Being  that  is  not  a  moral  Agent ;  as  the  Bright 
nefs  of  the  Sun,  and  the  Fertility  of  the  Earth  are  good,  but 
not  virtuous,  becauie  thefe  Properties  are  necefTary  to  thefe 
Bodies,  and  not  the  Fruit  of  Self- determining  Power, 

There 


Sedt.  I.    yet  Virtuous  and  Praife-worthy.         137 

There  needs  no  other  Confutation  of  this  Notion  of  GocT$ 
not  being  virtuous  or  Praife-worthy,  to  Chriftians  acquainted 
with  the  Bible,  but  only  ftating  and  particularly  reprefenting 
of  it.  To  bring  Texts  of  Scripture,  wherein  God  is  repre- 
fented  as  in  every  Refped,  in  the  highelt  Manner  virtuous, 
and  fupremeiy  Praife-vvorthy,  would  be  endlefs,  and  is  altoge 
ther  needlefs  to  fuch  as  have  been  brought  up  under  the  Light 
pf  the  GofpeJ. 

It  were  to  be  wiftied,  that  Dr.  Whiffy,  and  other  Divines 
of  the  fame  Sort,  had  explain'd  themfelves,  when  they  have 
aflerted  that  That  which  is  qeceifary,  is  not  deferring '  of 
Praife ;  at  the  fame  Time  that  they  have  own'd  God's  Per- 
fedion  to  be  neceffary,  and  fo  in  EfFeft  reprefented  God  as 
not  deferring  Praife.  Certainly,  if  their  Words  have  any 
Meaning  at  all,  by  Praife,  they  muft  mean  the  Exercife  or 
Teftimony  of  fome  Sort  of  Efteem,  Refpecl,  or  honourable 
Regard.  And  will  they  then  fay,  that  Men  are  worthy  of 
that  Efteem,  Refpeft,  and  Honour  for  their  Virtue,  fmall 
and  imperfect  as  it  is,  which  yet  God  is  not  worthy  of,  for  his 
infinite  Righteoufnefs,  Holinefs,  and  Goodnefs  ?  If  fo,  it 
muft  be  becaufe  of  forae  Sort  of  peculiar  Excellency  in  the 
virtuous  Man,  which  is  his  Prerogative,  wherein  he  really 
has  the  Preference  ;  fome  Dignity,  that  is  entirely  diftin- 
guifh'd  from  any  Excellency,  Amiablenefs  or  Honourablenefs 
in  God  ;  not  in  Imperfection  and  Dependance,  but  in 
Pre-eminence ;  which  therefore  he  don't  receive  from  Gad, 
nor  is  God  the  Fountain  or  Pattern  of  it ;  nor  can  God,  in 
that  Refpeft,  ftand  in  Competition  with  him,  as  the  Object  of 
Honour  and  Regard  ;  but  Man  may  claim  a  peculiar  Efteem, 
Commendation  and  Glory,  that  God  can  have  no  Pretenfion 
to.  Yea,  God  has  no  Right,  by  virture  of  his  neceflary  Ho 
linefs,  to  intermeddle  with  that  grateful  Refpecl  and  Praife, 
due  to  the  virtuous  Man,  who  chufes  Virtue,  in  the  Exercife 
of  a  Freedom  ad  utrumcue ;  any  more  than  a  precious  Stone, 
which  can't  avoid  being  hard  and  beautiful. 

And  if  it  be  fo,  let  it  be  explained  what  that  peculiar 
Refpeft  is,  that  is  due  to  the  virtuous  Man,  which  differs 
in  Nature  and  Kind,  in  forne  Way  of  Pre-eminence,  from 
all  that  is  due  to  God.  What  is  the  Nature  or  Defcription 
of  that  peculiar  Affe&ion  ?  Is  it  Efteem,  Love,  Admiration, 
Honour,  Praife,  or  Gratitude?  The  Scripture  every  where 
teprefents  God  as  the  higheft  Object  of  all  thefe  :  there  we 
read  of  the  Soul's  magnifying  the  Lord,  of  loving  Him  <witb  all  the 


138         Concerning  G  O  D's  Virtue.       Part  III. 

Heart,  with  all  the  Soul,  with  all  the  Mixd,  and  with  all  the 
Strength;  admiring  him,  and  his  righteous  A&s,  or  greatly  re 
garding  them,  as  marvellous  and  wonderful;  honouring,  glorify 
ing,  exalting,  extolling,  blejfing,  thanking,  and  praifing  Him  ; 
giving  unto  Him  all  the  Glory  of  the  Good  which  is  done  or  re 
ceived,  rather  than  unto  Men;  that  no  Flejh  Jhould  glory  in  his 
frefence  ;  but  that  He  mould  be  regarded  as  the  Being  to  whom 
all  Glory  is  due.  What  then  is  that  Refpeft  ?  What  Paflion, 
Affeftion,  or  Exercife  is  it,  that  Arminians  call  Praife,  diverfe 
f«rom  all  thefe  Things,  which  Men  are  worthy  of  for  their  Vir 
tue,  and  which  God  is  not  worthy  of,  in  any  Degree  ? 

If  that  Neceffity  which  attends  God's  moral  Perfections 
and  Aclions,  be  as  inconfiftent  with  a  Being  worthy  of 
Praife,  as  a  Neceffity  of  Coaftion  ;  as  is  plainly  implied  in 
or  inferred  from  Dr.  Whitby's  Difcourfe  ;  then  why  fhould 
we  thank  God  for  his  Goodnefs,  any  more  than  if  He  were 
forced  to  be  good,  or  any  more  than  we  mould  thank  one 
of  our  Fellow-Creatures  who  did  us  Good,  not  freely,  and 
of  good  Will,  or  from  any  Kindnefs  of  Heart,  but  from  mere 
Compulfion,  or  extrinfical  Neceffity?  Arminians  fuppofe, 
that  God  is  neceflarily  a  good  and  gracious  Being  :  for  this 
they  make  the  Grqund  of  fome  of  their  main  Arguments 
againft  many  Dqclrines  maintain'd  by  Calvinifts  :  They  fay, 
thefe  are  certainly  falfe,  and  it  is  impojjihle  they  Ihould  be  true, 
becaufe  they  are  not  confiftent  with  the  Goodnefs  of  God. 
This  fqppofes,  that  it  is  impoJJiUe  but  that  God  mould  be 
good :  for  if  it  be  poffible  that  He  mould  be  otherwife,  then 
that  Impoffibility  of  the  Truth  of  thefe  Doelrines  ceafes,  accord-* 
ing  to  their  own  Argument. 

That  Virtue  in  God  is  not,  in  the  moft  proper  Senfe, 
mvardablt,  is  not  for  Want  of  Merit  in  his  moral  Perfec 
tions  and  Actions,  fufficient  to  deferve  Rewards  from  his 
Creatures ;  but  becaufe  He  is  infinitely  above  all  Capacity 
of  receiving  any  Reward  or  Benefit  from  the  Creature  :  He 
is  already  infinitely  and  unchangeably  happy,  and  we  can't 
be  profitable  unto  Him.  But  ftill  he  is  worthy  of  our  fupreme 
Benevolence  for  his  Virtue  ;  and  would  be  worthy  of  our 
Beneficence,  which  is  the  Fruit  and  Expreflion  of  Benevo 
lence,  if  our  Goodnefs  could  extend  to  Him.  If  God  de- 
ferves  to  be  thanked  and  praifed  for  his  Goodnefs,  He  would 
for  the  fame  Reafon,  deferve  that  we  fhould  alfo  requite  his 
Kindnefs,  if  that  were  poflible.  What  Jhall  I  render  to  the 
Lord  fir  all  his  Benefits  ?  is  the  natural  Language  of  Thank- 

fulnefs ; 


Seel.  II.         Chrift's  Obedience  nece/ary. 

fulnefs :  and  fo  far  as  in  us  lies,  it  is  our  Duty  to  recompenfe 
God's  Goodnefs,  and  tender  again  according  to  Benefits  received* 
And  that  we  might  have  Opportunity  for  fo  natural  an  Ex-t 
preffion  of  our  Gratitude  to  God,  as  Beneficence,  notwith- 
Handing  his  being  infinitely  above  our  Reach ;  He  has  ap^ 
pointed  others  to  be  his  Receivers,  and  to  ftand  in  his  Stead, 
as  the  Objects  of  our  Beneficence;  fuch  are  efpecially  ous 
indigent  Brethren* 


S    E    C    T    I    O    N    II. 

The  Afts  of  the  Will  of  the  human  Soul  of  JESUS 
CHRIST  necefiarily  holy,  yet  truly  virtuous  y 
praife-worthy>  mvardable,  &e. 

I  Have  already  confidered  how  Dr.  Whitly  infifts  upon  in, 
that  a  Freedom,  not  only  from  Coaction,  but  Neceflity, 
is  requifite  to  either  Virtue  or  Vice,  Praife  or  Difpraife,  Reward. 
or  Punijhment.  He  a4fo  infifts  on  the  fame  Freedom  as  abfo- 
lutely  requifite  to  a  Perfon's  being  the  Subject  of  a  Law,  ef 
Precepts  or  Prohibitions  ;  in  the  Book  before  mentioned  ;  P.  301  , 
314,  328,  339,  340,  341,  342,  347,  361,  373,  410.  And  of 
Promijes  and  Threatnings  ;  P.  298,  301,  305,  31*1,  339,  340, 

"ial  ;  P.  297, 


363.  And  as  requifite  to  a  State  of  ^"rial  ;  P.  297,  &c. 

Now  therefore,  with  an  Eye  to  thefe  Things,  I  would  in 
quire  into  the  moral  Conduct  and  Practice  of  our  Lord  Jefus 
Ghrift,  which  he  exhibited  in  his  human  Nature  here,  in 
his  State  of  Humiliation.  And  Firfty-  I  would  {hew,  that  his 
holy  Behaviour  was  neeejfery  ;  or  that  it  was  impojffible  it 
fliould  be  otherwife,  than  that  He  fhould  behave  himfel£ 
holily,  and  that  he  Ihould  be  perfectly  holy  in  each  indivi 
dual  Act  of  his  Life.  And  Secondly,  that  his  holy  Behaviour 
was  properly  of  the  Nature  of  Virtue,  and  was  worthy  of 
Praife  ;  and  that  He  was  the  Subject  of  Law,  Precepts  or 
Commands  >  Prorrtifes  and  Rewards  ;  and  that  he  was  in  a  State 
of  Trial, 

Lit 


j4o      The  Ms  of  the  Will  of  Ghtift,      Part  III. 

I.  It  was  impofftble,  that  the  Ads  of  the  Will  of  the  human 
Soul  of  Chrift  fhouldj  in  any  Inftance,  Degree  or  Circum- 
ftance,  be  otherwife  than  holy,  and  agreeable  to  God's  Na 
ture  and  Will.  The  folio  wing- Things  make  this  evident. 

i .  God  had  promifed  fo  effectually  to  preferve  and  uphold 
Him  by  his  Spirit,  under  all  his  Temptations,  that  he  fhould 
not  fail  of  reaching  the  End  for  which  He  came  into  the 

World  ; which  he  would  have  fail'd  of,  had  he  fallen  into 

Sin.  We  have  fuch  a  Promife,  Ifai.  xlii.  i,  2,  3,  4.  Behold  my 
Servant ,  whom  I  uphold  ;  mine  Elefl,  in  whom  my  Soul  delighteth  : 
I  have  put  my  Spirit  upon  Him  :  He /hall  bring  forth  Judgmnt  to  the 
Gentiles  :  Hejhall  not  cry,  nor  lift  up,  nor  caufe  his  Voice  to  be  heard 
in  the  Street. — Hejhall  bring  forth  Judgment  unto  Truth.  Hejhall 
not  fail>  nor  be  difcouraged,  till  he  have  fet  Judgment  'in  the  Earth  ,* 
end  the  IJles  Jhall  wait  for  his  Law.  This  Promife  of  Chrift's 
having  God's  Spirit  put  upon  Him,  and  his  not  crying  and 
lifting  up  his  Voice,  &c.  relates  to  the  Time  of  Chrift's  Ap 
pearance  on  Earth ;  as  is  manifeft  from  the  Nature  of  the 
Promife,  and  alfo  the  Application  of  it  in  the  New  Tefta- 
ment,  Matth.  xii.  18.  And  the  Words  imply  a  Pr<5mife  of 
his  being  fo  upheld  by  God's  Spirit,  that  he  ihould  be  pre- 
ferved  from  Sin ;  particularly  from  Pride  and  Vain-glory, 
and  from  being  overcome  by  any  of  the  Temptations  he 
Ihould  be  under  to  afrecl:  the  Glory  of  this  World  ;  the  Pomp 
of  an  earthly  Prince,  or  the  Applaufe  and  Praife  of  Men  :  and 
that  he  ihould  be  fo  upheld,  that  he  Ihould  by  no  Means 
fail  of  obtaining  the  End  of  his  coming  into  the  World,  of 
bringing  forth  judgment  unto  Viclory,  and  eftablifhing  his 
Kingdom  of  Grace  in  the  Earth.-- — And  in  the  following 
Verfes,  this  Promife  is  confirmed,  with  the  greateft  imagina 
ble  Solemnity.  Thus  Jaith  the  LORD,  HE  that  created  the 
Heavens,  and Jlretched  them  out  ;  He  that  fpread  forth  the  Earth, 
and  that  which  ccmeth  out  of  it ;  He  that  giveth  Breath  unto  the 
People  upon  it,  and  Spirit  to  them  that  walk  therein  :  I  the  Lord 
have  called  Thee  in  Right  eoufnefs ,  and  will  hold  thine  Hand;  and 
<will  keep  Thee,  and  give  Thee  for  a  Covenant  of  the  People,  for 
a  Light  of  the  Gentiles,  to  open  the  blind  Eyes,  to  bring  out  the 
Prifoners  from  the  Prifvn,  and  them  that  Jit  in  Darknefs  out  of  the 
Prifon-Houfe.  1  am  JEHOVAH,  that  is  my  Name,  &c. 

Very  parallel  with  thefe  Promifes  is  that,  Ifai.  xlix.  7,  8,  9. 
which  alfo  has  an  apparent  Refpeft  to  the  Time  of  Chrift's 
Humiliation  on  Earth.  Th*f  faith  the  Lord,  the  Redeemer  of 
Ifrael,  and  his  hsly  One,  to  him  whom  Man  defpifetb,  to  Him 

whom 


Se<ft.  II*  neccflarily  holy.  141 

whom  the  Nation  abhorretht  to  a  Servant  of  Rulers  •  Kings  Jball 
fee  andarife,  Princes  alfo  Jball  ivor/bip;  becaufe  of  the  Lord  thai  is 
faithful)  and  the  holy  One  of  Ifrael,  and  He  Jhall  chufe  Thee* 
Thus  faith  the  Lcrd,  In  an  acceptable  Time  have  I  heard  Thee  ; 
in  a  Day  of  Salvation  have  I  helped  Thee  ;  and  I  will  preferve 
Thee,  and  give  Thee  fir  a  Covenant  of  the  People,  to  eftablifb 
the  Earth,  &c. 

And  in   IfuL  1.  5— 9,  we  have  the  Meffiah  exprefllng 

his  Aflurance,  that  God  would  help  Him,  by  fo  opening 
his  Ear,  or  inclining  his  Heart  fce  God's  Commandments, 
that  He  {hould  not  be  rebellious,  but  Ihould  perfevere, 
and  not  apoftatife,  or  turn  his  Back :  that  through  God's 
Help,  He  ihould  be  immovable,  in  a  Way  of  Obedience, 
under  the  great  Trials  of  Reproach  and  Suffering  he  fhould 
meet  with  ;  fetting  his  Face  like  a  Flint :  So  that  He  knew 
He  ihould  not  be  aihamed,  or  fruftrated  in  his  Defign  ; 
and  finally  mould  be  approved  and  juftified,  as  having  done 
his  Work  faithfully.  The  Lord  hath  opened  mine  Ear  ;  fo  that 
I  was  not  rebellious,  neither  turned  away  my  Back  :  I  gave  my 
Sack  to  the  Smiters,  and  my  Cheeks  to  them  that  plucked  off  the 
Hair;  I  hid  not  my  Face  from  Jhame  and  Spitting.  For  the 
Lord  God  will  help  me  ;  therefore  Jkall  I  not  be  confounded:  there 
fore  have  I  fet  my  Face  as  a  Flint,  and  I  know  that  I  Jhall 
not  be  ajhamed.  He  is  near  that  jujlijieth  me  :  who  will  contend 
with  me  ?  Let  us  ftand  together.  Who  is  mine  Adverfary  ?  Let 
him  come  near  to  me.  Behold  the  Lord  God  will  help  me  :  who  is 
He  that  Jhall  condemn  me?  Lo,  they  Jhall  all  <wax  old  as  a  Gar 
ment,  the  Moth  Jfcall  eat  them  up. 

2.  The  fame  Thing"  is  evident  from  all  the  Promifes 
which  God  made  to  the  Meffiah,  of  his  future  Glory, 
Kingdom  and  Succefs,  in  his  Office  and  Character  of  a 
Mediator :  which  Glory  could  not  have  been  obtained,  if 
his  Holinefs  had  fail'd,  and  he  had  been  guilty  of  Sin. 
God's  abfolute  Promife  of  any  Things  makes  the  Things 
promifed  necej/ary,  and  their  failing  to  take  Place  abfolutely 
impojfible :  and  in  like  Manner  it  makes  thofe  Things  ne- 
ceffary,  on  which  the  Thing  promifed  depends,  and  without 
which  it  can't  take  Effecl:.  Therefore  it  appears,  that  it 
was  utterly  impoffible  that  Chrift's  Holinefs  (hould  fail, 
from  fueh  abfolute  Promifes  as  thofe,  Pfal.  ex.  4.  The  Lord 
hathfvoorn,  andvjillnot  repent,  Thou  art  a  Prieft  forever,  after  the. 
Order  of  Melchizedek.  And  from  every  other  Promife  in. 
that  Pfalm,  contained  in  each  Verfe  of  it.  And  P/a/,  ii.  6.  7. 

U  / 


1 42        <Tbe  Afts  tf  Ibe  Will  of  Clirift,     Paft  III. 

1  <will  declare  the  Decree  :  The  Lord  hath  faid  unto  met  Thou 
art  my  Son,  this  Day  have  I  begotten  Thee  :  Ajk  of  Me,  and  I 
will  give  Thee  the  Heathen  for  thine  Inheritance,  &C.  Pfal.  xlv. 
3,  4,  &C.  Gird  thy  Sword  on  thy  Thigh,  O  moft  Mighty,  with  thy 
Glory  and  thy  Majefty  ,•  and  in  thy  Majefy  ride  profperoujly.  And 
fo  every  Thing  that  is  faid  from  thence  to  the  End  of  the  Pfalm. 
And  thofe  Promifes,  If  at.  Hi.  13,  14,  15.  &  liii.  10,  n,  12. 
And  all  thofe  Promifes  which  God  makes  to  the  Mefliah,  of 
Succefs,  Dominion  and  Glory  in  the  Character  of  Redeemer* 
in  Ifai.  Chap.  xlix. 

3.  It  was  often  promifed  to  the  Church  of  God  of  old, 
for  their  Comfort,  that  God  would  give  them  a  righteous, 
finlefs  Saviour.  Jer.  xxiii.  5,  6.  Behold,  the  Days  come,  faith  the 
Lord,  that  I  will  raijc  up  unio  David  a  righteoiis  Branch ;  and  a 
Kingjha  II  reign  and  proffer,  and jbull  execute  Judgment  and  Jj^flice 
in  the  Earth.  In  his  Days  Jhall  Judah  befa<vt~d,  and  \hzz\Jhall 
dwell  fafely.  And  this  is  the  Name  whereby  Hejhall  be  called ',  The 
Lord  our  RighteouJ nefs.  So,  Jer.  xxxiii.  1 5. — I  will  caufe  the  Branch 
cfRighteoufnefs  to  grow  up  unto  David ;  and  Hejhall  execute  Judg 
ment  and  Righteoufnefs  in  the  Land.  Ifai.  ^X.  6.  7.  For  unto  us 
a  Child  is  born;— Upon  the  Throne  of  David  and  of  his  King 
dom,  to  order  it,  and  to  eftablyh  it  with  Judgment  and  Jtiftice, 
from  henceforth,  e<ven  for  ever :  The  Z^eal  of  the  Lordof  Hofts  will 
do  this.  Chap.  xi.  a-t  the  Beginning.  There  Jhall  come  forth  a 
Rod  out  of  the  Stem  of  Jefle^  and  a  Branch  Jhall  grew  cut  of  his 
Roots  ;  and  the  Spirit  offhe  Lord  Jhall  reft  upon  Him, The  Spi 
rit  of  Knowledge,  and  of  the  Fear  of  the  Lord  : With  Righ 
teoufnefs  Jhall  He  judge  the  Poor,  and  reprove  with  Equity : 

Righteoufnefs  Jhall  be  the  Girdle  of  his  Loins,  and  Faith fulnefs 
the  Girdle  of  His  Reins,  Chap.  Hi.  13.  My  Servant  Jhall  deal 
prudently.  Chap.  liii.  9.  Becaufe  He  had  done  no  Violence,  neither 
was  GuiL*  found  in  His  Mouth.  If  it  be  impoffible,  that  thefe 
Promifes  fhould  fail,  and  it  be  eafier  for  Heaven  and  Earth  to 
pafs  away,  than  for  one  Jot  or  Tittle  of  thefe  Promifes  of 
God  to  pafs  away,  then  it  was  impoifible  that  Chrift  fhould 
commit  aay  Sin.  Ch-riil  himfelf  fignified,  that  it  was  im- 
poifible  but  that  the  Things  which  were  fpoken  concerning 
Him  fhould  be  fulfilled.  Luke  xxiv.  44. — That  all  Things  muft 
be  fulfilled,  'which  were  written  in  the  Law  of  Mofes,  and  m 
the  Prophets,  and  in  the  Pfalms  concerning  Me.  Mat.  xxvi.  53. 
54.  But  how  thenjljall  the  Scripture  be  fulfilled,  that  thus  it  muft 
bf  ?  Mark  xiv.  49.  But  the  Scriptures  mnjl  be  fulfilled.  And  fo 
the  Apoftle,  A&s  it  1 6,  17,  <»-ThfS  Scripture  mujl  needs  have 
fan  fulfilled* 

4.  All 


SedL  II.  neceffarily  holy.  143 

4.  All  the  Promifes  which  were, made  to  the  Church  of  old, 
of  the  Meffiah  as  a  future  Saviour,  from  that  made  to  our  firft 
Parents  in  Paradife,  to  that  which  was  delivered  by  the  Prophet 
Malachi,  mew  it  to  be  irnpoffible  that  Chriit  fhould  not  have 
perfevered  in  perfect  Holinefs.  The  antient  Predictions  given 
to  God's  Church,  of  the  Meffiah  as  a  Saviour,  were  of  the  Na 
ture  of  Promifes  ;  as  evident  by  the  Predictions  themfelves,  and 
the  Manner  of  delivering  them.  But  they  are  exprcily,  and 
"very  often  called  Promifes  in  the  New-Teftament ;'  as  in  Luke 
i.  54,  55,  72,  73.  Ads  xiii.  32,  33.  Rom.  i.  i,  2,  3.  and 
Chap.  xv.  8.  Heb.  vi.  13,  &c.  Thefe  Promifes  were  often 
made  with  great  Solemnity,  and  confirmed  with  an  Oath ;  as 
in  Gen.  xxii.  16,  17.  By  myfelfhave  I  f<w')rn,  faith  the  Lord, 
that  in  blejfmg,  I  will  blefs  thee,  and  in  multiplying,,  I  voill  mul 
tiply  thy  Seed,  as  the  Stars  of  Heaven,  and  as  the  Sand  which  is 

upon  the  Sea- Shore  : And  in  thy  Seed  Jhall  all  the  Nations  of 

the  Earth  be  blejfid.  Compare  Luke  i.  72,  73.  and  Gal.  iii. 
8,  15,  1 6.  The  Apoftle  in  Heb.  vi.  17.  18.  fpeaking  of  this 
Promife  to  Abraham,  fays,  Wherein  God  nviilmg  more  abundant 
ly  to  foe™  to  the  Heirs  of  Promife  the  Immutability  of  his  Counfel, 
confirmed  it  by  an  Oath  ,•  that  by  two  IMMUTABLE  Things,  in. 
which  it  'was  IMPOSSIBLE  for  God  to  lie,  he  might  have 
ftrong  Confolation. — • — In  which  Words,  the  Neceffity  of  the  Ac- 
complilhment,  or  (which  is  the  fame  Thing)  the  Impossibility 
of  the  contrary,  is  fully  declared.  So  God  confirmed  the  Pro 
mife  of  the  great  Salvation  of  the  Meffiah,  made  to  David,  by 
an  Oath;  Pfal.  Ixxxix.  3,  4.  /  have  made  a  Covenant 'with 
my  Chofen,  I  have  fvoorn  unto  David  my  Servant ;  Thy  Seed 
twill I  eftablijh  for  ever,  and  build  up  thy  Throne  to  all  Generations, 
There  is  Nothing  that  is  fo  abundantly  fet  forth  in  Scripture, 
as  fure  and  irrefragable,  as  this  Promife  and  Oath  to  David, 
See  Pfal.  Ixxxix,  34,  35,  36.  2.  Sam.  xxiii.  5.  Ifai.  Iv.  3. 
Afts  ii.  29,  30.  and  xiii,  34.  The  Scripture  exprefly  fpeaks 
of  it  as  utterly  impojjible  that  this  Promife  and  Oath  to  David, 
concerning  the  everlafting  Dominion  of  the  Meffiah  of  his  Seed,*' 
ihould  fail.  Jer.  xxxiii.  15,  &c.'  In  thofeDays,  and  at  that 
Time,  I  <will  caufe  the  Branch  of  Righteoufnefs  to  groiv  up  unto 

David. For  thus  faith  the  Lord,   David  /hall  never  want  a 

Man   to  fit  upou  the  Throne  of  the  Houfe  of  Ifrael. -ver.   20. 

21.  If  you  can  break  my  Covenant  of  the  Day,  and  my  Covenant 
of  the  Night,  and  that  there  fhould  not  be  Day  and  Night  in  their 
Seafon ;  then  may  alfo  my  Covenant  be  broken  <with  David  my 
Servant,  that  He  Jhordd  not  have  a  Son  to  rei^n  upon  his  Throne* 
So  in  ver.  25,  26. — Thus  abundant  is  the  Scripture  in  reprefent- 
ifig  how  impoffible  it  was,  that  the  Promifes  made  of  Old*con- 

U  3  cerning 


I  44         The  Atfs  of  the  Will  of  Chrift,     Part  III. 

cerning  the  great  Salvation  and  Kingdom  cf  the  Mefiinh 
mould  fail  :  Which  implies,  that  it  was  impoffible  that 
this  Meijuah,  the  fecond  Adam,  the  promifed  Seed  of  A- 
braham,  and  of  David,  fhould  fall  from  his  Integrity,  as 
the  firft  Adam  did. 

5.  All  the  Promifes  that  were  made  to  the  Church  of  God 
under  the  Old  Teftament,  of  the  great  Enlargement  of  the 
Church,    and  Advancement   of  her  Glory,   in   the   Days  of 
the  Gofpel,    after  the  Coming  of  the  Meffiah  ;    the  Increafe 
of  her  Light,    Liberty,    Holinefs,    Joy,    Triumph   over  her 
Enemies,  &V.  of  which  fo   great   a   Part   of  the  Old  Tefta 
ment  confifts ;  which  are  repeated  fo  often,  are  fo  varioufly 
exhibited,  fo  frequently  introduced  with  great  Pomp  and  So- 
Jemnity,  and  are  fo  abundantly  fealed  with  typical  and  fym- 
bolical  Reprefentations ;    I  fay,    all  thefe   Promifes   imply, 
that  the  Meffiah  mould  perfect  the  W7ork  of  Redemption; 
and   this    implies,    that   He  mould   perfevere  in   the   W^ork 
which  the  Father  had  appointed  Him,  being  in   all  Things 
conformed  to  his  Will.     Thefe  Promifes  were  often  confirm 
ed  by  an  Oath.     (See  I/a/,  liv.  9.  with  the  Context  j   Chap. 
Ixii.   i^.)    And  it  is  reprefented    as   utterly  impoffible   that 
thefe  Promifes   mould   fail.     (Ifai.  xlix.   15.  with  the   Con 
text,  Chap.  liv.  10.  with  the  Context;  Chap.li.  4, — 8.  Chap. 
xl.  8.  with  the  Context.)  And  therefore  it  was  impoffible ,  that 
the  Meffiah  fhould  fail,  or  commit  Sin. 

6.  It  was  impoffible 9    that  the  Meffiah  mould  fail  of  perfe- 
vering    in  Integrity   and   Holinefs,     as   the   firft   Adam  did, 
becaufe    this    would    have    been  inconfiftent  with  the   Pro 
mifes  which   God  made  to  the  blefled  Virgin,   his  Mother, 
and  to  her  Hufband  ;  implying,  that  He  Jholud  Ja<ve  his  People 
from  their  Sins,  that  God  would gi<ve  Him  the  throne  of  his  Fa 
ther  David,  that  He  Jhould  reign  over  the  Houfe  of  Jacobjfor- 
e<ve r ;  and  that  of  his  Kingdom  there  Jhould  be  no  End.     Thefe 
Promifes   were   fure,   and  it    was  impoffible  they  mould  fail. 
And  therefore  the  Virgin  Mary,   in  trufting  fully  to  them, 
*acled  reafonably,    having  an  immovable  Foundation  of  her 
Faith  ;  as  Elizabeth  obferves,  ver.  45.  And  bleffed  is  Jhe  that 
belie<veth  ;  for  there  Jhall  be  a  Performance  of  thofe  things  which 
fwere  told  her  from  the  Lord* 

7.  That  it  mould  have  been   poffible  that  Chrift   mould 
fin,  and  fo  fail  in  the  Work  of  our  Redemption,  does  not 
confift  with  the  eternal  Purpofe  and  Decree  of  God,  reveal'd 

in 


Seel.  II.  necefTarily  holy.  145 

in  the  Scriptures,  that  He  would  provide  Salvation  for  fallen 
Man  in  and  by  Jefus  Chrifl,  and  that  Salvation  fhould  he 
offered  to  Sinners  through  the  Preaching  of  the  Gofpel. 
Such  an  abfolute  Decree  as  this  Arminians  don't  deny. 
Thus  much  at  leaft  (out  of  all  Controverfy)  is  implied  in  fuch 
Scriptures,  as  i  Cor.  ii.  7,  Eph.  i.  4,  $.  and  Ch.  iii.  9,  10  n. 
I  Pet,  i.  19,  20*  Such  an  abfolute  Decree  as  this,  Arminians 
allow  to  be  fignified  in  thefe  Texts.  And  the  Arminians 
Election  of  Nations  and  Societies,  and  general  Election 
of  the  Chriftian  Church,  and  conditional  Election  of  parti 
cular  Perfons,  imply  this.  God  could  not  decree  before  the 
Foundation  of  the  World,  to  fave  all  that  ihould  believe 
in,  and  obey  Chrift,  unlefs  he  had  abfoiutely  decreed  that 
Salvation  Ihould  be  provided,  and  effectually  wrought  out 
by  Chrift.  And  fince  (as  the  Arminians  themfelves  ftrenu- 
oufly  maintain)  a  Decree  of  God  infers  NeceJ/tty ;  hence 
it  became  necejjary  that  Chrift  fhould  perfevere,  and  actually 
work  out  Salvation  for  us,  and  that  He  fhould  not  fail  by 
the  Commiilion  of  Sin. 

8,  That    it  fhould  have    been    poffible   for  Chrift's  Ho- 
linefs    to    fail,    is    not     confiftent     with     what  God     pro- 
inifed   to    his    Son    before    all  Ages.     For,    that  Salvation 
fhould  be    offered   to  Men   thro'  Chrift,   and    beftowed   on 
all  his    faithful   Followers,    is  what  is  at  leaft    implied   in 
that  certain  and  infallible  Promife  fpoken  of  by  the  Apoftle, 
Tit.  i.  ^•  In  hope  of  eternal  Life  ;  which  God,  that  cannot  lie, 
promifed  before  the  World  began.     This  don't  feem  to  be  con 
troverted  by  Arminians.  * 

9.  That  it  fhould  be   poffible   for  Chrift  to  fail  of  doing 
his    father's  Will,    is    inconfiflent    with   the  Promife     made 
to  the  Father  by  the  Son,  by  the  Logos  that  was   with   the 
Father    from    the  Beginning,    before    he    took  the    human 
Nature:  as  may  be  feen  in  Pfal,  xl.  6,  7,  8.  (compar'd  with 
the  Apoftle's  Interpretation,  Heb.  x.  £, — 9.)    Sacrifice     and 
Offering   thou   didft   not  defire  :  mine  Ears  haft  thou  opened,   (or 
bored  ;)  Burnt-Offering  and  Sin-Offir'mg  Thou  haft  not   required. 
^Thenfaid  /,  Lo,  I  come  :  In  the  Volume  of  the  Book  it  is  written 
of  me,  I  delight  to  do  thy  Will,  O  my  God,  and  thy  Lavu  is  --with- 
in  my  Heart*     Where  is   a   manifeft  Allufion  to   the  Cove 
nant  which  the  willing  Servant,  who  loved  his  Matter's  Ser 
vice,  made  with  his  Mafter,  to  be  his  Servant  for  ever,   on 

the 

f  See  Dr.  Whltby  on  the  five  Points,  P.  48,  49,  50, 


I 


The  Atts  of  the  Will  of  Chrift,      Part  III. 

the  Day  wherein  he  had  his  Ear  bored ;  which  Covenant 
was  probably  inferted  in  the  publick  Records,  called  the 
Volume  of  the  Book,  by  the  Judges,  who  were  called  to  take 
Cognizance  of  the  Tranfaftion ;  Exod.  xxi.  If  the  Logos, 
\vho  was  with  the  Father,  before  the  World,  and  who  made 
the  World,  thus  engaged  in  Covenant  to  do  the  Will  of  the 
Father  in  the  human  Nature,  and  the  Promife,  was  as  it  were 
recorded,  that  it  might  be  made  fure,  doubtlefs  it  was  im~ 
fffible  that  it  ihould  fail ;  and  fo  it  was  impoffibk  that  Chrift 
Ihould  fail  of  doing  the  Will  of  ihe  Father  in  the  human 
Nature. 

10.  If  it  was  poffible  for  Chrift  to  have  failed  of  doing 
the  Will  of  his  Father,  and  fo  to  have  failed  of  effectually 
working  out  Redemption  for  Sinners,  then  the  Salvation  of 
all  the  Saints,  who  were  faved  from  the  Beginning  of  the 
World,  to  the  Death  of  Chrift,  was  not  built  on  a  firm 
Foundation.  The  Meffiah,  and  the  Redemption  which  He 
was  to  work  out  by  his  Obedience  unto  Death,  was  the 
Foundation  of  the  Salvation  of  all  the  Pofterity  of  fallen 
Man,  that  ever  were  faved.  Therefore,  if,  when  the  Old- 
Teftament  Saints  had  the  Pardon  of  their  Sins,  and  the  Fa 
vour  of  God  promifed  them,  and  Salvation  beftowed  upon 
them,  ftill  it  was  poffible  that  the  Meffiah,  when  he  came, 
might  commit  Sin,  then  all  this  was  on  a  Foundation  that 
was  not  firm  and  ftable,  but  liable  to  fail ;  fomething  which 
it  was  poffible  might  never  be,  God  did  as  it  were  truft 
to  what  his  Son  had  engaged  and  promifed  to  do  in  future 
Time ;  and  depended  fo  much  upon  it,  that  He  proceeded 
aftually  to  fave  Men  on  the  Account  of  it,  as  tho'  it  had  been 
already  done.  But  this  Truft  and  Dependance  of  God,  on 
the  Suppofition  of  Chrift's  being  liable  to  fail  of  doing  his 
Will,  was  leaning  on  a  Staff  that  was  weak,  and  might 
poffibly  break.  The  Saints  of  old  trufted  on  the  Promifes 
of  a  future'Redemption  to  be  wrought  out  and  compleated 
by  the  Mefliah,  and  built  their  Comfort  upon  it :  Abraham 
faw  Chrift's  Day  and  rejoyced ;  and  lie  and  the  other  Pa 
triarchs  died  in  the  Faith  of  the  Promife  of  it.  (Heb.  xi.  13.) 
But  on  this  Suppofition,  their  Faith  and  their  Comfort,  and 
their  Salvation,  was  built  on  a  moveable  fallible  Foundation  ; 
Chrift  was  not  to  them  a  tried  Stone,  a  fure  Foundation;  as 
in  Ifai.  xxviii.  16.  David  entirely  refted  on  the  Covenant  of 
God  with  him,  concerning  the  future  glorious  Dominion  and 
Salvation  of  the  Meffiah,  of  his  Seed  ;  fays,  \t  was  all  bis  Salvation, 
and  all  his  Defire  ;  and  comforts  himfelf  that  this  Covenant  was 

an 


Sed.  IL  neceffarily  My.  147 

an  everlaftiug  Covenant,  ordered  in  all  Things  andfure,  z  Sam. 
xxiii.  5.  But  if  Chrift's  Virtue  might  fail,  he  was  miftaken  i 
his  great  Comfort  was  not  built  fo  fure,  as  he  thought  it 
was,  being  founded  entirely  on  the  Determinations  of  the 
Free- Will  of  Chrift' s  human  Soul ;  which  was  fubjeft  to  no 
Neceffity,  and  might  be  determined  either  one  Way  or  the 
other.  Alfo  the  Dependance  of  thofe  who  looked  for  Re 
demption  in  Jerufalem,  and  waited  for  the  Confolation  of 
Ifraelt  (Luke  ii.  25,  &  38.)  and  the  Confidence  of  the  Difci- 
ples  of  Jefus,  who  forfook  all  and  followed  Him,  that  they 
might  enjoy  the  Benefits  of  his  future  Kingdom,  was  built  on 
a  faiidy  Foundation. 

IT.  The  Man  Chrift  Jefus,  before  he  had  fmiihed  his 
Courfe  of  Obedience,  and  while  in  the  midft  of  Tempta 
tions  and  Trials,  was  abundant  in  pofitively  predicting  his 
own  future  Glory  in  his  Kingdom,  and  the  Enlargement  of 
his  Church,  the  Salvation  of  the  Gentiles  through  Him,  &c. 
and  in  Promifes  of  Bleffings  he  would  beilow  on  his  true 
Difciples  in  his  future  Kingdom  ;  on  which  Promifes  he  re 
quired  the  full  Dependance  of  his  Difciples.  (Joh.  xiv.) 
But  the  Difciples  would  have  had  no  Ground  for  fuch  De- 
pendaitce,  if  Chrift  had  been  liable  to  fail  in  his  Work  : 
And  Chrift  himfelf  would  have  been  guilty  of  Prefumption, 
in  fo  abounding  in  peremptory  Promifes  of  great  Things, 
which  depended  on  a  mere  Contingence  ;  t;/z.  the  Determi 
nations  of  his  free  Will,  confiding  in  a  Freedom  ad  utrumquey. 
to  either  Sin  or  Holinefs,  ftanding  in  Indifference,  and  incident, 
in  Thoufands  of  future  Inftances,  to  go  either  one  Way  or  the 
other. 

Thus  it  is  evidentr  that  it  was  impojfible  that  the  Acls  of 
the  Will  of  the  human  Soul  of  Chrift  mould  be  otherwife  than 
holy,  and  conformed  to  the  Will  of  the  Father ;  or,  in  other 
\Vords,  they  were  ncceflarily  fo  conformed. 

I  have  been  the  longer  in  the  Proof  of  this  Matter,  it  being 
a  Thing  denied  by  fome  of  the  greateft  Arminians,  by  Epifcopii&s 
in  particular  ;  and  becaufe  I  look  upon  it  as  a  Point  clearly  and 
abfolutely  determining  the  Controverfy  between  Calvinijis  and 
Arminians,  concerning  the  Neceffity  of  fuch  a  Freedom  of  Will 
as  is  infifted  on  by  the  latter,,  in  order  to  moral  Agency,  Vir 
tue,  Command  or  Prohibition,  Promife  or  Threatning,  Re 
ward  or  *Punilhment,  Praife  or  Difpraife,  Merit  or  Demerit. 
I  now  therefore  proceed^ 

II.  To 


148          CHRIST'S  Righteoufnefs         Part  II  t 

II»  To  confidsr  whether  CHRIST,  in  his  holy  Behaviour  on 
Earth,  was  not  thus  a  moral  Agent,  fubjeft  to  Commands,  Pro- 
mifes,  &c. •  > 

Dr.  Whitly  wry  often  fpeaks  of  what  he  calls  2  Freedom 
ad  utrumlibei,  without  Neceflity,  as  requifite  to  Law  and  Com 
mands  ;  and  fpeaks  of  Neceffity  as  entirely  inconfiftent  with 
Injunctions  and  Prohibitions.  But  yet  we  read  of  Clirift's  being 
the  Subject  of  the  Commands  of"  his  Father,  Job.  x.  18.  and 
xv.  10.  And  Chrift  tells  us,  that  every  Thing  that  He  faid, 
or  did,  was  in  Compliance  with  Commandments  he  had  received 
of  the  Father ;  Joh.  xii.  49,  <p.  &  xiv.  31.  And  we  often 
read  of  Clirift's  Obedience  to  his  Father's  Commands,  Rom.  v, 
19.  Phil.  ii.  1 8.  Heb.  v.  8. 

The  forementioned  Writer  reprefents  Promifes  offered  as 
Motives  to  Perfons  to  do  their  Duty,  or  a  being  moved  and  in 
duced  by  Promifes ,  as  utterly  inconfiftent  with  a  State  wherein 
Perfons  have  not  a  Liberty  ad  utrumlibet,  but  are  neceflarily 
determined  to  one.  (See  particularly,  P.  298,  &  311.)  But 
the  Thing  which  this  Writer  afferts,  is  demonftrably  falfe, 
if  the  Chriftian  Religion  be  true.  If  there  be  any  Truth  in 
Chriftianity  or  the  holy  Scriptures,  the  Man  Chrift  Jefus 
had  his  Will  infallibly,  unalterably  and  unfruftrably  deter 
mined  to  Good,  and  that  alone;  but  yet  he  had  Promifes 
of  glorious  Rewards  made  to  Him,  on  Condition  of  his  per- 
fevering  in,  and  perfecting  the  Work  which  God  had  ap 
pointed  Him;  Ifai.  liii.  10,  n,  12.  Pfal.  ii.  &  ex.  If  at. 

xlix.  7,  8,  9. In  Luke  xxii.  28,  29,  Chrift  fays  to  his  Dif- 

ciples,  Te  are  5 "hey  which  have  continued  with  me  in  my  Tempta 
tions ;  and  1  appoint  unto  you  a  Kingdom,  as  my  Father  hath  ap 
pointed  tmto  me.  The  Word  moft  properly  fignifies  to  ap 
point  by  Covenant,  or  Promife.  The  plain  Meaning  of  Chrift 's 
Words  is  this  :  "As  you  have  partook  of  my  Temptations 
*f  and  Trials,  and  have  been  ftedfaft,  and  have  overcome  ;  I 
"  promife  to  make  you  Partakers  of  my  Reward,  and  to  give 
"  you  a  Kingdom ;  as  the  Father  has  promifed  me  a  Kingdom 
"  for  continuing  ftedfaft,  and  overcoming  in  thofe  Trials." 
And  the  Words  are  well  explained  by  thofe  in  Rev.  iii.  21. 
T'o  him  that  overcomethy  will  I  grant  tojtt  with  me  in  my  ^Throne  ; 
even  as  I  alfo  overcame,  and  amfet  down  with  my  Father  in  his 
Throne.  And  Chrift  had  not  only  Promifes  of  glorious  Suc- 
cefs  and  Rewards  made  to  his  Obedience  and  Sufferings, 
but  the  Scriptures  piainly  reprefent  Him  as  ufmg  thefe  Pro 
mifes  for  Motives  and  Inducements  to  obey  and  fuffer  ;  and 

particularly 


Sect.  II.       Pralfe-^ortbyy  rr&drdable,  &c.       149 

particularly  that  Promife  of  3  Kingdom  which  the  Father 
had  appointed  Him,  or  fitting  with  the  Father  on  his  Throne  ; 
as  in  Heb*  xii.  ij  2.  Let  us  lay  ajide  every  Weighty  and  the  Sin. 
which  doth  enjily  befet  us,  and  let  us  run.  with  Patience  the  Race 
that  is  fct  before  us,  looking  zmto  Jffus,  the  Author  and  Finijher 
of  our  Faith  ;  <voho  for  the  Joy  that  was  fet  before  Himt  endured 
the  Crofs,  defpifing  the  Shame „  and  isfet  dawn  on  the  right  Hand 
of  the  Throne  of  God, 

And  how  ftrange  would  it  be  to  hear  any  Chriftian  affert, 
that  the  holy  and  excellent  Temper  and  Behaviour  of  Je- 
fus  Chrift,  and  that  Obedience  which  he  performed  under 
fuch  great  Trials,  was  not  virtuous  ifa'Prafff-iuortfy;  becaufe 
his  Vv  ill  was  not  free  ad  utrvmque,  to  either  Holinefs  or  Sin, 
but  was  unalterably  determined  to  one;  that  upon  this  Ac 
count,  there  is  no  Virtue  at  all,  in  all  Chrift's  Humility, 
Meekncfs,  Patience,  Charity,  Forgivenefs  of  Enemies,  Con 
tempt  of  the  World,  Heavenly- mindednefs,  Submiffion  to 
the  Will  of  God,  perfect  Obedience  to  his  Commands, 
(tho5  He  was  obedient  unto  Death,  even  the  Death  of  the 
Crofs)  his  great  Compaffion  to  the  Afflicled>  his  unparal- 
lel'd  Love  to  Mankind,  his  Faithfulnefs  to  God  and  Man, 
under  fuch  great  Trials ;  his  praying  for  his  Enemies,  even 
when  nailing  Him  to  the  Crofs;  That  Virtue,  when  applied 
to  thefe  Things,  is  but  an  empty  Name ;  That  there  was  no 
Merit  in  any  of  thefe  Things  ;  that  is,  that  Chrift  was  wor 
thy  of  Nothing  at  all  on  the  Account  of  them,  worthy  of  no 
Reward,  no  Praife,  no  Honour  or  RefpecT:  from  God  or 
Man ;  Becaufe  his  Will  was  not  indifferent,  and  free  either 
to  thefe  Things,  or  the  Contrary ;  but  under  fuch  a  flrong 
Inclination  or  Bias  to  the  Things  that  were  excellent,  as 
made  it  impffible  that  he  (hould  chufe  the  contrary;  That 
upon  this  Account  (to  ufe  Dr.  WToitby's  Language)  /"/  *would 
be  fenjibly  unreafonable  that  the  human  Nature  fhould  be  re 
warded  for  any  of  thefe  Things* 

According  to  this  Doctrine,  That  Creature  who  is  evi 
dently  fet  forth  in  Scripture  as  the  Firft-born  of  every  Crea 
ture,  as  having  in  all  Things  the  Pre-eminence,  and  as  the  high- 
eft  of  all  Creatures  in  Virtue,  Honour,  and  Worthinefs  of 
Efteem,  Praife  and  Glory,  on  the  Account  of  his  Virtue,  is 
lefs  worthy  of  Reward  or  Praife,  than  the  very  lead  of  Saints ; 
yea,  no  more  worthy  than  a  Clock  or  mere  Machine*,  that  is 
purely  paffive,  and  moved  by  Natural  Neceffity, 

W  { 


ij,o  CHRIST'S  Righteoufnefs          Fart  III. 

If  we  judge  by  fcriptural  Reprefentuions  of  Things,  we 
have  Reafon  to  fuppofe,  that  Chriil  took  on  him  our  Na 
ture,  and  dwelt  with  us  in  this  World,  in  a  fuftering 
State,  not  only  to  fatisfy  for  cur  Sins  ;  but  that  He,  being 
in  our  Nature  and  Circurnftances,  and  under  our  Trials, 
might  be  our  moil  fit  and  proper  Example.,.  Leader  and 
Captain,  in  the  Exercife  of  glorious  arid  victorious  Vir 
tue,  and  might  be  a  vifible  Inftance  of  the  glorious  End 
and  Reward  of  it  ;  That  we  might  fee  in  Him  the 
Beauty,  Amiablenefs,.  and  true  Honour  and  Glory,  and 
exceeding  Benefit  of  that  Virtue,  which  it  is  proper  for  us- 
human  Beings  to  praclife  ;  and  might  thereby  learn,  and 
be  animated,  to  feek  the  like  Glory  and  Honour,  and  to 
obtain  the.  like  glorious  Reward.  See  Heb.  ii.  9,  --  14,, 
with  v.  8,  9.  and  xii.  i,  2,  3.  Joh.  xv.  ro.  Rom.  viii.  17. 
2  Tim.  ii.  1  1,  12.  i  Pet*  ii.  19,  20.  and  iv.  13.  But  if  there 
was  Nothing  of  any  Virtue  or  Merit,  or  Worthinefs  of  any 
Reward,  Glory,  Praife  or  Commendation  at  all,  in  all  that 
He  did,  becaufe  it  was  all  neceflary,  and  He  could  not 
fcelp  it  ;  then  how  is  here  any  Thing  fo  proper  to  animate 
and  incite  us,  free  Creatures,  by  patient  Continuance  in 
Well-doing,  to  feek  for  Honour,  Glory,  and  Virtue  ? 

God  fpcaks  of  Himfelf  as  peculiarly  well-pleafed  with, 
the  Righteoufaefs  of  this  Servant  of  his.  Ifai.  xlii.  21.  The 
Lord  is  well  pleafed  for  his  Righteoufnefs  Sake.  The  Sacrifices  of* 
old  are  fpoken  of  as  a  fweet  Savour  to  God,  but  the  Obe 
dience  of  Chrift  as  far  more  acceptable  than  they.  Pfal. 
xl.  6)  7.  Sacrifice  and  Offering  Thou  didjl  not  dcjtre  :  —  ••  -  Mine 
Ear  haft  Thou  opened  [as  thy  Servant  performing  willing 
Obedience  ;]  Burnt-Offering  and  Sin-Oaring  haft  thou  not  re 
quired  :  Then/aid  /,  Lo,  I  come  [as  a  Servant  that  chearfuily 
anfwers  the  Calls  of  his  Matter  :]  /  delight  to  do  thy  Will,  O 
my  God,  and  thy  La-iv  is  within  mine  Heart.  Matth,  xvii.  £. 
This  is  my  beloved  Son,  in  <ivhom  I  am  ^well-pleafed.  And 
Chrift  tells  us  exprefly,  that  the  Father  loves  Him  for 
that  wonderful  Inftance  of  his  Obedience,  his  voluntarily 
yielding  himfclf  to  Death,  in  Compliance  with  the  Father's 
Command.  Joh.  x.  r7,  18.  Therefore  doth  my  Father  love  met 
becaitje  I  lay  down  my  Life  :  —  —  No  Man  taketh  it  from  mt  ; 
f  el—  -  This 


£>ut  I  lay  it  down   of  my  f  elf—  -  This  Commandment  received  I  of 
zny  Father* 

And'  if  there   was   no  Merit  in  Chriil's  Obedience    unto 
Pcath>   if  it  was  not    worthy  of  Praife,   an4  of  the  moft 

glorious 


Sedl.  II.     Pratfe-worthy,  rewardalle,  &c.         151 

glorious  Rewards,  the  heavenly  Hofts  were  exceedingly 
iniftaken,  by  the  Account  that  is  given  of  them,  in  Rev.'v. 

S, 12. The  four  Beafts  and  the  four-and-twcnty  Elders  felt 

down  before  the  Lamb,  having  every  one  of  them  Harps ,  anil 

golden  Vials  full  of  'Odours ,- And  they  fung  a  new  fi?ig,  fay- 

ing,   Thou  art  WORTHY  to  take  the    Book,    and   to    open    the 

Seals  thereof;  for  thou  waft  flain. And  I  beheld,  and  I 

heard  the  Ifoice  of  many  Angels  round  about  the  Throne ,  and  the 
Beafts,  and  the  Elders ,  and  the  Number  of  them  was  ten  Tho/sfand 
Times  ten  Thoufand,  and  Thoufands  of  Thoufands,  faying  with  a 
loud  Voice,  WORTHY  is  the  Lamb  that  was  Jlain,  La  receive 
Power,  and  Riches ,  and  Wijdom,  arid  Strength,  and  Honour t 
and  Glory ,  and  BleJJing. 

Chrifl  fpeaks  of  the  eternal  Life  which  He  was  to  re 
ceive,  as  the  Reward  of  his  Obedience  to  the  Father's  Com 
mandments.  Joh.  xii.  49,  50.  /  have  not  fpoken  ofmyjdf;  but 
the  Father  which  fent  me,  He  gave  me  a  Commandment  what  I 
jbould fny,  and  what  I  Jhouldjpeak  :  And  I  know  that  his  Com" 
mandment  is  Life  everlafting  :  Whatfoever  I  /peak  therefore,  evetz 
as  the  Father  Jaid  unto  me,  fo  I  f peak. God  promifes  to  di 
vide  Him  a  Portion  with  the  Great,  &c.  for  his  being  his 
righteous  Servant,  for  his  glorious  Virtue  under  fuch  great 
Trials  and  Sufferings  ;  Ifai.  liii.  1 1 ,  12.  He  Jhallfee  of  the  Travel 
of  his  Soul  and  be  Jatisficd  :  By  his  Knowledge  Jhall  my  righteous 
Servant  jnftify  many  ;  for  hejhall  bear  their  Iniquities.  Therefore, 
will  I  divide  him  a  Portion  with  the  Great,  and  he  Jball divide  the 
Spoil  with  the  Strong,  becaiife  He  hath  poured  out  his  Soul  unto 

Death. -The  Scriptures  reprefent  God  as  rewarding  Him 

far  above  all  his  other  Servants.  Phil.  ii.  7,  8,  9.    He  took  on 
Him   the   form  of  a   Servant,  and  was  made  in  the  Likenefs  ef 
Men  :  and  being  found  in  ¥ajhion  as  a  Man,  He  humbled  hitnfelfy 
and  became  obedient  unto   Death,  even  the  Death  of  the  Crofs  : 
Wherefore  GOD  alfo  hath  highly  exalted  Him,  and  given  Him  a 

Name  above  every  Name. Pfal.  xlv.   7.   Thou  laveft  Righte* 

oufnefs,    and  hahft  IVkkednefs :    Therefore   God,   thy  God,    hath 
anointed  Thee  with  the  Oil  of  Gladnejs  above  thy  Fellows. 

There  is  no  P.oom  to  pretend,  that  the  glorious  Benefits 
beftowed  in  Confequence  of  Chrift's  Obedience,  are  not  pro 
perly  of  the  Nature  of  a  Reward.  What  is  a  Reward,  in- 
the  moft  proper  Senfe,  but  a  Benefit  beftowed  in  Confe 
quence  of  fomething  morally  excellent  in  Quality  or  Beha 
viour,  in  Teftimony  of  well-pleafednefs  in  that  moral  Ex- 
and  Refpeft  and  Favour  on  that  Account  ?  If 
W  3  we 


152       CHRIST'S  Righteoufnefs,  &c.     Part  II L 

we  confider  the  Nature  of  a  Reward  moft  ftriiftly,  and  make 
the  utmoft  of  it,  and  add  to  the  Things  contained  in  this 
Defcription,  proper  Merit  or  Worthiness,  and  the  Beftow- 
jnent  of  the  Benefit  in  Confequence  of  a  Prcmife;  Hill  it 
will  be  found,  there  is  Nothing  belonging  to  it,  but  that 
the  Scripture  is  moft  expre/s  as  to  its  belonging  to  the 
Glory  beftowed  on  Chrift,  after  his  Sufferings  ;  as  appears 
from  what  has  been  already  obferved :  There  was  a  glo 
rious  Benefit  beftowed  in  Confequence  of  fome thing  mo 
rally  excellent,  being  called  Right eoufnejs  and  Obedience  ; 
There  was  great  Favour,  Love  and  Well-pleafednefs,  for 
this  Righteoufnefs  and  Obedience,  in  the  Beftower;  There 
was  proper  Merit,  or  Worthinefs  of  the  Benefit,  in  the  O- 
bedience ;  It  was  beftowed  in  Fulfilment  of  Promifes,  made 
to  that  Obedience  ;  and  was  beftowed  therefore  t  or  becaufe 
he  had  performed  that  Obedience* 

I  may  add  to  all  thefe  Things,  that  Jefus  Chrift, 
while  here  in  the  Flefh,  was  manifeftly  in  a  State  of  Trial* 
The  laft  Adam,  as  Chrift  is  called,  i  Cor.  xv.  45.  Rom.  v.  14. 
taking  on  Him  the  human  Nature,  and  fo  the  Form  of 
a  Servant,  and  being  under  the  Law,  to  ftand  and  ad  for 

us,  was  put  into  a  State  of  Trial,  as  the  firft  Adam  was. 

Dr.  Whiiby  mentions  thefe  three  Things  as  Evidences  of 
Perfons  being  in  a  State  of  Trial,  (on  the  five  Points,  P.  29?* 
299 ;)  namely,  Their  Afflictions  being  fpoken  of  as  their 
Trials  or  Temptations,  their  being  the  Subjects  of  Promifes, 
and  their  being  expofed  to  Satan's  Temptations,  But  Chrift 
was  apparently  the  Subject  of  each  of  thefe.  Concerning 
Promifes  made  to  Him,  I  have  fpoken  already.  The 
Difficulties  and  Afflictions  He  met  with  in  the  Courfe  of  his 
Obedience,  are  called  his  Temptations  or  Trials,  Luke  xxii.  28. 
Ye  are  they  which  have  continued  with  me  in  my  Temptations,  or 
Trials.  Heb.  ii.  18.  For  in  that  he  HimfelJ  hath  fuffe  red,  being 
tempted,  [or  tried]  He  is  able  to  fuccour  them  that  are  tempted. 
And  Chap.  iv.  15.  We  have  not  an  High-Prieft,  which  cannot  be 
touched  with  the  Feeling  of  our  Infirmities  ;  but  <vcas  in  all  Pointy 
tempted  like  as  <we  are,  yet  <vuithou1  Sin.  And  as  to  his  being 
tempted  by  Satan,  it  is  what  none  will  difpute. 


SECTION 


(  153  ) 

aecocotfooofiooooojcOooooooocooocoQoooocoo^*  >ooo  jooowoojooooooooooooOdoooccooOcgooo  A 

SECTION  III. 

Cafe  of  fuch  as  are  given  up  of  God  to 
Sin,  and  of  fallen  Man  in  general,  proves  mo 
ral  Necefltty  and  Inability  to  be  confident  with 
Blame-worthinefs. 

DR.  Whitby   afferts   Freedom,    not   only   from   Coadlion, 
but  Neceffity,    to  be  effential  to  any  Thing  defervmg 
the  Name   of  Sin,  and  to  an  Action's  being  culpable  :  in  thefe 
Words,    (Difcourfe  on  five  Points,  Edit,  3.    P.  348.)    "  If 
they  be  thus  neceffitated,    then  neither  their  Sins  of  Omif- 
fion  or  Commiffion  could  deferve  that  Name ;  it  being  effen- 
tial  to  the  Nature  of  Sin,    according  to  St.  Auftins  Defini 
tion,  that  it  be  an  Aftion,  a  quo  liberum  eft  abftinere.     Three 
Things  feem  plainly  neceflary  to  make  an  Action  or  Omiili- 
on  culpable ;   i .  That  it  be  in  our  Power  to  perform  or  for 
bear  it :  For,  as  Origen,  and  all  the  Fathers  fay,  no  Man  is 
blame-worthy  for  not  doing  what   he  could  not  do/' — And 
elfewhere  the  Dodor  infills,   that  when  any  do  Evil  of  Ne- 
ceifity,  what  they  do  is  no  Vice,  that  they  are  guilty  of  no 
Fault,    §  are  worthy  of  no  Blame,    Difpraife,  ||  or  Diftio- 
-    nour,  t  but  are  unblameable.  * 

If  thefe  Things  are  true,  in  Dr.  Wlitby's  Senfe  of  Necef%, 
they  will  prove  all  fuch  to  be  blamelefs,  who  are  given  up  of 
God  to  §in,  in  what  they  commit  after  they  are  thus  given 

up. That  there  is  fuch  a  Thing  as  Men's  being  judicially 

given  up  to  Sin,  is  certain,  if  the  Scripture  rightly  informs  us ; 
fuch  a  Thing  being  often  there  fpoken  of:  as  in  Pfalms.  Ixxxi. 
12.  S/y  I  gave  them  up  to  their  own  Hearts  Ltft,  and  they  wal 
ked  in  their  own  Counfels,  A&s.  vii.  42.  Then  God  turned, 
and  gave  them  up  ta  worjhip  the  Heft  of  Heaven,  Rom,  i.  24. 
Wherefore,  God  alfo  gave  them  up  to  Uncleannefs,  through  the 
Lufts  of  their  own  Hearts,  to  difoonour  their  o<wn  Bodies  between. 
Themf elves.  Ver.  26.  For  this  Caufe  God  gave  them  up  to  vile 
Ajf  eft  ions.  Ver.  28,  And  even  as  they  did  not  like  to  retain  God 
in  their  Knowledge,  God  gave  them  over  to  a  reprobate  Mind,  to 
fa  tlofe.  Things  that  are  not  convenient,  'Tis 

4  Difc.    on  five  Points,     P.  347.  360,  361.  377.     |j  303.  326.  329, 
and  many  other  Places,     f  371.    *  304.  361. 


154       Of  the  Inability  and  Sin  of  Juch       Part  IIL 

JTis  needlefs  to  (land  particularly  to  inquire,  what  God'* 
giving  Men  up  to  their  o<wn  Heart's  Lufts  fignifies  :  It  is  fuffi- 
eient  to  obferve,  that  hereby  is  certainly  meant  God's  fo  or 
dering  or  difpofmg  Things,  in  fome  Refpect  or  other,  either 
by  doing  or  forbearing  to  do,  as  that  the  Confequence  fhouid 
be  Men's  continuing  in  their  Sins.  So  much  as  Men  arc 
given  up  /<?,  fo  much  is  the  Confequence  of  their  being 
given  up  ;  whether  that  be  lefs  or  more.  If  God  don't  order 
Things  fo,  by  Action  or  Permiffien,  that  Sin  will  be  the 
Confequence,  then  the  Event  proves  that  they  are  not  given 
up  to  that  Confequence.  If  Good  be  the  Confequence,  in- 
ilead  of  Evil,  then  God's  Mercy  is  to  be  acknowledged  in 
that  Good;  which  Mercy  muft  be  contrary  to  God's 
Judgment  in  giving  up  to  Evil.  If  the  Event  muft  prove 
that  they  are  given  up  to  Evil  as  the  Confequence,  then  the 
Perfons  who  are  the  Subjects  of  this  Judgment,  muft  be  the 
Subjects  of  fuch  an  Event,  and  fo  the  Event  is  nece0ary. 

If  not  only  Coaftion,  but  all  Neceffity,  will  prove  Men 
blamelefs,  then  Judas  was  blamelefs,  after  Chrift  had  given 
him  over,  and  had  already  declared  his  certain  Damnation, 
and  that  he  mould  verily  betray  Him.  He  was  guilty  of  no 
Sin  in  betraying  his  Mafter,  on  this  Suppofition ;  tho'  his  fo 
doing  is  fpoken  of  by  Chrift  as  the  moft  aggravated  Sin, 
more  heinous  than  the  Sin  of  Pilate  in  crucifying  Him. 
And  the  Jews  in  Egypt,  in  Jeremiah'*  Time,  were  guilty  of 
no  Sin,  in  their  not  worfhipping  the  true  God,  after  God 
had  Sworn  by  his  great  Name,  that  his  Name  Jhould  be  no  more 
•named  in  the  Mouth  of  any  filan  of  Judah,  in  all  the  Land  of 
Egypt.  Jer.  xliv.  26. 

Dr.  Whitoy  (Difc.  on  five  Points,  P.  302,  303,}  denies* 
that  Men,  in  this  World,  are  ever  fo  given  up  by  God  to  Sin, 
that  their  Wills  mould  be  neceffarily  determined  to  Evil ;  tho' 
He  owns,  that  hereby  it  may  become  exceeding  difficult  for  Men 
to  do  Good,  having  a  ftrong  Bent,  and  powerful  Inclination  to 

what  is  Evil.- But  if  we  mould  allow  the  Cafe  to  be  juit  as 

he  reprefents,  the  Judgment  of  giving  up  to  Sin  will  no  bet 
ter  agree  with  his  Notions  of  that  Liberty,  which  is  eflential 
to  Praife  or  Blame,  than  if  we  mould  fuppofe  it  to  render  the 
avoiding  of  Sin  impoffiblc.  For  if  an  Impoffbility  of  avoiding 
Sin  wholly  excufes  a  Man  ;  then,  for  the  fame  Reafoa,  its 
being  difficult  to  avoid  it  excufes  him  in  Part ;  and  this 

juft  in  Proportion  to    the  Degree    of  Difficulty. If  the 

Influence 


Secfd.  III.         as  are  given  up  to  Sin.  * 

Influence  of  moral  Impoffibility  or  Inability  be  the  fame,  to> 
excufe  Perfons   in     not   doing,    or  not  avoiding  any  Thing^ 
as  that  of  natural  Inability,  (which  is  fuppofed)  then  undoubt 
edly,  in  like  Manner,  moral  Difficulty  has  the  fame  Influence 
\JQ  excafe  with  natural  Difficulty.     But  all  allow,  that  natural 
Impoffibility  wholly  excufes,    and  alfo   that   natural  Difficulty 
excufes  in  Part,  and  makes  the  Acl  or  Omiflion  lefs  blame- 
able,  in  Proportion   to   the    Difficulty.     All  natural  Difficulty, 
according    to  the  plaineft    Dictates    of  the  Light  of  Nature, 
excufes  in  forne  Degree,  fo  that  the  Neglect  is  not  fo  blame- 
able,  as  if  there  had  been  no  Difficulty   in  the  Cafe  :    and  fo 
the  greater  the  Difficulty  is,  {till  the  more  excufable,  in  Pro 
portion  to  the  Increafe  of  the  Difficulty.     And  as  natural  fm- 
poffibility  wholly  excufes  and  excludes  all  Blame,  fo  the  nearer 
the  Difficulty  approaches   to    Impcffibility,    {till  the    nearer  a 
Perfon  is  to   Blamelefnefs,    in  Proportion  to  that  Approach^ 
And  if  the  Cafe  of  moral  Impoffibility  or  Neceffity,  be  juft  th« 
fame  with  natural  Neceffity   or  Coaftion,  as   to  Influence  to 
excufe  a  Neglecl,  then  alfo,  for  the  fame  Reafon,    the  Cafe  of 
natural  Difficulty  don't  differ  in  Influence,  to  excufe  a  Neglect, 
from   moral  Difficulty,    arifing  from  a  itrong  Bias  or  Bent  to 
Evil,  fuch   as  Dr  Whitly.  owns  in   the  Cafe  of  thofe  that  are 
given  up  to  their  own   Hearts   Lufts.     So   that   the  Fault  o£ 
fuch   Perfons  muft   be   lefien'd,    in   Proportion   to  the   Diffi 
culty,,     and   Approach  to   Impoffibility.     If  ten   Degrees   oi 
moral  Difficulty  make   the  Action  quite   irapoffible,    and  fa 
wholly  excufe,  then   if  there  be  nine  Degrees   of  Difficulty, 
the  Perfon  is  in  great  Part  excufed,    and  is  nine  Degrees  if* 
ten,  lefs  Blame-worthy,  than  ii  there  had  been  no  Difficulty 
at  all  ;    and   he  has   but   one   Degree    of  Blame-warthinefs. 
The  Reafon  is  plain,  on  Arminian  Principles  ;  'viz.    beeaufe  as 
Difficulty,,   by  antecedent  Bent   and  Bias  on  the  Will,  is  in- 
creafed,    Liberty   of  Indifference,    and   Self-determination  in 
the  Will,  is  diminifhed  :  fo  much  Hindrance  and  Impediment 
is  there,    in   the  Way    of  the  Will's  acting   freely,    by  mere 
Self-determination.     And  if  ten  Degrees   of  fuch  Hindrance 
take   away  all  fuch  Liberty,   then  nine  Degrees  take  away 
nine  Parts  in  ten,    and  leave    but   one   Degree  of  Liberty. 
And  therefore  there  rs    but    one   Degree  of    Blarneablenefs, 
cteteris  paribus.,    in  the  Neglect ;    the  Man   being  no  further 
blameable  in  what  he  does,    or  neglefts,  than  he  has  Liberty 
in  that  Affair  :    For  Blame  or  Praife  (fay  they)  arifes  wholly 
from  a  good  Ufe  or  Abufe  of  Liberty. 

From 


156'  Of  the  Inability  and  Sin          Part  II! 

From  all  which  it  follows,  that  a  ftrong  Bent  and  Bias  one 
Way,  and  Difficulty  of  going  the  contrary,  never  caufes  a 
Perfon  to  be  at  all  more  expofed  to  Sin,  or  any  Thing  blame- 
able  :  Becaufe  as  the  Difficulty  is  increafed,  fo  much  the  left 
is  required  and  expected.  Tho'  in  one  Refpecl,  Expofednefs 
to  Sin  or  Fault  is  increafed,  <diz.  by  an  Increafe  of  Expofed 
nefs  to  the  evil  Action  or  OmiiTion  ;  yet  it  is  diminimed  in 
another  Refpeft,  to  balance  it ;  namely,  as  the  Sinfulr.efs  or 
Elameablenefs  of  the  Aftion  or  Omiflion  is  diminifned  in  the 
fame  Proportion.  So  that,  on  the  Whole^  the  Affair,  as  to 
Expofednefs  to  Guilt  or  Blame,  is  left  juft  as  it  was. 

To  illuftrate  this,  let  us  fuppofe  a  Scale  of  a  Balance  to  be 
intelligent,  and  a  free  Agent,  and  indued  with  a  felf-moving. 
Power,  by  Virtue  of  which  it  could  aft  and  produce  Eifeds 
to  a  certain  Degree;  ex.  gr.  to  move  it feh" up  or  down  with 
a  Force  equal  to  a  Weight  of  ten  Pounds ;  and  that  it  might 
therefore  be  required  of  it,  in  ordinary  Circumftances,  to 
move  itfelf  down  with  that  Force  :  for  which  it  has  Power 
and  full  Liberty,  and  therefore  would  be  blame-worthy  if  it 
fail'd  of  it.  But  then  let  us  fuppofe  a  Weight  of  ten  Pounds 
to  be  put  in  the  oppofite  Scale,  which  in  Force  entirely  coun 
ter-balances  its  felf-moving- Power,  and  fo  renders  it  impoili- 
ble  for  it  to  move  down  at  all ;  and  therefore  wholly  excufes  it 
from  any  fuch  Motion.  But  if  we  fuppofe  there  to  be  only 
nine  Pounds  in  the  oppofite  Scale,  this  renders  its  Motion 
not  impoffibie,  but  yet  more  difficult ;  fo  that  it  can  now  only 
move  down  with  the  Force  of  one  Pound  :  But  however,  this 
is  all  that  is  required  of  it  under  thefe, Circumftances;  it  is 
wholly  excufed  from  nine  Parts  of  its  Motion  :  And  if  the 
Scale,  under  thefe  Circumftances,  negleels  to  move,  and  re 
mains  at  Reft,  all  that  it  will  be  blamed  for,  will  be  its  Ne- 
£left  of  that  one  tenth -Part  of  its  Motion  ;  which  it  had  as  muel> 
iberty  and  Advantage  for,  as  in  ufual  Circumftances,  it  has 
for  the  greater  Motion,  which  in  fuch  a  Cafe  would  be  required. 
So  that  this  new  Difficulty,  don't  at  all  increafe  its  Expofednefs 
to  any  Thing  blame- worthy. 

And  thus  the  very  Supposition  of  Difficulty  in  the  Way  of  z 
Man's  Duty,  or  Proclivity  to  Sin,  thro'  a  being  given  up  ta 
Hardnefs  of  Heart,  or  indeed  by  any  other  Means  whatfoever, 
is  an  Inconfiftence,  according  to  Dr.  Whitby's  Notions  of  Li 
berty,  Virtue  and  Vice,  Blame  and  Praife.  The  avoiding  Sin 
and  Blame,  and  the  doing  what  is  virtuous  and  Praife- worthy, 
muft  be  always  equally  eafy. 


Sed.  III.  of  fallen  Man.  157, 

Dr.  Whitby's  Notions  of  Liberty,  Obligation,  Virtue,  Sin, 
&c.  lead  Him  into  another  great  Inconfiilence.  He  abundantly 
infills,  that  Neceffity  is  inconfiilent  with  the  Na:u:e  of  Sin  or 
Fault.  He  fays  in  the  foremention'd  Treatife,  P.  14.  Who  can. 
blame  a  Per/on  for  doing  what  he  could  not  help  ?  and  P.  I  5.  It 
being  fenjlbly  Uizjuft,  to  punijh  any  Man  for  doing  that  'which  it 
was  newer  in  his  Power  to  avoid.  And  in  P.  341*  to  confirm 
his  Opinion,  he  quotes  one  of  the  Fathers,  faying,  Why  doth 
God  command,  if  Man  hath  not  Free-will  and  Power  to  obey  I* 
And  again  in  the  fame  and  the  next  Page,  Who  'will  not  cry  out, 
that  it  is  folly  to  command  him,  that  hath  not  Liberty  to  do  what 
is  commanded  ,•  and  that  it  is  unjuft  to  condemn  Him,  that  has  it 
not  in  his  Power  to  do  what  is  required?  And  in  P.  373.  He 
cites  another  faying,  A  Law  is  given  to  Him  that  can  turn  to 
both  Parts  ;  i.  e.  obey  or  tranfgrefs  it :  But  no  Law  can  be  «- 
vain  ft  Him  who  is  bound  by  Nature, 

And  yet  the  fame  Dr.  Whit  by  aflerts,  that  fallen  Man  is  not: 
able  to  perform  perfedl  Obedience.  In  P.  165.  He  has  thefe 
Words,  "  The  Nature  of  Adam  had  Power  to  continue  inno- 
*'  cent,  and  without  Sin  ;  whereas  it  is  certain  our  Nature  ne- 
ff  ver  had  fo."  But  if  we  han't  Power  to  continue  innocent 
and  without  Sin,  then  Sin  is  confident  with  Neceffity,  and  we 
may  be  fmful  in  that  which  we  have  not  Power  to  avoid ;  and 
thofe  Things  can't  be  true,  which  He  aflerts  elfewhere,  name 
ly,  «*  That  if  we  be  neceflitated,  neither  Sins  of  Omiflion  nor 
"  Com'miiiion,  would  deferve  that  Name."  (P.  348.)  If  we 
have  it  not  in  our  Power  to  be  innocent,  then  we  have  it  not  in 
our  Power  to  be  blamelefs  :  and  if  fo,  we  are  under  a  Necef 
fity  of  being  blame- worthy.  And  how  does  this  confift  with 
what  he  fo  often  aflerts,  that  Neceflity  is  inconfittent  with 
Blame  or  Praife  ?  If  we  have  it  not  in  our  Power  to  perform 
perfect  Obedience  to  all  the  Commands  of  God,  then  we  are 
under  a  Neceffity  of  breaking  fome  Commands  in  fome  De 
gree:  having  no  Power  to  perform  fo  much  as  is  com 
manded.  Andiffo,  why  does  he  cry  out  of  the  Unreafon- 
ablenefs  and  Folly  of  commanding  beyond  what  Men  have 
Power  to  do  ? 

And  Arminians  in  general  are  very  inconfiftent  with  them- 
felves  in  what  they  fay  of  the  Inability  of  fallen  Man  in  this 
Refpeft.  They  ftrenuoufly  maintain,  that  it  would  be  un 
juft  in  God,  to  require  any  Thing  of  us  beyond  our  prcfent 
Power  and  Ability  to  perform  ;  and  alfo  hold,  that  we  are 
now  unable  to  perform  perfect  Obedience,  and  that  Chrift 

X  die'd 


-ty  the  Inability  of  fallen  Man.      Part  HL 

di-d  to  fatisfy  for  the  li&ptrfe&iona  of  our  Obedience,  and  has 
made  Way  that  our  imperfect  Obedience  might  be  accepted  in- 
ftead  of  perfect :  Wherein  they  fee  m  infenfibly  to  run  them- 
fefves  into  the  grofleft  Inconfiftences.  For,  (as  I  have  obferv- 
ed  clfewhere)  "  They  hold  that  God  in  Mercy  to  Mankind 
<r  has  abciifhed  that  rigorous  Conftitution  or  Law,  that  they 
*;  were  under  originally ;  and  inftead  of  it,  has  introduced  a 
"  more  mild  Conititution,  and  nu-t  us  under  a  new  Law,  which 
"  requires  n<*more  than  imperfect  lincere  Obedience,  in  Com- 
"  pliance  with  our  poor  infirm  impotant  Circamftances  fmce 
"  the  Fall." 

Now,  how  can  thefe  Things  be  made  eoiiftent  ?•  I  would 
alk  what  Law  thefe  Imperfections  of  our  Obedience  are  a 
Breach  of?  If  they  are  a  Breach  of  no  Law  that  we  were 
ever  under,  then  they  are  not  Sins.-  And  if  they  be  not 
l>ins,  what  need  of  Chriil's  dying  to  fatisfy  for  them  ?  But 
if  they  are  Sins,  and  the  Breach  of  fome  Law,  what  Law  is 
ii;  ?  They  can't  be  a  Breach  of  their  new  Law  ;  for  that 
requires  no  other  than  imperfect  Obedience,  or  Obedience 
vnth  Imperfections  :  And  therefore  to  have  Obedience  attend 
ed  with'  Imperfections,  is  no  Breach  of  it ;  for  'tis  as  much 
as  it  requires.  And  they  can't  be  a  Breach  of  their  old  Law  5. 
for  that,  they  fay,  is  entirely  abolifned,  and  we  never  were 
under  it. — « — They  fay,  it  would  not  be  juft  in  God  to  require 
of  us  perfect  obedience,  becaufe  it  would  not  be  juft  to  re 
quire  more  than  we  can  perform,  or  to  punifti  us  for  failing 
of  it.  And  therefore,  by  their  own  Scheme,  the  imper 
fections  of  our  Obedience  don't  deferve  to  be  punifhed. 
What  need  therefore  of  Chrift's  dying,  to  fatisfy  for  them  ? 
What  need  of  his  Suffering,  to  fatisfy  for  that  which  is  no 
Faults  and  in  its  own  Nature  deferves  no  fujfering  ?  What 
-need  of  Chrift's  dying,  to  purchafe,  that  our  imperfeft  Obedi- 
fence  fhould  be  accepted,  when  according  to  their  Scheme, 
it  would  be  unjuft  in  itfelf,  that  any  other  Obedience  than 
imhtrfetf  mould  be  required  ?  What  need  of  Chrift's  dying 
to  make  Way  for  God's  accepting  fuch  an  Obedience,  a& 
it  would  be  unjuft  in  Him  not  to  accept  ?  Is  there  any 
Need  of  Chrift's  dying,  to  prevail  with  God  not  to  do  un- 

Tighteoufly  ? If  it   be  faid,  that  Chrift  died  to  fatisfy  that 

old  Law  for  u.s,  that  fo  we  might  not  be  under  it,  but  that 
there  might  be  Room  for  our  being  under  a  more  mild  Law  ; 
ilill  I  would  inquire,  what  Need  of  Chrift's  dying  that 
we  might  not  be  under  a  Law,  which '(by  their  Principles) 
it  would  be  in  itfelf  unjuft  that  we  Ihould  be  under,  whe- 

theiv 


Seel.  IV.        Of  Inability,  end  Obligation,        159 

ther  Chrift  had  died  or  no,    becaufe  in  our  prefcnt  State  we 
are  not  able  to  keep  it  ? 

So  the  Arminians  are  inconfiftent  with  themfelves,  not 
only  in  what  they  fay  of  the  Need  of  Chrift's  Satisfac 
tion  to  attone  for  thofe  Imperfections  which  we  cannot 
avoid,  but  alfo  in  what  they  fay  of  the  Grace  of  God, 
granted  to  enable  Men  to  perform  the  fincere  Obedience  of 
the  new  Lav/.  "  I  grant  (fays  Dr.  Stebbing  **)  indeed,  that 
by  Reafon  of  original  Sin,  we  are  utterly  difabled  for  the 
Performance  of  the  Condition,  without  new  Grace  from 
God.  But  I  fay  then,  that  He  gives  fuch  Grace  to  all  of 
us,  by  which  the  Performance  of  the  Condition  is  truly 
pofTible :  And  upon  this  Ground  he  may,  a-nd  doth  moft 
righteou fly  require  it."  If  Dr.  Stebbing  intends  to  fpeak 
properly,  by  Grace  he  nraft  mean,  that  AHiftance  which  is  of 
Grace,  or  of  free  Favour  and  Kindnefs.  But  yet  in  the  fame 
Place  he  fpeaks  of  it  as  very  tutreafonqblt,  unjvft  and  cruel,  for 
<God  to  require  that,  as  the  Condition  of  Pardon,  that  is  be 
come  impoliibie  by  original  Sin.  If  it  be  fo3  what  Grace  is 
there  in  giving  Affiftance  and  Ability  to  perform  the  Condition 
of  Pardon  ?  Or  why  is  that  called  by  the  Name  cf  Grace, 
that  is  an  abfolute  Debt,  which  God  is  bound  to  beftow,  and 
which  it  would  be  unjuft  and  cruel  in  him  to  wivh-hold, 
feeing  he  requires  that,  as  the  Condition  of  Pa.rdin\  which  we 
cannot  perform  without  it  ? 


SECTION     IV. 

Command,    and.  Obligation  to  Obedience,    con- 
fiftent  "joith  moral  Inability  to  obey. 

IT  being  fo  much  infilled  on  by  Arminian  Writers,  that 
Neceflity  is  inconfiftent  with  Law  or  Command,  and 
particularly,  that  it  is  abfurd  to  fuppofe  God  by  his 
Command  (hould  require  that  of  Men  which  they  are  unable 
to  do  ;  not  allowing  in  this  Cafe  for  any  Difference  that  there 
is  between  natural  and  moral  Inability ;  I  would  therefore  now 
particularly  confider  this  Matter. 

X  3  And 

*  Treatife  of  the  Operations  of  the  Spiritt    »  Edit.  P.    112,   113. 


160  Commands  confident  Part  III. 

And  for  the  greater  Clearnefs,  I  would  diftinftiv  lay  dovv  n 
the  following  1  hings. 

I.  The  Will  itfelf,  and  not  oijly  thofe  Aliens  which  are 
the  Effeds  of  the  Will,  is  the  proper  Objed:  of  Precept  or 
Command.  That  is,  fuch  or  fuch  a  State  or  Ads  of  Men's 
Wills,  is  in  many  Cafes,  properly  required  of  them  by- 
Command  ;  and  not  only  thofe  Alterations  in  the  State  of 
their  Bodies  or  Minds  that  are  the  Confequences  of  Volition. 
This  is  mod  manifeft  ;  for 'tis  the  Soul  only,  that  is  properly 
and  diredly  the  Subjed  of  Precepts  or  Commands ;  that 
only  being  capable  of  receiving  or  perceiving  Commands. 
The  Motions  or  State  of  the  Body  are  Matter  of  Command, 
only  as  they  are  Subjed  to  the  Soul,  and  connected  with 
its  Ads.  But  now  the  Soui  has  no  other  Faculty  whereby 
it  can,  in  the  moft  direct  and  proper  Senfe,  confent,  yield  to* 
or  comply  with  any  Command,  but  the  Faculty  of  the  Will  > 
and 'tis  by  this  Faculty  only,  that  the  Soul  can  diredly  dif- 
obey,  or  refufe  Compliance:  For  the  very  Notions  of 
€onfentiAgtYirldingt  Accepting,  Complying,  Refujtng,  Reje fling,  &C. 
are,  according  to  the  Meaning  of  the  Terms,  Nothing  but 
certain  Adls  of  the  Will.  Obedience,  in  the  primary  Na 
ture  of  it,  is  the  fubmitdng  and  yielding  of  the  Will  of  one 
to  the  Will  of  another.  Difobedience  is  the  not  confent- 
ing,  not  complying  of  the  Will  of  the  commanded  to  the 
manifefted  Will  of  the  Commander.  Other  Ads  that  are 
not  the  Ads  of  the  Will,  as  certain  Motions  of  the  Body 
and  Alterations  in  the  Soul,  are  Obedience  or  Difobedience 
only  indiredly,  as  they  are  connected  with  the  State-  or 
Actions  of  the  Will,  according  to  an  eilablifhed  Law  of 
Nature.  So  that  'tis  manifeft,  the  Will  itfelf  may  be  re 
quired  :  And  the  Being  of  a  good  Will  is  the  moft  proper, 
dired  and  immediate  Subjed  of  Command  ;  and  if  this 
Can't  be  prefcribed  or  required  by  Command  or  Precept,  no 
thing  can ;  For  other  Things  can  be  required  no  otherwife 
than  as  they  depend  upon,  and  are  the  Fruits  of  a  Good  Will. 

Carol,  i. 'If  there  be  feveral  Ads  of  the  Will,  or  a  Series 
of  Ads,  one  following  another,  and  one  the  EfFed  of  ano 
ther,  the  frft  and  determining  Att  is  properly  the  Subjed  of 
Command,  and  not  only  the  confequent  Ads,  which  are  de 
pendent  upon  it.  Yea,  'tis  this  more  efpecrally  which  is  that 
which  Command  or  Precept  has  a  proper  Refped  to ;  be- 
$aufe  'tis  this  Ad  that  determines  the  whole  Affair  :  In  this 
Ad  the  Obedience  or  Difobedience  lies,  in  a  peculiar  Manner ; 

the 


Reft.  IV.  with  moral  Inability.  1 6i 

the  confequent  Ads  being  all  fubjed  to  it,  and  governed  and 
determined  by  it.  This  determining  governing  Ad  muft  be 
the  proper  Subjed  of  Precept,  or  none. 

Carol.  2.  It  alfo  follows  from  what  has  been  obferved, 
That  if  there  be  any  Sort  of  Aft,  or  Exertion  of  the  Soul, 
prior  to  all  free  Ads  of  the  Will  or  Ads  of  Choice  in  the  Cafe. 
tiireding  and  determining  what  the  Ads  of  the  Will  (hall  be  ; 
that  Ad  or  Exertion  of  the  Soul  can't  properly  be  fabjed 
to  any  Command  or  Precept,  in  any  Refped  whatsoever, 
cither  diredly  or  indiredly,  immediately  or  remotely.  Such 
Ads  can't  be  fubjed  to  Commands  direttly,  becaufe  they  are 
no  Ads  of  the  Will ;  being  by  the  Suppoiition  prior  to  all 
Ads  of  the  Will,  determining  and  giving  Rife  to  all  its  Ads  : 
They  not  being  Ads  of  the  Will,  there  can  be  in  them  no 
Confcnt  to,  or  Compliance  with  any  Command.  Neither  can 
they  be  fubjed  to  Command  or  Precept  indirefily  or  remotely  ; 
for  they  are  not  fo  much  as  the  Effetts  or  Confluences  of  the 
Will,  being  prior  to  ail  its  Ads.  So  that  if  there  be  any 
Obedience  in  that  original  Ad  of  the  Soul,  determining  all 
Volitions,  it  is  an  Ad  of  Obedience  wherein  the  Will  has  no 
Concern  at  all ;  it  preceding  every  Ad  of  Will.  And  there 
fore,  if  the  Soul  either  obeys  or  difobeys  in  this  Ad,  it  is 
wholly  involuntarily  ;  there  is  no  willing  Obedience  or  Rebel 
lion,  no  Compliance  or  Oppofition  of  the  Will,  in  the  Affair  : 
and  what  Sort  of  Obedience  or  Rebellion  is  this  ! 
* 

And  thus  the  Armlnian  Notion  of  the  Freedom  of  the  Will 
confifting  in  the  Soul's  determining  its  own  Ads  of  Will, 
inftead  of  being  eiTential  to  moral  Agency,  and  to  Men's 
being  the  Subjeds  of  moral  Government,  is  utterly  incon- 
fiftent  with  it.  For  if  the  Soul  determines  all  its  Ads  of 
Will,  it  is  therein  fubjed  to  no  Command  or  moral  Govern 
ment,  as  has  been  now  obferved  ;  becaufe  its  original  deter- 
raining  Ad  is  no  Ad  of  Will  or  Choice,  it  being  prior,  by  the 
Suppoiition,  to  every  A&  of  Will.  And  the  Soul  can't  be  the 
Subjed  of  Command  in  the  Ad  of  the  Will  itfelf,  which 
depends  on  the  foregoing  determining  Ad,  and  is  determined 
by  it ;  in  as  much  as  this  is  neceifary,  be;ng  the  neceflary 
Confequence  and  Eifed  of  that  prior  determining  Ad,  which 
is  not  voluntary.  Nor  can  the  Man  be  the  Subjed  of  Com 
mand  or  Government  in  his  external  Adions ;  becaufe  thefe 
are  all  neceflary,  being  the  neceffary  EiFeds  of  the  Ads  of  the 
Will  themfelves.  So  that  Mankind,  according  to  this  Scheme, 
$re  Subjeds  of  Command  or  moral  Government  in  nothing 

at 


162  Commands  conjtftcnt  Part  III. 

at  all ;  and  all   their   moral  Agency  is  entirely  excluded,  and 
no  Room  left  for  Virtue  or  Vice  in  the  World. 

So  that  'tis  the  Arminian  Scheme,  and  not  the  Scheme  of 
the  Calvinifts,  that  is  utterly  inconfiftent  with  moral  Govern 
ment,  and  with  all  Ufe  of  Laws,  Precepts,  Prohibitions,  Pror 
mifes,  or  Threatnings.  Neither  is  there  any  Way  whatfoever, 
to  make  their  Principles  confift  with  thefe  Things.  For  if 
£t  be  faid,  that  there  is  no  prior  determining  Acl  of  the  Soul, 
preceding  the  Ads  of  the  Will,  but  that  Volitions  are  Events 
that  come  to  pafs  by  pure  Accident,  without  any  determining 
Caufe,  this  is  mofi  palpably  inconfiftent  with  all.  Ufe  of  Laws 
and  Precepts;  for  nothing  is  more  plain  than  that  Laws  can 
be  of  no  Ufe  to  direct  and  regulate  perfect  Accident ;  which 
by  the  Suppofition  .of  its  being  pure  Accident,  is  in  no  Cafe 
regulated  by  any  Thing  preceding  •  but  happens  this  Way 
or  that  perfectly  by  Chance,  without  any  Caufe  or  Rule.  The 
perfect  Ufelefnefs  of  Laws  and  Precepts  alfo  follows  from  the 
Arminian  Notion  of  Indifference,  as  effential  to  that  Liberty 
which  is  requisite  to  Virtue  or  Vice.  For  the  End  of  Laws  is 
to  bind  to  one  Side ;  and  the  End  of  Commands  is  to  turn  the 
Will  one  Way  :  and  therefore  they  are  of  no  Ufe  unlefs  they 
turn  or  bias  the  WTill  that  Way.  But  if  Liberty  confifts  in 
Indifference,  then  their  biafling  the  Will  one  Way  only,  de 
frays  Liberty  ;  as  it  puts  the  Will  out  of  Equilibrium.  So 
that  the  Will,  having  a  Bias,  thro'  the  Influence  of  binding 
X<a<w,  laid  upon  it,  is  not  wholly  left  to  itfelf,  to  determine 
itfelf  which  Way  it  will,  without  Influence  from  without. 

II.  Having  fnewn  that  the  Will  itfelf,  efpecially  in  thofe 
Afts  which  are  original,  leading  and  determining  in^any  Cafe, 
is  the  proper  Subject  of  Precept  and  Command,  and  not  only 
thofe  Alterations  in  the  Body,  &c.  which  are  the  Effecls  of  the 
Will ;  I  now  proceed  in  the  fecond  Place,  to  obferve  that  the 
very  Oppofition  or  Defecl  of  the  Will  itfelf,  in  that  Aft  which 
is  its  original  and  determining  A&  in  the  Cafe,  I  fay  the  Will's 
Oppofition  in  this  Afl  to  a  Thing  propofed  or  commanded,  or 
its  failing  of  Compliance,  implies  a  moral  Inability  to  that 
Thing  :  Or  in  other  Words,  whenever  a  Command  requires  a 
certain  State  or  Aft  of  the  Will,  and  the  Perfon  commanded, 
notwithftanding  the  Command  and  the  Circumftances  under 
which  it  is  exhibited,  dill  finds  his  Will  opposite  or  wanting, 
in  that,  belonging  to  its  State  or  Ac~ts,  which  is  original  and 
determining  in  the  Affair -,  that  Man  is  morally  unable  to  obey 
that  Command, 

This 


SedL  IV.  with  moral  Inability.  163 

This  is  manifefc  from  what  was  obferved  in  the  firft  Part, 
eoncerning  the  Nature  of  moral  Inability,  as  diiiinguimed  from 
-natural :  where  \\  was  obferved,  That  a  Man  may  then  be  faid 
to  be  morally  unable  to  do  a  Thing,  when  He  is  under  the 
Influence  or  Prevalence  of  a  contrary  Inclination,  or  has  a 
Want  of  Inclination,  under  fuch  Circumftances  and  Views. 
'Tis  alfo  evident  from  what  has  been  before  proved,  that  the 
Will  is  always,  and  in  every  individual  Aft,  necefTarily  deter 
mined  by  the  ftrongeft  Motive  ;  and  fo  is  always  unable  to  go 
againft  the  Motive,  which  all  Things  confidered,  has  now 

the  greateft  Strength  and  Advantage   to  move  the  Will. 

But  not  further  to  infift  on  thefe'  Things,  the  Truth  of 
the  Pofition  now  laid  down,  viz.  That  when  the  Will  is  op- 
pofite  to,  or  failing  of  a  Compliance  with  a  Thing  in  its 
original  determining  Inclination  or  Afl,  it  is  not  able  to  comply, 
appears  by  the  Coniideration  of  thefe  two  Things. 

i.  The  Will  in  the  Time  of  that  diverfe  or  oppofite  leading; 
Acl:  or  Inclination,  and  when  aftually  under  the  Influence  of 
it,  is  not  able  to  exert  itfelf  to  the  contrary,  to  make  an  Alte 
ration,  in  order  to  a  Compliance.  The  Inclination  is  unable 
to  change  itfelf;  and  that  for  this  plain  Reafon,  that  it  is 
unable  to  incline  to  change  itfelf.  Prefent  Choice  can't  at 
prefent  chufe  to  be  otherwife  :  for  that  would  be  at  prefent 
to  chufe  fomething  diverfe  from  what  is  at  prefent  chofen.  If 
the  Will,  all  Things  now  confidered,  inclines  or  chufes  to  go 
that  Way,  then  it  can't  chufe,  all  Things  now  confidered,  to 
go  the  other  way,  and  fo  can't  chufe  to  be  made  to  go 
the  other  Way.  To  fuppofe  that  the  Mind  is  now  fincerely 
inclined  to  change  itfelf  to  a  different  Inclination,  is  to  fup 
pofe  the  Mind  is  now  truly  inclined  otherwife  than  it  is  now 
inclined.  The  Will  may  cppofe  fome  future  remote  Aft  that 
it  is  expofed  to,  but  not  its  own  prefent  Aft. 

.2.  As  it  is  impoflible  that  the  Will  ihould  comply  with  the 
Thing  commanded  with  Refpeft  to  its  leading  A8,  by  an  Aft 
of  its  own,  in  the  Time  of  that  diverfe  or  oppofite  leading  and 
original  Aft,  or  after  it  is  aft u ally  come  under  the  Influence  of 
that  determining  Choice  or  Inclination  ,*  fo  'tis  impoflible  it  mould 
be  determined  to  a  Compliance  by  any  foregoing  Aft ;  for  by 
the  very  Suppofition,  there  is  no  foregoing  Aft  ;  the  oppofite 
or  non-complying  Aft  being  that  Aft  which  is  original  and 
determining  in  the  Cafe.  Therefore  it  muft  be  fo,  that  if  this 
frft  determining  Aft  be  found  non-complying,  on  the  Propofal 
of  the  Command,  the  Mind  is  morally  unable  to  obey.  For 
to  fuppofe  it  to  be  able  to  obey,  is  to  fuppofe  it  to  be  able  to 
determine  and  caufe  its.  frjl  determining  A&  to  be  otherwife^ 

and 


1 64  Commands  confjfient  Part  IIL 

and  that  it  has  Power  better  to  govern  and  regulate  its  frft 
governing  and  regulating  Ad,  which  is  abfurd  ;  For  it  is  to  fup- 
pofe  a  prior  Aft  of"  the  Will,  determining  its  firft  determining 
Aft ;  that  is,  an  Aft  prior  to  the  firft,  and  leading  and  govern 
ing  the  original  and  governing  Aft  of  all;  which  is  a 
Contradiction. 

Here  if  it  fhould  be  faid,  that  altho'  the  Mind  has  not 
any  Ability  to  will  contrary  to  what  it  does  will,  in  the 
original  and  leading  Aft  of  the  Will,  becaufe  there  is  fup- 
poied  to  be  no  prior  Aft  to  determine  and  order  it  otherwife, 
and  the  W7ill  can't  immediately  change  itfelf,  becaufe  it 
can't  at  prefent  incline  to  a  Change  ;  yet  the  Mind  has  an 
Ability  for  the  prefent  to  forbear  to  proceed  to  Aftion,  and 
take  Time  for  Deliberation ;  which  may  be  an  Occafion  of  the 
Change  of  the  Inclination. 

I  anfvver,  (i.)  In  this  Objection  that  feems  to  be  for 
gotten  which  was  obferved  before,  <uiz.  that  the  determining 
to  take  the  Matter  into  Confideration,  is  itfelf  an  Aft  of  the 
V/ill :  And  if  this  be  all  the  Aft  wherein  the  Mind  exercifes 
Ability  and  Freedom,  then  this,  by  the  Suppofition,  muft  be 
all  that  can  be  commanded  or  required  by  Precept.  And  if 
this  Aft  be  the  commanded  Aft,  then  all  that  has  been  obfer 
ved  concerning  the  commanded  Aft  of  the  Will  remains  true, 
that  the  very  Want  of  it  is  a  moral  Inability  to  exert  it,  &c, 
(2.)  We  are  fpeaking  concerning  the  firft  and  leading  Aft  of 
the  Will  in  the  Cafe,  or  about  the  Affair  ;  And  if  a  Determin 
ing  to  deliberate,  or  on  the  contrary,  to  proceed  immediately 
without  deliberating,  be  the  firft  and  leading  Aft ;  or  whe 
ther  it  be  or  no,  if  there  be  another  Aft  before  it,  which 
determines  that ;  or  whatever  be  the  original  and  leading 
Act;  ftill  the  foregoing  Proof  Hands  good,  that  the  Non- 
compliance  of  the  leading  Act  implies  moral  Inability  to 
comply. 

If  it  (hould  be  objected,  that  thefe  Things  make  all  moral 
Inability  equal,  and  fuppofe  Men  morally  unable  to  will 
otherwife  than  they  actually  do  will,  in  all  Cafes,  and  equally 
fo,  in  every  Inftance. 

In  anfwer  to  this  Objection,  I  defire  two  Things  may  be 
obferved.  Firft  t  That  if  by  being  equally  unable,  be  meant 
as  really  unable ;  then  fo  far  as  the  inability  is  merely  mo 
ral,  'tis  true,  the  Will,  in  every  Inftance,  acts  by  moral  Ne~ 

ceffity, 


IV.  with  moral  Inability.  165 

ceffity,  and  is  morally  unable  to  ad  otherwife,  as  truly  and 
properly  in  one  Cafe  as  another;  a*,  i  humbly  conceive, 
has  been  perfectly  and  abundantly  demontlrated  by  what 
has  been  faid  in  the  preceding  Part  of  this  Eiiay.  But  yet, 
in  fome  Refpeft,  the  Inability  may  be  faid  to  be  greater  in 
fome  Inftances  than  others  :  Tho'  the  Man  may  be  truly  un 
able,  (if  moral  Inability  can  truly  be  called  Inability)  yet 
he  may  be  further  from  being  able  to  do  fome  Things  than 
others,  As  it  is  in  Things  which  Men  are  naturally  unable 
to  do.  A  Perfon  whofe  Strength  is  no  more  than  fufficient 
to  lift  the  Weight  of  one  Hundred  Pounds,  is  as  truly  and 
ifeally  unable  to  lift  one  Hundred  and  one  Potmds,  as  ten 
Thoufand  Pounds ;  but  yet  he  is  further  from  being  able  to 
lift  the  latter  Weight  than  the  former ;  and  fo,  according  to 
common  Ufe  of  Speech,  has  a  greater  Inability  for  it.  So 
it  is  in  moral  Inability.  A  Man  is  truly  morally  unable  to 
chufe  contrary  to  a  prefent  Inclination,  which  in  the  leait 
Degree  prevails;  or  contrary  to  that  Motive,  which,  all 
Things  confidered,  has  Strength  and  Advantage  now  to 
move  the  Will,  in  the  leaft  Degree,  fujteriour  to  all  othec 
Motives  in  View  :  But  yet  he  is  further  from  Ability  to  refilt 
a  very  ftrong  Habit,  and  a  violent  and  deeply  rooted  Incli 
nation,  or  a  Motive  vaftly  exceeding  all  others  in  Strength. 
And  again,  the  Inability  may  in  fome  Refpecls  be  called 
greater,  in  fome  Inftances  than  others,  as  it  may  be  more 
general  and  extenji've  to  all  Ads  of  that  Kind.  So  Men  may  be 
faid  to  be  unable  in  a  different  Senfe,  and  to  be  further  from 
moral  Ability,  who  have  that  moral  Inability  which  is  gene 
ral  and  habitual \  than  they  who  have  only  that  Inability  which 
is  occnfional  and  particular.  *  Thus  in  Cafss  of  natural  Inability  ; 
he  that  is  born  blind  may  be  faid  to  be  unable  to  fee,  in  a 
different  Manner,  and  is  in  fome  Refpecls  further  from  being 
able  to  fee,  than  He  whofe  Sight  is  hinder'd  by  a  tranfienc 
Cloud  cr  Mift. 

And  beiides,  that  which  was  obferved  in  the  fvrft  Part  of 
this  Difcoiirfe  concerning  the  Inability  which  attends  a  ftrong 
and  fettled  Habit,  mould  be  here  remember'd  ;  viz.  That  fix'd 
Habit  is  attended  with  this  peculiar  moral  Inability,  by  which 
it  is  diftinguimed  from  occafional  Volition,  namely,  that  En 
deavours  to  avoid  future  Volitions  of  that  Kind,  which  are 
agreeable  to  fuch  a  Habit,  much  more  frequently  and  com 
monly  prove  vain  and  inefficient.  For  tho'  it  is  impofiible 

Y  there 

*  S?e  this  Diftinftion  of  moral  Inability  explain'd  in  PART  I.  SeR.  IV, 


i66  Commands  confident  Part  III. 

there  fi>ould  be  any  true  fincere  Defires  and  Endeavours  againft 
a  prefent  Volition  or  Choice,  yet  there  may  be  againft  Voli 
tions  of  that  Kind,  when  view'd  at  a  Diftance.  A  Perfon  may 
dsfire  and  ufe  Means  to  prevent  future  Exercifes  of  a  certain 
Inclination  ;  and  in  order  to  it,  may  wifh  the  Habit  might  be 
removed  ;  but  his  Defires  and  Endeavours  may  be  ineffectual, 
The  Man  may  be  faid  in  fome  Senfe  to  be  unable  ;  yea,  even 
as  the  Word  wnabfe  is  a  relative  '•I'erm,  and  has  Relation  to  in- 
efeclual  Endeavours  ;  yet  not  with  Regard  to  prefent,  but  re 
mote  Endeavours. 


,  It  muit  be  borne  in  Mind,  according  to  what  was 
obferv'd  before,  that  indeed  no  Inability  whatfoever  which  is 
merely  moral,  is  properly  called  by  the  Name  of  Inability  ; 
and  that  in  the  ftricteft  Propriety  of  Speech,  a  Man  may  be 
faid  to  have  a  Thing  in  his  Power,  if  he  has  it  at  his  Ekclion  ; 
and  He  can't  be  faid  to  be  unable  to  do  a  Thing,  when  He 
can  if  He  now  pleafes,  or  whenever  he  has  a  proper,  direct 
and  immediate  Defire  for  it.  As  to  thofe  Defires  and  Endea 
vours  that  may  be  againft  the  Exercifes  of  a  ftrong  Habit, 
with  Regard  to  which  Men  m?.y  be  faid  to  be  unable  to 
avoid  thofe  Exercifes,  they  are  remote  Defires  and  Endea 
vours  in  two  Refpcds.  Fitfi,  as  to  Time  ;  they  are  never 
againft  prefent  Volitions,  but  only  againft  Volitions  of  fuch  a 
Kind,  when  view'd  at  a  Diftance.  Secondly  ,  as  to  their  Nature  • 
thefe  oppofite  Defires  are  not  diredly  and  properly  againft  the 
Habit  and  Inclination  itfelf,  or  the  Volitions  in  which  it  is 
exercifed  ;  for  thefe,  in  themfelves  confidered,  are  agreeable  j 
but  againft  fcmething  elfe,  that  attends  them,  or  is  their  Con- 
fequence  ;  the  Oppofition  of  the  Mind  is  levelled  entirely 
againft  thb  ;  the  Inclination  or  Volitions  themfelves  are  not 
at  all  oppofed  diredly,  and  for  their  own  Sake  ;-  but  only 
indiredly,  and  remotely  on  the  Account  of  Something  alien 
and  foreign. 

III.  Tho'  the  Oppofition  of  the  Will  itfelf,  or  the  very  want 
of  Will  to  a  Thing  commanded,  implies  a  moral  Inability  to 
that  Thing  ;  yet,  if  it  be  as  has  been  already  (hewn,  that  the 
Being  of  a  good  State  or  Aft  of  Will,  is  a  Thing  moft  pro 
perly  required  by  Command  ;  then,  in  fome  Cafes  fuch  a  State 
or  Ad  of  Will  may  properly  be  required,  which  at  prefent  is 
not,  and  which  may  alfo  be  wanting  after  it  is  commanded  : 
And  therefore  thofe  Things  mayproperly.be  commanded,  which 
Men  have  a  moral  Inability  for* 

Such 


Saft.  IV.  with  moral  Inability.  167 

Such  a  State  or  Act  of  the  Will,  may  be  required  by  Com 
mand,  as  does  not  already  exift.  For  if  that  Volition  only 
may  be  commanded  to  be  which  already  is,  there  could  be 
no  Ufe  of  Precept ;  Commands  in  all  Cafes  would  be  per 
fectly  vain  and  impertinent.  And  not  only  may  fuch  a  Will 
be  required  as  is  wanting  before  the  Command  is  given,  but 
alfo  fuch  as  may  pollibly  be  wanting  afterwards ;  fuch  as  the 
Exhibition  of  the  Command  may  not  be  effectual  to  produce 
or  excite,  Otherwife,  no  fuch  Thing  as  Difobedience  to  a 
proper  and  rightful  Command  is  pofiible  in  any  Cafe ;  and 
there  is  no  Cafe  fuppofable  or  poflible,  wherein  there  can 
be  an  inexcufable  or  faulty  Difobedience  :  Which  Afmfntans 
cannot  affirm,  confidently  with  their  Principles  ;  for  this  makes 
Obedience  to  juft  and  proper  Commands  always  necejjary,  and 
Difobedience  impoifible.  And  fo  the  Arminian  would  over 
throw  Himfelf,  yielding  the  very  Point  we  are  upon.,  which 
He  fo  ftrenuoufly  denies, -viz.  that  Law  and  Command  are 
confident  with  Neceffity. 

If  merely  that  Inability  will  excafe  Difobedience,  which  is 
implied  in  the  Oppofition  or  Defect  of  Inclination,  remaining 
after  the  Command  is  exhibited,  then  Wickednefs  always 
carries  that  in  it  which  excufes  it.  'Tis  evermore  fo,  that  by 
how  much  the  more  Wickednefs  there  is  in  a  Man's  Heart, 
by  fo  much  is  his  Inclination  to  Evil  the  ftronger  ;  and  by  fo 
much  the  more  therefore  has  he  of  moral  Inability  to  the 
Good  required.  His  moral  Inability,  confiding  in  the 
Strength  of  his  evil  Inclination,  is  the  very  Thing  wherein 
his  Wickednefs  conlifts  ;  and  yet  according  to  Arminian  Prin 
ciples,  it  muft  be  a  Thing  inconliftent  with  Wickednefs ;  and 
by  how  much  the  more  he  has  of  it,  by  fo  much  is  he  the 
further  from  Wickednefs. 

Therefore,  en  the  Whole,  it  is  manifeft,  that  moral  Inability 
alone  (which  confifts"in  Dilinclination)  never  renders  any 
Thing  improperly  the  Subject-matter  of  Precept  or  Command, 
and  never  can  excufe  any  Perfon  in  Difobedience,  or  Want 
of  Conformity  to  a  Command, 

Natural  Inability,  arifmg  from  the  Want  of  natural  Capa 
city,  or  external  Hindrance  (which  alone  is  properly  called 
Inability)  without  doubt  wholly  excufes,  or  makes  a  Thing 
improperly  the  Matter  of  Command.  If  Men  are  excufed 
from  doing  or  acting  any  good  Thing,  fuppofed  to  be  com 
manded,  it  muft  be  through  Tome  Defect  or'Obftacle  that  is 

Y  not 


168         Commands  and  Invitations         Part  III. 

not  in  the  Will  itfelf,  but  extrinfic  to  it ;  either  in  the  Capaci 
ty  of  UnderHanding,  or  Body,  or  outward  Circumfcances. 


Here  two  or  three  Things  may  be  obferve^. 

1.  As  to  fpiritual  Duties  or  Acts,  or  any  good  Thing  in  .the 
State  or  immanent  Acts  of  the  Will  kfelf,  or  of  the  Affections 
(which  are  only  certain  Modes  of  the  Exercife  of  the  Will) 
if  Perfons  are  juftly  excufed,  it  mud  be  thro'  want  of  Capacity 
in  the  natural  Faculty  of  Underilanding.     Thus  the  fame  fpi 
ritual  Duties,  or  holy  Affections  and  Exercifes  of  Heart,  can't 
be  required  of  Men,  as  may  be  of  Angels ;  the  Capacity  of  Un- 
flterftanding    being   fo    much    inferior.      So   Men    can't,    be 
required   to  love   thofe   amiable  Perfons    whom     they    have 
liad  no  Opportunity  to  fee,    or  hear  of,    or  com£  to  the  Know 
ledge  of,  in  any  Way  agreeable  to  the  Natural  State  and  Capa 
city   of  the   human  Underftanding.     But  the  Infufficiency   of 
Motives  will  not  excufe ;    unlefs  their  being  inefficient  arifes 
riot  from  the  moral  State  of  the  Will  or  Inclination  itfelf,    but 
from   the  State  of  the    natural  Underftanding.      The  great: 
Kindnefs  and  Generofity  of  another  may  be  a  Motive  infuffi- 
cient   to    excite  Gratitude   in   the  Perfon    that   receives   the 
Kindnefs,  thro'  his  vile  and  ungrateful  Temper :    In  this  Cafe, 
the  Infufficiency   of  the  Motive  arifes   from   the  State   of  the. 
Will  or  Inclination  of  Heart,    and  don't  at  all  excufe_.     But  if 
this  Generofity  is  not  fufficient  to  excite  Gratitude,    being  un 
known,    there  being  no  Means  of  Information  adequate  to  the 
State  and  Meaiure  of  the  Perfon 's  Faculties,    this  Infufficiency; 
is  attended  with  a  natural  Inability,  which  entirely  excufes, 

2.  As  to  fuch  Motions  of  Body,    or  Exercifes  and  Alterati 
ons  of  Mind,  which  don't  confift  in  the  immanent  Acls  or  State 
of  the  Will  itfelf,    but  are  fuppofed  to  be  required  as  Effects 
cf  the  Will;    I  fay,  in  fuch   fuppofed :  Effects  of  the  Will,    in. 
Cafes  wherein  there  is  no  Want  of  a  Capacity  of  Underftand 
ing  ;    that  Inability,    and  that  only  excufes,    which  confifts  in 
Want  of  Connection  between  them  and  the  Will.     If  the  Will 
fully  complies,  and  the  propofed  EfTecT:  don't  prove,  according 
to  the  Laws   of  Nature,  to  be  connected   with  his  Volition, 
the  Man  is  perfectly  excufed  ;    he  has  a  natural  Inability  to  the 
Thing  required.     For  the  Will  itfelf,  as  has  been  obferved,    is 
all  thac  can  be  directly  and  immediately  required  by  Command  ; 
and  other  Things  only  indirectly,    as  connected  with  the  Will. 
If  therefore  there  be  a  full  Compliance  of  Will,   the  Perfon 

has 


Sedt.  IV.      confident  with  moral  Inability.  1 69 

has  done  his  duty  ;  and  if  other  Things  don't  prove  to  be  con 
nected  with  his  Volition,  that  is  not  owing  to  him. 

3.  Both  thefe  Kinds  of  natural  Inability  that  have  been, 
mentioned,-  and  fo  all  Inability  that  excufes,  may  be  refolved 
into  one  Thing;  namely,  Want  of  natural  Capacity  or  Strength ; 
either  Capacity  of  TJnderftanding,  or  external  Strength.  For 
when  there  are  external  Defects  and  Obftacles,  they  would  be 
r*o  Obftacles,  were  it  not  for  the  Imperfection  and  Limitations 
of  Underftanding  and  Strength. 

CoroL  If  Things,  for  which  Men  have  a  moral  Inability,  may 
properly  be  the  Matter  of  Precept  or  Command,  then  they  may 
alfo  of  Invitation  and  Counfel.  Commands,  and  Invitations 
come  very  much  to  the  fame  Tlvng ;  the  Difference  is  only 
circumftantial  :  Commands  are  as  much  a  Manifeftation  of  the 
Will  of  him  that  fpeaks,  as  Invitations,  and  as  much  Teftimo- 
nies  of  Expectation  of  Compliance.  The  Difference  between 
them  lies  in  nothing  that  touches  the  Affair  in  Hand.  The 
main  Difference  between  Command  and  Invitation  confifts  in 
the  Enforcement  of  the  Will  of  Him  who  commands  or  invites. 
In  the  latter  it  is  his  Kindnefs,  the  Goodnefs  which  his  Will 
arifes  from  :  in  the  former  it  is  his  Authority.  But  whatever  be 
the  Ground  of  the  WTili  of  him  that  fpeaks, 'or  the  Enforce 
ment  of  what  he  fays,  yet  feeing  neither  his  Will  nor  Expec 
tation  is  any  more  teftified  in  the  one  Cafe  than  the  other; 
therefore  a  Perfon's  being  known  to  be  morally  unable  to  do 
the  Thing  to  which  he  is  directed  by  Invitation,  is  no  more  an 
Evidence  of  Infmcerity  in  him  that  directs,  in  manifefting  either 
a  Will,  or  Expectation  which  he  ha's  not,  than  his  being  known 
to  be  morally  unable  to  do  what  he  is  directed  to  by  Command. 

So  that  all  this  grand  Objection  of  Arminians  againft  the 

Inability  of  fallen  Men  to  exert  faith  in  Chrift,  or  to  perform 
other  fpiritual  Gofpel-Duties,  from  the  Sincerity  of  God's 
Counfels  and  Invitations,  muft  be  without  Force, 


xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 


S  £  C.  T  I  O 


What  Willingneft  and          PartHL 


SECTION   V. 

Fkat  Sincerity  of  Defires  and  Endeavours,  which 
is  fuppofed  to  excufe  in  the  Nonperformance  of 
Things  in  themf  elves  good,  particularly  confidered. 

X5  what  is  much  infilled  on  by  many,  that  fome  Men* 
A  tho'  they  are  not  able  to  perform  fpiritual  Duties,  fuch 
as  Repentance  of  bin,  Love  to  God,  a  cordial  Acceptance  of 
Chrift  as  exhibited  and  oifer'd  in  the  Gofpel,  &c.  yet  they  may 
fincerely  defire  and  endeavour  thefe  Things  ;  and  therefore  muft 
be  excufed  ;  it  being  unreafonable  to  blame  them  for  the  Omiflion 
of  thofe  Things  which  they  fincerely  defire  and  endeavour  to  do, 
but  c?n't  do, 

Concerning  this  Matter,  the  following  Things  may  be  ob- 
ferved. 

i.  What  is  here  fuppofed,  is  a  great  Miftake,  and  grofs 
Abfurdity  ;  even  that  Men  may  fincerely  chufe  and  defire  thofe 
fpiritual  Duties  of  Love,  Acceptance,  Choice,  Rejection,  £c. 
confuting  in  the  Exercife  of  the  Will  itfelf,  or  in  the  Difpofition 
and  Inclination  of  the  Heart;  and  yet  not  be  able  to  perform 
or  exert  them.  This  is  abfurd,  becaufe  'tis  abfurd  to  fuppofe 
that  a  Man  fhould  direclly,  properly  and  fincerely  incline  to, 
have  an  Inclination,  which  at  the  fame  Time  is  contrary  to  his 
Inclination  :  for  that  is  to  fuppofe  him  not  to  be  inclined  to 
that  which  he  is  inclined  to.  If  a  Man,  in  the  State  and  Ads 
of  his  Will  and  Inclination,  does  properly  and  directly  fall  in 
with  thofe  Duties,  he  therein  performs  them  :  For  the  Duties 
themfelves  confift  in  that  very  Thing  ;  they  confift  in  the  State 
and  Acts  of  the  Will  being  fo  formed  and  directed.  If  the  Soul 
properly  and  fincerely  falls  in  with  a  certain  propofed  Act  of 
Will  or  Choice,  the  Soul  therein  makes  that  Choice  its  own. 
Even  as  when  a  moving  Body  falls  in  with  a  propofed  Direction 
of  its  Motion,  that  is  the  fame  Thing  at  to  move  in  that  Direc 
tion. 

2,  That 


.  Sincerity  is  no  Excufe.  171 

2.  That  which  is  called  a  Defere  and  Willingnefs  for  thofe 
inward  Duties,  in  fuch  as  don't  perform  them,  has  refpedl  to 
thefe  Duties  only  indirectly  and  remotely,  and  is  improperly 
reprefented  as  a  Willingnefs  for  them  ;  not  only  becaufe  (as 
was  obferved  before)  it  refpeds  thofe  good  Volitions  only  in  a 
diftant  View,  and  with  refped  to  future  Time  ;  but  alfo  be 
caufe  evermore,  not  thefe  Things  themfelves,  but  fomething 
elfe,  that  is  alien  and  foreign,  is  the  Objed  that  terminates 
thefe  Volitions  and  Defires, 

A  Drunkard,  who  continues  in  his  Drunkennefs,  being  un 
der  the  Power  of  a  Love,  and  violent  Appetite  to  ftrong  Drink, 
and  without  any  Love  to  Virtue  ;  but  being  alfo  extreamly 
covetous  and  clofe,  and  very  much  exercifed  and  grieved  at 
the  Diminution  of  his  Eftate,  and  Profped  of  Poverty,  may  in 
a  Sort  defire  the  Virtue  of  Temperance :  and  tho'  his  prefent 
Will  is  to  gratify  his  extravagant  Appetite,  yet  he  may  wifli 
he  had  a  Heart  to  forbear  future  Ads  of  Intemperance,  and 
forfake  his  Excefles,  thro'  an  Unwillingnefs  to  part  with,  his 
Money  :  But  ftill  he  goes  on  with  his  Drunkennefs ;  his 
Wifties  and  Endeavours  are  inefficient  and  ineffectual :  Such 
a  Man  has  no  proper,  direct,  fincere  Willingnefs  to  forfake 
this  Vice,  and  the  vicious  Deeds  which  belong  to  it :  for  He 
afts  voluntarily  in  continuing  to  drink  to  excefs :  His  Defire 
is  very  improperly  called  a  Willingnefs  to  be  temperate  ;  it  is 
no  true  Defire  of  that  Virtue  ;  for  it  is  not  that  Virtue  that 
terminates  his  Wilhes  ;  nor  have  they  any  direct  Refped  at 
all  to  it.  'Tis  only  the  facing  bis  Money,  and  avoiding  Poverty, 
that  terminates,  and  exhaufts  the  whole  Strength  of  his  Defire. 
The  Virtue  of  Temperance  is  regarded  only  very  indiredly 
and  improperly,  even  as  a  neceffary  Means  of  gratifying  the. 
Vice  of  Covetoufnefs. 

So,  a  Man  of  an  exceeding  corrupt  and  wicked  Heart, 
who  has  no  Love  to  God  and  Jefus  Chrift,  but  on  the  con 
trary,  being  very  profanely  and  carnally  inclined,  has  the 
greateft  Diitafte  of  the  Things  of  Religion,  and  Enmity  againft 
them ;  yet  being  of  a  Family,  that  from  one  Generation  to 
another,  have  moft  of  them  died  in  Youth  of  an  hereditary  Con- 
fumption ;  and  fo  having-little  Hope  of  living  long ;  and  having, 
been  inftruded  in  the  Neceffity  of  a  fupreme  Love  to  Chrifty 
and  Gratitude  for  his  Death  and  Sufferings,  in  Order  to  his 
Salvation  from  eternal  Mifery  ;  if  under  thefe  Circumftances 
he  (hould,  thro'  Fear  of  eternal  Torments,  wiih  he  had  fuch  a 
Difpofitioii'  ]  but  his  profane  and  carnal  Heart  remaining,  He 

continues 


172  What,  Willingnefs  and          Part.  I  If. 

continues  ftill  in  his  habitual  Diftafte  of,  and  Enmity  to  God 
and  Religion,  and  wholly  without  any  Exercife  of  that  Love 
and  Gratitude  ;  (as  doubtlefs  the  very  Devils  themfelves,  not- 
withftanding  all  the  Devilithnefs  of  their  Temper,  would  wife 
for  a  holy  Heart,  if  by  that  Means  they  could  get  out  of  Hell :) 
In  this  Cafe,  there  is  rto  fincere  Willingnefs  to  love  Chrift 
and  chufe  him  as  his  chief  Good.  Thefe  holy  Difpofitions 
«md  Exercifes  are  not  at  all  the  direct  Objeft  of  the  Will  : 
they  truly  mare  no  Part  of  the  Inclination  or  Defird  of  the 
Soul ;  but  all  is  terminated  on  Deliverance  from  Torment : 
and  thefe  Graces  and  pious  Volitions,  notwithilanding  this 
forced  Confenty  are  looked  upon  undeiirable ;  as  when  a  fick 

Man  delires  a  Dofe  he  greatly  abhors,  to  fave  his  Life. — = 

From  thefe  Things  it  appears. 

3.  That  this  indirect.  Wiliiagnefs  which  has  been  fpoken  of, 
is  not  that  Exercife  of  the  Will  which  the  Command  requires  ; 
but  is  entirely  a  different  one;  being  a  Volition  of  a  different 
Nature,  and  terminated  altogether  on  different  Objects ;  wholly 
falling  fhort  of  that  Virtue  of  Will,  which  the  Command  has 
refpect  to. 

4.  This  other  Volition,  which  has  only  fame  indirect  Con- 
csrn  with  the  Duty  required,  can't  excufe  for  the  Want  of  that 
good  Will  itfeif,    which  is  commanded  ;  being  not  the  Thing 
which  anfwers  and  fulfils  the  Command,  and  being  wholly  de- 
ftitute  of  the  Virtue  which  the  Command  feeks. 

Further  .  to  illuftrate  this  Matter, If  a  Child  has  a  moft 

excellent  Father,  that  has  ever  treated  him  with  fatherfy 
Kindnefs  and  Tendernefs,  and  has  every  Way  in  the  higheft 
Degree  merited  his  Love  and  dutiful  Regard,  being  withal 
very  wealthy ;  but  the  Son  is  of  fo  vile  a  Difpofition,  that  He 
inveterately  hates  his  Father ;  and  yet,  apprehending  that  his 
Hatred  of  Him  is  like  to  prove  his  Ruin,  by  bringing  Him' 
finally  to  Poverty  and  abject  Circumftances,  thro'  his  Father's 
difmheriting  Him,  or  otherwife  ;  which  is  exceeding  crofs  to 
his  Avarice  and  Ambition ;  He  therefore  wifhes  it  were  other- 
wife  :  but  yet  remaining  under  the  invincible  Power  of  his  vile 
and  malignant  Difpofition,  He  continues  ftill  in  his  fettled 
Hatred  of  his  Father.  Now  if  fuch  a  Son's  indirect  Willing 
nefs  to  have  Love  and  Honour  towards  his  Father,  at  all  ac 
quits  or  excufes  before  God,  for  his  failing  of  actually  exer- 
cifmg  thefe  Difpofitions  towards  Him  which  God  .requires, 
it  muft  be  on  one  of  thefe  two  Accounts,  (i.)  Either  that 

it 


Sc<fL  V.  Sincerity  ~ts  no  Excufe.  173 

it  anfwers  and  fulfils  the  Command.  But  this  it  does  not,  by 
the  Suppofition  ;  becaufe  the  Thing  commanded  is  Love  and 
Honour  to  his  worthy  Parent.  If  the  Command  be  proper 
andjuft,  as  is  fuppofed,  then  it  obliges  to  the  Thing  com 
manded  ;  and  fo  nothing  elfe  but  that  can  anfwer  the  Obligati 
on.  Or,  (2.)  It  mult  be  at  kail  becaufe  there  is  that  Virtue 
or  Goodnefs  in  his  indirect  Willingnefs,  that  is  equivalent  to 
the  Virtue  required;  and  fo  balances  or  countervails  it,  and 
makes  up  for  the  Want  of  it.  But  that  alfo  is  contrary 
to  the  Suppofition.  The  WTillingnefs  the  Soa  has  merely 
from  a  Regard  to  Money  and  Honour,  has  no  Goodnefs 
in  it,  to  countervail  the  Want  of  the  pious  filial  Refpeft 
required. 

Sincerity  and  Reality,  in  that  indirect  Willingnefs  which 
lias  been  fpoken  of,  don't  make  it  the  better.  That  which 
is  real  and  hearty  is  often  called  fmcere ;  whether  it  be  in 
Virtue  or  Vice.  Some  Perfons  are  fi  nee  rely  bad;  others  are 
fmcerely  good;  and  others  may  be  fincere  and  hearty  in 
Things  which  are  in  their  own  Nature  indifferent  „•  as  a  Man 
may  be  fir.cerely  defirous  of  eating  when  he  is  hungry.  But  a 
being  fincere,  hearty  and  in  good  Earneft,  is  no  Virtue,  un- 
lefs  it  be  in  a  Thing  that  is  virtuous.  A  Man  may  be  fin- 
cere  and  hearty  in  joining  a  Crew  of  Pirates,  or  a  Gang  of 
Robbers.  When  the  Devils  cried  out,  and  befought  Chrift 
not  to  torment  them,  it  was  no  mere  Pretence ;  they  were 
very  hearty  in  their  Defires  not  to  be  tormented :  but  this 
-did  not  make  their  WTill  or  Defires  virtuous.  And  if  Men 
have  fincere  Defires,  which  are  in  their  Kind  and  Nature  no 
better,  it  can  be  no  Excufe  for  the  Want  of  any  required 
Virtue. 

And  as  a  Man's  being  fincere  in  fuch  an  indirect  Defire  ox. 
Willingnefs  to  do  his  Duty,  as  has  been  mentioned,  can't  ex- 
cufe  for  the  want  of  Performance  ;  fo  it  is  with  Endeavours 
arifing  from  fach  a  Willingnefs.  The  Endeavours  can  have 
no  .more  Goodnefs  in  them,  than  the  Will  which  they  are  the 
Effect  and  Exprefiion  of.  And  therefore,  however  fincere  and 
real,  and  however  great  a  Perfon's  Endeavours  are  ;  yea,  tho" 
they  fhould  be  to  the  utmoft  of  his  Ability  ;  unlefs  the  Will 
which  they  proceed  from  be  truly  good  and  virtuous,  they 
can  be  of  no  Avail,  Influence  or  Weight  to  any  Purpofe  what- 
foever,  in  a  moral  Senfe  or  Refpect.  That  which  is  not  truly 
virtuous  in  God's  Sight,  is  looked  upon  by  Him  as  good  for 
Nothing  :  and  fo  can  bs  of  no  Value,  Weight  or  Influence 

Z  in 


174      What  Sincerity  of  Endeavours       Part  IIL 

in  his  Account,  to  recommend,  fatisfy,  excufe  or  make  up  for 
any  moral  Defecl:.  For  Nothing  can  counter-balance  Evil,  but 
Good.  If  Evil  be  in  one  Scale,  and  we  put  a  great  deal  into 
the  other,  fincere  and  earneft  Defires,  and  many  and  great  En 
deavours  :  yet  if  there  be  no  real  Goodnefs  in  all,  there  is  no 
Weight  in  it ;  and  fo  it  does  nothing  towards  balancing  the 
real  Weight  which  is  in  the  oppofite  Scale.  'Tis  only  like  the 
fubftracting  a  Thoufand  Noughts  from  before  a  real^Numbcr, 
which  leaves  the  Sum  juft  as  it  was. 

Indeed  fuch  Endeavours  may  have  a  negatively  good  Influ 
ence.  Thofe  Things  which  have  no  pofitive  Virtue,  have  no 
pofitive  moral  Influence ;  yet  they  may  be  an  Occafion  of 
Perfons  avoiding  fome  pofitive  Evils.  As -if  a  Man  were  in 
the  Water  with  a  Neighbour  that  he  had  ill-will  to,  who, 
'could  not  fwim,  holding  him  by  his  Hand ;  which  Neigh 
bour  was  much  in  Debt  to  Him  ;  and  mould  be  tempted  to  let 
him  fink  and  drown  ;  but  mould  refufe  to  comply  with  the 
Temptation  ;  not  from  Love  to  his  Neighbour,*  but  from  th^ 
Love  of  Money,  and  becaufe  by  his  drowning  He  mould  lofe 
his  Debt  ;  that  which  he  does  in  preferving  his  Neighbour 
from  drowning,  is  nothing  good  in  the  Sight  of  God:  Yet 
Jiereby  he  avoids  the  greater  Guilt  that  would  have  been 
contracted,  if  he  had  defignedly  let  his  Neighbour  fink  and 
perifh.  But  when  Arminians  in  their  Difputes  with  Calwinijis 
infill  fo  much  on  fincere  Defires  and  Endeavouts,  as  what 
mutt  excufe  Men,  muft  be  accepted  of  God,  &c.  'tis  raanifeft 
they  have  Refpecl  to  fome  pofitive  moral  Weight  or  Influence 
of  thofe  Defires  and  Endeavours.  Accepting,  juftifying,  or 
excufing  on  the  Account  of  fincere  honeft  Endeavours  (as 
they  are  called)  and  Men's  doing  what  they  can,  &c.  has  Re 
lation  to  fome  moral  Value,  fomething  that  is  accepted  as 
Good,  and  as  fuch,  countervailing  fome  Defect. 

But  there  is  a  great  and  unknown  Deceit,  arifmg  from  the 
Ambiguity  of  the  Fhrafe,  Jtncere  Endeavours.  Indeed  there  is 
a  vaft  Indiftinc~tnefs  and  Unnxednefs  in  moft,  or  at  leaft  very  ma 
ny  of  the  Terms  ufed  to  exprefs  Things  pertaining  to  moral  and 
fpiritual  Matters.  Whence  arife  innumerable  Miftakes,  ftrong 
Prejudices,  inextricable  Confufion,  and  endlefs  Controverfy. 

The  WTord  fincere  is  moft  commonly  ufed  to  fignify  fome 
thing  that  is  good':  Men  are  habituated  to  underftand  by  it 
the  fame  as  honeft  and  upright ;  which  Terms  excite  an  Idea 
of  foinething  good  in  the  ftrideft  and  higheft  Senfe;  good  in 

the 


'Sedt.  V.-  is  no  Excufe.  175 

the. Sight  of  Him  who  fees  not  only  the  outward  Appearance, 
but  the  Heart.  And  therefore  Men  think  that  if  a  Perfon  be 
fencere,  he  will  certainly  be  accepted.  If  it  be  faid  that  any 
.one  is  fincere  in  his  Endeavours,  this  fuggefls  to  Men's  Minds 
as  much,  as  that  his  Heart  and  Will  is  good,  that  there  is  no 
Defect  of  Duty,  as.  to  virtuous  Inclination ;  he  houtftly  and 
uprightly  defires  and  endeavours  to  do  as  he  is  required  ;  and 
this  leads  tiiem  to  fuppofe  that  it  would  be  very  hard  and  unrca- 
fonable  to  puniih  him,  only  becaufe  he  is-  unfuccefsful  in  his 
Endeavours,  the  Thing  endeavoured  being  beyond  his  Power. 

•- Whereas  it  ought  co  be  obferved,    that  the  Word  Jtnc*.  re 

has  thefe  different  Significations. 

1.  Sincerity,    as   the  Word  is  fometimes  ufed,    fignifies  no 
more  than  Reality  of  Will  and  Endeavour,    with  refped  to  any 
Thing  that  is  profeifed  or  pretended  ;    without  any  Confidera- 
tion  of  the  Nature  of  the  Principle  or  Aim,    whence  this  real 
Will  and  true  Endeavour  arifes.     If  a  Man  has  fome  real  De- 
fire  to  obtain  a  Thing  either  dired  or  indired,    or  does  really 
endeavour  after  a  Thing,  he  is  faid  fincerely  to  defire  or  endea 
vour  it ;  without  any  Coniideration  of  the  Goodnefs  or  Virtu- 
oufnefs  of  the  Principle  he  ads  from,    or  any  Excellency  or 
Worthinefs  of  the  End  he  ads  for.     Thus  a  Man  that  is  kind 
to  his  Neighbour's  Wife,    who  is  lick  and  languishing,    and 
very  helpful  in  her  Cafe,  makes  a  Shew  of  defiring  and  endea 
vouring  her  Reftoration  to  Health  and  Vigour;    and  not  only 
makes  fuch  a  Shew,    but  there  is  a  Reality  in  his  Pretence,    he 
does  heartily  and  earneftly  defire  to  have  her  Health  reftored, 
and  ufes  his  true  and  utmoil  Endeavours  for  it;  He  is  faid  fin 
cerely  to  defire  and  endeavour  it,    becaufe  he  does  fo  truly  or 
really ;    tho'  perhaps  the  Principle  he  ads  from,    is  no  other 
than  a  vile  and  fcandalous  Paffion  ;    having  lived  in  Adultery 
with  her,    he  earneftly  defires  to  have  her  Health  and  Vigour 
reftored,  that  he   may  return  to  his    criminal   Pleafures   with 
her.      Or, 

2.  By  Sincerity  is  meant,    not  merely  a  Reality  of.  Will  and 
Endeavour  of  fome  Sort  or  other,    and  from  fome  Confiderati- 
on  or  other,  but  a  'virtuous  Sincerity.     That  is,  that  in  the  Per 
formance  of  thofe  particular  Ads  that  are  the  Matter  of  Vir 
tue  or  Duty,    there  be  not  only  the  Matter,    but  the  Form  and 
EfTence  of  Virtue,  confuting  in  the  Aim  that  governs  the  Ad, 
and  the  Principle  exercifed  in  it.     There  is  not  only  the  Reali 
ty  of  the  Ad,  that  is  as  it  were  the  Body  of  the  Duty  ;  but  al- 
(o  the  6W,  which  Ihould  properly  belong  to  fuch  a  Body*     In 

Z  3  this 


1 76  Of  Promifea  Part 

this  Senfe,  a  Man  is  faid  to  be  fincere,  when  he  acls  with  a 
pure  Intention;  not  from  finifter  Views,  or  bye-Ends:  He 
not  only  in  Reality  defires  and  feeks  the  Thing  to  be  done, 
or  Qualification  to  be  obtain'd,  for  fome  End  or  ether  ; 
But  he  wills  the  Thing  directly  and  properly,  as  neither  forced 
nor  bribed ;  the  Virtue  of  tbe  Thing  is  properly  the  Objeft  of 
the  Will. 

In  the  former  Senfe,  a  Man  is  faid  to  be  fincere,  in,  Oppofi- 
tion  to  a  mere  Pretence,  and  Shew  of  the  particular  Thing  to  be 
done,  or  exhibited,  without  any  real  Defire  or  Endeavour  at  all. 
In  the  latter  Senfe,  a  Man  is  faid  to  be  fmcere  in  Oppofition  to 
that  Shew  of  Virtue  there  is  in  merely  doing  the  Matter  of  Duty,, 
without  the  Reality  of  the  Virtue  itfelf  in  the  Soul,  and  the 
Eflence  of  it,  which  there  is  a  Shew  of.  A  Man  may  be  fin- 
cere  in  the  former  Senfe,  and  yet  in  the  latter  be  in  the  Sight 
of  God,  who  fearches  the  Heart,  a,  vile  Hypocrite. 

In  the  latter  Kind  of  Sincerity,  only,  is  there  any  Thing 
truly  valuable  or  acceptable  in  the  Sight  of  God.  And  this  is 
the  Thing  which  in  Scripture  is  called  Sincerity,  Uprightnefs, 
Integrity,  Truth  in  the  inward  Parts,  and  a  being  ofaperfettH,eart. 
And  if  there  be  fuch  a  Sincerity,  and  fuch  a  Degree  of  it  as 
there  ought  to  be,  and  there  be  any  Thing  further  that  the 
Man  is  not  able  to  perform,  or  which  don't  prove  to  be  con 
nected  with  his  fmcere  Delires  and  Endeavours,  the  Man  is 
wholly  excufed  and  aquitted  in  the  Sight  of  God ;  His  Will 
fnall  furely  be  accepted  for  his  Deed :  And  fuch  a  fmcere 
Will  and  Endeavour  is  all  that  in  Stridtnefs  is  required  of  him, 
by  any  Command  of  God.  But  as  to  the  other  Kind  of 
Sincerity  of  Defires  and  Endeavours,  it  having  no  Virtue  in 
it,  (as  was  obferved  before)  can  be  of  no  Avail  before  God, 
in  any  Cafe,  to  recommend,  fatisfy,  or  excufe,  and  has  no  po- 
fitive  moral  Weight  or  Influence  whatsoever. 

Carol,  i.  Hence  it  may  be  infer 'd,  that  Nothing  in  the  Rea- 
fon  and  Nature  of  Tilings  appears,  from  the  Confideration  of 
any  moral  Weight  of  that  former  Kind  of  Sincerity,  which 
has  been  fpoken  of,  at  all  obliging  us  to  believe,  or  leading 
us  to  fuppofe,  that  God  has  made  any  pofitive  Promifes  of 
Salvation,  or  Grace,  or  any  faving  Afliftance,  or  any  fpiritual 
^Benefit  whatsoever,  to  any  Defires,  Prayers,  Endeavours, 
Striving,  or  Obedience  of  thofe,  who  hitherto  have  no  true 
Virtue  or  Holinefs  in  their  Hearts ;  tho'  we  ftiould  fuppofe, 

all 


Scct.V.  to  grac clefs  Endeavour*.  177 

all  'the  Sincerity,  and  the  utmoft  Degree  of  Endeavour,  that  is 
poffible.,to  be  in  a  Perfon  without  Holinefs, 

Some  object  againft  God's  requiring,  as  the  Condition  of 
Salvation,  thofe  holy  Exercifes,  which  are  the  Refult  of  a  fu- 
pernatural  Renovation  ;  fuch  as  a  fupreme  RefpecT:  to  Chrift, 
Love  to  God,  loving  Holinefs  for  its  own  Sake,  &c.  that  thefe 
inward  Difpofitions  and  Exercifes  are  above  Men's  Power,  as 
they  are  by  Nature  ;  and  therefore  that  we  may  conclude,  that 
when  Men  are  brought  to  be  fincere  in  their  Endeavours,  and 
do  as  well  as  they  can,  they  are  accepted  ;  and  that  this  muft 
be  all  that  God  requires  in  order  to  Men's  being  received  as 
the  Objeds  of  his  Favour,  and  muft  be  what  God  has  ap 
pointed  as  the  Condition  of  Salvation. — Concerning  which  I 
would  obferve,  that  in  fuch  a  Manner  of  Speaking  of  Men's 
being  accepted y  becaufe  they  arejincere,  and  do  as  <wellas  they  can, 
there  is  evidently  a  Supposition  of  fome  Virtue-,  fome  Degree 
of  that  which  is  truly  Good;  tho'  it  don't  go  fo  far  as  were 
to  be  wim'd.  For  if  Men  do  ivhat  they  can,  unlefs  their  fo 
doing  be  from  fome  good  Principle,  Difpofition,  or  Exercife  of 
Heart,  fome  virtuous  Inclination  or  Aft  of  the  Will ;  their 
fo  doing  what  they  can,  is  in  fome  Refpecls  not  a  Whit  better 
than  if  they  did  Nothing  at  all.  In  fuch  a  Cafe,  there  is  no 
more  pofitive  moral  Goodnefs  in  a  Man's  doing  what  he  can, 
than  in  a  Wind-mill's  doing  what  it  can  \  becaufe  the  Aftion 
does  no  more  proceed  from  Virtue  ;  and  there  is  Nothing  in 
fuch  Sincerity  of  Endeavour,  or  doing  what  we  can,  that  mould 
render  it  any  more  a  proper  or  fit  Recommendation  to  pofitive 
Favour  and  Acceptance,  or  the  Condition  of  any  Reward  or 
actual  Benefit,  than  doing  Nothing  ;  for  both  the  one  and  the 
other  are  alike  Nothing,  as  to  any  true  moral  Weight  or  Value. 

Cord.  2.  Hence  alfo  it  follows,  there  is  Nothing  that  appears 
in  the  Reafon  and  Nature  of  Things,  which  can  juftly  lead  us  to 
determine,  that  God  will  certainly  give  the  neceflary  Means  of 
Salvation,  or  fome  Way  or  other  beftow  true  Holinefs  and 
eternal  Life  on  thofe  Heathen,  who  are  fincere  (in  the  Senfe 
above  explained)  in  their  Endeavours  to  find  out  the  Will  of. 
the  Deity,  and  to  pleafe  Him,  according  to  their  Light,  that 
they  may  efcape  his  future  Difpleafure  and  Wrath,  and  obtain 
Happ.inefs  in  their  future  State,  through  his  Favour. 


SECTION 


178  Indifference  incwffieni         Part  III. 


SECTION     VL 

Liberty  of  Indifference,  not  only  not  necejjary  IQ 
Virtue,  but  utterly  inconfiftent  with  it  :  And  all> 
either  virtuous  or  vicious  Habits  or  Inclinations, 
inconfiftent  with  Arminian  Notions  of  Liberty  and 

moral  Agency. 

TO  fuppofe  fuch  a  Freedom  of  Will,  as  Armenians  talk  of 
to  be  requifite  to  Virtue  and  Vice,  is  many  Ways  contrary 
to  common  Senfe. 

If  Indifference  belongs  to  Liberty  of  Will,  as  Armlnians  fup 
pofe,  and  it  be  effential  to  a  virtuous  Action  that  it  be  perform 
ed  in  a  State  of  Liberty,  as  they  alfo  fuppofe  ;  it  will  follow, 
that  it  is  effential  to  a  virtuous  Aftion  that  it  be  performed  in 
a  State  of  Indifference  :  And  if  it  be  performed  in  a  State  of 
Indifference,  then  doubtlefs  it  muft  be  performed  in  the  Time 
of  Indifference.  Arid  fo  it  will  follow,  that  in  order  to  the 
Virtucufnefs  of  an  Aft,  the  Heart  muft  be  indifferent  in  the 
Time  of  the  Performance  of  that  Aft,  and  the  more  indiffer 
ent  and  cold  the  Heart  is  with  Relation  to  the  Aft  which  is 
performed,  fo  much  the  better  ;  becaufe  the  Aft  is  performed 
with  fo  much  the  greater  Liberty.  But  is  this  agreeable  to  the 
Ught  of  Nature  ?  Is  it  agreeable  to  the  Notions  which  Man 
kind,  in  all  Ages,  have  of  Virtue,  that  it  lies  in  that  which  is 
contrary  to  Indifference,  even  in  the  Tendency  and  Inclination  of 
the  Heart  to  virtuous  Aftion  ;  and  that  the  ftronger  the  Incli 
nation,  and  fo  the  further  from  Indifference,  the  more  virtuous 
the  Heart,  and  fo  much  the  more  praife-worthy  the  Aft  wbicfy 
proceeds  from  it  ? 

If  we  mould  fuppofe  (contrary  to  what  has  been  before  de- 
monftiated)  that  there  may  be  an  Aft  of  Will  in  a  State  of 
Indifference  ;  for  Inftance,  this  Aft,  -viz.  The  Will's  deter 
mining  to  put  itfelf  out  of  a  State  of  Indifference,  and  give  it- 
felf  a  Preponderation  one  Way,  then  it  would  follow,  on  Armi- 

nian 


Sect. VI.  ivftb  Virtue.  179 

nian  Principles,  that  this  Aft  or  Determination  cf  the  Will  is 
that  alone  wherein  Virtue  ccnlifts,  becaufe  this  only  is  per 
formed  while  the  Mind  remains  in  a  State  of  Indifference,  and 
fo  in  a  State  of  Liberty  :  For  when  once  the  Mind  is  put  out 
of  its  Equilibrium,  it  is  no  longer  in  fuch  a  State  ;  and  there 
fore  all  the  Acts  which  follow  afterwards,  proceeding  from 
Bias,  can  have  the  Nature  neither  of  Virtue  nor  Vice.  Or  if 
the  Thing  which  the  Will  can  do,  while  yet  in  a  State  of 
Indifference,  and  fo  of  Liberty,  be  only  to  fufpend  acting,  and 
determine  to  take  the  Matter  into  Confideraticn,  then,  this 
Determination  is  that  alone  wherein  Virtue  ccnlifts,  and  not 
proceeding  to  Action  after  the  Scale  is  turned  by  Confideration. 
So  that  it  will  follow  from  thefe  Principles,  ?.ll  that  is  done 
after  the  Mind,  by  any  Means,  is  once  out  of  its  Equilibrium 
and  already  pofiefTed  by  an  Inclination,  and  arifing  from  that 
Inclination,  has  nothing  of  the  Nature  of  Virtue  or  Vice,  and 
is  worthy  of  neither  Blame  nor  Praife.  But  how  plainly  con 
trary  is  this  to  the  imiverfal  Senfe  of  Mankind,  and  to  the  No 
tion  they  have  of  fmcerely  virtuous  Actions  ?  Which  is,  that 
they  are  Actions  which  proceed  from  a  Heart  well  difpojed  and 
inclined  ;  and  tbtftrtmger,  and  the  more_/urV  and  determined  \hs 
good  Difpofition  of  the  Heart,  the  greater  the  Sincerity  of 
Virtue,  and  fo  the  more  of  the  Truth  and  Reality  of  it.  But 
if  there  be  any  Acts  which  are  done  in  a  State  of  Equilibrium, 
or  fpring  immediately  from  perfect  Indifference  and  Coldnefs 
of  Heart,  they  cannot  arife  from  any  good  Principle  or  Dif- 
poiition  in  the  Heart ;  and  confequently,"  according  to  common 
Senfe,  have  no  {incere  Goodnefs  in  them,  having  no  Virtue  of 
Heart  in  them.  To  have  a  virtuous  Heart,  is  to  have  a  Heart 
that  favours  Virtue,  and  Is  friendly  to  it,  and  not  one  perfect,- 
ly  cold  and  indifferent  about  it. 

And  bcfides  the  Actions  that  are  done  in  a  Stats  of  Indiffer 
ence,  or  that  arife  immediately  out  of  fuch  a  State,  can't  be1 
virtuous,  becaufe,  by  the  Suppofition,  they  are  not  determined 
by  any  preceding  Choice.  For  if  there  be  preceding  Choice, 
then  Choice  intervenes  between  the  Act  and  the  State  of  In 
difference  ;  which  is  contrary  to  the  Supposition  of  the  Act's 
ariiing  immediately  out  of  Indifference.  But  thofe  Ads  which 
are  not  determined  by  preceding  Choice,  can't  be  virtuous  or 
vicious  by  Arminian  Principles,  becaufe  they  are  not  determined 
by  the  Will.  So  that  neither  one  Way,  nor  the  other,  can  any 
Actions  be  virtuous  or  vicious  according  to  Arminran  Principles. 
If  the  Action  be  determined  by  a  preceding  Act  of  Choice  it  can'*t 
be  virtuous ;  becaafe  the  Action  is  not  done  in  a  State  of  In- 

difference* 


i  So   Indifference  tittoifijltnt  with  Virtue.  Part  lit 

Difference,  nor  dees  immediately  arife  from  fiich  a  State ;  and 
fo  is  not  done  in  a  State  of  Liberty.  If  the  Aftion  be  net  de 
termined  by  a  preceding  Aft  of  Choice,  then  it  can't  be  vir 
tuous  ;  becaufe  then  the  Will  is  not  Self-determin'd  in  it.  So 
that  'tis  made  certain,  that  neither  Virtue  nor  Vice  can  ever 
find  any  Place  in  the  Univerfe. 

Moreover,  that  it  is  neceflary  to  a  virtuous  Acliori  that  it 
be  performed  in  a  State  of  Indifference,  under  a  Notion  of 
that's  being  a  State  of  Liberty,  js  contrary  to  common  Senfe'j 
as  '"tis  a  Didate  of  Common  Senfe,  that  Indifference  itfblf,  in 
many  Cafes,  is  vicious,  and  fo  to  a  high  Degree.  As  if  when 
I  fee  my  Neighbour  or  near  Friend,  and  one  who  has  in  the 
highefl  Degree  merited  of  me,  in  extreme  Diftrefs,  and  ready 
to  perim,  I  find  an  Indifference  in  my  Heart  with  Refpecl  to 
any  Thing  propofed  to  be  done,  which  I  can  eafily  do,  for  his 
Relief  :  So  if  it  mould  be  propofed  to  me,  toblafpheme  God, 
or  kill  my  Father,  or  to  do  numberlefs  other  Things  which 
might  be  mentioned ;  the  being  indifferent,  for  a  Moment, 
would  be  highly  vicious  and  vile* 

And  it  may  be  further  obferved,  that  to  fuppofe  this  Liberty 
of  Indifference  is  eflential  to  Virtue  and  Vice,  deltroys  the 
great  Difference  Of  Degrees  of  the  Guilt  of  different  Crimes, 
and  takes  away  the  Heinoufnefs  of  the  moft  flagitious  horrid 
Iniquities ;  fdch  as  Adultery  Beftiality,  Murder,  Perjury,  Blaf- 
phemy,  &c.  For  according  to  thefe  Principles,  there  is  no 
.Harm  at  all  in  having  the  Mind  in  a  State  of  perfect  Indiffer 
ence  with  Refpecl  to  thefe  Crimes;  nay,  'tis  abfolutely  neceflary 
in  order  to  any  Virtue  in  avoiding  them,  or  Vice  in  doing 
them.  But  for  the  Mind  to  be  in  a  State  of  Indifference 
with  Refped  to  them,  is  to  be  next  Door  to  doing,  them  ;  It  is 
then  infinitely  near  to  chufmg,  and  fo  committing  the  Facl  : 
For  Equilibrium  is  the  next  Step  to  a  Degree  of  Prepondera- 
tion ;  and  one,  even  the  leaft  Degree  of  Preponderation  (all 
Things  confidered)  is  Choice.  And  not  only  fo,  but  for  the 
Will  to  be  in  a  State  of  perfect  Equilibrium  with  Refpecl  to 
fuch  Crimes,  is  for  the  Mind  to  be  in  fuch  a  State,  as  to  be 
full  as  likely  to  chufe  them  as  to  refufe  them,  to  do  them  as  to 
omit  them.  And  if  our  Minds  muft  be  in  fuch  a  State 
wherein  it  is  as  near  to  chufmg  as  refufing,  and  wherein  it 
mull  of  Neceffity,  according  to  the  Nature  of  Things,  be  as 
likely  to  commit  them,  as  to  refrain  from  them  ;  where  is  the 
exceeding  Heinoufnefs  of  chufmg  and  committing  them  ?  If 
there  be  no  Harm  in  often  being  in  fuch  a  State,  wherein  the 

Probability 


Se6t.  VI.       Of  virtuous  and  vicious  Habits.       1 8  r 

Probability  of  doing  and  forbearing  are  exactly  equal,  there 
being  an  Equilibrium,  and  no  more  Tendency  to  one  than  the 
other ;  then  according  to  the  Nature  and  Laws  of  fuch  a  Con- 
tingence,  it  may  be  expected,  as  an  inevitable  Confequence  of 
fuch  a  Difpofition  of  Things,  that  we  ihould  chufe  them  as 
often  as  reject  them  :  That  it  mould  generally  fo  fall  out  is  ne- 
ceffary,  as  Equality  in  the  Effect  is  the  natural  Confequence 
of  the  equal  Tendency  of  the  Caufe,  or  of  the  antecedent 
State  of  Things  from  which  the  Effect  arifes :  Why  then 
mould  we  be  fo  exceedingly  to  blame,  if  it  does  fo  fall  out  £ 

'Tis  many  Ways  apparent,  that  the  Arminian  Scheme  of  Li 
berty  is  utterly  inconfiftent  with  the  being  of  any  fuch  Things 
as  either  virtuous  or  vicious  Habits  or  Difpofitions.  If  Liberty 
of  Indifference  be  eifential  to  moral  Agency,  then  there  can  be 
no  Virtue  in  any  habitual  Inclinations  of  the  Heart ;  which 
are  contrary  to  Indifference,  and  imply  in  their  Nature  the 
very  Deftrudtion  and  Exclufion  of  it.  They  fuppofe  nothing 
can  be  virtuous,  in  which  no  Liberty  is  exercifed ;  but  how 
abfurd  is  it  to  talk  of  exercifing  Indifference  under  Bias  and 
Preponderation  ! 

And  if  filf- determining  Power  in  the  Will  be  neceffary  to 
moral  Agency,  Praife,  Blame,  &c.  then  nothing  done  by  the 
Will  can  be  any  further  Praife  or  Blame-worthy,  than  fo  far  as 
the  Will  is  moved,  fwayed  and  determined  by  itfelf,  and  the 
Scales  turned  by  the  fovereign  Power  the  Will  has  over  itfelf. 
And  therefore  the  Will  muft  not  be  put  out  of  its  Balance  alrea 
dy,  the  Preponderation  muft  not  be  determined  and  effected  be 
fore-hand  ;  and  fo  the  felf-determining  Ad  anticipated.  Thus 
it  appears  another  Way,  that  habitual  Bias  is  inconfiftent  with 
that  Liberty  which  Armenians  fuppofe  to  be  neceffary  to  Virtue 
or  Vice ;  and  fo  it  follows,  that  habitual  Bias  itfelf  cannot  be 
either  virtuous  or  vicious. 

The  fame  Thing  follows  from  their  Doctrine  concerning; 
the  Inconfiftence  of  Neceffity  with  Liberty,  Praife,  Difpraife,  &c. 
None  will  deny,  that  Bias  and  Inclination  may  be  fo  ftrong  as 
to  be  invincible,  and  leave  no  Poffibility  of  the  Will's  determin 
ing  contrary  to  it ;  and  fo  be  attended  with  Neceffity.  This 
Dr.  Whitby  allows  concerning  the  Will  of  God,  Angels  and 
glorified  Saints,  with  Refpect  to  Good ;  and  the  Will  o£ 
Devils  with  Refpect  to  Evil.  Therefore  if  Neceffity  be  incon 
fiftent  with  Liberty  ;  then  when  fix'd  Inclination  is  to  fuch  a 
Degree  of  Strength,  it  utterly  excludes  all  Virtue,  Vice,  Praife 

A  a  or 


1 82  Of  virtuous  Part  III. 

or  Blame.  And  if  fo,  then  the  nearer  Habits  are  to  this? 
Strength,  the  more  do  they  impede  Liberty,  and  fo  diminifli 
Praife  and  Blame.  If  very  ftrong  Habits  deflroy  Liberty,  the 
lefler  Ones  proportionably  hinder  it,  according  to  their  Degree 
ef  Strength.  And  therefore  it  will  follow,  that  then-  is  the 
Ad  moft  virtuous  or  vicious,  when  performed  without  any 
Inclination  or  habitual  Bias  at  all ;  becaufe  it  is  then  perform 
ed  with  moft  Liberty. 

Every  pre-poffefSrrg  nVd  Bins  on  the  Mind  brings  a  Degree 
of  moral  Inability  for  the  contrary  ;  becaufe  fo  far  as  the  Mind 
is  biaffed  and  pre-poflefled,  fo  much  Hindrance  is  there  of  the 
contrary.  And  therefore  if  moral  Inability  be  ineonfiftent  with 
moral  Agency,  or  the  Nature  of  Virtue  and  Vice,  then  fo  fat 
as  there  is  any  fuch  Thing  as  evil  Difpofition  of  Heart,  or  ha 
bitual  Depravity  of  Inclination  ;  whether  Covetoufnefs,  Pride, 
Malice,  Cruelty,  or  whatever  elfe ;  fo  much  the  more  excuf- 
able  Perfons  are  ;  fo  much  the  lefs  have  their  evil  Ads  of  this 
Kind,  the  Nature  of  Vice.  And  on  the  contrary,  whatever 
excellent  Difpofitions  and  Inclinations  they  have,  fo  much  are 
they  the  lefs  virtuous.. 

'Tis  evident,  that  no  habitual  Difpofition  of  Heart,  whether 
it  be  to  a  greater  or  lefTer  Degree,  can  be  in  any  Degree  vir 
tuous  or  vicious  ;  or  the  Adions  which  proceed  from  them 
at  all  Praife  or  Blame-worthy.  Becaufe,  tho'  we  mould  fup- 
pofe  the  Habit  not  to  be  of  fuch  Strength  as  wholly  to  take 
away  all  moral  Ability  and  felf-determining  Power  ;  or  hin 
der  but  that,  altho'  the  Ad  be  partly  from  Bias,  yet  it  may 
be  in  Part  from  Self-determination  ;  yet  in  this  Cafe,  all  that 
is  from  antecedent  Bias  muft  be  fct  afide,  as  of  no  Confidera- 
tion  ;  and  in  eftimating  the  Degree  of  Virtue  or  Vice,  no 
more  mull  be  confidered  than  what  arifes  from  felf- determin 
ing  Power,  without  any  Influence  of  that  Bias,  becaufe  Liberty 
is  exercifed  in  ng  more  :  So  that  all  that  is  the  Exercife  of 
habitual  Inclination,  is  thrown  away,  as  not  belonging  to  the 
Morality  of  the  Adion.  By  which  it  appears,  that  no  Exer 
cife  of  thefe  Habits,  let  them  be  ftronger  or  weaker,  can  ever 
have  any  Thing  of  the  Nature  of  either  Virtue  or  Vice. 

Here  if  any  one  mould  fay,  that  notwithftanding  all  thefe 
Things,  there  may  be  the  Nature  of  Virtue  and  Vice  in  Habits 
of  the  Mind ;  becaufe  thefe  Habits  may  be  the  Effeds  of 
thofe  Ads  wherein  the  Mind  exercifed  Liberty ;  that  how 
ever  the  foremention'd  Reafons  will  prove  that  no  Habits 

which. 


Sedl.  VI.  And  vicious  Habits.  I  $3 

which  are  natural,  or  that  any  are  born  or  created  with  us,  can 
be  either  virtuous  or  vicious  ;  yet  they  will  not  prove  this  of 
Kabits,  which  have  been  acquired  and  eftabliih'd  by  repeated 
free  Ads. 

To  fuch  an  Objedor  I  would  fay,  that  this  Evafion  will  not 
at  all  help  the  Matter.  For  if  Freedom  of  Will  be  eflential  to 
the  very  Nature  of  Virtue  and  Vice,  then  there  is  no  Virtue 
or  Vice  but  only  in  that  very  Thing,  wherein  this  Liberty  is 
exercifed.  If  a  Man  in  one  or  more  Things  that. he  does,  ex- 
ercifes  Liberty,  and  then  by  thofe  Ads  is  brought  into  fuch 
Circurnftances,  that  Ins  Liberty  ceafes,  and  the.re  follows  a 
long  Series  of  Ads  or  Events  that  come  to  pafs  neceffarily  ; 
thofe  confequent  Ads  are  not  virtuous T>r  vicious,  rewardable 
or  punimable  ;  but  only  the  free  Ads  that  eftabiilh'd  this  Ne- 
ceffity  ;  for  in  them  aione  was  the  Man  free.  The  following 
Effects  that  are  necefiary,  have  no  more  of  the  Nature  of  Vir 
tue  or  Vice,  than  Health  or  Sicknefs  of  Body  have  properly 
the  Nature  of  Virtue  or  Vice,  being  the  Effects  of  a  Courfe  of 
free  Ads  of  Temperance  or  Intemperance ;  or  than  the  good 
Qualities  of  a  Clock  are  of  the  Nature  of  Virtue,  which  arc 
the  Effeds  of  free  Ads  of  the  Artificer  ;  or  the  Goodnefs  and 
Sweetnefs  of  the  Fruits  of  a  Garden  are  moral  Virtues,  being 
the  Effeds  of  the  free  and  faithful  Ads  of  the  Gardener.  If 
Liberty  be  abfolutely  requifite  to  the  Morality  of  Adions,  and 
Necefiity  wholly  inconfiftent  with  it,  as  Arminians  greatly  in- 
fift  ;  then  no  nece/ary  Ejfefls  whatfoever,  ler  the  Caufe  be  never 
fo  good  or  bad,  can  be  virtuous  or  vicious ;  but  the  Virtue  or 
Vice  muft  be  only  in  the  free  Cmife.  Agreeably  to  this,  Dr. 
Whltly  fuppofes,  the  Neceffity  that  attends  the  good  and 
evil  Habits  of  the  Saints  in  Heaven,  and  Damned  in  Hell, 
which  are  the  Confequence  of  their  free  Ads  in  their  State  of 
Probation,  are  not  rewardable  or  punilhabie, 

On  the  Whole,  it  appears,  that  if  the  Notions  of  Armimnns 
concerning  Liberty  and  moral  Agency  be  true,  it  will  follow- 
that  there  is  no  Virtue  in  any  fuch  Habits  or  Qualities  as 
Humility,  Meeknefs,  Patience,  Mercy,  Gratitude,  Generofity, 
Heavenly-mindednefs  :  Nothing  at  all  Praife-worthy  in  loving 
Chrift  above  Father  and  Mother,  Wife  and  Children,  or  our 
own  Lives  \  or  in  Delight  in  Holinefs,  hungering  and  thirfting 
after  Righteoufnefs,  Love  to  Enemies,  univerfal  Benevolence 
to  Mankind.  And  on  the  other  Hand,  there  is  Nothing  at  all 
vicious,  or  worthy  of  Difpraife,  in  the  moft  fordid,  beaftly, 
ntj  devililh  Difpofuions ;  in  being  ungrateful,  profane, 
A  a  3  habitually 


1 84  Arminianifm  inconjiftent  Part  IIL 

habitually  hating  God,  and  Things  facrcd  and  holy  ;  or  in 
being  moil  treacherous,  envious  a-nd  cruel  towards  Men.  For 
all  thefe  Things  are  Difpofitions  and  Inclinations  of  the  Heart. 
And  in  fhort,  there  is  no  fuch  Thing  as  any  virtuous  or  vici 
ous  Quality  of  Mind ;  no  fuch  Thing  as  inherent  Virtue  and 
Holinefs,  or  Vice  and  Sin  :  And  the  ftronger  thofe  Habits  or 
Difpofitions  are,  which  ufed  to  be  called  virtuous  and  vicious, 
the  further  they  are;  from  being  fo  indeed ;  the  more  violent 
Men's  Luiis  are,  the  more  fiVd  their  Pride,  Envy,  Ingratitude 
and  Malicioufnefs,  ilill  the  further  are  they  from  being  blame- 
u-orthy.  If  there  be  a  Man  that  by  his  own  repeated  Ads, 
or  by  any  other  Means,  is  come  to  be  of  the  moft  hellifh 
Difpofition,  defperately  inclined  to  treat  his  Neighbours  with 
Injurioufnefs,  Contempt  and  Malignity ;  the  further  they 
ihould  be  from  any  Difpofition  to  be  angry  with  Him,  or  in 
the  leaft  to  blame  Him.  So  on  the  other  Hand,  if  there  be  a 
Perfon,  who  is  of  a  moft  excellent  Spirit,  itrongly  inclining 
him  to  the  moft  amiable  Actions,  admirably  meek,  benevolent* 
&c.  fo  much  is  he  further  from  any  Thing  rewardable  or  com 
mendable.  On  which  Principles,  the  Man  Jefus  Chrift  was 
very  far  from  being  Praife- worthy  for  thofe  Afts  of  Holinefs 
and  Kindnefs  which  He  performed,  thefe  Propensities  being  fo 
llrong  in  his  Heart.  And  above  all,  the  infinitely  holy  and 
gracious  God,  is  infinitely  remote  from  any  Thing  commend 
able,  his  good  Inclinations  being  infinitely  ftrong,  and  He 
therefore  at  the  utmoft  poffible  Diitance  from  being  at  Liberty. 
And  in  all  Cafes,  the  ftronger  the  Inclinations  of  any  are  to 
Virtue,  and  the  more  they  love  it,  the  lefs  virtuous  they 

are ;  and  the  more  they  love  Wickednefs,  the  lefs  vicious. 

Whether  thefe  Things  are  agreeable  to  Scripture,  let  every 
Chriftian,  and  every  Man  who  has  read  the  Bible,  judge  :  and 
whether  they  are  agreeable  to  common  Senfe,  let  every  one 
judge,  that  have  human  Underftanding  in  Exercife. 

And  if  we  purfue  thefe  Principles,  we  mail  find  that  Vir 
tue  and  Vice  are  wholly  excluded  out  of  the  World  ;  and  that 
there  never  was,  nor  ever  can  be  any  fuch  Thing  as  one  or 
the  other ;  either  in  God,  Angels  or  Men.  No  Propenfity, 
Difpofition  or  Habit  can  be  virtuous  or  vicious,  as  has  been 
Ihewn  ;  becaufe  they,  fo  far  as  they  take  Place,  deftroy  the 
Treedom  of  the  Will,  the  Foundation  of  all  moral  Agency, 

and  exclude   all  Capacity   of  either  Virtue  or  Vice. 

And  if  Habits  and  Difpofitions  themfelves  be  not  virtuous 
nor  vicious,  neither  can  the  Exercife  of  thefe  Difpofitions  be 
fo  :  For  the  Exercife  of  Bias  is  not  the  Exercife  of  f reef  el f- 

determininp 


with  moral  Habits  and  Motives.       1 85 

determining  Will,  and  fo  there  is  no  Exercife  of  Liberty  in  it. 
Confequently  no  Man  is  virtuous  or  vicious,  either  in  being  well 
or  ill  difpofed,  nor  in  afting  from  a  good  or  bad  Diipoiition. 
And  whether  this  Bias  or  Difpofition  be  habitual  or  not,  if  it 
exifts  but  a  Moment  before  the  Aft  of  Will,  which  is  the 
EfFeftof.it,  it  alters  not  the  Cafe,  as  to  the  Necefiity  of  the 
EiFeft.  Or  if  there  be  no  previous  Difpofition  at  all,  either 
habitual  or  occafional,  that  determines  the  Aft,  then  it  is  not 
Choice  that  determines  it :  It  is  therefore  a  Contingence,  that 
happens  to  the  Man,  arifing  from  Nothing  in  him  ;  and  is 
nece'ifary,  as  to  any  inclination  or"  Choice  of  his  ;  and  there 
fore  can't  make  Him  either  the  better  or  worfe,  any  more  than 
a.  Tree  is  better  than  other  Trees,  becaufe  it  oftener  happens 
to  be  lit  upon  by  a  Swan  or  Nightingale  ;  or  a  Rock  more 
vicious  than  other  Rocks,  becaufe  Rattle-Snakes  have  happened 
oftener  to  crawl  over  it.  So  that  there  is  no  Virtue  nor  Vice 
in  good  or  bad  Difpofitions,  either  fix'd  or  tranfient  ;  nor  any 
Virtue  or  Vice  in  afting  from  any  good  or  bad  previous  In 
clination  ;  nor  yet  any  Virtue  or  Vice  in  afting  wholly  with 
out  any  previous  Inclination,  Where  then  lha-11  we  find  Room 
tor  Virtue  or  Vice  ? 


SECTION   VII. 

Arminian  Notions  of  moral  Agency  inconfiftent  with 
all  Influence  of  Motive  and  Inducement,  in  either 
'virtuous  or  vicious  Affions. 

AS  Armiman  Notions  of  that  Liberty,  which  is  eflential  to 
Virtue  or  Vice,  are  inconfiftent  with  common  Senfe,  in 
their  being  inconfiftent  with  all  virtuous  or  vicious  Habits  and 
Difpofitions  ;  fo  they  are  no  lefs  fo  in  their  Inconfiftency  with 
all  Influence  of  motives  in  moral  Aftionst 

'Tis 


j$6    Motive  and  Inducement  inconfiftent  Part  III. 

'Tis  equally  againft  thofe  Notions  of  Liberty  of  Will,  whe.- 
ther  there  be,  previous  to  the  Aft  of  Choice,  a  Preponde-^ 
rancy  of  the  Inclination,  or  a  Preponderaricy  of  thofe  Circum- 
jftances,  which  have  a  Tendency  to  move  the  Inclination : 
And  indeed  it  comes  to  juft  the  fame  Thing.  To  fay,  the  Cir- 
cumftances  of  the  Mind  are  fuch  as  tend  to  fway  and  turn  its 
Inclination  one  Way,  is  the  fame  Thing  as  to  fay,  the  Incli 
nation  of  the  Mind,  as  under  fuch  Circumftances,  tends  that 
Way. 

Or  if  any  think  it  moft  proper  to  fay,  that  Motives  do  alter 
the  Inclination,  and  give  a  new  Bias  to  the  Mind  ;  it  will  not 
alter  the  Cafe,  as  to  the  prefent  Argument.  For  if  Motives 
operate  by  giving  the  Mind  an  Inclination,  then  they  operate 
by  deftroying  the  Mind's  Indifference,  and  laying  it  under  a 
Bias.  But  to  do  this,  is  to  deftroy  the  Arminlan  Freedom  :  It 
Is  not  to  leave  the  Will  to  its  own  Self-determination,  but  to 
brine  it  into  Subjection  to  the  Power  of  fomething  extrinfick, 
which  operates  upon  it,  fways  and  determines  it,  previous  to 
its  own  Determination,  So  that  what  is  done  from  Motive, 

can't  be  either  virtuous  or  vicious.^ And  befides,  if  the  Ads 

of  the  Will  are  excited  by  Motives,  thofe  Motives  are  the 
Caufes  of  thofe  Afts  of  the  Will :  which  makes  the  Afts  of 
the  Will  neceflary  ;  as  Effects  neceflarily  follow  the  Efficiency 
of  the  Caufe.  And  if  the  Influence  and  Power  of  the  Mo 
tive  caufes  the  Volition,  then  the  Influence  of  the  Motive 
determines  Volition,  and  Volition  don't  determine  itfelf; 
and  fo  is  not  free,  in  the  Senfe  of  Armittiaxt  (as  has  been 
largely  {hewn  already)  and  confequently  can  be  neither  virtu 
ous  nor  vicious. 

The  Suppofition,  which  has  already  been  taken  Notice  of  as 
an  infufficient  Evafion  in  other  Cafes,  would  be  in  like  Manner 
impertinently  alledged  in  this  Cafe  ;  namely,  the  Suppofition 
that  Liberty  confifts  in  a  Power  of  fufpending  Aftion  for  the 
prefent,  in  order  to  Deliberation.  If  it  mould  be  faid,  Tho* 
it  be  true,  that  the  Will  is  under  a  Neceflity  of  finally  follow 
ing  the  ftrongeft  Motive,  yet  it  may  for  the  prefent  forbear  to 
aft  upon  the  Motive  prefented,  till  there  has  been  Opportunity 
thoroughly  to  confider  it,  and  compare  its  real  Weight  with  the 
Merit  of  other  Motives.  I  anfwer,  as  follows : 

Here  again  it  muft  be  remember'd,  that  if  determining  thus 
to  fufpend  and  confider,  be  that  Aft  of  the  Will  wherein  alone 
Liberty  is  exercifed,  then  in  this  all  Virtue  and  Vice  muft 

confift  i 


Sed.  VII.     with  Arminian  Virtue  and  Vice.      \  $j 

confift;  and  the  Afts  that  follow  this  Confideration,  and  arc 
the  Efiefts  of  it,  being  neceffary,  are  no  more  virtuous  or 
vicious  than  fome  good  or  bad  Events  which  happen  when  they 
are  faft  afieep,  and  are  the  Confequences  of  what  they  did  when 
they  were  awake.  Therefore  I  would  here  obferve  two 
Things. 

1 .  To  fuppofe  that  all  Virtue  and  Vice,  in  every  Cafe,  con- 
fifls  in  determining  whether  to  take  Time  for  Confederation, 
or  not,  is  not  agreeable  to  common  Senfe.     For  according  to 
fuch  a  Suppofitioa,  the  moft  horrid  Crimes,  Adultery,  Murder, 
Buggery,  Blafphemy,  &c.    do  not  at  all  confift  in  the  horrid 
Nature  of  the  Things  themfelves,  but  only  in  the  Neglect  of 
thorough   Confideration  before  they  were  perpetrated  :  which 
brings   their  Vicioufnefs   to   a   frnall  Matter,    and  makes  all 
Crimes  equal.     If  it  be  faid,    that  Negleft  of  Confiderationy 
when  fuch  heinous  Evils  are  propofed  to  Choice,  is  worfe  thaa 
in  other  Cafes :    I  aufwer,  this  is  inconfiftent,  as  it  fuppofes 
the  very  Thing   to  be,    which   at  the  fame  Time  is  fuppofed 
not  to  be ;  it  fuppofes  all  moral  Evil,  all  Vicioufnefs  and  HeU 
noufnefs,  does  not  con  lift  merely  in  the  want  of  Confideration. 
It  fuppofes  fome  Crimes  in  themfsl-ves,  in  their  own  Nature,  to 
be  more  heinous  than  others,    antecedent  to  Confideration  or 
Inconfideration,  which  lays  the  Perfon  under  a  previous  Obli 
gation  to  confider  in  fome  Cafes  more  than  others. 

2.  If  it  wer"e  fo,    that  all  Virtue  and  Vice,  in  every  Cafe, 
confided  only  in  the  Aft  of  the  Will,  whereby  it  determines 
whether  to  confider  or  no,    it  would  not  alter  the  Cafe  in  the 
kaft,  as  to  the  prefent  Argument.     For  ftill  in  this  Aft  of  the 
Will  on  this  Determination,  it  is  induced  by  fome  Motive,  and 
neceffarily  follows  the  ftrongeft   Motive ;    and  fo  is  neceffary, 
even  in  that  Aft  wherein  alone  It  is  either  virtuous  cr  vicious. 

One  Thing  more  I  would  obferve,  concerning  the  Incon- 
iiftence  of  Arminian  Notions  of  moral  Agency  with  the  Influ 
ence  of  Motives. 1  fuppofe  none  will  deny,  that  'tispoffible 

for  Motives  to  be  fet  before  the  Mind  fo  powerful,  and  exhibit 
ed  in  fo  ftrorg  a  Light,  and  under  fo  advantageous  Circumftances,, 
as  to  be  invincible  ;  and  fuch  as  the  Mfnd  cannot  but  yield 
to.  In  this  Cafe,  Arminians  will  doubtlefs  fay,  Liberty  is  de- 
Uroyed,  And  if  fo,  then  if  Motives  are  exhibited  with  half 
fo  much  Power,  they  hinder  Liberty  in  Proportion  to  their 
Strength,  and  go  half  xvay  towards  deftroying  it.  If  a 
Thoufand  Degrees  of  Motive  abolilh.  all  Liberty,  then  five 

Hundred 


1 8  8    Arminian  Argument  from  the  Sincerity  P.  III. 

Hundred  take  it  "half  away.  If  one  Degree  of  the  Influence 
of  Motive  don't  at  all  infringe  or  diminifh  Liberty,  then  no 
more  do  two  Degrees ;  for  Nothing  doubled,  is  ftill  Nothing. 
And  if  two  Degrees  don't  diminifh  the  Will's  Liberty,  no 
more  do  four,  eight,  fixteen,  or  fix  Thoufand.  For  Nothing 
multiplied  never  fo  much,  comes  to  but  Nothing.  If  there  be 
nothing  in  the  Nature  of  Motive  or  moral  Suaiion,  that  is  at 
all  oppofite  to  Liberty,  then  the  greateft  Degree  of  it  can't 
hurt  Liberty,  But  if  there  be  any  Thing  in  the  Nature  of 
the  Thing,  that  is  againft  Liberty,  then  the  leaft  Degree  of  it 
hurts  it  in  fome  Degree  ;  and  confequently  hurts  and  dimi- 
nimes  Virtue.  If  invincible  Motives  to  that  Action  which  is 
good,  take  away  all  the  Freedom  of  the  Ad,  and  fo  all  the 
Virtue  of  it ;  then  the  more  forceable  the  Motives  are,  fo  much 
the  worfe,  fo  much  the  lefs  Virtue  ;  and  the  weaker  the  Mo 
tives  are,  the  better  for  the  Caufe  of  Virtue  ;  and  none  is  bell 
of  all. 

Now  let  it  be  confidered,  whether  thefe  Things  are  agreeable 
to  common  Senfe.  If  it  mould  be  allowed,  that  there  are 
fome  Inftances  wherein  the  Soul  chufes  without  any  Motive, 
what  Virtue  can  there  be  in  fuch  a  Choice  ?  I  am  fure,  there 
is  no  Prudence  or  Wifdom  in  it.  Such  a  Choice  is  made  for 
no  good  End  ;  for  it  is  for  no  End  at  all.  If  it  were  for  any 
End,  the  View  of  the  End  would  be  the  Motive  exciting  to 
the  Ad ;  and  if  the  Aft  be  for  no  good  End,  and  fo  from  no 
good  Aim,  then  there  is  no  ~ood  Intention  in  it:  And  there 
fore,  according  to  all  our  natural  Notions  of  Virtue,  no  more 
Virtue  in  it  than  in  the  Motion  of  the  Smoke,  which  is  driven 
to  and  fro  by  the  Wind,  without  any  Aim  or  End  in  the  Thing 
moved,  and  which  knows  not  whether,  nor  why  and  wherefore, 
it  is  moved. 

CoroL  i.  By  thefe  Things  it  appears,  that  the  Argument 
againft  the  Cafvirti/ts,  taken  from  the  Ufe  of  Counfels,  Exhor 
tations,  Invitations,  Expostulations,  &c.  fo  much  infifted  on 
by  Armenians,  is  truly  againft  themfelves.  For  thefe  Things 
can  operate  no  other  Way  to  any  good  Effed,  than  as  in 
them  is  exhibited  Motive  and  Inducement,  tending  to  excite 
and  determine  the  Ads  of  the  Will.  But  it  follows  on  their 
Principles,  that  the  Ads  of  Will  excited  by  fuch  Caufes,  can't 
be  virtuous ;  becaufe  fo  far  as  they  are  from  thefe,  they 
are  not  from  the  Will's  felf-deterraining  Power.  Hence  it 
will  follow,  that  it  is  not  worth  the  while  to  offer  any  Argu 
ments  to  perfwade  Men  to  any  virtuous  Volition  or  voluntary 


Invitations,  &V.  ^////hhemfelves,  . 

Aclion ;  'tis  in  vain  to  fet  before  them  the  Wifdom  and 
Amiablenefs  of  Ways  of  Virtue,  or  the  Odioufnefs  and 
Folly  of  Ways  of  Vice.  This  Notion  of  Liberty  and  moral 
Agency  .frustrates  all  Endeavours  to  draw  Men  to  Virtue- 
by  Inftruftion,  or  Perfwaiion,  Precept,  or  Example  :  For  tho* 
thefe  Things  may  induce  Men  to  what  is  materially  virtuous, 
yet  at  the  fame  Time  they  take  away  the  Form  of  Virtue, 
becaufe  they  deilroy  Liberty ;  as  they,  by  their  own  Power, 
put  the  Will  out  of  its  Equilibrium,  determine  and  turn  the 
Scale,  and  take  the  Work  of  felf-determming  Power  out  o£ 
its  Hands.  And  the  clearer  the  Inftru&ions  are  that  are  given, 
the  more  powerful  the  Arguments  that  are  ufed,  and  the  more 
moving  the  Perfwafions  or  Examples,  the  more  likely  they  are 
to  fruftrate  their  own  Defign  ;  becaufe  they  have  fo  much  the 
greater  Tendency  to  put  the  Will  out  of  its  Balance,  to  hinder 
its  Freedom  of  felf-determination ;  and  fo  to  exclude  the 
very  Form  of  Virtue,  and  the  Effence  of  whatfoever  is  Praife- 
worthy. 

So  it  clearly  follows  from  thefe  Principles,  that  God  has  no 
Hand  in  any  Man's  Virtue,  nor  does  at  all  promote  it,  either 
by  a  phyfkal  or  moral  Influence ;  that  none  of  the  mora! 
Methods  He  ufes  with  Men  to  promote  Virtue  in  the  World, 
have  Tendency  to  the  Attainment  of  that  End  ;  that  all  the 
Inftrudions  which  He  has  given  to  Men,  from  the  Beginning 
of  the  World  to  this  Day,  by  Prophets,  or  Apoftles,  or  by  his 
Son  Jefus  Chrift ;  that  all  his  Counfels,  Invitations,  Promifes, 
Threatnings,  Warnings  and  Expostulations  ;  that  all  Means 
He  has  ufed  with  Men,  in  Ordinances,  or  Providences  ;  yea, 
all  Influences  of  his  Spirit,  ordinary  and  extraordinary,  have 
had  no  Tendency  at  all  to  excite  any  one  virtuous  A<5t  of  the 
Mind,  or  to  promote  any  Thing  morally  good  and  commend 
able,  in  any  Refpecl. For  there  is  no  Way  that  thefe  or. 

any  other  Means  can  promote  Virtue,  but  one  of  thefe  three. 
Either  (i.)  By  a  phyfical  Operation  on  the  Heart.  But  all 
Effects  that  are  wrought  in  Men  in  this  Way,  have  no  Virtue 
in  them,  by  the  concurring  Voice  of  all  Arminians.  Or  (2.) 
Morally,  by  exhibiting  Motives  to  the  Underftanding,  to  excite 
good  Ads  in  the  Will.  But  it  has  been  demonftrated,  that 
Volitions  which  are  excited  by  Motives,  are  neceffary,  and  not 
excited  by  a  felf-moving  Power  ;  and  therefore,  by  their  Prin 
ciples,  there  is  no  Virtue  in  them.  Or  (3.)  By  merely  giving 
the  Will  an  Opportunity  to  determine  itielf  concerning 
the  Objects  propofed,  either  to  chufe  or  reject,  by  its  own 
tmcaufed.,  unmoved,  uninfluenced  Self-determination,  And  if 

B  b  dffe 


190     Arminianiim  excludes  all  Virtue >      Part  III. 

this  be  all,  then  all  thofe  Means  do  no  more  to  promote  Vir 
tue,  than  Vice  :  For  they  do  Nothing  but  give  the  Will 
Opportunity  to  determine  itfelf  either  Way,  either  to  Good 
or  Bad,  without  laying  it  under  any  Bias  to  either :  And  fo 
there  is  really  as  much  of  an  Opportunity  given  to  determine 
in  Favour  of  Evil,  as  of  Good. 

Thus  that  horrid  blafphemous  Confequence  will  certainly 
follow  from  the  Arminian  Doftrine,  which  they  charge  on 
others  ;  namely,  that  God  ails  an  inconfiftent  Part  in  uling 
fo  many  Coimfels,  Warnings,  Invitations,  Intreaties,  £cr  with 
Sinners,  to  induce  them  to  forfake  Sin,  and  turn  to  the  Ways  of 
Virtue  ;  and  that  all  are  infmcere  and  fallacious.  It  will  fol 
low  from  their  Doftrine,  that  God  does  thefe  Things  when 
He  knows  at  the  fame  Time,  that  they  have  no  Manner  of 
Tendency  to'  promote  the  Effeft  Fie  feems  to  aim  at ;  yea, 
knows  that  if  they  have  any  Influence,  this  very  Influence 
will  be  inconfiftent  with  fuch  an  ElFeft,  and  will  prevent  it. 
But  what  an  Imputation  of  Infmcerity  would  this  fix  on  Him 
who  is  infinitely  holy  and  true  ! — So  that  their's  is  the  Doftrine 
which  if  purfued  in  its  Confequences,  does  horribly  reflect  on 
the  moft  High,  and  fix  on  Him  the  Charge  of  Hypocrify  ;  and 
not  the  Doctrine  of  the  Calvinift  ;  according  to  their  frequent, 
and  vehement  Exclamations  and  Inveftives. 

Carol.  2.  From  what  has  been  obferved  in  this  Seftion,  it 
again  appears,  that  Arminian  Principles  and  Notions,  when- 
fairly  examined,  and  purfued  in  their  demonitrable  Confe 
quences,  do  evidently  (hut  all  Virtue  out  of  the  World,  and 
make  it  impotfible  that  there  fhould  ever  be  any  fuch  Thing,, 
in  any  Cafe  \  or  that  any  fuch  Thing  ihould  ever  be  conceived 
of.  For  by  thefe  Principles,  the  very  Notion  of  Virtue  or 
Vice  implies  Abfurdity  and  Contradiction  :  For  it  is  abfurd  in 
itfelf,  and  contrary  to  common  Senfe,  to  fuppofe  a  virtuous 
Aft  of  Mind  without  any  good  Intention  or  Aim.  And  by 
their  Principles,  it  is  abfurd  to  fuppofe  a  virtuous  Aft  with  a 
good  Intention  or  Aim  ;  for  to  aft  for  an  End,  is  to  aft  from 
a  Motive.  So  that  if  we  rely  on  thefe  'Principles,  there  can 
be  no  virtuous  Aft  with  a  good  Defign  and  End ;  and  'tis 
felf-evident,  there  can  be  none  without :  confequently  there 
can  be  no  virtuous  Aft  at  all. 

Carol.  3.  'Tis  manifeft,  that  ilrminian  Notions  of  moral 
Agency,  and  the  Being  of  a  Faculty  of  Will,  cannot  confift  to 
gether  j  and  that  it'  there  be  any  fu.ch  Thing  as,  either  a  vir- 

tUOttflg 


Seel.  VII.      and  Vice,  out  of  the  World.  191 

tuous,  or  vicious  Adi,  it  can't  be  an  Adi  of  Will ;  no  Will  can 
be  at  all  concerned  in  it.  For  that  Adt  which  is  performed 
without  Inclination,  without  Motive,  without  End,  muft  be 
performed  without  any  concern  of  the  WilL  To  fuppofe  an 
Adi  of- the  Will  without  thefe,  implies  a  Contradidlion.  If 
the  Soul  in  its  Adi  has  no  Motive  or  End;  then  in  that  Adi 
(as  was  obferved  before)  it  feeks  Nothing,  goes  after  Nothing, 
exerts  no  Inclination  to  any  Thing ;  and  this  implies,  that  in 
that  Adi  it  delires  Nothing,  and  chufes  Nothing  ;  Co  that  there 
is  no  Adi  of  Choice  in  the  Cafe  :  And  that  is  as  much  as  to  fay, 
there  is  no  Adi  of  Will  in  the  Cafe.  Which  very  effedlually 
(huts  out  all  vicious  and  virtuous  Adls  out  of  the  Univerfe ; 
in  as  much  as,  according  to  this,  there  can  be  no  vicious  or 
virtuous  Adi  wherein  the  Will  is  concerned ;  and  according 
to  the  plained  Didlates  of  Reafon,  and  the  Light  of  Nature, 
and  alfo  the  Principles  dt -Arminians  thenifelves,  there  can  be 
no  virtuous  or  vicious  Adi  wherein  the  Will  is  not  concerned. 
And  therefore  there  is  no  Room  for  any  virtuous  or  vicious 
Ads  at  all. 

Coral,  4..  If  none  of  the  moral  Adlions  of  intelligent  Beings 
are  influenced  by  either  previous  Inclination  or  Motive,  ano 
ther  ftrange  Thing  will  follow ;  and  this  is,  that  God  not 
only  can't  foreknow  any  of  the  future  moral  Adlions  of  his 
Creatures,  but  He  can  make  no  Conjedlure,  can  give  no  pro 
bable  Guefs  concerning  them.  For,  all  Conjedlure  in  Things 
of  this  Nature,  muft  depend  on  fome  Difcerning  or  Appre- 
henfion  of  thefe  two  Things,  previous  Difpojition,  and  Motive  ; 
which,  as  has  been  obferved,  Arminian  Notions  of  moral 
Agency,  in  their  real  Confequence,  altogether  exclude. 


(XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX) 


(XXXXXXXXSOC<XXXXXXXXXXXX) 


B  b  3          PART 


^-•^•••^-•^-••^•Hk-^--& 

„*.    *  #.-"*  *•*•,*.##-•#   f:  '  "  " 

i  " 


PART       IV. 

Wherein  the  chief  Grounds  of  the 
Reafonings  ^Artnimam,  in  Sup 
port  and  Defence  of  the  foremen- 
tion'd  Notions  of  Liberty,  moral 
Agency,  &c<  and  againft  the  op- 
pofite  Dodrine,  are  considered  , 


S    E    C    T    I    O.  N       I. 

The  EfTence  of  the  Virtue  and  Vice  of  D  if  portions  of 
the  Hearty  and  Afts  of  the  Will,  lies  not  in  their 
Caufe,  but  in.  their  Nature. 

NE  main  Foundation  of  the  Reafons,  which  are 
brought  to  eftablifh  the  foremention'd  Notions  of 
Liberty,  Virtue,  Vice,  &c.  is  a  Suppofition,  that 
the  Virtuoufnefs  of  the  Difpofitions  or  Acls  of  the 
Will  confifts  not  in  the  Nature  of  thefe  Difpofi 
tions  or  Ads,  but  wholly  in  the  Origin  or  Caufe  of  them:  fp 
that  if  the  Difpofition  of  the  Mind  or  Ad  of  the  Will  be  never 
fo  good,  yet  if  the  Caufe  of  the  Difpcntion  or  Ad  be  not  our 
Virtue,  there  is  nothing  virtuous  or  praife-worthy  in  it  ;  and 
on  the  contrary,  if  the  Will  in  its  Inclination  or  Ads  be  ne 

ver 


Sedt.  I.     Of  the  Eflencc  of  Virtue  and  Vice.        1 93 

ver  fo  bad,  yet  unbfs  it  arifes  from  fornething  that  is  our  Vice. 
or  Fault,  there  is  Nothing  vicious  or  blame-worthy  in  it. 
Hence  their  grand  Objection  and  pretended  Demonltratibn,  or 
Self-evidence,  againft  any  Virtue  and  Commendablenefs,  or 
Vice  and  Blame- worthinefs,  of  thofe  Habits  or  Afts  of  the; 
Will,  which  are  not  from  fome  virtuous  or  vicious  Determina 
tion  of  the  Will  itfelf. 

Now,  if  this  Matter  be  well  confidered,  it  will  appear  to  be 
altogether  a  Miftake,  yea,  a  grofs  Abfurdity  ;  and  that  it  is 
moft  certain,  that  if  there  be  any  fuch  Things,  as  a  virtuous, 
or  vicious  Difpofition,  or  Volition  of  Mind,  the  Virtuoufnefs 
or  Vicioufnefs  of  them  confifls  not  in  the  Origin  or  Caufe  of 
thefe  Things,  but  in  the  Nature  of  them. 

If  the  Effence  of  Virtuoufnefs  or  Commendablenefs,  and 
of  Vicioufnefs  or  Fault,  don't  lie  in  the  Nature  of  the  Difpo- 
fitions  or  Afts  of  Mind,  which  are  faid  to  be  our  Virtue  or 
our  Fault,  but  in  their  Caufe,  then  it  is  certain  it  lies  no 
where  at  all.  Thus,  for  Inftance,  if  the  Vice  of  a  vicious 
Aft  of  Will,  lies  not  in  the  Nature  of  the  Aft,  but  the 
Caufe;  fo  that  its  being  of  a  bad  Nature  will  not 
make  it  at  all  Our  Fault,  unlefs  it  arifes  from  fome  faulty 
Determination  of  our's  as  its  Caufe,  or  fomething  in  us  that 
is  our  Fault ;  then  for  the  fame  Reafon,  neither  can  the 
Vicioufnefs  of  that  Caufe  lie  in  the  Nature  of  the  Thing  it 
felf,  but  in  its  Caufe  :  That  evil  Determination  of  our's  is  not 
our  Fault,  merely  becaufe  it  is  of  a  bad  Nature,  unlefs  it 
arifes  from  fome  Caufe  in  us  that  is  our  Fault.  And  when 
we  are  come  to  this  higher  Caufe,  ftill  the  Reafon  of  the 
Thing  holds  good  ;  tho'  this  Caufe  be  of  a  bad  Nature,  yet 
•we  are  not  at  all  to  blame  on  that  Account,  unlefs  it  arifes 
from  fomething  faulty  :n  us.  Nor  yet  can  Blame- worthinefs 
lie  in  the  Nature  of  this  Caufe,  but  in  the  Caufe  of 'that.  And 
thus  we  muft  drive  Faultinefs  back  from  Step  to  Step,  from 
a  lower  Caufe  to  a  higher,  in  infinitnm  ;  and  that  is  thoroughly 
to  banifh  it  from  the  World,  and  to  allow  it  no  poffibility  of 
Exiftence  any  where  in  the  Univerfality  of  Things.  On  thefe 
Principles,  Vice  or  moral  Evil  can't  confift  m  any  Thing 
that  is  an  Ejfefl ;  becaufe  Fault  don't  confift  in  the  Nature 
of  Things,  but  in  their  Caufe  ;  as  well  as  becaufe  EiFefts 
are  neceffary,  being  unavoidably  connefted  with  their  Caufe  : 
Therefore  the  Caufe  only  is  to  blame.  And  fo  it  follows,  that 
Faultinefs  can  lie  only  in  that  Cavfe,  which  is  a  Caufe  only,  and 
no  Effect  of  any  Thing.  Nor  yet  can  it  lie  in  this ;  for  then 
it  muft  lie  in  the  Nature  of  the  Thing  itfelf;  not  in  its  be- 


194         ¥be  ILfence  of  Hr/ne  and  Vice,     Part  IV. 

ing  from  any  Determination  of  our's,  nor  any  Thing  faulty 
in  us  which  is  the  Caufe,  nor  indeed  from  any  Caufe  at  all, 
for  by  the  Suppofition,  it  is  no  Effect,  and  has  no  Caufe. 
And  thus,  He  that  will  maintain,  it  is  not  the  Nature  of 
Habits  or  Acls  of  Will  that  makes  them  virtuous  or  faulty, 
but  the  Caufe,  muft  immediately  run  Himfelf  out  of  his 
own  Affertion ;  and  in  maintaining  it,  will  infenfibly  contradict 
and  deny  it. 

This  is  certain,  that  if  Effects  are.  vicious  and  faulty,  not 
from  their  Nature,  or ,  from  any  Thing  inherent  in  them, 
but  becaufe  they  are  from  a  bad  Caufe,  it  muft  be  on  Ac 
count  of  the  Badnefs  of  the  Caufe  ;  and  fo  on  Account 
of  the  Nature  of  the  Caufe.  A  bad  Effect  in  the  Will  muft 
be  bad,  becaufe  the  Caufe  is  bad,  or  of  an  evil  Nature, 
or  has  Badnefs  as  a  Quality  inherent  in  it :  And  a  good  Effect 
in  the  Will  mult  be  good,  by  Reafon  of  the  Goodnffs  of  the 
Caufe,  or  its  being  of  a  good  Kind  and  Nature.  And  if  this 
be  what  is  meant,  the  very  Suppofition  of  Fault  and  Praife 
lying  not  in  the  Nature  of  the  Thing,  but  the  Caufe,  con 
tradicts  itfclf,  and  does  at  leaft  refolve  the  Eflence  of  Virtue 
and  Vice  into  the  Nature  of  Things,  and  fuppofes  it  originally 

to  confift  in  that, And  if  a  Caviller   has  a  Mind  to  run 

from  the  Abfurdity,  by  faying,  "  No,  the  Fault  of  the 
tf  Thing  which  is  the  Caufe,  lies  not  in  this,  that  the  Caufe 
"  itfelf  is  of  an  evil  Nature,  but  that  the  Caufe  is  evil  in 
"  that  Senfe,  that  it  is  from  another  bad  Caufs  :"  Still  the 
Abfurdity  will  follow  him  ;  for  if  fo,  then  the  Caufe  before 
charged  is  at  once  acquitted,  and  all  the  Blame  muft  be  laid 
to  the  higher  Caufe,  and  mult  confift  in  that's  being  Evil,  or 
of  an  evil  Nature.  So  now  we  are  come  again  to  lay  the  Blame 
of  the  Thing  blame-worthy,  to  the  Nature  of  the  Thing,  and 
not  to  the  Caufe.  And  if  any  is  fo  foolim  as  to  go  higher 
ftill,  and  afcend  from  Step  5to  Step,  till  he  is  come  to  that 
•which  is  the  firtt  Caufe  concerned  in  the  whole  Affair,  and  will 
fay,  all  the  Blame  lies  in  that ;  then  at  laft  he  muft  be  forced 
to  own,  that  the  Faultinefs  of  the  Thing,  which  he  fuppofes 
alone  blame-worthy,  lies  wholly  in  the  Nature  of  the  Thing, 
and  not  in  the  Original  or  Caufe  of  it;  for  the  Suppofition 
is,  that  it  has  no  Original,  it  is  determined  by  no  Ad  of  our's, 
is  caufed  by  nothing  faulty  in  us,  being  abfolutely  without  any 
Caufe.  And  fo  the  Race  is  at  an  End,  but  the  Evader  is  taken 
in  his  Flight. 

'Tis  agreeable  to  the  natural  Notions  of  Mankind,  that 
moral  Evil,  with  its  Defert  of  Diflike  and  Abhorrence,  and 
all  its  other  Ill-defervings,  coniifts  in  a  certain  Deformity  ia 

the 


Seel.  f.  in  the  Nature  of  Volition,  not  intheC&uk.  1^5 

the  Nature  of  certain  Difpofitions  of  the  Heart,  and  Afts  of 
the  Will  ;  and  not  in  the  Deformity  of  fomething  elfe,  diverfe 
from  the  very  Thing  itfelf,  which  deferves  Abhorrence, 
fuppofed  to  be  the  Caufe  of  it  :  Which  would  be  abfurd, 
becaufe  that  would  be  to  fuppofe,  a  Thing  that  is  in 
nocent  and  not  Evil,  is  truly  evil  and  faulty,  becaufe  another 
Thing  is  Evil.  It  implies  a  Contradiction  ;  for  it  would  be 
to  fuppofe,  the  very  Thing  which  is  morally  evil  and  blame 
worthy,  is  innocent  and  not  blame-worthy  ;  but  that  fomething. 
elfe,  which  is  its  Caufe,  is  only  to  blame.  To  fay,  that  Vice 
don't  confift  in  the  Thing  which  is  vicious,  but  in  its  Caufe, 
is  the  fame  as  to  fay,  that  Vice  don't  ccnfift  in  Vice,  but  in 
that  which  produces  it. 

'Tis  true,  a  Caufe  may  be  to  blame,  for  being  the  Caufe 
of  Vice  :  It  may  be  Wickednefs  in  the  Caufe,  that  it  pro 
duces  Wickednefs  :  But  it  would  imply  a  Contradiction,  to 
fuppofe  that  thefe  two  are  the  fame  individual  Wickednefs. 
The  wicked  Aft  of  the  Caufe  in  producing  Wickednefs,  is 
one  Wickednefs ;  and  the  Wickednefs  produced,  if  there  be 
any  produced,  is  another.  And  therefore  the  Wickednefs  of 
the  latter  don't  lie  in  the  former,  but  is  diftinft  from  it ;  and 
the  Wickednefs  of  both  lies  in  the  evil  Nature  of  the  Things 
which  are  wicked. 

The  Thing  which  makes  Sin  hateful,  is  that  by  which  it 
deferves  Punifhment;  which  is  but  the  Exprefllon  of  Hatred. 
And  that  which  renders  Virtue  lovely,  is  the  fame  with  that* 
on  the  Account  of  which,  it  is  fit  to  receive  Praife  and  Re 
ward  ;  which  are  but  the  Expreffions  of  Efteem  and  Love. 
But  that  which  makes  Vice  hateful,  is  its  hateful  Nature;  and 
that  which  renders  Virtue  lovely,  is  its  amiable  Nature.  'Tis 
a  certain  Beauty  or  Deformity  that  are  inherent  in  that  good 
or  evil  Will,  which  is  the  Saul  of  Virtue  and  Vice,  (and  not 
in  the  Qccafion  of  it)  which  is  their  Worthinefs  of  Efteem  or 
Difeftecm,  Praife  or  Difpraifc,  according  to  the  common  Senfe 
of  Mankind.  If  the  Caufe  or  Occafion  of  the  Rife  of  an 
hateful  Difpofition  or  Aft  of  Will,  be  alfo  hateful ;  fuppofe 
another  antecedent  evil  Will ;  that  is  entirely  another  Sin, 
and  deferves  Puniihment  by  itfelf,  under  a  diftinft  Confide- 
ration.  There  is  Worthinefs  of  Difpraife  in  the  Nature  of  an 
evil  Volition,  and  not  wholly  in  fome  foregoing  Aft  which 
is  its  Caufe ;  otherwife  the  evil  Volition  which  is  the  Effeft, 
is  no  moral  Evil,  any  more  than  Sicknefs,  or  fome  other  na 
tural  Calamity,  which  arifes  from  a  Caufe  morally  evil. 

Thus 


196       The  EiTence  of  Virtue  and  Vi'ct>       Part  IV* 

Thus,  for  Inftance,  Ingratitude  is  hateful  and  worthy  of 
Difpraife,  according  to  common  Senfe  ;  not  becaufe  fomething 
as  bad,  or  worfe  than  ingratitude,  was  the  Caufe  that  produced 
k  ;  but  becaufe  it  is  hateful  in  itfelf,  by  its  own  inherent 
Deformity.  So  the  Love  of  Virtue  is  amiable,  and  worthy  of 
Praife,  not  merely  becaufe  fomething  elfe  went  before  this 
Love  of  Virtue  in  our  Minds,  which  caufed  it  to  take  Place 
there  ;  for  Inftance,  our  own  Choice  ;  we  chofe  to  love  Virtue, 
and  by  feme  Method  or  other  wrought  ourfeives  into  the 
Love  of  it  ;  but  becaufe  of  the  Amiablenefs  and  Gondecency 
of  fuch  a  Difpofition  and  Inclination  of  Heart.  If  that  was 
the  Cafe,  that  we  did  chufe  to  love  Virtue,  and  fo  produced 
that  Love  in  ourfeives,  this  Choice  itfelf  could  be  no  other- 
wife  amiable  or  praife-  worthy,  than  r.s  Love  to  Virtue,  or 
fome  other  amiable  inclinat  rcifed  and  implied  in 

it.     If  that  Choice  was  PZI  ailj    it  mud  be  fo  on  Ac 

count  of  fome  am"  ui  the  Nature  of  the  Choice* 

If  we  chofe  to  love  .  irtuej  L  :  in  love  to  Virtue,  or  any 
Thing  that  was  good,  and  exereifed  no  Sort  of  good  Difpofi 
tion  in  the  Choice,  the  Choice  itfelf  was  not  virtuous,  nor 
worthy  of  any  Praife,  according  to  common  Senfe,  becaufe 
the  Choice  was  net  of  a  good  Nature. 

It  may  not  be  improper  here  to  take  Notice  of  fomething 
faid  by  an  Author,  that  has  lately  made  a  mighty  Noife  in  Ame 
rica.  <(  A  neceffary  Holinefs  (fays  He  *)  is  no  Holinefs.  --- 
Adam  could  not  be  originally  created  in  Righteoufnefs  and 
true  Holinefs,  becaufe  He  muft  chufe  to  be  righteous,  before 
He  could  be  righteous.  And  therefore  He  muft  exift,  He 
rnuit  be  created,  yea  He  he  rnuft  exercife  Thought  and  Re 
flection,  before  he  was  righteous."  There  is  much  more 
to  the  fame  Effect  in  that  Place,  and  alfo  in  P.  437,  438,  439, 
440.  If  thefe  Things  are  fo,  it  will  certainly  follow,  that  the 
firft  chufing  to  be  righteous  is  no  righteous  Choice;  there 
is  no  Righteoufnefs  or  Holinefs  in  it  ;  becaufe  no  chufing  to 
be  righteous  goes  before  it.  For  He  plainly  fpeaks  of  chufing 
is  be  righteous  ,  as  what  mujl  go  before  Righteoufnefs  :  And  that 
which  follows  the  Choice,  being  the  Effecl  of  the  Choice, 
can't  be  Righteoufnefs  or  Holinefs  :  For  an  Effect  is  a  Thing 
neceffary,  and  can't  prevent  the  Influence  or  Efficacy  of  its 
Caufe  ;  and  therefore  is  unavoidably  dependent  upon  the 
Caufe  :  And  He  fays,  A  necejjary  Holinefs  is  no  Holinefs*  Sa 
that  neither  can  a  Choice  of  Righteoufnefs  be  Rigbteoufnefs  of 


Scrip.  Doc.  of  Original  Sint  P.  1  80.  3d  Edit. 


Sec.  I .  in  -the  Nature  of  Volition t  not  in  the  Caufe.    197 

Holinefs,  nor  can  any  Thing  that  is  confequent  on  that  Choice* 
and  the  Effect  of  it,  be  Righteoufnefs  or  Holinefs  ;  nor  can 
any  Thing  that  is  without  Choice,  be  Righteoufnefs  or  Holi 
nefs.  So  that  by  his  Scheme,  all  Righteoufnefs  and  Holinefs 
is  at  once  (hut  out  of  the  World,  and  no  Door  left  open,  by 
which  it  can  ever  poilibly  enter  into  the  World. 

I  fuppofe,  the  Way  that  Men  came  to  entertain  this  abfurd 
inconfiftent  Notion,  with  Refpecl:  to  internal  Inclinations  and 
Volitions  themfelves,  (or  Notions  that  imply  it)  *viz.  that  the 
Eflence  of  their  moral  Good  or  Evil  lies  not  in  theif  Nature, 
but  their  Caufe,  was,  that  it  is  indeed  a  very  plain  Dictate 
of  common  Senfe,  that  it  is  fo  with  Refpecl:  to  all  outward 
ASions  9  and  fenfible  Motions  of  the  Body ;  that  the  moral 
Good  or  Evil  of  them  don't  lie  at  all  in  the  Motions  them 
felves  •  which  taken  by  themfelves,  are  he-thing  of  a  moral 
Nature ;  and  the  Eifence  of  all  the  moral  Good  or  Evil  that 
concerns  them,  lies  in  thofe  internal  Difpofitions  and  Volitions 
which  are  the  Caufe  of  them.  Now  being  always  ufed  to  de 
termine  this;  without 'Hefitation  or  Difpute,  concerning  external 
Attions ;  which  are  the  Things  that  in  the  common  Ufe  of 
Language  are  fignified  by  fuch  Phrafes,  as  Men's  Asians,  or 
their  Doings :  Hence  when  they  came  to  fpeak  of  Volitions, 
and  internal  Exercijes  of  their  Inclinations,  under  the  fame  De 
nomination  of  their  Aftions,  or  what  they  do,  they  unwarily  de 
termined  the  Cafe  muft  alfo  be  the  fame  with  thefe,  as  with 
external  Afthns  ;  not  confidering  the  vaft  Difference  in  the  Na 
ture  of  the  Cafe. 

If  any  {hall  {till  objecl  and  {ay,  Why  is  it  not  neceflary  that 
the  Caufe  mould  be  confidered,  in  order  to  determine  whether 
any  Thing  be  worthy  of  Blame  or  Praife  ?  Is  it  agreeable  to 
Reafon  and  common  Senfe,  that  a  Man  is  to  be  praifed  or 
blamed  for  that  which  he  is  not  the  Caufe  or  Author  of,  and 
has  no  Hand  in  ? 

I  anfwer,  fuch  Phrafes  as  being  the  Caufe,  being  the  Author*. 
having  a  Hand,  and  the  like  are  ambiguous.  They  are  moft 
vulgarly  underftood  for  being  the  deligning  voluntary  Caufe, 
or  Caufe  by  antecedent  Choice  :  And  it  is  moft  certain  that 
Men  are  not  in  this,  Senfe  the  Caufes  or  Authors  of  the  firft: 
Aft  of  their  Wills,  in  any  Cafe  ;  as  certain  as  any  Thing  is, 
or  ever  can  be  ;  for  nothing  can  be  more  certain,  than  that  a 
Thing  is  not  before  it  is,  nor  a  Thing  of  the  fame  Kind  be 
fore  the  firft  Thing  of  that  Kind ;  and  fo  no  Choice  before 

C  c  the 


Arminian  Notion  of  Adlicn,      Part  ttf. 

the  firft  Choice. As  the  Phrafe,  being  the  Author,  may  be  un- 

derftood,  not  of  being  the  Producer  by  an  antecedent  Act  of 
Will ;  but  as  a  Perfon  may  be  faid  to  be  the  Author  of  the 
Acl  of  Will  itfelf,  by  his  being  the  immediate  Agent,  or  the 
Being  that  is  afting,  or  /*  Exercife  in  that  Ad  :  If  the  Phrafe 
of  being  the  Author,  is  ufed  to  fignify  this,  then  doubtlefs  com 
mon  Senfe  requires  Men's  being  the  Authors  of  their  own  Ac~ls 
of  Will,  in  order  to  their  being  efleemcd  worthy  of  Praife  or 
Difpraife  on  Account  of  them.  And  common  Senfe  teaches, 
that  they  mult  be  the  Authors  of  external  Aftiom,  in  the  former 
Sen-fe,  namely,  their  being  the  Caufes  of  them  by  an  Aft  of 
Will  or  Choice,  in  order  to  their  being  juftly  blamed  or  praifed : 
But  it  teaches  no  fucft  Thing  with  Refpeft  to  the  Ads  of  the 

Will  themfelves. But  this  may  appear  more  manifeft  by  the 

Things  which  will  be  obferved  in  the  following  Section. 


ECTION 

^•he  Falfemfs  and  Inconfiftence  oftbat  metaph\fical  No-- 
tion  of  Adlion,  and  Agency,  which  Je ems  to  be 
generally  entertained  ly  the  Defenders  of  the  Armi 
nian  -De Brine  concerning  Liberty,  moral  Agency ,  &c. 

ON  E  Thing  that  is  made  very  much  a  Ground  of  Argu 
ment  and  fuppofed  Demonftration  by  Armenians,  in  De 
fence  of  the  fore- mentioned  Principles,  concerning  moral 
Agency,  Virtue,  Vice,  &c.  is  their  metaphyfical  Notion  of 
Agency  and  Aftion..  They  fay,  unlefs  the  Soul  has  a  Self-deter 
mining  Power,  it  has  no  Power  of  Aftion  :  If  its  Volitions  be 
not  caufed  by  itfelf,  but  are  excited  and  determined  by  fome 
extrinfic  Caufe,  thy  can't  be  the  Soul's  own  Afts;  and  that  the 
Soul  can't  be  aftive,  but  mutt  be  wholly  pq//i<ve,  in  thofe  Ef- 
fe&s  which  it  is  the  Subjeft  of  neceflarily,  and  not  from  its  own 
fjee  Determination, 

Mrt- 


;Se<fL  II.  .fatfe  and  inconfiftcnt, 

Mr.  Chubb  lays  the  Foundation  of  his  Scheme  of  Liberty, 
;and  of  his  Arguments  to  fupport  it,  very  much  in  this  Pofitiort, 
That  Man  is  an  Agent,  and  capable  of  AB:on.  Which  doubtlefs 
is  true  :  But  Self-determination  belongs  to  his  Notion  of  Afihn-y 
and  is  the  very  Efience  of  it.  Whence  he  infers  that  it  is  impofii- 
ble  for  a  Man  to  aft  and  be  afted  upon,  in  the  fame  Thing, 
at  the  fame  Time ;  and  that  nothing  that  is  an  Aftion,  can  be 
the  Effect  of  the  Aftion  of  another :  And  he  infills,  that  a  ue- 
.cejjaiy  Agent,  or  an  Agent  that  is  necefiarily  determined  to  Ac1a 
is  ?i  plain  Coniradifiio?z. 

But  thofe  are  a  precarious  Sort  of  Demonftrations,  which 
.Men  bnild  on  the  Meaning  that  they  arbitrarily  affix  to  a  Word; 
.efpecially  when  that  Meaning  is"  abftrufe,  inconfiltent,  and  en 
tirely  diverfe  -from  the  original  Senfe  of  the  Word  in  common 
Speech. 

That  the  Meaning  of  the  Word  A&on,  as  Mr.  Ckubb  and 
many  ethers  ufe  it,  is  utterly  unintelligible  and  inconfifient,  is 
-manifeft,  becaufe  it  befengs  to  their  Notion  of  an  Aftion,  that 
'tis  fomething  wherein  is  no  Paffion  or  Pafllvenefs ;  that  isj 
(according  to  their  Senfe  of  Paffivenefs)  it  is  under  the 
Power,  Influence  or  Aftion  of  no  Caufe.  And  this  implies, 
that  Aftion  has  no  Caufe,  and  is  no  EfFeft  :  for  to  be  an 
EiTeft  implies  Pajfi^venefs,  or  the  being  fabjeft  to  the  Power  and 
Aftion  of  its  Caufe.  And  yet  they  hold,  that  the  Mind's 
Aciion  is  the  Effeft  of  its  own  Determination,  yea,  the  Mind's 
free  and  voluntary  Determination  \  which  is  the  fame  with 
free  Choice.  So  that  Aftion  is  the  Effeft  of  fomething  pre 
ceding,  even  a  preceding  Aft  of  Choice  :  And  confequently, 
in  this  EfFeft  the  Mind  is  paffive,  fubjeft  to  the  Power  and 
Action  of  the  preceding  Caufe,  which  is  the  foregoing  Choice, 
and  therefore  can't  be  active.  '  So  that  here  we  have  this  Con 
tradiction,  that  Action  is  always  the  Effect  of  foregoing  Choice ; 
and  therefore  can't  be  Action  ;  becaufe  it  is  pc>Jfi<ve  to  the 
Power  of  that  preceding  caufal  Choice  ;  a;td  the  Mind  can't 
he  active  and  paifive  in  the  fame  Thing,  at  the  fame  Time. 
Again,  they  fay,  NecefTity  is  utterly  inconfiftent  with  Action, 
and  a  neceffary  Action  is  a  Contradiction .;  and  fo  their  Notion 
of  Action  implies  Contingence,  and  excludes  all  Neceifity : 
And  therefore  their  Notion  of  Action  implies,  that  it  has  no 
neceffary  Dependence  or  Connection  with  any  Thing  forego 
ing  ;  for  fuch  a  Dependence  or  Connection  excludes  Contin 
gence,  and  implies  NecefBty.  And  yet  their  Notion  of  Action 
implies  Neceflity,  ar.U  fuppofes  that  it  is  neceflary,  and  can't  be 
C  c  3  contingent* 


200        The  Arminlan  Notion  cf  AtfKon,     Fart  IV. 

contingent.  For  they  fuppofe,  that  whatever  is  properly  called 
Adioir,  muft  be  determined  by  the  Will  and  free  Choice  ; 
and  this  is  as  much  as  to  fay,  that  it  muft  be  neceilary,  being 
dependent  upon,  and  determined  by  fomething  foregoing ; 
namely,  a  foregoing  Ad;  of  Choice.  Again,  it  belongs  to  their 
Notion  of  Action,  of  that  which  is  a  proper  and  mere  Aft, 
that  it  is  the  Beginning  of  Motion,  or  of  Exertion  of  Power  ; 
but  yet  it  is  implied  in  their  Notion  of  Action,  that  it  is  not 
the  Beginning  of  Motion  or  Exertion  of  Power,  but  is  confe- 
quent  and  dependent  on  a  preceding  Exertion  ot  Power,  viz,. 
the  Power  cf  Will  and  Choice  :  For  they  fay  there  is  no  pro 
per  Adion  but  what  is  freely  chafen ;  or,  which  is  the  fame 
Thing,  determined  by  a  foregoing  Ad  of  free  Choice.  But 
if  any  of  them  mall  fee  Caufe  to  deny  .this,  and  fay  they  hold 
no  fiich  Thing  as  that  every  Action  is  chofen,  or  determined  by 
a  foregoing  Choice  j  but  that  the  very  firft  Exertion  of  Will 
only,  undetermined  by  any  preceding  Ad,  is  properly  called 
Adion;  then  I  fay,  fuch  a  Man's  Notion  .of  Action  implies 
Neceiiity  :  For  what  the  Mind  is  the  Subjed  of  without  the 
[Determination  of  its  own  previous  Choice,  it  is  the  Subjed  cf 
jiecelfarily,  as  to  any  Hand  that  free  Choice  has  in  the  Affair  ; 
and  without  any  Ability  the  Mind  has  to  prevent  it,  by  any 
Will  or  Eledion  of  its  own  :  Becaufe  by  the  Suppofuion  it 
precludes  all  previous  Ads  of  the  Will  or  Choice  in  the  Cafe, 
which  might  prevent  it.  So  that  it  is  again,  in  this  other 
Way,  implied  in  their  Notion  of  Ad,  that  it  is  both  neceffary 
and  not  neceffary. — Again,  it  belongs  to  their  Notion  of  an  Atty 
that  it  is  no  Effect  of  a  pre- determining  Bias  or  Preponderation, 
but  fprings  immediately  out  of  Indifference  ;  and  this  implies 
that  it  can't  be  from  foregoing  Choice,  which  is  foregoing  Pre- 
ponderation  :  If  it  be  not  habitual,  but  occafional,  yet  if  it 
caufes  the  Ad,  it  is  truly  previous,  efficacious  and  determining. 
And  yet,  at  the  fame  Time,  'tis  effential  to  their  Notion  of  an 
Ad,  that  it  is  what  the  Agent  is  the  Author  of  freely  and  vo 
luntarily,  and  that  is,  by  previous  Choice  and  Defign. 

So  that  according  to  their  Notion  of  an  Act,  confidered  with 
Regard  to  its  Confequences,  thefe  following  Things  are  all 
effential  to  it ;  <viz.  That  it  mould  be  neceffary,  and  not  ne 
ceflary  ;  that  is  mould  be  from  a  Caufe,  and  no  Caufe  ;  that  it 
Jhould  be  the  Fruit  of  Choice  and  Defign,  and  not  the  Fruit  of 
Choice  and  Defign ;  that  it  mould  be  the  Beginning  of  Motion 
or  Exertion,  and  yet  confequent  on  previous  Exertion ;  that 
it  fnould  be  before  it  is ;  that  it  mould  fpring  immediately 
put  of  Indifference  and  Equilibrium,  and  yet  be  the  Effect  of 

Preponderation ; 


Sect.  II.  falfe  and  incovfiftent.  2Ot 

Preponderation  ;  that  it  (hould  be  felf-originated,  and  alfo 
have  its  Original  from  fo  me  thing  elfe  ;  that  it  is  what  the 
Mind  caufes  irfelf,  of  its  own  Will,  and  can  produce  or  pre 
vent,  according  to  its  Choice  or  Pleafure,  and  yet  what  the 
Mind  has  no  Power  to  prevent,  it  precluding  all  previous 
Choice  in  the  Affair. 

So  that  an  Act,  according  to  their  metaphyfical  Notion  of 
it,  is  fomething  of  which  there  is  no  Idea  ;  'tis  nothing  but 
a  Confufion  of  the  Mind,  excited  by  Words  without  any 
diftinci  Meaning,  and  is  an  abfolute  Non-entity  ;  and  that  in 
two  Refpedts  :  (i.)  There  is  nothing  in  the  World  that  ever 
was,  is,  or  can  be,  to  anfwer  the  Things  which  mull  belong  to 
its  Defcription,  according  to  what  they  fuppofe  to  be  elfential 
to  it.  And,  (2.)  There  neither  is,  nor  ever  was,  nor  can  be, 
any  Notion  or  Idea  to  anfwer  the  Word,  as  they  ufe  and  ex 
plain  it.  For  if  we  mould  fuppofe  any  fuch  Notion,  it  would 
many  Ways  deftroy  itfejf.  But  'tis  impoffible,  any  Idea  or 
Notion  Ihould  fubfift  in  the  Mind,  whofe  very  Nature  and 

Effence,    which  conftitutes  it,    deilroys  it. If  fome  learned 

Philofopher,  who  had  been  abroad,  in  giving  an  Account  of 
the  curious  Obfervations  he  had  made  in  his  Travels,  mould 
fay,  "  He  had  been  in  Terra  del  Fuego,  and  there  had  feen  an 
"  Animal,  which  he  calls  by  a  certain  Name,  that  begat  and 
"  brought  forth  itfelf,  and  yet  had  a  Sire  and  a  Dam  diftincl: 
"  from  itfelf;  that  it  had  an  Appetite,  and  was  hungry  before 
"  it  had  a  Being  ;  that  his  Mailer,  who  led  him,  and  govern- 
"  ed  him  at  his  Pleafure,  was  always  governed  by  him,  and 
"  driven  by  him  where  he  pieafed  ;  that  when  he  moved,  he 
*'  always  took  a  Step  before  the  firft  Step  ;  that  he  went  with 
"  his  Head  lint,  and  yet  always  went  Tail  foremoft  ;  and  this, 
*'  tho'  he  had  neither  Head  nor  Tail."  It  would  be  no  Impu 
dence  at  all,  to  tell  fuch  a  Traveller,  tho'  a  learned  Man,  that 
He  himfelf  had  no  Notion  or  Idea  of  fuch  an  Animal  as  he 
gave  an  Account  of,  and  never  had,  nor  never  would  have. 

As  the  foremention'd  Notion  of  Action  is  very  inconfiftent, 
fo  it  is  wholly  diverfe  from  the  original  Meaning  of  the  Word. 
The  more  ufual  Signification  of  it  in  vulgar  Speech,  feems  to 
be  fome  Motion  or  Exertion  of  Power,  that  is  voluntary,  or  that 
is  the  EJfed  of  the  Will;  and  is  u fed  in  the  fame  Senfe  as  doing : 
And  moft  commonly  'tis  ufed  to  fignify  outward  Afiions.  So 
Thinking  is  often  dillinguilhed  from  Atting ;  and  Defiring  and 
ffl 'tiling ,  from  Doing* 

Befides 


202      tte  Arminian  Notion  of  Action,     Part  IV, 

Befides  this  more  ufual  snd  proper  Signification  of  the  Word 
Action,  there  are  other  Ways  in  which  the  Worji  is  ufed  that 
are  lefs  proper,  which  yet  have  Place  in  common  Speech. 
Oftentimes  'tis  ufed  to  fignify  fome  Motion  or  Alteration  in 
inanimate  Things,  with  Relation  to  fome  Object  and  Effect. 
Go  the  Spring  of  a  Watch  is  faid  to  aft  upon  the  Chain  and 
Wheels ;  the  Sun-beams,  to  ad  upon  Plants  and  Trees  j 
and  the  Fire,  to  act  upon  Wood.  Sometimes  the  Word  is  ufed 
to  fignify  Motions,  Alterations,  and  Exertions  of  Power,  which 
are  feen  in  corporeal  Things,  conjldered  alfolutely  ;  efpecially 
when  thefe  Motions  feem  to  arife  from  fome  internal  Caufe 
which  is  hidden  ;  fo  that  they  have  a  greater  Refemblance  of 
thofe  Motions  of  our  Bodies,  which  are  the  Effects  of  internal 
Volition,  or  invifible  Exertions  of  Will.  Sp  the  Fermentation 
of  Liquor,  the  Operations  of  the  Loadftone,  and  of  electrical 
Bodies,  are  called  the  Adion  of  thefe  Things.  And  fometimes 
the  Word  Aftion  is*  ufed  to  fignify  the  Exercife  of  Thought, 
or  of  Will  and  Inclination  ;  fo  meditating,  loving,  hating,  in 
clining,  difinclining,  chafing  and  refufmg,  may  be  fometimes 
called  acting;  tho'  more  rarely  (unlefs  it  be  by  Philofcphers 
and  Metaphysicians)  than  in  any  of  the  other  Senfes. 

But  the  Word  is  never  ufed  in  vulgar  Speech  in  that  Senfe 
which  Arminian  Divines  ufe  it  in,  namely,  for  the  felf-deter- 
minate  Exercife  of  the  Will,  or  an  Exertion  of  the  Soul  that 
arifes  without  any  neceflary  Connection  with  any  Thing  fore 
going.  If  a  Man  does  fomething  voluntarily,  or  as  the  Effect 
of  his  Choice,  then  in  the  moft  proper  Senfe,  and  as  the  Word 
is  moft  originally  and  commonly  ufed,  he  is  faid  to  act :  But 
whether  that  Choice  or  Volition  be  felf-determined,  or  no, 
whether  it  be  connected  with  foregoing  habitual  Bias,  whether 
it  be  the  certain  Effect  of  the  ftrongeft  Motive,  or  fome  extrin- 
fick  Caufe,  never,  comes  into  Consideration  in  the  Meaning  of 
the  Word. 

And  if  the  Word  Action  is  arbitrarily  ufed  by  fome  Men 
othetwife,  to  fuit  fome  Scheme  of  Metaphyficks  or  Morality, 
no  Argument  can  reafonably  be  founded  on  fuch  a  Ufe  of  this 
Term,  to  prove  any  Thing  but  their  own  Pleafure.  For  Di 
vines  and  Philosophers  ftrenuoufly  to  urge  fuch  Arguments,  as 
tho*  they  were  fufficient  to  fupport  and  demonftrate  a  whole 
Scheme  of  moral  Philofophy  and  Divinity,  is  certainly  to  erect 
a  mighty  Edifice  on  the  Sand,  or  rather  on  a  Shadow.  And 
tho'  it  may  now  perhaps,  through  Cuftom,  have  becouie  natural 
for  them  to  ufe  the  Word  in  this  Senfe,  (if  that  may  be  called  a 

Senfe 


Sedl.  II.  ffilfe  and  incovjtfonf.  2CJ 

Senfe  or  Meaning,  which  is  fo  inconfiftent  with  itfelf)  yet 
this  don't  prove  that  it  is  agreeable  to  the  natural  Notions  Men 
have  of  Things,  or  that  there  can  be  any  Thing  in  the  Creation 
that  mould  anfwer  fuch  a  Meaning.  And  tho'  they  appeal  to 
Experience,  yet  the  Truth  is,  that  Men  are  fo  far  from  expe 
riencing  any  fach  Thing,  that  it  is  impoiiible  for  them  to  hare 
any  Conception  of  it, 

If  it  ftiould  be  objected,  that  Aftion  and  Paffion  are  doubtlefs< 
Words  of  a  contrary  Signification  ;  but  to  fuppofe  that  the 
Agent,  in  its  Action,  is  under  the  Power  arid  Influence  of 
fomething  extrinfick,  is  to  confound  Action  and  Paflion,  and 
make  them  the  fame  Thing. 

I  anfwer,.  That  Action  and  Paflion  are  doubtlefs,  as  they  are 
Sometimes  ufed,  Words  of  oppofite  Signification ;    but  not  as 
signifying  oppofite  Exifttnces,  but  only  oppofite  Relations.    The 
Words  Caufe  and  Effeff  are  Terms  of  oppofite  >  Signification  ; 
but  neverthelefs,  if  I  aflert  that  the  fame  Thing  may  at  the  feme 
Time,  in  different  Refpects  and  Relations,  be  both  Cau/e  and 
Effefi,  this   will  not    prove  that  I  confound  the  Terms.     The. 
Soul  may  be  both  aftwe  and  pajfiw  in  the  fame  Thing  in  dif 
ferent  Refpects,  a8i<ve  with  Relation  to  one  Thing,  andjX^w 
with  Relation  to  another.     The  Word  Paffion  when  fef  in  Op- 
pofition  to  A  ft  son  or  rather  A&vvenffs,  is  merely  a  relative  Term : 
It  fignifies  no  Effect  or  Caufe,  nor  any  proper  Exiftence  ;  but  is 
the  fame  with  Pajfivenefs,  or  a  being  paffive,  or  a  being  acted  up 
on  by  fomething  :  Which  is  a  mere  Relation  of  a  Thing  to  fome 
Power  or  Force  exerted  by  fome  Caufe,  producing  fome  Effect 
in  it,  or  upon  it.    And  Adion,  when  fet  properly  in  Qppofition 
to  Pajfiotty  or  Paffivenefs,  is  no  real  Exiftence ;  it  is  not  the  fame 
with  AN  Aflion,  but  is  a  mere  Relation  ;  'Tis  the  Afliwnefs  of 
fomething  on  another  Thing,    being  the  oppofite  Relation  to 
the  other,  viz.  a  Relation  of  Power,  or  Force  exerted  by  fome 
Caufe,  towards  another  Thing,    w«iich   is  the  Subject  of  the 
Effect  of  that  Power.     Indeed  the  Word  Aftion  is  frequently 
ufed  to  fignify  fomething  not  merely  relative,  but  mbre  abfolutey 
and  a  real  Exiftence  ;    as  when  we  fay  An  Aflion ;  when  the 
Word  is  not  ufed  tranfitively,  but  abfolutely,  for  fome  Motion 
or  Exercife  of  Body  or   Mind,  without  any  Relation  to  any 
Object  or  Effect :  And  as  ufed  thus,  it  is  not  properly  the  op 
pofite  of  PaJ/ion ;  which  ordinarily  fignifies  nothing  abfolute,,. 
but  merely  the  Relation  of  being  afled  upon.     And  therefore  i£ 
the  Word  ASion  be  ufed  in  the  like  relative  Senfe,  then  Actior* 
and  Paffion  are  only  two  contrary  Relations,     And  'tis  no  Ab- 

furdity. 


204         How  this  A^minian  Notion         Part  IV. 

furdity  to  fuppofe,  that  contrary  Relations  may  belong  to  the 
fame  Thing,  at  the  fame  Time,  with  Refped  to  different  Things. 
So  to  fuppofe,  that  there  are  Ads  of  the  Soul  by  which  a  Man 
voluntarily  moves,  and  Acts  upon  Objects,  and  produces  Effects, 
which  yet  themfelves  are  Effects  of  fomething  elfe,  and  wherein. 
the  Soul  itfelf  is  the  Objed  of  fomething  ading  upon,  and 
influencing  that,  don't  at  all  confound  Adion  and  Paffion. 
The  Words  mav  neverthelefs  be  properly  of  oppcfite  Signifi 
cation  :  'There  may  be  as  true  and  real'  a  Difference  between 
afting  and  being  caufed  to  afly  tho'  we  fhould  fuppofe  the  Soul 
to  be  both  in  the  fame  Volition,  as  there  is  between  living,  and 
Iming  quicken' d,  or  made  to  live.  3Tis  no  more  a  Contradiction,  to 
fuppofe  that  Adion  may  be  the  Effect  of  fome  other  Caufe, 
befides  the  Agent,  or  Being  that  ads,  than  to  fuppofe  that  Life 
may  be  ihe  Effect  of  fome  other  Caufe,  befides  the  Liver,  or 
the  Being  that  lives,  in  whom  Life  is  caufed  to  be. 

The  Thing  which  has  led  Men  into  this  inconfiftent  No 
tion  of  Adion,  when  applied  to  Volition,  as  tho'  it  were 
effential  to  this  internal  Adion,  that  the  Agent  fhould  be  fclf- 
determined  in  it,  and  that  the  Will  mould  be  the  Caufe  of  it, 
was  probably  this;  that  according  to  the  Seafe  of  Mankind, 
and  the  common  ufe  of  Language  it  is  fo,  with  refpecl  to- 
Men's  external  Adions  ;  which  are  what  originally,  and  ac 
cording  to  the  vulgar  ufe  and  moft  proper  Senfe  of  the  Word, 
are  called  Asians.  Men  in  thefe  are  felf-direded,  felf-deter- 
mined,  and  their  Will's  are  the  Caufe  of"  the  Motions  of  their 
Bodies,  -and  the  external  Things  that  are  done  ;  fo  that  unlefs 
Men  do  them  voluntarily,  and  of  Choice,  and  the  Action  be  de 
termined  by  their  antecedent  Volition,  it  is  no  Action  or  Doing 
of  theirs.  Hence  fome  Metaphyficians  have  been  led  unwarily, 
but  exceeding  abfurdly,  to  fuppofe  the  fame  concerning  Volition 
itfelf,  that  That  alfo  muft  be  determined  by  the  Will ;  which 
Is  to  be  determin'd  by  antecedent  Volition,  as  the  Motion  of 
the  Body  is  ;  not  confidering  the  Contradiction  it  implies. 

But  'tis  very  evident,  that  in  the  metaphyfical  Diftinction  be 
tween  Action  and  Faffion,  (tho'  long  fince  become  common  and 
the  general  Vogue)  due  Care  has  not  been  taken  to  conform 
Language  to  the  Nature  of  Things,  or  to  any  diftinct  clear 
Ideas.  As  it  is  in  innumerable  other  Philofophical,  Metaphy 
fical  Terms,  ufed  in  thefe  Difputes  ;  which  has  occafion'd  in- 
cxpreffiblc  Difficulty,  Contention,  Error  and  Confufion. 

And 


Sedl.  II.  probably  arofe. 

And  thus  probably  it  came  to  be  thought,  that  Neceffity  was 
inconfiftent  with  Action,  as  thefe  Terms  are  applied  to  Vo 
lition.  Firft,  thefe  Terms  Aftion  and  Neccffity  are  changed  from 
their  original  Meaning,  as  fignifying  external  voluntary  Action, 
and  Coriitraint,  (in  which  Meaning  they  are  evidently  incon 
fiftent)  to  fignify  quite  other  Things,  viz.  Volition  itfelf,  and 
Certainty  of  Exigence.  And  when  the  Change  of  Signification 
is  made,  Care  is  not  taken  to  make  proper  Allowances  and 
Abatements  for  the  Difference  of  Senfe ;  but  ftill  the  fame 
Things  are  unwarily  attributed  to  Action  and  Necejjity,  in  the 
new  Meaning  of  the  Words,  which  plainly  belonged  to  themjfi 
their  firft  Senfe  ;  and  on  this  Ground,  Maxims  are  eftablifhed 
without  any  real  Foundation,  as  tho'  they  were  the  moft  cer 
tain  Truths,  and  the  moft  evident  Dictates  of  Reafon. 

But  however  ftrenuouily  it  is  maintain'd,  that  what  is  necef- 
fary  can't  be  properly  called  Action^  and  that  a  neceffary 
Action  is  a  Contradiction,  yet  'tis  probable  there  are  few  Arnti~ 
man  Divines,  who,  if  thoroughly  tried,  would  ftand  to  thefe 
Principles.  They  will  allow^  that  God  is  in  the  higheft  Senfe 
an  active  Being,  and  the  higheft  Fountain  of  Life  and  Action  y 
and  they  would  not  probably  deny,  that  thofe  that  are  called 
God's  Acts  of  Righteoufnefs,  Holinefs  and  Faithfulnefs,  are 
truly  and  properly  God's  Acts,  and  God  is  really  a  holy  Agent 
in  them  :  and  yet  I  truft,  they  will  not  deny,  that  God  necef- 
farily  acts  juftly  and  faithfully,  and  that  it  is  impoffibie  foe 
Him  to  act  unrighteously  and  unholily. 


Dd  SECTION 


Why  Calvinifm  is  fuppofed      Part 


SECTION   III. 

¥be  Reafons  why  fome  think  it  contrary  to  com 
mon  Senfe,  to  fnppofe  tbofe  Things  which  are 
necefTary,  to  be  worthy  of  either  Praife  or  Blame- 

)HP*  I  S  abundantly  affirmed  and  urged  by  Arminian  Writers* 
JL  that  it  is  contrary  to  common  Senfe,  and  the  natural  No 
tions  and  Appreherfions  of  Mankind,  to  fuppofe  otherwife  than 
that  Neceffity  (making  no  Diftinction  between  natural  and  mo-< 
ral  Neceffity)  is  inconuftent  with  Virtue  and  Vice,  Praife  and 
Blame,  Reward  and  Puniftiment.  And  their  Arguments  from 
hence  have  been  greatly  triumphed  in ;  and  have  been  not  a 
Httle  perplexing  to  many  who  have  been  friendly  to  the  Truth, 
as  clearly  reveakd  in  the  holy  Scriptures :  It  has  feem'd  to  them 
indeed  difficult,  to  reconcile  Cakvbtiftjc  Doctrines  with  the 
Notions  Men  commonly  have  of  Juftice  and  Equity.  And  the 
true  Reafons  of  it  feem  to  be  thefe  that  follow  : 

I.  'Tis  indeed  a  very  plain  Dictate  of  common  Senfe,  that 
natural  Necefiity  is  wholly  inconfiftent  with  juft  Praife  or 
Blame.  If  Men  do  Things  which  in  themfelves  are  very 
good,  fit  to  be  brought -to  pafs,  and  very  happy  Effects,  pro 
perly  againft  their  Wills,  and  can't  help  it ;  or  do  them  from 
a  Neceffity  that  is-  without  their  Wills,  or  with  which 
their  Wills  have  no  Concern  or  Connection ;  then  'tis 
a  plain  Dictate  of  common  Senfe,  that  its  none  of  their 
Virtue,  nor  any  moral  Good  in  them  ;  and  that  diey  arc 
not  worthy  to  be  rewarded  or  praifed  ;  or  at  all  eueemed, 
honoured  or  loved  on  that  Account.  And  on  the  other 
Hand,  that  if  from  like  Neceffity  they  do  thofe  Things  which- 
in  Themfelves  are  very  unhappy  and  pernicious,  and  do  them1 
becaufe  they  can't  help  it ;  the  Neceffity  is  fuch,  that  it  is 
all  one  whether  they  will  them,  or  no  ;  and  the- Reafon  why 
they  are  done,  is  from  Neceffity  only,  and  not  from  their 
Wills  ;  'Tis  a  very  plain  Dictate  of  common  Senfe  that  they 
are  not  at  all  to  blame  ;  there  is  no  Vice,  Fault,  or  mora! 
SU.il  at  all  in  the  Effect  done  j  aor  are  they  who  are  thus 

ncceffitated 


Sedl.  III.         contrary  to  common  Senfe.          207 

neceffitated,    in  any  wife  worthy   to  be  punifhed,   hated,    o? 
in  the  leaft  difrefpefted,  on  that  Account. 

In  like  Manner,  if  Things  in  themfelves  good  and  defira* 
ble  are  abfolutely  impoffible,  with  a  natural  Impoffibiiity, 
the  univerfal  Reafon  of  Mankind  teaches,  that  this  wholly  and 
perfectly  excufes  Perfons  in  their  not  doing  them. 

And  'tis  alfo  a  plain  Dictate  of  common  Senfe,  that  if  the 
doing  Things  in  themfelves  Good,  or  avoiding  Things  in 
themfelves  Lvil,  is  not  abfolutely  impffible,  with  fuch  a  natural 
Impoffibiiity,  but  very  difficult,  with  a  natural  Pifficulty ;  that 
is,  a  Difficulty  prior  to,  and  not  at  all  confifting  in  Will  and 
Inclination  itfelf,  and  which  would  remain  the  fame,  let  the 
Inclination  be  what  it  will ;  then  a  Perfon's  Neglect  or  O- 
miilion  is  excufed  in  fame  Men/are,  tho'  not  wholly  ;  his  Sin  is 
lefs  aggravated,  than  if  the  Thing  to  be  done  were  eafy.  And 
if  inftead  of  Difficulty  and  Hindrance,  there  be  a  contrary  na» 
tural  Propenfity  in  the  State  of  Things,  to  the  Thing  to  be  done, 
or  Effect  to  be  brought  to  pafs,  abftrafted  from  any  Ccnfidera- 
tion  of  the  Inclination  of  the  Heart  ;  tho'  the  Propenfity  be 
not  fo  great  as  to  amount  to  a  natural  Neceffity ;  yet  being 
fome  Approach  to  it,  fo  that  the  doing  the  good  Thing  be 
very  much  from  this  natural  Tendency  in  the  State  of  Things, 
and  but  little  from  a  good  Inclination  ;  then  it  is  a  Dictate 
of  common  Senfe,  that  there  is  fo  much  the  lefs  Virtue  io. 
what  is  done;  and  fo  it  is  lefs  Praife- worthy  and  rewarda^ 
ble.  The  Reafon  is  eafy,  viz.  becaufe  fuch  a  natural  Propen 
fity  or  Tendency  is  an  Approach  to  natural  Neceffity  ;  and  the 
greater  -  the  Propenfity,  ftill  fo  much  the  nearer  is  the 
Approach  to  Neceffity.  And  therefore  as  natural  Neceffity 
takes  away  or  fhuts  out  all  Virtue,  fo  this  Propenfity  ap 
proaches  to  an  Abolition  of  Virtue  j  that  is,  it  diminijkes  it. 
And  on  the  other  Hand,  natural  Difficulty  in  the  State  of 
ThinJJfis  an  Approach  to  natural  Impoffibiiity.  And  as  the 
latter,  when  it  is  complete  and  abfolute,  wholly  takes  away 
Blame  ;  fo  fuch  Difficulty  takes  away  fome  Blame,  or  dimi-. 
nifties  Blame ;  and  makes  the  Thing  done  to  be  Jefs  worthy 
of  Punimment. 

II.  Men  in  their  firft  Ufe  of  fuch  Phrafes  as  thefe,  Muft, 
can't,  cant  help  it,  can't  avoid  it,  neceffary,  unable,  impoflible, 
unavoidable,  irrefeftible ,  &c.  ufe  them  to  fignify  a  Neceffity  of 
Conftraint  or  Reftraint,  a  natural  Neceffity  or  Impoffibiiity  ;  or 
fome  Neceffity  that  the  Will  has  nothing  to,  do  in  j  which 

D  4  3  "  may 


Why  Calvinifin  is-  Juppofed          Part  IV.. 

may  be,  whether  Men  will  or  no ;  and  which  may  be  fup- 
poied  to  be  juft  the  fame,  let  Men's  Inclinations  and  Defires 
be  what  they  will.  Such  Kind  of  Terms  in  their  original 
Ufe,  I  fuppofe  among  all  Nations,  are  relative  ;  carrying  in, 
their  Signification  (as  was  before  obferved)  a  Reference  or  Re- 
fpecl  to  fome  contrary  Will,  Defire  or  Endeavour,  which,  it  is 
fuppofed,  is,  or  may  be  in  the  Cafe.  All  Men  find,  and  be-, 
gin  to  find  in  early  Childhood,  that  there  are  innumerable 
Things  that  can't  be  done,  which  they  defire  to  do  ;  and  in 
numerable  Things  which  they  are  averfe  to,  that  muft  be, 
they  can't  avoid  them,  they  will  be,  whether  they  chufe  them 
or  no.  'Tis  to  exprefs  this  Neceffity,  which  Men  fo  foon 
and  fo  often  find,  and  which  fo  greatly  and  fo  early  affeds, 
them  in  innumerable  Cafes,  that  fucli  Terms  and  Phrafes 
are  firft  formed ;  and  •  'tis  to  fignify  fuch  a.  Neceffity,  that 
they  are  firlt  ufed,  and  that  they  are  moft  conftantly  ufed,  in 
the  common  Affairs  of  Life ;  and  not  to  fignify  any  fuch  me- 
taphyfical,  fpeculative  and  abftraft  Notion,  as  that  Connection 
in  the  Nature  or  Courfe  of  Things,  which  is  between  the 
Subjed  and  Predicate  of  a  Propofition,  and  which  is  the  Foun 
dation  of  the  certain  Truth  of  that  Propofition ;  to  lignify 
which,  they  who  employ  themfelves  in  Philofophical  Inqui 
ries  into  the  firft  Origin  and  Metaphyfical  Relations  and 
Dependences  of  Things,  have  borrowed  thefe  Terms,  for 
want  of  others.  But  we  grow  up  from  our  Cradles  in  a  Ufe 
of  fuch  Terms  and  Phrafes,  entirely  different  from  this,  and 
carrying  a  Senfe  exceeding  diverfe  from  that  in  which  they  are 
commonly  ufed  in  the  Controverfy  between  Arminians  and 
Calvinifts.  And  it  being,  as  was  faid  before,  a  Dictate  of 
the  univerfal  Senfe  of  Mankind,  evident  to  us  as  foon  as  we 
begin  to  think,  that  the  Neceffity  fignified  by  thefe  Terms,  in 
the  Senfe  in  which  we  firft  learn  them,  does  excufe  Perfons, 
and  free  them  from  all  Fault  or  Blame  :  Hence  our  Idea's  of 
Excufablenefs  or  Faultlefnefs  is  tied  to  thefe  Tern^  and 
Phrafes  \yy  a  ftrong  Habit,  which  is  begun  in  ChikflRd  as, 
foon  as  we  begin  to  fpeak,  and  grows  up  with  us,  and  is 
ilrengthned  by  conftant  Ufe  and  Cuftom,  the  Connection, 
growing  ftronger  and  ftronger. 

The  habitual  Connection  which  is  in  Men's  Minds  be 
tween  Blamelefnefs  and  thofe  foremention'd  Terms,  Muji, 
cann-jtt  unable,  necej/ary,  impoffible,  unavoidable,  &c.  becomes  very 
ftrong ;  becaufe  as  foon  as  ever  Men  begin  to  ufe  Reafon 
and  Speech,  they  have  Occafion  to  excufe  themfelves,  from 
the  natural  Neceffity  fignified  by  thefe  Terms,  in  numerous 

Jnftaaces ;. 


Se6L  III.      contrary  to  common  Senfe.  209 

inftances: 1  can  t  do  it- 1  could  not  help  it. And  alj 

Mankind  have  conftant  and  daily  Occafion  to  ufe  fuch  Phrafes 
in  this  Senfe,  to  excufe  themfelves  and  others  in  almoft  all  the 
Concerns  of  Life,  with  Refpect  to  Difappointments,  and 
Things  that  happen  which  concern  and  nifect  us  and  others, 
that  are  hurtful,  or  difagreeable  to  us  or  them,  or  Things  de- 
firable  that  we  or  others  fail  of. 

That  a  being  accuftomed  to  an  Union  of  different  Ideas, 
from  early  Childhood,  makes  the  habitual  Connection  ex 
ceeding  ftfong,  as  tho'  fuch  Connection  were  owing  to  Nature* 
is  manifcft  in  innumerable  Inftances.  It  is  altogether  by  fuch 
an  habitual  Connection  of  Ideas,  that  Men  judge  of  the  Big- 
nefs  or  Diftance  of  the  Objects  of  Sight  from  their  Appearance. 
Thus  'tis  owing  to  fcch  a  Connection  early  eftabiifhed,  and 
growing  up' with  a  Perfon,  that  he  judges  a  Mountain,  which 
he  fees  at  ten  Miles  diftance,  to  be  bigger  than  his  Nofe,  or 
further  off  than  the  End  of  it.  Having  been  ufed  fo  long  to 
join  a  confiderable  Dirtance  and  Magnitude  with  fuch  an  Ap 
pearance,  Men  imagine  it  is  by  a  Dictate  of  natural  Senfe : 
Whereas  it  would  be  quite  ptherwife  with  one  that  had  his  Eyes 
newly  opened,  who  had  been  born  blind  :  He  would  have  the 
fame  vifible  Appearance,  but  natural  Senfe  would  dictate  no 
fuch  Thing  concerning  the  Magnitude  or  Diftance  of  what 
appeared. 

III.  When  Men,  a,fter  they  had  been  fo  habituated  to  connect 
Ideas  of  Innocency  or  Blamelefnefs  with  fuch  Terms,  that  the 
Union  feems  to  be  the  Effect  of  mere  Nature,  come  to  hear  the 
fame  Terms  ufed,  and  learn  to  ufethem  themfelves  in  the  fore- 
rnention'd  new  and  metaphyfical  Senfe,  to  fignify  quite  another 
Sort  of  Neceffity,  which'  has  no  fuch  Kind  of  Relation  to  a 
contrary  fuppofable  Will  and  Endeavour  ;  the  Notion  of  plain 
and  n^nifeft  Blamelefnefs,  by  this  Means,  is  by  a  ftrong  Pre- 
judidBBnfenfibly  and  unwarily  transfer'd  to  a  Cafe  to  which  it 
by  no  Means  belongs :  The  Change  of  the  Ufe  of  the  Terms, 
to  a  Signification  which  is  very  diverfe,  not  being  taken  No 
tice  of,  or  adverted  to.  And  there  are  feveral  Reafons  why  it 
is  not. 

i.  The  Terms,  as  ufed  by  Philofophers,  are  not  very  diftinft 
and  clear  in  their  Meaning:  few  ufe  them  in  a  fix'd  deter 
mined  Senfe.  On  the  contrary,  their  Meaning  is  very  vague 
and  confufed,  Which  is  what  commonly  happens  to  the 

Words 


m 

?io          Why  Calvinifm  Is  fuppcfed        Part  IV,, 

Words  ufed  to  fignify  Things  intellectual  and  moral,  and  to 
exprefs  what  Mr.  Locke  calls  mixt  Modes,  if  Men  had  a  clear 
and  diftinct  Underitanding  of  what  is  intended  by  thefe  meta- 
phyfical  Terms,  they  would  be  able  more  eafily  to  compare 
them  with  their  original  and  common  Senfe  ;  and  fo  would  not 
be  fo  eafily  cheated  fry  them.  The  Minds  of  Men  are  fo  eafily 
Jed  into  Deluficn  by  no  .  Sort  of  Terms  in  the  World,  as  by 
Words  of  this  Sort. 

2.  The  Change  of  the  Signification  of  the  Terms  is  the 
Tnore  infenfible,  becaufe  the  1  hings  iignified,  tho'  indeed  very 
different,  yet  do  in  fome  generals  agree.  In  Nectffitj,  that 
which  is  'vulgarly  fo  called,  there  is  a  ftrong  Connection  be 
tween  the  Thing  faid  to  be  NeceiFary,  and  fomething  antece-r 
dent  to  it,  in  the  Order  of  Nature  ;  fo  there  is  alfo  in  philo- 
fophical  Necejfitj.  And  tho'  in  both  Kinds  of  Neceffity,  the. 
Connection  can't  be  called  by  that  Name,  with  Relation  to 
an  oppofite  Will  or  Endeavour,  to  which  it  is  fuperiour  ; 
which  is  the  Cafe  in  vulgar  Neceffity ;  yet  in  both,  the  Con 
nection  is  prior  to  Will  and  Endeavour,  and  fo  in  fome  Re-* 
fyz&.  fuperiour.  In  both  Kinds  of  Neceffity  there  is  a  Foun 
dation  for  fome  Certainty  of  the  Propofition  that  affirms  the. 
gvent. — r — The  Terms  ufed  being  the  fame,  and  the  Things 
(ignified  agreeing  in  thefe  and  fome  ether  general  Circumftances, 
and  the  Expreffions  as  ufe4  by  Philofophers  being  not  well  de- 
figned,  and  fo  of  obfcure  and  loofe  Signification  ;  hence  Per- 
fons  are  not  aware  of  the  great  Difference ;  and  the  Notions  of 
Innocence  or  Faultlefnefs,  which  were  fo  ftrongly  aflbciated 
with  them,  and  were  Itriclly  united  in  their  Minds,  ever  fince 
they  can  remember,  remain  united  with  them  ftill,  as  if  the 
Union  were  altogether  natural  and  neceflary  ;  and  they  that  go 
about  to  make  a  Separation,  feem  to  them  to  do  great  Violence, 
even  to  Nature  itfelf. 

IV.  Another  Reafon  why  it  appears  difficult  to  recttfle  it 
with  Reafon,  that  Men  mould  be  blamed  for  that  wriich  is. 
neceflary  with  a  moral  Neceffity  (which  as  was  obferved  before 
is  a  Species  of  Philofophical  Neceffity)  is,  that  for  want  of 
due  Confideration,  Men  inwardly  entertain  that  Apprehenfion, 
that  this  Neceffity  may  be  againft  Men's  Wills  and  fincere  En 
deavours.  They  go  away  with  that  Notion,  that  Men  may  truly 
will  and  wifli  and  drive  that  it  may  be  otherwife ;  but  that 
invincible  Neceffity  (lands  in  the  Way.  And  many  think  thus 
concerning  themfelves  :  Some  that  are  wicked  Men  think  they 
wifh  that  they  were  good,  that  they  loved  God  and  Holinefs ; 

but 


6e6t.  III.       contrary  to  common  Senfe.  21! 

but  yet  don't  find  that  their  Wiihes  produce  the  EfFecl. 

The  Reafons  why  Men  think  thus,  are  as  follows,   (i.)  They 
find  what  may  be  called  an  indirect  Willingnejs  to  have  a  better    ' 
Will  in  "the   Manner  before  obferved  :    Fcr  it  is  impoffible, 
and  a  Contradiction  to  fuppofe  the  Will  to  be  directly  and 
properly  againft  itfelf.     And  they  don't  coniider,  that  this  in* 
direct  Willingnefs  is  entirely  a   different  Thing  from  properly 
willing  the  1  hing  that  is  the  Duty  and  Virtue  required ;  and 
that  there  is  no  Virtue  in  that  Sort  of  Willingnefs  which  they 
have.     They  don't  confider,  that  the  Volitions  which  a  wicked 
Man  may  have  that  he  loved  God,    are  no  Acts  of  the  Will 
at  all  againft  the  moral  Evil  of  not  loving  God  ;    but  only 
fome  difagreeable  Confequences  :    But  the  making  the  requifite 
Diftinction  requires   more   Care  of  Reflection   and   Thought 
than  moft  Men  are  ufed  to.     And  Men  through  a  Prejudice  in 
their  own  Fa.vour,    are  difpofed  to  think   well  of  their  own 
Defires   and    Difpofitions,  and  to  account  them  good  and  vir 
tuous,  tho'  their  Refpect  to  Virtue  be  only  indirect  and  remote* 
and  'tis  nothing  at  all  that  is  virtuous  that  truly  excites  or  ter 
minates  their  Inclinations.     (2.)  Another  Thing  that  infenfibly 
leads    and  beguiles  Men  into  a  Suppofition    that  this  moral 
Neceffity  or  Impodibility  is,    or  may  be  againft  Men's  Wills, 
and  true  Endeavours,  is  the  Derivation  and  Formation  of  ths 
Terms  themfelves,    that  are  often  ufed   to  exprefs  it,  which 
is  fuch  as  feems  directly  to  point  to,  and  hold  this  fortlt.  Such 
Words,    for  Inilance,    as  unable,  unavoidable,  impojjible,  irre- 
fiftible ;  which  carry  a  plain  Reference  to  a  fuppofable  Power 
exerted,  Endeavours  ufed,    R.efiftance  made,  in  Oppofition  to 
the  Neceffity  :  And  the  Perfons  that  hear  them,  not  confidering 
nor  fufpecting  but  that  they  are  ufed  in  their  proper  Senfe  :  That 
Senfe  being  therefore  underftood,  there  does  naturally,  and  as 
it  were  neceflarily  arife  in   their  Minds   a  Suppofition  that  if 
may  be  fo  ii-Jeed,    that  true  Defires  and  Endeavours  may  take 
Place,    but  that  invincible  Neceffity  fcands  in  the  Way,  and 
rendeAthem  vain  and  to  no  Effect. 

V.  Anothe'r  Thing  which  makes  Perfons  more  ready  to 
fuppofe  it  to  be  contrary  to  Reafon,  that  Men  mould  be  ejc- 
pofed  to  the  Punilhments  threaten'd  to  Sin,  for  doing  thofe 
Things  which  are  morally  neceffary,  or  not  doing  thofe 
Things  morally  impoffible,  is,  that  Imagination  ftrengthens  the 
Argument,  and  adds  greatly  to  the  Power  and  Influence  of 
the  feeming  Reafons  againft  it,  from  the  greatnefs  of  that 
Punimment.  To  allow  that  they  may  be  juftly  expofed  to  a 
fmall  Punifament,  would  not  be  fo  difficult.  Whereas,  if  there 

were 


£12  Neceffary  Virtue  y  &c.  Part  IV; 

were  any  good  Reafon  in  the  Cafe,  if  it  were  truly  at  Dictate  of 
Reafon  that  fuch  Neceility  was  inconfiftent  with  Faultinefs,  or 
juft  Puniihment,  the  Demonftration  would  be  equally  certain 
with  refpect  to  a  fmall  Pumfhment,  or  any  Punifhment  at  all, 
as  a  very  great  one  :  But  it  is  not  equally  eafy  to  the  Imagi 
nation.  They  that  argue  againft  the  Juftice  of  damning  Meri 
for  thofe  Things  that  are  thus  neceiTary,  feem  to  make  their 
Argument  the  itronger,  by  fetting  forth  the  Greatnefs  of  the 

Puniihment  in  ftrong  £xpreiTions : That  a  Man/hould  be  caft 

into  eternal  Earnings,  that  he  .Jhould  be  made  to  fry  in  Hell  to  ell 
Eternity ,  for  thofe  9  kings  njohich  He  had  no  Po-iver  to  avoid,  and 
under  a  fatal y  unfruftrable ,  invincible  NeceJJity  of  doing. — — 


SECTION     IV^ 

//  is  agreeable  to  common  Senfe,  and  the  natu 
ral  Notions  of  Mankind,  to  Juppofe  moral  Ne- 
cejfity  to  be  confiftent  with  Praife  and  Blame, 
Reward  and  Ptmijkment.  . 

WHETHER  the  Reafons  that  have  been  given, 
why  it  appears  difficult  to  fome  Perfons  to  reconcile 
with  common  Senfe  the  praiiing  or  blaming,  rewarding  or 
punifhing  thofe  Things  which  are  morally  neceflary,  are 
thought  fatisfactory,  or  not ;  yet  it  moft  evidently  appears  by 
the  following  Things,  that  if  this  Matter  be  rightly  underftood, 
fetting  afide  ail  Delufion  arifmg  from  the  Impropriety  and 
Ambiguity  of  Terms,  this  is  not  at  all  inconfiftent  with  the 
natural  Apprehenfioiis  of  Mankind,  and  that  Senfe  of  Things 
which  is  found  every  where  in  the  common  People,  who  arc 
furtheft  from  having  their  Thoughts  preverted  from  their  natu 
ral  Channel,  by  metaphyfical  and  philosophical  Subtilties  ;  but 
on  the  contrary,  altogether  agreeable  tot  and  the  very  Voice 
and  Dictate  of  this  natural  and  vulgar  Senfe. 

I.  This  will  appear  if  we  confider  what  the  vulgar  Notion  of 
Blame-wortbinefs  is.    The  Idea   which    the  common  Peopls 

through 


Sed:.  IV>         agreeable  to  common  Senfe.         213 

through  all  Ages  and  Nations  have  of  Faultinefs,  I  fuppofe  to 
be  plainly  this  j  A  Perfon  s  being  or  doing  wrong,  with  his  own 
Will  and  Pleafure  ;  containing  thefe  two  Things  ;  I .  His  doing 
wrong,  when  he  does  as  he  plcafss.  2.  His  P/eafure's  being  wrong. 
Or  in  other  Words,  perhaps  more  intelligibly  exprefling  their 
Notion  j  A  Perfon  s  having  his  Heart  wrong,  and  doing  wrong 
from  his  Heart.  Arid  this  is  the  Sum  total  of  the  Matter. 

The  common  People  don't  afcend  up  in  their  Reflections  and 
Abft ractions,  to  the  rnetaphyfical  Sources,  Relations  and  De 
pendences  of  Things,  in  order  to  form  their  Notion  of  Faul 
tinefs  or  Blame-worthinefs.  They  don't  wait  till  they  have 
decided  by  their  Refinings,  what  firil  determines  the  Will ; 
whether  it  be  determined  by  fomething  extrinfic,  or  intrinfic  ; 
whether  Volition  determines  Volition,  or  whether  the  Under- 
ftanding  determines  the  Will ;  whether  there  be  any  fuch 
Thing  as  Metaphyficians  mean  by  Contingence,  (if  they  have 
any  Meaning ;)  whether  there  be  a  Sort  of  a  ftrange  unac- 
dountable  Sovereignty  in  the  Will,  in  the  Exercife  of  which, 
by  its  own  fovereign  Acts,  it  brings  to  pafs  all  its  own  fove- 
reign  Acts.  They  don't  take  any  Part  of  their  Notion  of 
Fault  or  Blame  from  the  Refolution  of  any  fuch  Queftions.  If 
this  were  the  Cafe,  there  are  Multitudes,  yea  the  far  greater 
Part  of  Mankind,  nine  Hundred  and  ninety-nine  out  of  a 
Thocfand  would  live  and  die  without  having  any  fuch 
Notion  as  that  of  Fault  ever  entring  into  their  Heads,  or  with 
out  fo  much  as  once  having  any  Conception  that  any  Body 
was  to  be  either  blamed  or  commended  for  any  Thing.  To 
be  fure,  it  would  be  a  long  Time  before  Men  came  to  have 
ftich  Notions.  Whereas  'tis  manifeft,  they  are  fome  of  the  firft 
Notions  that  appear  in  Children ;  who  difcover  as  foon  as 
they  can  think,  or  fpeak,  or  act  at  all  as  rational  Creatures, 
a  Senfe  of  Defert.  And  certainly,  in  forming  their  Notion  of 
it,  they  make  no  ufe  of  Metaphyficks.  All  the  Ground  they 
go  upon  eonftfts  in  thefe  two  Things  ;  Experience,  and  a  natu 
ral  Senfation  of  a  certain  Fitnefs  or  Agreeablenefs  which  there  is 
in  uniting  fuch  moral  Evil  as  is  above  defcribed,  *uiz.  a  being 
or  doing  wrong  with  the  Will,  and  Refentment  in  others,  and 
Pain  inflicted  on  the  Perfon  in  whom  this  moral  Evil  is. 
Which  natural  Senfe  is  what  we  call  by  the  Name  of  Confcience* 

'Tis  true,  the  common  People  and  Children,  in  their  Notion 
of  a  faulty  Act  or  Deed  of  any  Perfon,  do  fuppofe  that  it  is 
the  Perfon's  own  Act  and  Deed.  But  this  is  all  that  belongs  to 
what  they  underftand  by  a  Thing's  being  a  Perfon's  own  Deed  or 

E  e  Action  ; 


214  Neceffary  Virtue,  &c.  Part  IV; 

Aftion;  even  that  it  is  fomething  done  by  him  of  Choice. 
That  fome  Exercife  or  Motion  fhould  begin  of  itfelf,  don't 
belong  to  their  Notion  of  an  /iflion,  or  Doing.  If  fo,  it  would 
belong  to  their  Notion  of  it,  that  it  is  fomething  which  is  the 
Caufe  of  its  own  Beginning:  And  that  is  as  much  as  to  fay, 
that  it  is  before  it  begins  to  be.  Nor  is  their  Notion  of  an 
Atlion  fome  Motion  or  Exercife  that  begins  accidentally,  with 
out  any  Caufe  or  Reafon ;  for  that  is  contrary  to  one  of  the 
prime  Dictates  of  common  Senfe,  namely,  that  every  Thing 
that  begins  to  be,  has  fome  Caufe  or  Reafon  why  it  is. 

The  common  People,  in  their  Notion  of  a  faulty  or 
praife-worthy  Deed  or  Work  done  by  any  one,  do  fup- 
pofe  that  the  Man  does  it  in  the  Exercife  of  Liberty.  But 
then  their  Notion  of  Liberty  is  only  a  Perfon's  having  Oppor 
tunity  of  doing  as  he  pleafes.  They  have  no  Notion  of  Liber 
ty  confifting  in  the  Will's  firft  afting,  and  fo  caufing  its  own 
Afts;  and  determining,  and  fo  caufing  its  own  Determina 
tions  ;  or  chufing.,.  and  fo  caufing  its  own  Choice.  Such  a 
Notion  of  Liberty  is  what  none  have,  but  thofe  that  have 
darken'd  their  own  Minds  with  confufed  metaphyfical  Specu 
lation,  and  abftrafe  and  ambiguous  Terms.  If  a  Man  is  not 
reftrain'd  from  afting  as  his  Will  determines,  or  conftrain'd  to 
aft  otherwife  ;  then  he  has  Liberty,  according  to  common  No 
tions  of  Liberty,  without  taking  into  the  Idea  that  grand  Con 
tradiction  of  all  the  Determinations  of  a  Man's  free  Will  being 

the  Effects  of  the  Determinations  of  his  free  Will. Nor 

have  Men  commonly  any  Notion  of  Freedom  confifting  in  In 
difference.  For  if  fo,  then  it  would  be  agreeable  to  their  No 
tion,  that  the  greater  Indifference  Men  ad  with,  the  more 
Freedom  they  aft  with  ;  whereas  the  Reverfe  is  true.  He  that 
in  afting,  proceeds  with  the  fulleft  Inclination,  does  what  He 
does  with  the  greateft  Freedom,  according  to  common  Senfe. 
And  fo  far  is  it  from  being  agreeable  to  common  Senfe,  that 
fuch  Liberty  as  confifts  in  Indifference  is  requifite  to  Praife  or 
Blame,  that  on  the  contrary,  the  Diftate  of  every  Man's  natu 
ral  Senfe  thro'  the  World  is,  that  the  further  he  is  from  being 
indifferent  in  his  afting  Good  or  Evil,  and  the  more  he  does 
either  with  full  and  flrong  Inclination,  the  more  is  he  efteemed 
or  abhorred,  commended  or  condemned. 

II.  If  it  were  inconfiftent  with  the  common  Senfe  of  Man 
kind,  that  Men  mould  be  either  to  be  blamed  or  commend 
ed  in  any  Volitions  they  have  or  fail  of,  in  Cafe  of  moral 
Necefiity  or  Impoffibility  ;  then  it  would  furely  alfo  be  agreea 
ble  to  the  fame  Senfe  and  Reafon  c£  Mankind,  that  the  near 
er- 


Se<fh  IV.     agreeable  to  common  Senfe.  21  £ 

er  the  Cafe  approaches  to  fuch  a  moral  Neceffity  or  Impofli- 
bility,  either  through  a  rtrong  antecedent  moral  Propenfity 
on  the  one  Hand,  *  or  a  great  antecedent  Oppofition  and 
Difficulty  on  the  other,  the  nearer  does  it  approach  to  a  being 
neither  blameable  nor  commendable  ;  fo  that  Ads  exerted 
with  fuch  preceding  Propenfity  would  be  worthy  of  propor- 
tionably  lefs  Praife  ;  and  when  omitted,  the  Aft  being  attend 
ed  with  fuch  Difficulty,  the  Omiffion  would  be  worthy  of  the 
lefs  Blame.  It  is  fo,  as  was  obferved  before,  with  natural 
Neceflity  and  Impolfibility,  Propenfity  and  Difficulty  :  As  'tis 
a  plain  Dictate  of  the  Senfe  of  all  Mankind,  that  natural  Ne- 
ceifity  and  Jmpoffibility  takes  away  all  Blame  and  Praife  ;  and 
therefore,  that  the  nearer  the  Approach  is  to  thefe  through 
previous  Propenfity  or  Difficulty,  fo  Praife  and  Blame  are 
proportionably  diminijhed.  And  if  it  were  as  much  a  Didate 
of  common  Senfe,  that  moral  Neceffity  of  doings  or  Impoffi- 
bility  of  avoiding,  takes  away  all  Praife  and  Blame,  as  that 
natural  Neceffity  or  Impoffibility  does  this;  then,  by  a  perfed 
Parity  of  Reafon,  it  would  be  as  much  the  Didate  of  common 
Senfe,  that  an  Approach  to  moral  Neceffity  of  doing,  or  Im 
poffibility  of  avoiding,  diminijhes  Praife  and  Blame,  as  that 
an  Approach  to  natural  Neceffity  and  Impoffibility  does  fo. 
'Tis  equally  the  Voice  of  common  Senfe,  that  Perfons  are 
fxcufable  in  Part,  in  neglecting  Things  difficult  againft  their 
Wills,  as  that  they  are  excujMe  wholly  in  negleding  Things 
impoffible  againft  their  Wills.  And  if  it  made  no  Difference, 
whether  the  Impoffibility  were  natural  and  againft  the  Will,  or 
moral,  lying  in  the  Will,  with  regard  to  Excufablenefs ;  fo 
neither  would  it  make  any  Difference,  whether  the  Difficulty, 
or  Approach  to  Neceffity  be  natural  againft  the  Will,  or  rnora!A 
lying  in  the  Propenfity  of  the  Will. 

But  'tis  apparent,  that  the  Reverfe  of  thefe  Things  is  true. 
If  there  be  an  Approach  to  a  moral  Neceffity  in  a  Man's  Ex 
ertion  of  good  Ads  of  Will,  they  being  the  Exercife  of  a 
ftrong  Propenfity  to  Good,  and  a  very  powerful  Love  to  Vir 
tue;  'tis  fo  far  from  being  the  Didate  of  common  Senfe,  that 
He  is  lefs  virtuous,  and  the  lefs  to  be  etteem'd,  loved  and 
•praifed  ;  that  'tis  agreeable  to  the  natural  Notions  of  all  Man 
kind  that  he  is  fo  much  the  better  Man,  worthy  of  greater 
Refped,  and  higher  Commendation.  And  the  ftronger  the 
JncUnation  is,  and  the  nearer  it  approaches  to  Neceffity  in  that 
E  e  3  Refped, 

*  'Tis  here  argued,  on  Suppofition  that  not  all  Propenfity  implies  moral 
^eceffity,  but  only  fomc   very  high  Degrees  ;  which  none  will  deny. 


2i  6  Neceflary  Virtue,  &c.  Part  IV. 

Refpeft,  or  to  Impoffibility  of  neglefting  the  virtuous  Aft,  or  of 
doing  a  vicious  one ;  ftill  the  more  virtuous,  and  worthy  of 
higher  Commendation.  And  on  the  other  Hand,  if  a  Man 
exerts  evil  Ads  of  Mind;  as  for  Inftarice,  Afts  of  Pride  or 
Malice,  from  a  rooted  and  Itrong  Habit  or  Principle  of  Haugh- 
tinefs  and  Malicioufnefs,  and  a  violent  Propenfiiy  of  Heart  to 
fuch  Afts ;  according  to  the  natural  Senfe  of  all  Men,  he  is 
fo  far  from  being  the  lefs  hateful  and  blameable  on  that  Ac 
count,  that  he  is  fo  much  the  more  worthy  to  be  detefted  and 
condemned  by  all  that  obferve.Him. 

Moreover,  'tis  manifeft  that  it  is  no  Part  of  the  Notion, 
which  Mankind  commonly  have  of  a  blameable  or  Praife- 
worthy  Ad  of  the  Will,  that  it  is  an  Aft  which  is  not  deter 
mined  by  an  antecedent  Bias  or  Motive,  but  by  the  fovereign 
Power  of  the  Will  itfelf;  becaufe  if  fo,  the  greater  Hand 
fuch  Caufes  have  in  determining  any  Aft  of  the  Will,  fo  much 
the  lefs  virtuous  or  vicious  would  they  be  accounted  ;  and 
the  lefs  Hand,  the  more  virtuous  or  vicious.  Whereas  the 
Heverfe  it  true  :  Men  don't  think  a  good  Aft  to  be  the  lef; 
praife-worthy,  for  the  Agent's  being  much  determined  in  it  by 
a  good  Inclination  or  a  good  Motive,  but  the  more.  And  if 
good  Inclination  or  Motive  has  but  little  Influence  in  deter 
mining  the  Agent,  they  don't  think  his  Aft  fo  much  the  more 
virtuous,  but  the  lefs.  And  fo  concerning  evil  Afts,  which  are 
determined  by  evil  Motives  or  Inclinations. 

Yea,,  if  it  be  fuppofed  that  good  or  evil  Difpofitions  are  im 
planted  in  the  Hearts  of  Men  by  Nature  itfelf,  (which,  it  is 
certain,  is  vulgarly  fuppofed  in  innumerable  Cafes)  yet  it  is 
not  commonly  fuppofed  that  Men  are  worthy  of  no  Praife  or' 
Difpraife  for  fuch  Difpofitions  ;  altho'  what  is  natural  is  un 
doubtedly  neceflary,  Nature  being  prior  to  all  Afts  of  the  Will 
\vhatfoever.  Thus  for  Inftance,  if  a  Man  appears  to  be  of  a 
very  haughty  or  malicious  Difpofition,  and  is  fuppofed  to  be 
fo  by  his  natural  Temper,  'tis  no  vulgar  Notion,  no  Diftate  of 
the  common  Senfe  and  Apprehenfion  of  Men,  that  fuch  Dif 
pofitions  are  no  Vices  or  moral  Evils,  or  that  fuch  Perfons  are 
not  worthy  of  Difefteem,  Odium  and  Difhonour  ;  or  that  the 
proud  or  malicious  Afts  which  flow  from  fuch  natural  Difpo 
fitions,  are  worthy  of  no  Refentment.  Yea,  fuch  vile  na 
tural  Difpofitions,  arid  the  Strength  of  them,  will  commonly  be 
mention'd  rather  as  an  Aggravation  of  the  wicked  Afts  that 
co-me  from  fuch  a  Fountain,  than  an  Extenuation  of  them. 
Its  being  natural  for  Men  to  aft  thus,  is  often  obferved  by 


Se«fl.  IV.         agreeable  to  common  Senfe.          2 1 7 

Men  in  the  Height  of  their  Indignation  :  They  will  fay,  "  'Tis 
"  his  very  Nature:  He  is  of  a  vile  natural  Temper ;  'tis  as 
*f  natural  to  Him  to  aft  fa,  as  it  is  to  breathe  ;  He  can't  help 
"  ferving  the  Devil,  &c."  But  it  is  not  thus  with  Regard  to 
hurtful  mifchievous  Things  that  any  are  the  Subjects  or  Occar 
fions  of  by  natural  Neceffity,  againil  their  Inclinations.  In  fuch 
a  Cafe,  the  Neceffitv,  by  the  common  Voice  of  Mankind,  will 
be  fpoken  of  as  a  full  Excufe.- — -Thus  'tis  very  plain,  that 
common  Senfe  makes  a  vaft  Difference  between  thefe  two  Kinds 
of  Neceffity,  as  to  the  Judgment  it  makes  of  their  Influence  on 
the  moral  Quality  and  Defert  of  Men's  Actions. 

And  thefe  Dictates  of  Men's  Minds  are  fo  natural  and  necef- 
fary,  that  it  may  be  very  much  doubted  whether  the  Arminians 
themfelves  have  ever  got  rid  of  them ;  yea,  their  greateft  Doctors, 
that  have  gone  furtheft  in  Defence  of  their  metaphyfical  No 
tions  of  Liberty,  and  have  brought  their  Arguments  to  their 
greateft  Strength,  and  as  they  fuppofe  to  a  Demonftration, 
againft  the  Confidence  of  Virtue  and  Vice  with  any  Neceflity  : 
'Tis  to  be  queftion'd,  whether  there  is  fo  much  as  one  of  them, 
but  that  if  He  fuffered  very  much  from  the  injurious  Acts  of  a 
Man  under  the  Power  of  an  invincible  Haughtinefs  and  Malig 
nancy  of  Temper,  would  not,  from  the  foremention'd  natural 
Senfe  of  Mind,  refent  it  far  ctherwife,  than  if  as  great  Sufferings 
came  upon  Him  from  the  Wind  that  blows,  and  Fire  that 
turns  by  natural  Neceflity;  and  otherwife  than  he  would,  if 
he  fuffered  as  much  from  the  Conduct  of  a  Man  perfectly  de 
lirious  ;  yea,  tho'  he  firft  brought  his  Diftraction  upon  Him 
fome  Way  by  his  own  Fault. 

Some  feem  to  difdain  the  Diftinction  that  we  make  between 
natural and  moral  Neceftty,  as  tho'  it  were  altogether  impertinent 
in  this  Controverfy  :  "  That  which  is  neceifary  (fay  they)  is 
'*  neceflary  ;  it  is  that  which  muft  be,  and  can't  be  prevented. 
"  And  that  which  is  Jmpoffible,  is  impoifible,  and  can't  be  done ; 
ft  and  therefore  none  can  be  to  blame  for  not  doing  it."  And 
fuch  Comparifons  are  made  ufe  of,  as  the  commanding  of  a 
Man  to  walk  who  has  loft  his  Legs,  and  condemning  and  pu- 
nifhing  Him  for  not  obeying  ;  inviting  and  calling  upon  a 
Man,  who  is  (hut  up  in  a  ftrong  Prifoh,  to  come  forth,  £c. 
]3ut  in  thefe  Things  Arminians  are  very  unreafonable.  Let 
common  Senfe  determine  whether  there  be  not  a  great  Differ 
ence  between  thofe  two  Cafes;  the  one,'  tHat  of  a  Man  who 
has  offended  his  Prince,  and  is  caft  into  Prifon  ;  and  after  he 
has  lain  there  a  while,  the  King  comes  to  him,  calls  him  to 

come 


.21.8  Caivinifm  confijleni  Part  IV, 

come  forth  to  him  ;  and  tells  him  that  if  he  will  do  fo,  and  will 
fall  down  before  Him,  and  humbly  beg  hi?  Pardon,  he  lhall 
be  forgiven,  and  fet  at  Liberty,  and  alfo  be  greatly  enrich'd,  and 
advanced  to  Honour :  The  Prifoner  heartily  repents  of  the 
Folly  and  Wickednefs  of  his  Offence  againft  his  Prince,  is 
thoroughly  difpofed  to  abafe  Himfelf,  and  accept  of  the  King's 
Offer ;  but  is  confined  by  ftrong  Walls,  with  Gates  of  Brafs, 
and  Barrs  of  Iron.  The  other  Cafe  is,  that  of  a  Man  who 
is  of  a  very  unreafonable  Spirit,  of  a  haughty,  ungrateful, 
wilful  Difpofition  j  and  moreover,  has  been  brought  up  in 
traiterious  Principles ;  and  has  his  Heart  poflefled  with  an 
extream  and  inveterate  Enmity  to  his  lawful  Soveriegn  ;  and 
for  his  Rebellion  is  caft  into  Prifon,  and  lies  long  there,  leaden, 
with  heavy  Chains,  and  in  miferable  Circumftances.  At  length 
the  compaffionate  Prince  comes  to  the  Prifon,  orders  his 
Chains  to  be  knocked  oft,  and  his  Prifon-doors  to  be  fet  wide 
open ;  calls  to  him,  and  tells  Him,  if  He  will  come  forth  to 
him,  and  fall  down  before  him,  acknowledge  that  he  has 
treated  him  unworthily,  and  afk  his  Forgivenefs;  He  lhall  be 
forgiven,  fet  at  Liberty,  and  fet  in  a  Place  of  great  Dignity  and 
Profit  in  his  Court.  But  He  is  fo  ftout  and  ftomachful,  and 
full  of  haughty  Malignity,  that  He  can't  be  willing  to  accept  the 
Offer  :  His  rooted  ftrong  Pride  and  Malice  have  perfect  Power 
over  him,  and  as  it  were  bind  him,  by  binding  his  Heart ; 
The  Oppofition  of  his  Heart  has  the  Maftery  over  Him,  hav 
ing  an  Influence  on  his  Mind  far  fuperiour  to  the  King's  Grace 
and  Condefcenfion,  and  to  all  his  kind  Offers  and  Promifes. 
Now,  is  it  agreeable  to  common  Senfe,  to  aflert  and  ftand  to 
it,  that  there  is  no  Difference  between  thefe  two  Cafes,  as  to 
any  Worthinefs  of  Blame  in  the  Prifoners ;  becaufe,  forfooth, 
there  is  a  Neceflity  in  both,  and  the  required  Aft  in  each  Cafe 
is  impoffible  ?  'T  is  true,  a  Man's  evil  Difpofitions  may  be  as 
ftrong  and  immovable  as  the  Barrs  of  a  Caftle.  But  who  can't 
fee,  that  when  a  Man,  in  the  latter  Cafe,  is  faid  to  be  unable 
to  obey  the  Command,  the  Expreffion  is  ufed  improperly,  and 
not  in  the  Senfe  it  has  originally  and  in  common  Speech  r  And 
that  it  may  properly  be  faid  to  be  in  the  Rebel's  Power  to  come 
out  of  Prifon,  feeing  he  can  eafily  do  it  if  he  pleafes  ;  tho'  by 
Reafon  of  his  vile  Temper  of  Heart  which  is  fix'd  and  rooted, 
'tis  impoffible  that  it  mould  pleafe  Him  ? 

Upon  the  Whole,  I  prefume  there  is  no  Perfon  of  good  Un- 
derftanding,  who  impartially  confiders  the  Things  which  have 
been  obferved,  but  will  allow  that  'tis  not  evident  from  the 
Diftates  of  the  common  Senfe,  or  natural  Notions  of  Man- 

kindA 


.  IV.  with  common  Senfe. 

kind,  that  moral  Neceility  is  inconfiftent  with  Praife  and  Blame; 
And  therefore,  if  the  Arminians  would  prove  any  fuch  Ineon- 
fiftency,  it  .muft  be  by  fome  philofophical  and  metaphyfica! 
Arguments,  and  not  common  Senfe. 

There  is  a  grand  Illuflon  in  the  pretended  Demonftraticri 
of  Arminians  from  common  Senfe.  The  main  Strength  of  ai> 
thefe  Demcnftrations,  lies  in  that  Prejudice  that  arifes  thro'  the 
infenfible  Change  of  the  Ufe  and  Meaning  of  fuch  Terms  as 
Liberty,  able,  unable,  tieceffary ,  impojjible,  u?ia*-uoidable ,  invincible, 
Atlion,  &c.  from  their  original  and  vulgur  Senfe,  tc  a  meta- 
phyfical  Senfe  entirely  diverfe  ;  and  the  ftrong  Connection  of 
the  Ideas  of  Blamelefnefs,  &c.  with  fome  of  thefe  Terms,  by 
an  Habit  contracted  and  eftablim'd,  while  thefe  Terms  were 
ufed  in  their  rirft  Meaning.  This  Prejudice  and  Delufion  is  the 
Foundrtion  of  all  thefe  Petitions  they  lay  down  as  Maxims, 
by  which  mod  of  the  Scriptures,  which  they  alledge  in  this 
Controverfy,  are  interpreted,  and  on  whicli  all  their  pompcus 
Demonftrations  from  Scripture  and  Reafon  depend.  From  this 
fecret  Deluiion  and  Prejudice  they  have  almoft  all  their  Ad 
vantages :  'Tis  the  Strength  of  their  Bulwarks,  and  the  Edge 
of  their  Weapons.  And  this  is  the  main  Ground  of  all  the 
Right  they  have  to  treat  their  Neighbours  in  fo  afluming  a 
Manner,  and  to  infult  others,  perhaps  as  wife  and  good  as 
themfelves,  as  tweak  Bigots,  Men  that  dwell  in  the  dark  Calves  of 
Superjtitiort,  perverjly  fet,  obftinately  Jbutting  their  Eyes  againjl  th: 
Noon-day  Light,  Enemies  to  common  Senfe ,•  maintaining  the  Jir/i- 
born  of  Abfurdities,  &c.  &c.  But  perhaps  an  impartial  Coniide- 
ration  of  the  Things  which  have  been  obferved  in  the  preceding 
Parts  of  this  Inquiry,  may  enable  the  lovers  of  Truth  better 
to  judge,  whofe  Doctrine  is  indeed  abfurd,  abftrufe,  Jdf~contra- 
ditlory,  and  inconfiftent  with  common  Senfe,  and  many  Ways 
repugnant  to  the  univerfal  Dictates  of  the  P>.eafon  of  Mankind, 

CoroL  From  Things  v/hich  have  been  obfer.ved,  it  will  fol 
low,  that  it  is  agreeable  to  common  Senfe  to  fuppofe,  that  the 
glorified  Saints  have  not  their  Freedom  at  all  dirninifh'd,  in 
any  Ref^ed ;  and  that  God  Himfelf  has  the  higheft  polTibk 
Freedom,  according  to  the  true  and  proper  Meaning  of  the 
Term  ;  and  that  He  is  in  the  higheft  poiSble  refped  an  Agent, 
and  active  in  the  Exercife  of  his  infinite  Kolinefs  ;  tho3  Kc 
ads  therein  in  the  higheft  Degree  neceflarily  :  and  his  Adions 
of  this  Kind  are  in  the  higheft,  moft  abfolutely  perfect  Man 
ner  virtuous  and  Praife-worthy  ;  and  are  fo',  for  that  very 
Reafon,  becaufe  they  are  molt  perfectly  neceffary. 

SECTION 


22O       Endeavours  not  rendered  vain,        Part 


SECTION     V. 

Concerning  thofe  Objections,  that  this  Scheme  of 
NeceJJity  renders  all  Means  and  Endeavours 
for  the  avoiding  of  Sin,  or  the  obtaining  Virtue 
and  Holinefs,  vain,  and  to  no  Purpofe;  and 
that  it  makes  Men  no  more  than  mere  Machines 
in  Affairs  of  Morality  and  Religion, 


fay,  if  it  be  fo,  that  Sin  and  Virtue  come 
to  pafs  by  a  Neceflity  confiftirtg  in  a  fure  Connexion  of 
Caufes  and  Eftecls,  Antecedents  and  Confequents,  it  can  never 
be  worth  the  while  to  ufe  any  Means  or  Endeavours  to  obtain 
the  one,  and  avoid  the  other  ;  feeing  no  Endeavours  can  alter 
the  Futurity  of  the  Event,  which  is  become  neceifary  by  a 
Connection  already  eflabliflied. 

But  I  defire,  that  this  Matter  may  be  fully  confidered  ;  and 
that  it  may  be  examined  with  a  thorough  Striftnefs,  whether 
it  will  follow  that  Endeavours  and  Means,  in  order  to  avoid  or 
obtain  any  future  Thing,  muft  be  more  in  vain,  on  the  Sup- 
pofition  of  fuch  a  Connection  of  Antecedents  and  Confequents, 
than  if  the  contrary  be  fuppofed. 

For  Endeavours  to  be  in  vain,  is  for  them  not  to  be  fuccefs- 
ful  ;  that  is  to  fay,  for  them  not  eventually  to  be  the  Means  of 
the  Thing  aimed  at,  which  can't  be,  but  in  one  of  thefe  two 
Ways  ;  either,  firft,  That  altho'  the  Means  are  ufed,  yet  the 
Event  aimed  at  don't  follow  :  Or,  Secondly,  If  the  Event  does 
follow,  it  is  not  becaufe  of  the  Means,  or  from  any  Connection 
o*  Dependence  of  the  Event  on  the  Means  ;  the  Event  would 
have  come  to  pafs,  as  well  without  the  Means,  as  with  them. 
If  either  of  thefe  two  Things  are  the  Cafe,  then  the  Means 
are  not  properly  fuccefsful,  and  are  truly  in  vain.  The  Suc- 
cefsfulnefs  or  Unfuccefsfulnefs  of  Means,  in  order  to  an 
Effect,  or  their  being  in  vain  or  not  in  vain,  confifts  in  thofe 
Means  being  connected,  or  not  connected,  with  the  Effecl  in 

fuch 


Sedh  V»  by  Caiviniftic  Principles.  221 

fueh  a  Manner  as  this,  viz.  That  the  Effeft  is  <u>//£  the  Means, 
and  not  without  them  ;  or,  that  the  Being  of  the  Effeft  is,  on 
the  one  Hand,  'connected  with  the  Means,  and  the  Want  of 
the  EffeCi,  on  the  other  Hand,  is  connected  with  the  Want  of 
the  Means.  If  there  be  fuch  a  Connection  as  this  between 
Means  and  End,  the  Means  are  not  in  vain  :  The  more  there 
is  of  fuch  a  Connexion,  the  further  they  are  from  being  in 
vain;  and  the  lefs  cf  fuch  a  Connection,  the  more  are  they 
in  vain. 

Now,  therefore,  the  Queftion  to  be  anfwered,  (in  order  to 
determine,  whether  it  follows  from  this  Doftrine  of  the  ne- 
ceflary  Connection  between  foregoing  Things  and  confequent 
One's,  that  Means  lifed  in  order  to  any  EffeCV,  are  more  in 
vain  than  they  would  be  otherwife)  is,  Whether  it  follows 
from  it,  that  there  is  lefs  of  the  forementioned  Connexion 
between  Means  and  Effeft  ;  that  is,  Whether  on  the  Suppofi- 
tion  of  their  being  a  real  and  true  Connection  betweea 
antecedent  Things  and  confequent  Ones,  there  muft  be  lefs  of 
a  Connection  between  Means  and  Effedi'  than  on  the  Suppo- 
iition  of  their  being  no  fix'd  Connection  between  antecedent 
Things  and  confequent  Ones :  And  the  very  ftating  of  this 
Queftion  is  fufficient  to  anfwer  it.  It  muft  appear  to  every 
one  that  will  open  his  Eyes,  that  this  Queftion  can't  be 
affirmed,  without  the  grofseft  Abfurdity  and  Inconfiftence- 
Means  are  foregoing  Things,  and  Effects  are  following 
Things :  And  if  there  were  no  Connection  between  foregoing 
Things,  and  following  Ones,  there  could  be  no  Connection 
between  Means  and  End  ;  and  fo  all  Means  would  be  wholly- 
Vain  and  fruitlefs.  For  'tis  by  Virtue  of  fome  Connection 
only,  that  they  become  fuccefsful :  'Tis  fome  Connection 
obferved,  or  revealed,  or  otherwife  known,  between  ante 
cedent  Things  and  following  Ones,  that  is  what  directs  in  the 
Choice  of  Means.  And  if  there  were  no  fuch  Thing  as  an 
eftablifh'd  Connection,  there  could  be  no  Choice,  as  to  Means; 
one  Thing  would  have  no  more  Tendency  to  an  Effect,  than 
another;  there  would  be  no  fuch  Thing  as  Tendency  in  the 
Cafe.  All  thofe  Things  which  are  fuccefsful  Means  of  other 
Things,  do  therein  prove  connected  Antecedents  of  them : 
And  therefore  to  aflert,  that  a  fix'd  Connection  between  Ante 
cedents  and  Confequents  makes  Means  vain  and  ufelefs,  or 
Hands  in  the  Way  to  hinder  the  Connection  between  Means 
and  End,  is  juft  fo  ridiculous,  as  to  fay,  that  a  Connection 
between  Antecedents  and  Confequents  Hands  in  the  Way  t9 
tunder  a  Connection  between  Antecedents  and  Confequents. 

F  f  Nor 


Mea&s.and  Endeavours  w^'Vain,     Part  IVv 

Nor  cafn  any  fuppofed  Connection  of  the  Succeflion  or  Train 
of  Antecedents  and  Confequents  from  the  very  Beginning  of 
all  Things,  the  Connection  being  made  already  fare  and 
neceffary,  either  by  eftablim'd  Laws  of  Nature,  or  by 
thefe  together  with  a  Decree  of  fovereign  immediate  Inter- 
pofitions  of  divine  Power,  on  fuch  and  fuch  Occaiions,  or  any 
other  Way,  (if  any  other  there  be •;.)  I  fay,  no  fuch  neceffary 
Connection  of  a  Series  of  Antecedents  and  Confequents  can 
in  the  leail  tend  to  hinder,  but  that  the  Means  /we  ufe  may- 
belong  to  the  Series  ;  and  fo  may  be  fome  of  thofc  Antecedents 
which  are' connected-  with  the  Confequerits  we'  aim  at,  in  the 
eftablifh'd  Courfe  of  Things.  Endeavours  which  we  ufe,  are 
Things  that  exift ;  and  therefore  they  belong  to  the  general 
Chain  of  Events ;  all  the  Parts  of  which  Chain  are  fuppofed 
to  be  connected  :  And  fo  Endeavours  are  fuppofed  to  be  con=- 
nected  with  fome  Effects,  or  fome  confequent  Things,  or  other. 
And  certainly  this  don't  hinder  but  that  the  Events  they  are 
connected  with,  may  be  thofe  which  we  aim  at,  and  which 
we  chufe,  becaufe  we  judge  them  moft  likely  to  have  a  Con 
nection  with  thofe  Events,  from  the  eftablim'd  Order  and 
Courfe  of  Things  which  we  obferve,  or  from  fomething  in 
divine  Revelation. 

Let  us  fuppofe  a  real  and  fure  Connexion  between- a  Man's 
having  his  Eyes  open  in  the  clear  Day-light,  with  good  Organs 
of  Sight,  and  Seeing  j  fo  that  feeing  is  connected  with  his 
opening  his  Eyes,  and  not  feeing,  with  his  not  opening  his 
Eyes ;  and  alfo  the  like  Connection  between  fuch  a  Man's 
attempting  to  open  his  Eyes,  and  his  actually  doing  it  :  The 
fuppofed  eftablilhed  Connection*  bet  ween- thefe  Antecedents  and 
Gonfequents^  let  the  Connection  be  never  fo'fure  and  neceffary, 
certainly  don't  prove  that  it  is  in  vain,  for  a  Man  in  fuch  Cir- 
eumftances  to  attempt  to  open  his  Eyes,  in  order  to  feeing  : 
His  aiming  at  that  Event,  and  the  Ufe  of  the  Means,  being 
the  Effect  of  his  Will,  don't  break  the  Connection.*  or  hinder 
the  Succefs. 

So  that  the  Objection  we  are  uponr  don't  lie  againft  the- 
Doctrine  of  the  Neceflity  of  Events  by  a  Certainty  of  Connec 
tion  and  Confequence  :  On  the  contrary,  it  is  truly  forcible 
againft  the  Arminian  Doctrine  of  Contingence  and  Self-deter 
mination  ;  which  is  inconfiftent  with  fuch  a  Connection.  If 
there  be  no  Connection  between  thofe  Events  wherein  Virtue 
and  Vice  confift,-  and  any  Thing  antecedent ;  then  there  is  no 
Connection  between  thefe  Events  and  any  Means  or  Endeavours 

ufect 


"Sedl.T.         ly  the  Arminian  Scheme. 

ufed  in  order  to  them  :  And  if  Ib,  then  thofe  Means  muft  be 
in  vain.  The  lefs  there  is  of  Connection  between  foregoing 
Things  and  following  Ones,  fo  much  the  lefs  there  is  between 
Means  and  End,  Endeavours  and  Succefs ;  and  in  the  fame 
Proportion  are  Means  and  Endeavours  ineffectual  and  in  vain. 

It  will  follow  from  Arminian  Principles,  that  there  is  no 
Degree  of  Connexion  between  Virtue  or  Viee,  and  any 
foregoing  Event  or  Thing:  Or,  in  other  Words,  That  the 
Determination  of  the  Existence  of  Virtue  or  Vice -don't  in  the 
kaft  depend  on  the  Influence  of  any  Thing  that  -comes  to 
pafs  antecedently,  from  which  the  Determination  of  its  Ex- 
iftence  is,  as  its  Caufe,  Means,  or  Ground;  becaufe,  fo  far  as 
it  is  fo,  4t  is  not  from  Self-determination  :  And  therefore,  fo  far 
there  is  nothing  of  the  Nature  -of  Virtue  or  Vice.  And  fo 
it  follows,  that  Virtue  and  Vice  are  not  at  all,  in  any  Degree* 
dependent  upon,  or  connected  with  any  foregoing  Event  or 
Exiftencej  as  its  Caufe,  Ground,  or  Means.  And  if  fo,  then 
^11  foregoing  Means  muft  be  totally  in  vain. 

Hence  it  follows,  that  there  cannot,  in  any  Confiftence  whk 
the  Arminian  Scheme,  be  any  reafonable  Ground  of  fo  much 
as  a  Conjecture  concerning  the  Confequence  of  any  Means 
and  Endeavours,  in  order  to  efcaping  Vice  or  obtaining  Virtue, 
cr  any  Choice  or  Preference  of  Means,  as  having  a  greater 
Probability  of  Succefs -by  fome  than  others;  cither  from  any 
natural  Connection  or  Dependence  of  the  End  on  the  Means, 
or  thrrrugh  any  divine  Conftitution,  or  revealed  Way  of  God's 
beftowing  or  bringing  to  pafs  thefe  Things,  in  Confequence  df 
any  Means,  Endeavours,  Prayers  or  Deeds.  Conjecture  in 
this  latter  Cafe  depends  on  a  Suppofition  that  God  himfelf  is 
the  Giver,  or  -determining  Caufe  of  the  Events  fought :  But 
if  they  depend  on  Self-determination,  then  God  is  not  the 
determining  or  difpoftng  Author  of  them  :  And  if  thefe  Things 
are  not  of  his  Difpofal,  then  no  Conjecture  can  be  made  from 
any  Revelation  he  has  given  concerning  any  Way  or  Method 
of  his  Difpofal  of  them. 

'  Yea,  on  thefe  Principles,  it  wifl  not  only  follow  that  Men 
can't  have  any  reafonable  Ground  of  Judgment  or  Conjecture, 
that  their  Means  and  Endeavours  to  obtain  Virtue  or  avoid 
Vice,  will  be  fuccefsfal,  but  they  may  be  fure  they  will  not ; 
they  may  be  certain,  that  they  will  be  in  vain;  and  that  if 
ever  the  Thing  which  they  feek  comes  to  pafs.  it  will  not  be 
^t  -all  owing  to  the  Means  tliey  ufe.  For  Means  and  En- 
F  f  3  deavours 


224    Calvinifm  don't  encourage  Sloth.     Part  IV. 

deavours  can  have  no  Effect  at  all,  in  Order  to  obtain  the. 
£nd,  but  in  one  of  thefe  two  Ways  ;  either  (i.)  Through  a 
natural  Tendency  and  Influence,  to  prepare  and  difpofe  the 
i/Iind  more  to  virtuous  Acts,  either  by  caufing  the  Difpofition 
of  the  Heart  to  be  more  in  Favour  of  fuch  Acts,  or  by 
bringing  the  Mind  more  into  the  View  of  powerful  Motives 
and  Inducements  :  Or,  (2.)  By  putting  Perfons  more  in  the 
Way  of  God's  Beftowment  of  the  Benefit.  But  neither  of 
thefe  can  be  the  Cafe.  Not  the  latter ;  for  as  has  been  juft 
now  obferved,  it  don't  confift  with  the  Arminian  Notion  of 
Self-determination,  which  they  fuppofe  eflential  to  Virtue, 
that  God  fhould  be  the  Beftower,  or,  (which  is  the  fame 
Thing)  the  determining,  difpofing  Author  of  Virtue.  Not" 
the  former;  for  natural  Influence  and  Tendency  fuppofes 
Caufality  and  Connection  ;  and  that  fuppofes  Neceffity  of 
Event,  which  is  inconfiftent  with  Arminian  Liberty.  A  Ten 
dency  of  Means,  by  biaffing  the  Heart  in  Favour  of  Virtue,  or 
by  bringing  the  Will  under  the  Influence  and  Power  of 
Motives  in  its  Determinations,  are  both  inconfiftent  with 
Arminian  Liberty  of  Will,  confiding  in  Indifference,  and 
Sovereign  Self-determination,  as  has  been  largely  demonftratedo 

But  for  the  more  full  Removal  of  this  Prejudice  againft  that 
poctrine  of  Neceffity  which  has  been  maintain'd,  as  though  it 
tended  to  encourage  a  total  Neglect  of  all  Endeavours  as  vain  ; 
the  following  Things  may  be  confidered. 

The  Queftion  is  not,  Whether  Men  may  not  thus  improve 
this  Doctrine  :  We  know  that  many  true  and  wholefome 
poctrines  are  abufed  :  But,  Whether  the  Doctrine  gives  any 
juft  Occafion  for  fuch  an  Improvement ;  or  whether y  on  the 
Suppofition  of  the  Truth  of  the  Doctrine,  fuch  a  Ufe  of  it 
would  not  be  unreafonable  ?  If  any  mail  affirm,  that  it  would 
not,  but  that  the  very  Nature  of  the  Doctrine  is  fuch  as 
gives  juft  Occafion  for  it,  it  muft  be  on  this  Suppofition ; 
namely,  That  fuch  an  invariable  Neceffity  of  all  Things  already 
fettled,  muft  render  the  Interpofition  of  all  Means,  Endea-r 
vours,  Conclufions  or  Actions  of  ours,  in  order  to  the  obtaining 
any  future  End  whatfoever,  perfectly  infignificant ;  becaufe 
they  can't  in  the  leaft  alter  or  vary  the  Courfeand  Series  of 
Things,  in  any  Event  or  Circumftance ;  all  being  already  fixed 
Unalterably  by  Neceffity  :  And  that  therefore  'tis  Folly,  for 
!Men  to  ufe  any  Means/or  any  End;  but  their  Wifdom,  to  fave 
themfelves  the  Trouble  of  Endeavours,  and  take  their  Eafe, 
£Jo  Perfon  can  draw  fuch  an  Inference  from  this  Doctrine, 

and 


Sedl.V.     Galvinifm  don't  encourage  Sloth.         225 

and  come  to  fuch  a  Conclufion,  without  contradicting  himfelf, 
and  going  counter  to  the  very  Principles  he  pretends  to  act 
upon  :  For  he  comes  to  a  Concluiion,  and  takes  a  Courfe,  ,«j 
order  to  an  End,  even  his  Eafe,  or  the  faving  himfelf  from 
Trouble  ;  he  feeks  fomething  future,  and  ufes  Means  in  Ordef 
to.  a  future  Thing,  even  in  his  drawing  up  that  Conclufion,, 
thaf  he  will  feek  nothing,  and  ufe  no  Means  in  order  to  any 
Thing  future  ;  he  feeks  his  future  Eafe,  and  the  Benefit  and 
Comfort  of  Indolence.  If  prior  Neceiiity  that  determines  all 
Things,  makes  vain  all  Actions  or  Conclufions  of  ours,  in 
order  to  any  Thing  future  ;  then  it  makes  vain  all  Conclufions 
and  Conduct  of  ours,  in  order  to  our  future  Eafe.  The  Mea- 
fure  of  our  Eafe,  with  the  Time,  Manner  and  every  Circum- 
ftance  of  it,  is  already  fix'd,  by  all  determining  Neceffity,  as 
much  as  any  Thing  elfe.  If  he  fays  within  himfelf,  "  What 
"  future  Happinefs  or  Mifery  I  (hall  have,  is  already  in  Effect 
"  determined  by  the  neceflary  Courfe  and  Connection  of 
"  Things ;  therefore  I  will  fave  myfelf  the  Trouble  of  Labour 
"  and  Diligence,  which  can't  add  to  my  determin'd  Degree. 
"  of  Happinefs,  or  diminifti  my  Mifery  ;  but  will  take  my 
"  Eafe,  and  will  enjoy  the  Comfort  of  Sloth  and  Negligence." 
Such  a  Man  contradicts  himfelf:  He  fays,  the  Meafure  of  his 
future  Happinefs  and  Mifery  is  already  fix'd,  and  he  won't 
try  to  diminim  the  one,  nor  add  to  the  other  :  But  yet  in  his 
very  Conclufion,  he  contradicts  this;  for  he  takes  up  this 
Conclufion,  to  add  to  his  future  Happinefs,  by  the  Eafe  and 
Comfort  of  his  Negligence ;  and  to  diminifh  his  future  Trou 
ble  and  Mifery,  by  laving  himfelf  the  Trouble  of  ufmg  Means 
and  taking  Pains. 

Therefore  Perfons  can't  reafonably  make  this  Improvement 
of  the  Doctrine  of  Neceflity,  that  they  will  go  into  a  voluntary 
Negligence  of  Means  for  their  own  Happinefs.  For  the 
Principles  they  muft  go  upon,  in  order  to  this,  are  inconfiftent 
with  their  making  any  Improvement  at  all  of  the  Doctrine  : 
For  to  make  fome  Improvement  of  it,  is  to  be  influenced  by 
it,  to  come  to  fome  voluntary  Conclufion,  in  Regard  to 
their  own  Conduct,  with  fome  View  or  Aim  :  But  this,  as 
has  been  ftiown,  is  inconfiftent  with  the  Principles  they  pretend 
to  act  upon.  In  Ihort,  the  Principles  are  fuch  as  cannot  be 
acted  upon  at  all,  or  in  any  Refpect,  confidently  :  And  there 
fore  in  every  Pretence  of  acting  upon  them,  or  making  any 
Improvement  at  all  of  them,  there  is  a  Self-contradiction, 


226  Cdvmifm  don't  make  Men  Machines.  Part  IV. 

.  As  to  that  Objection  againft  the  Doftrine  which  I  have 
endeavoured  to  prove,  that  it  makes  Men  no  more  than 
mere  Machines ;  I  would  fay,  that  notwithftanding  this  Doc 
trine,  Man  is  entirely,  perfectly  and  unfpeakably  different  from 
a  mere  Machine,  in  that  he  has  Reafon  and  Underftanding, 
and  has  a  Faculty  of  Will,  and  fo  is  capable  of  Volition  and 
Choice ;  and  in  that,  his  Will  is  guided  by  the  Dictates  or 
Views  of  his  Undemanding  ;  and  in  that  his  external  Actions 
and  Behaviour,  and  in  many  Refpefts  alfo  his  Thoughts,  and 
the  Exercifes  of  his  Mind,  are  fubjeft  to  his  Will ;  fo  that 
he  has  Liberty  to  aft  according  to  his  Choice,  and  do  what  he 
pleafes ;  and  by  Means  of  thefe  Things,  is  capable  of  moral 
Habits  and  moral  Afts,  fuch  Inclinations  and  Actions  as 
according  to  the  common  Senfe  of  Mankind,  are  worthy  of  Praife, 
Efteem,  Love  and  Reward  ;  or  on  the  contrary,  of  Difefteem, 
Deteftation,  Indignation  and  Punifhment, 

In  thefe  Things  is  all  the  Difference  from  mere  Machines, 
as  to  Liberty  and  Agency,  that  would  be  any  Perfection,  Dig 
nity  or  Privilege,  in  any  Refpeft «  All  the  Difference  that  can 
be  deiired,  and  all  that  can  be  conceived  of ;  and  indeed  all 
that  the  Pretenfions  of  the  Arminians  themfelves  come  to,  as 
they  are  forced  often  to  explain  themfelves.  (Tho'  their  Expli 
cations  overthrow  and  abolifh  the  Things  aflferted,  and  pre 
tended  to  be  explained:)  For  they  are  forced  to  explain  a  felf- 
determining  Power  of  Will,  by  a  Power  in  the  Soul,  to  deter 
mine  as  it  chufes  or  wills ;  which  comes  to  no  more  than  this, 
that  a  Man  has  a  Power  of  chufing,  and  in  many  Inftances, 
can  do  as  he  chufes.  Which  is  quite  a  different  Thing  from  that 
Contradiction,  his  having  Power  of  chufing  his  firft  Aft  of 
Choice  in  the  Cafe, 

Or  if  their  Scheme  makes  any  other  Difference  than  this, 
between  Men  and  Machines,  it  is  for  the  worfe  :  It  is  fo  far 
from  fuppofing  Men  to  have  a  Dignity  and  Privilege  above 
Machines,  that  it  makes  the  Manner  of  their  being  determined 
ftill  more  unhappy.  Whereas  Machines  are  guided  by  an  un- 
derftanding  Caufe,  by  the  fkilful  Hand  of  the  Workman  or 
Owner  ;  the  Will  of  Man  is  left  to  the  Guidance  of  nothing, 
but  abfolute  blind  Contingence, 


SECTION 


Se6t.  VI.  Of  the  Stoical  Fate.  227 


S  £  c  t  i  o  N     VI. 

Concerning  that  Objection  againjl  the  Doffrine 
which  has  been  maintain  d,  that  it  agrees  with 
the  Stoical  Doffrine  of  Fate,  and  the  Opinions 
of  Mr.  Hobbes. 

WHEN  Cal<vin$5  oppofe  the  Arminian  Notion  of  the 
Freedom  of  Will,  and  Contingence  of  Volition,  and 
inlift  that  there  are  no  Ads  of  the  Will,  nor  any  other  Events 
whatfoever,  but  what  are  attended  with  fome  Kind  of  Neceffi- 
ty  ;  their  Oppofers  cry  out  of  them,  as  agreeing  with  the  an- 
tient  Stoicks  in  their  Doftrine  of  Fate,  and  with  Mr.  Hobbes 
in  his  Opinion  of  Neceffity. 

It  would  not  be  worth  while,    to  take  Notice  of  fo  imperti 
nent  an  Objection,  had  it  not  been  urged  by  fome  of  the  chief 

Arminian  Writers. There  were  many  important  Truths 

maintain'd  by  the  antient  Greek  and  Roman  Philofophers,  and 
efpecially  the  Stoicks,  that  are  never  the  worfe  for  being  held  by 
them.  The  Stoick  Philofophers,  by  the  general  Agreement  of 
Chriftian  Divines,  and  even  Arminian  Divines,  were  the 
greateft,  wifeft  and  moil  virtuous  of  all  the  Heathen  Philofo 
phers  ;  and  in  their  Doftrine  and  Praftice  came  the  neareft 
to  Chriftianity  of  any  of  their  Seels.  How  frequently  are  the 
Sayings  of  thefe  Philofophers,  in  many  of  the  Writings  and 
Sermons,  even  of  Arminian  Divines,  produced,  not  as  Argu 
ments  of  the  Falfenefs  of  the  Doftrines  which  they  delivered, 
but  as  a  Confirmation  of  fome  of  the  greateft  Truths  of  the 
Chriftian  Religion,  relating  to  the  Unity  and  Perfections  of  the 
Godhead,  a  future  State,  the  Duty  and  Happinefs  of  Mankind, 
&c.  as  obferving  how  the  Light  of  Nature  and  Reafon  in  the 
wifeft  and  beft  of  the  Heathen,  harmonized  with,  and  confirms 
the  Gofpel  of  Jefus  Chrift. 

.  And  it  is  very  remarkable  concerning  Dr.  Whitby,  that  altho' 
He  alledges  the  Agreement  of  the  Stoicks  with  us,  wherein  He 
fuppofes  they  maintain'd  the  like  Doctrine  with  us,  as  an  Ar 
gument  againft  the  Truth  of  our  Doftrine  ;  yet  this  very  Dr. 
Wbiiby  alledges  the  Agreement  of  the  Stoicks  with  ti&A 


Of  the  Stoical  Fate.  Part  IV0 

wherein  he  fuppoies  they  taught  the  fame  Doclrine  with  them, 
as  an  Argument  for  the  Truth  of  their  Doctrine.  *  So  that 
when  the  Stoicks  agree  with  h^/rc,  this,  (it  feems)  is  a  Confirma 
tion  of  their  Doclrine,  and  a  Confutation  of  ours,  as  mewing 
that  our  Opinions  are.  contrary  to  the  natural  Senfe  and  common 
Reafon  of  Mankind  :  Neverth'elefs,  when  the  Stoids  agree  with 
us,  it  argues  no  fuch  Thing  in  our  Favour;  but  on  the  con 
trary,  is  a  great  Argument  againft  us,  and  ihews  our  Doftrinc 
to  be  Heathenilh. 

It  is  obferved  by  fome  Calvinrfth  Writers,  that  the  Arminians 
fymbolize  with  the  Stoicks,  in  fome  of  thofe  Dodrines  wherein 
they  are  oppofed  by  the  Cetl<i>iiBfts  ,•  particularly  in  their  denying 
an  original^  innate,  total  Corruption  and  Depravity  of  Heart; 
and  in  what  they  held  of  Man's  Ability  to  make  Himfelf 

truly  virtuous  arid  conformed  to  God ; and  in  fome  other 

Doftrines. 

It  may  be  further  obferved,  'tis  certainly  no  better  Objection 
againft  our  Doftrine,  that  it  agrees  in  fome  Refpefts  with  the 
Doctrine  of  the  antient  Stoick  Philofophers,  than  it  is  againft 
theirs,  wherein  they  diifer  from  us,  that  it  agrees  in  fome  Re- 
fpects  with  the  Opinion  of  the  very  worft  of  the  Heathen  Phi 
lofophers,  the  Followers  of  Epicurus,  that  Father  of  Atheifm 
and  Licentioufnefs,  and  with  the  Doctrine  of  the  Szdducees  and 
Jtfxtt*. 

I  am  not  much  concerned  to  know  precifely  what  the  antient 
Stoick  Philofophers  hdd  concerning  Fate,  in  order  to  determine 
what  is  Truth  ;  as  tho'  it  were  a  fure  Way  to  be  in  the  right, 
to  take  good  Heed  to  differ  from  them.  It  feems  that  they 
differed  among  themfelves ;  and  probably  the  Doclrine  of  Fate, 
as  maintain'd  by  mod  of  them,  was  in  fome  Refpects  erroneous. 
But  whatever  their  Doctrine  was,  if  any  of  them  held  fuch  a 
Fate,  as  is  repugnant  to  any  Liberty  confifting  in  our  doing 
as  we  pleafe,  I  utterly  deny  fuch  a  Fate.  If  they  held  any 
fuch  Fate,  as  is  not  confident  with  the  comnion  and  univerfal 
Notions  that  Mankind  have  of  Liberty,  Activity,  moral  Agen~ 
Cy,  Virtue  and  Vice  ;  I  difclaim  any  fuch  Thing,  and  think  I 
have  demonftrated  that  the  Scheme  I  maintain  is  no  fuch 
Scheme.  If  the  Stoicks  by  Fate  meant  any  Thing  of  fuch  a 
Nature,  as  can  be  fuppofed  to  ftand  in  the  Way  of  the  Advan 
tage  and  Benefit  of  the  Ufe  of  Means  and  fendeavours,  or 

makes 

*  Witty  oil  the  five  Points,  Edit*  3,  P.  325,  3*6,  3^7» 


ji         Of  Hobbiftical  Neceffily.  229 

makes  it  lefs  worth  the  while  for  Men  to  defire,  and  feek  after 
any  Thing  wherein  their  Virtue  aud  Happinefs  confiils  ;  I 
hold  no  JDodrine  that  is  clog'd  with  any  fuch  Inconvenience, 
any  more  than  any  other  bcheme  whatfoever  ;  and  by  no 
Means  fo  much  as  the  Arminian  Scheme  of  Contingence  ;  as 
has  been  fliewn.  If  they  held  any  fuch  Doclrine  of  univerfal 
Fatality,  as  is  inconfiftent  with  any  Kind  of  Liberty,  that  is 
or  can  be  any  Perfection,  Dignity,  Privilege  or  Benefit,  or 
any  Thing  deiirable,  in  any  Refpect,  for  any  intelligent  Crea 
ture,  or  indeed  with  any  Liberty  that  is  poffible  or  conceivable  ; 
I  embrace  no  fuch  Doctrine.  If  they  held  any  fuch  Doclrine 
of  Fate  as  is  irrconfiilent  with  the  World's  being  in  all  Things 
fubjeft  to  the  Difpofal  of  an  intelligent  wife  Agent,  that  pre- 
fides,  not  as  the  Soul  of  the  World,  but  as  the  fovereign  Lord 
of  the  Univerfe,  governing  all  Things  by  proper  Will,  Choice 
and  Defign,  in  the  Exercife  of  the  moft  perfect  Liberty  con 
ceivable,  without  Subjection  to  any  Conftraint,  or  being  pro 
perly  under  the  Power  or  Influence  of  any  Thing  before,  above 
or  without  himfelf;  I  wholly  renounce  any  fuch  Dodrine. 

As  to  Mr.  Eobbes's  maintaining  the  fame  Doclrine  concern 
ing  Neceffity  ;  —  I  confefs,  it  happens  I  never  read  Mr  Hobbes* 
Let  his  Opinion  be  what  it  will,  we  need  not  reject  all 
Truth  which  is  demonftrated  by  clear  Evidence,  merely  be- 
caufe  it  was  or.-ce  held  by  fome  bad  Man,  This  great  Truth, 
that  Jefus  is  the  Son  of  God  t  was  not  fpoil'd  becaufe  it  was 
once  and  again  proclaimed  with  a  loud  Voice  by  the  DeviU 
If  Truth  is  fo  defiled  becaufe  it  is  fpoken  by  the  Mouth,  or 
written  by  the  Pen  of  fome  ill-minded  mifchiev'ous  Man,  that 
it  muft  never  be  received,  we  fhall  never  know  when  we  hold 
any  of  the  moft  precious  and  evident  Truths  by  a  fure 
Tenure.  And  if  Mr.  Hobbes  has  made  a  bad  Ufe  of  this 
Truth,  that  is  to  be  lamented:  But  the  Truth  is  not  to  be 
thought  worthy  of  Rejection  on  that  Account.  'Tis  common. 
for  the  Corruptions  of  the  Hearts  of  evil  Men,  to  abufe.tha 
belt  Things  to  vile  Purpofes. 

I  might  alfo  take  Notice  of  its  having  been  obferved,  that 
the  Arminians  agree  with  Mr.  Hobbes  t  in  many  more  Things 
than  the  Cal<vinijh.  As,  in  what  he  is  faid  to  hold  concerning 
Original  Sin,  in  denying  the  Neceffity  of  fupernatural  Illumi 
nation,  in  denying  infufed  Grace,  in  denying  the  Dodrine.  of 
Juftification  by  Faith  alone  ;  and  other  Things. 

i  Dr.  Gill,  in  his  Anfwcr  to  Dr.  Whitby.  Vol.  3.  P.   183.  &c. 


SECTION 


Concerning  the  Necellity         Part 


SECTION     VII. 

Concerning   the  Neceffity  of  the  Divine  Will. 

SOME  may  pcflibly  object  againft  what  has  been  fuppofed 
of  the  Abfurdity  and  Inconliftence  of  a  felf-determining 
Power  in  the  Will,  and  the  Impoflibility  of  its  being 
©therwife,  than  that  the  Will  fhould  be  determined  in  every 
Cafe  by  fome  Motive,  and  by  a  Motive  which  (as  i't  ftand's 
in  the  View  of  the  Underitanding)  is  of  fuperipur  Strength  to 
any  appearing  on  the  other  Side  :  That  if  thefe  Things  are 
true,  it  will  follow,  that  not  only  the  Will  of  created  Minds, 
but  the  WTill  of  Gtd  himfelf  is  neceflary  in  all  its  Determina 
tions.  Concerning  which  fays  the  Author  of  the  EJJay  on  the 
Freedom  of  Will  in  God  and  in  the  Creature,  (Page  85,  86.) 
"  What  ftrange  Doctrine  is  this,  contrary  to  all  our  Ideas  of 
**  the  Dominion  of  God  ?  Does  it  not  deftroy  the  Glory  of 
"  his  Liberty  of  Choice,  and  take  away  from  the  Creator  and 
"  Governor  and  Benefactor  of  the  World^  that  moft  free  and 
*'  fovereign  Agent,  all  the  Glory  of  this  Sort  of  Freedom  ? 
"Does  it  not  feem  to  make  Him  a  Kind  of  mechanical  Me- 
*'  dium  of  Fate,  and  introduce  Mr.  Hobbes^s  Doctrine  of  Fata- 
"  lity  and  Neceffity,  into  all  Things  that  God  hath  to  do 
"  with  ?  Does  it  not  feem  to  reprefent  the  blefled  God,  as  a 
"  Being  of  vaft  Underftanding,  as  well  as  Power  and  Effi- 
"  cicncy,  but  ftill  to  leave  Him  without  a  Will  to  chufe  among 
**  all  the  Objects  within  his  View  ?  In  fhort,  it  feems  to  make 
ft  the  blefled  God  a  Sort  of  almighty  Minifter  of  Fate,  under 
"  its  univerfal  and  fupreme  Influence  ;  as  it  was  the  profefs'd 
**  Sentiment  of  fome  of  the  Antients,  that  Fate  was  above  the 
«  Gods." 

This  is  declaimirig,  rather  than  arguing  ;  and  an  Applica 
tion  to  Men's  Imaginations  and  Prejudices,  rather  than  to  mere 
Reafon.  --  But  I  would  calmly  endeavour  to  confider  whether 
there  be  any  Reafon  in  this  frightful  Reprefentation.  -  But 
before  I  enter  upon  a  particular  Confideration  of  the  Matter,  I 
would  obferve  this  :  That  'tis  reafonable  to  fuppofe,  it  mould 
be  much  more  difficult  to  exprefs  or  conceive  Things  accord 
ing  to  exact  metaphyfical  Truth,  relating  to  the  Nature  and 
Manner  of  the  Exiftence  of  Things  in  the  divine  Underftand 
ing  and  Will,  and  the  Operation  of  thefe  Faculties  (if  I  may 

fo- 


Scft.  VII.  of  the  Divine  Volition.  23  * 

fo  call  them)  of  the  Divine  Mind,  than  in  the  human  Mind  ; 
which  is  infinitely  more  within  our  View,  and  nearer  to  a 
Proportion  to  the  Meafure  of  our  Comprehenfion,  and  more 
commenfuratc  to  the  Ufe  and  Import  of  human  Speech. 
Language  is  indeed  very  deficient,  in  Regard  of  Terms  to 
.exprefs  precife  Truth  concerning  our  own  Minds,  and  their 
Faculties  and  Operations.  Words  were  firft  formed  to  exprefs 
external  Things  ;  and  thofe  that  are  applied  to  exprefs  Things 
internal  and  fpiriiual,  are  almoft  all  borrowed,  and  ufed  in  a  Sort 
of  figurative  Senfe.  Whence  they  are  moft  of  them  attended 
with  a  great  Deal  of  Ambiguity  and  Unfixednefs  in  their  Signi 
fication,  occafioning  innumerable  Doubts,  Difficulties  and  Con- 
.fu lions  in  Inquiries  and  Controversies  about  Things  of  this  Na 
ture.  But  Language  is  much  lefs  adapted  to  exprefs  Tilings 
in  the  Mind  of  the  incomprehenftbie  Deity,  precifely  as  they  are. 

We  find  a  great  Deal  of  Difficulty  in  conceiving  exactly  of 
the  Nature  of  our  own  Souls.  And  notwithftanding  all  the 
Progrefs  which  has  been  made  in  paft  and  prefent  Ages,  in 
this  Kind  of  Knowledge,  whereby  our  Metaphyficks,  as  it 
relates  to  thefe  Things,  is  brought  to  greater  Perfection  than 
once  it  was  ;  yet  here  is  ftill  Work  enough  left  for  future  In 
quiries  and  Refearches,  and  Room  lor  Progrefs  ftill  to  be  made, 
for  many  Ages  and  Generations.  But  we  had  need  to  be  infi 
nitely  able  Metaphyficians,  to  conceive  with  Clearncfs,-  accord- 
Ing  to  ftrict,  proper  and  perfect  Truth,  concerning  the  Nature 
of'  the  Divine  Effence,  and  the  Modes  of  the  Action  and  Ope 
ration  of  the  Powers  of  the  divine  Mind. 

And  it  may  be  noted  particularly,  that  tho'  we  are  obliged 
to  conceive  of  fome  Things  in  Gpd  as  confequent  and  depen 
dent  on  others,  and  of  fome  Things  pertaining  to  the  divine 
Nature  and  Will  as  the  Foundation  of  others,  and  fo  before 
others  in  the  Order  of  Nature  :  As,  we  muft  conceive  of  the 
Knowledge  and  Holinefs  of  God  as  prior  in  the  Order  of  Na 
ture  to  his  Happinefs;  the  Perfection  of  his  Underftan^ing,  as 
the  Foundation  of  his  "wife  Purpofes  and  Decrees  ;  the  Holi 
nefs  of  his  Nature,  as  the  Caufe  and  Reafon  of  his  holy  De 
terminations.  And  yet  when  we  fpeak  of  Caufe  and  Erreft, 
Antecedent  and  Confequent,  fundamental  and  dependent,  de 
termining  and  determined,  in  the  firft  Being,  who  is  felf- 
exiftent,  independent,  of  perfecl  and  abfolute  Simplicity  and 
Immutability,  and  the  firil  Caufe  of  all  Things  ;  doubtlefs 
tbere  muft  be  iefs  Propriety  in  fuch  Representations,  than  when 
G  g  3  we 


232         Neceffity  of  aftwg  mjl  wifely,        Part  IV. 

we  fpeak  of  derived  dependent  Beings,   who  are  compounded,, 
and  liable  to  perpetual  Mutation  and  Succeffion. 

Having  premifed  this,  I  proceed  to  obferve  concerning  the. 
foremention'd  Author's  Exclamation,  about  the  neceffary  Deter 
mination  of  God's  Will>  in  all  Things,  by  what  He  fees  to  be 
ftteft  and  heft* 

That  all  the  feeming  Force  of  fuch  Objections  and  Excla 
mations  muft  arife  from  an  Imagination,  that  there  is  fome 
Sort  of  Priviledge  or  Dignity  in  being  without  fuch  a  moral 
Neceffity,  as  will  make  it  iropoffible  to  do  any  other,  than 
always  chufe  what  is  wifeft  and  beft  ;  as  tho'  there  were  fome 
Difadvantage,  Meannefs  and  Subjection,  in  fuch  a  Neceffity  ; 
a  Thing  by  which  the  Will  was  confined,  kept  under,  and 
held  in  Servitude  by  fomething,  which,  as  it  were,  maintained 
a  ftrong  and  invincible  Power  and  Dominion  over  it,  by  Bonds 
that  held  him  fall,  and  that  he  could  by  no  Means  deliver 
himfelf  from.  Whereas,  this  muft  be  all  mere  Imagination 
and  Delufion.  'Tis  no  Difadvantage  or  Dilhonour  to  a  Being, 
neceflarily  to  aft  in  the  moft  excellent  and  happy  Manner, 
from  the  neceffary  Perfection  of  his  own  Nature.  This  argues 
no  Imperfeclkm,  Inferiority  or  Dependance,  nor  any  Want  of 
Dignity,  Privilege  or  Afcendency.  *  'Tis  not  inconfiftent  with 

the 

*  "  It  might  have  been  objected  with  much  more  Plaufiblenefs,  that 
<*  the  fupreme  Caufe.  cannot  be  free,  becaule  he  muft  needs  dq 
*'  always  what  is  beft  m  the  Whole.  But  this  would  not  at  all 
"  ferve  Spinoza's  Purpofe :  For  this  is  a  Neceffity,  not  of  Nature 
*'  and  Fate,  but  of  Fitnefs  and  Wifdom  ;  a  Neceffity  confiftent 
"  with  the  greateft  Freedom,  and  moft  perfect  Choice.  For  the 
•'  only  Foundation  of  this  Neceffity  is  fuch  an  unalterable  Recti- 
'«  tude  of  VYilU  and  Perfection  of  Wifdorn,  as  makes  it  impoffible 
"  for  a  wife  Being  to  act  foolifhly."  Ctark's  Dem.  of  the  Being 
"  and  Attributes  of  God.  Edit.  6.  P.  64. 

"   Tho'  God  is  a  moft  perfectly  free  Agent,    yet  he   cannot  but  do 

«'  always   what   is   beft   and    wifeft    in    the    Whole.       The    Reafon    is 

'*  evident ;     becaufe    perfect    Wifdom   and    Goodnefs    are    as     fteady 

"  and     certain    Principles    of  Action,     as   Neceffity    itfelf;      and    aa 

"  infinitely   wife    and    good    Being,     indued    with    the    moft    perfect 

"  Liberty,    can    no  more    chufe   to   act    in    Contradiction    to  Wifdom 

"  and    Goodnefs,      than   a    neceflary  Agent   can    act   contrary    to   the 

*'  Neceffity  by  which  it  is  acted  ;    it  feeing  as  great  an  Abfurdity  and 

"  impoffibility   in  Choice,    for   infinite  Wifdom   to  chufe   to   act   un- 

"  wifely,    or  infinite  Goodnefs  to  chufe  what  is  not  good,   as  it  would 


Seel. VII.  agreeable  to  moft  perfett  Liberty.         233 

the  abfolute,  and  moft  perfect  Sovereignty  of  God.  The 
Sovereignty  of  God  is  his  Ability  and  Authority  to  do  what 
ever  pleafes  Him  ;  whereby  He  doth  according  to  his  Will  hi  the 
Armies  of  Heaven,  and  among  ft  the  Inhabitants  of  the  Earth,  and 

none  can  flay  his  Hand,  orffiy  unto  him,  What  doft  thmt  ? The 

following  Things  belong  to  the  Sovereignty  of  God ;  <viz. 
(i.)  Supreme,  univerfal,  and  infinite  Power;  whereby  he  is 
able  to  do  what  he  pleafes,  without  Ccntroul,  without  any 
Confinement  of  that  Power,  without  any  Subjection  in  the  lealt 
Meafure  to  any  other  Power  ;  and  fo  without  any  Hindrance 
or  Reitraint,  that  it  mould  be  either  impoffible,  or  at  all 
difficult,  for  him  to  accomplifti  his  Will ;  and  without  any 

Dependanco 

"  be  in  Nature,  for  abfolute  Necefliry  to  fail  of  producing  its  ne- 
"  ceffary  Effect.  There  was  indeed  no  Neceflity  in  Nature,  that 
"  God  fbtould  at  firft  create  fuch  Beings  as  he  has  created,  or  indeed  any 
"  Being  at  all ;  becaufe  he  is  in  himfelf  infinitely  happy  and  All-fuffi- 
"  cient.  There  was  alfo  no  Neceflity  in  Nature,  that  he  fhould  preferve 
*'  and  continue  Things  in  Being,  after  they  were  created ;  becaufe  he 
"  would  be  felf-fufficient  without  their  Continuance,  as  he  was  before 
?'  their  Creation.  But  it  was  fit  and  wife  and  good,  that  infinite  Wif- 
*'  dom  fhould  manifcft,  and  infinite  Goodnefs  communicate  itfelf;  and 
"  therefore  it  was  neceffary,  in  the  Senfe  of  Neceflity  I  am  now  fpeak- 
"  ing  of,  that  Things  fhould  be  made  at  fuch  a  Time,  and  continuedyi 
"  long.,  and  indeed  with  various  Perfections  in  fuch  Degrees,  as  infinite 
'*  Wildom  and  Goodrjefs  faw  it  wifeft  and  belt  that  they  fhould."  Ibid* 
P.  IJ2,  113. 

"   'Tis     not    a     Fault,    but   a    Perfection   of  our   Nature,     to     de- 
"  fire,    will    and  act,   according  to  the  lafl  Refult  of  a  fair  Examination. 
•This  is  fo  far  from  being  a  Reftraint  or  Diminution  of  Freedom, 


that  it  is  the  very  Improvement  and  Benefit  of  it :  'Tis  not  an  Abridg 
ment,  'tis  the  End  and  Ufe  of  our  Liberty ;  and  the  further  we  are 
removed  from  fuch  a  Determination,  the  nearer  we  are- to.  Mifery  and 
Slavery.  A  perfect  Indifference  in  the  Mind,  not  determinate  by 
its  laft  Judgment  of  the  Good  or  Evil  that  is  thought  to  attend  its 
Choice,  would  be  fo  far  from  being  an  Advantage  and  Excellency  of 
any  intellectual  Nature,  that  it  would  be  as  great  an  Imperfection,  as 
the  Want  of  Indifferency  to  act,  or  not  to  act,  till  determined  by  the 

™   Will,  would  be  an  Imperfection   on  the  other  Side 'Tis  as 

"  much  a  Perfection,  that  Defire  or  the  Power  of  preferring  fhould  be 
*'  determined  by  Good,  as  that  the  Power  of  acting  fhould  be  determined 
"  by  the  Will :  And  the  certainer  fuch  Determination  is,  the  greater 
"  the  Perfection.  Nay,  were  we  determined  by  any  Thing  but  the  laft 
"  Refult  of  our  own  Minds,  judging  of  the  Good  or  Evil  of  any  Action, 
"  we  were  not  free.  The  very  End  of  our  Freedom  bejng,  that  we  mighc 
*'  attain  the  Good  we  chufe  ;  and  therefore  every  Man  is  brought  under 
*'  a  Neceflity  by  his  Conftitution,  as  an  intelligent  Being,  to  be 
*'  determin'd  in  willing  by  his  own  Thought  and  Judgment,  what 
*.*  is  beil  for  him  to  do;  elfe  he  would  be  under  the  Determination 
*'  of  fome  other  than  himfelf,  which  is  Want  of  Liberty.  And  to 
**  d§ny  that  a  Man's  Will,  in  every  Determination,  follows  his  awn 

**  Judgment, 


2  j 4  Necejjity  of  acting  mofl  wifely,       Part  IV* 

Dependance  of  his  Power  on  any  other  Power,  from  whence 
it  mould  be  derived,  or  which  it  mould  ftand  in  any  Need  ot  : 
So  far  from  this,  that  all  other  Power  is  derived  frsm  Him, 
and  is  abfolutely  dependent  on  Him.  (2.)  That  He  has  fu- 
prerne  Authority  ;  abfolute  and  moft  perfect  Right  to  do  what 
H€  wills,  without  Subjection  to  any  fuperiour  Authority,  or 
any  Derivation  of  Authority  from  any  other,  or  Limitation  by 
any  diftinct  independent  Authority,  either  fuperiour,  equal,  or 
inferiour ;  he  being  the  Head  of  all  Dominion,  and  Fountain 
of  all  Authority  ;  and  alfo  without  Reftraint  by  any  Obliga 
tion,  implying  either  Subjection,  Derivation,  or  Dependance, 
or  proper  Limitation.  (3.)  That  his  Will  is  fupreme,  unde- 
rived,  and  independent  on  any  Thing  without  Himfelf;  being 

in 

*'  Judgment,  is  to  fay,  that  a  Man  wills  and  acts  for  an  End  that 
«'  he  would  not  have,  at  the  fame  Time  that  he  wills  and  ads  for  it. 
**  For  if  he  prefers  it  in  his  prefent  Thoughts,  before  any  other, 
*'  'tis  plain  he  then  thinks  better  of  it,  and  would  have  it  before  any 
44  other;  unlefs  he  can  have,  and  not  have  it;  will,  and  not  will  it, 

'  at  the  fame  Time  :   A  Contradiction  too  manifeft  to  be  admitted. . 

*  If  we   look   upon   thofe   fuperiour  Beings  above   us,  who  enjoy  per- 
'  feet  Happinefs,  we  (hall  have    Reafon   to  judge,  that  they  are  more 
'  fteadily  determined    in   their  Choice  of  Good,    than    we ;    and  yet 
'  we  have  no  Reafon    to  think  they  are  lefs  happy,    or  lefs  free,  than 
*'  we  are.     And    if   it   were   fit  for  fuch  poor  finite    Creatures    as  we 
*'  are,  to    pronounce  what  infinite   Wifdom  and    Goodnefs   could    do, 
"  I   think  we   might  fay,    that  God  himfelf  connot  chufe  what  is  not 
**  Good.      The  Freedom  of  the  Almighty  hinders  not  bis  being  determined 

"  bywhat  is  beft. But   to  give   a   right  View  of  this  miftaken 

"  Part  of   Liberty,    let  me  afk,    Would   any  one     be  a   Changeling, 
"  becaufe  he   is   lefs  determined   by  wife  Determinations,   than   a  wife 
**  Man?  Is  it   worth   the  Name    of  Freedom,  to  be  at  Liberty  to  play 
the    Fool,    arid    draw   Shame   and    Mifery  upon  a  Man's  felf?  If  to 
break   loofe  from    the    Conduct    of    Reafon,      and     to     want    that 
Reftraint    of    Examination     and    Judgment,      that    keeps  us    from 
doing  or  chufing    the   worfe,    be  Liberty,    true   Liberty ;    Mad-men 
and   Fools  are   the  only  free   Men.     Yet  I    think    no  Body    would 
chufe  to  be  mad,  for  the  fake  of  fuch  Liberty,  but  he  that  is  mad.  al 
ready.  Locke,  Hum.  Und.  Vol.  I.   Edit.  7.   P.  215,   216." 

4t  This  Being  having  all  Things  always  neceCTarily  in  View,  muft  al- 
"  ways,  and  eternally  will,  according  to  his  infinite  Comprehenfion  of 
**  Things;  that  is,  muft  will  all  Things  that  are  wifeft  and  beft  to 
"  be  done.  There  is  no  getting  free  of  this  Confequence.  If  it 
"  can  will  at  all,  it  muft  will  this  Way.  To  be  capable  of  know- 
"  ing,  and  not  capable  of  willing,  is  not  to  be  underftood.  And 
"  to  be  capable  of  willing  otherwife  than  what  is  wifeft  and  beft, 
*'  contradicts  that  Knowledge  which  is  infinite.  Infinite  Knowledge 
"  muft  direct  the  Will  without  Error.  Here  then  is  the  Origin  of 

"  moral  Necejjity  ;  and  that  is    really,    of  Freedom. • Perhaps  it 

*'  may  be  faid,  when  the  divine  Will  is  determined,  from  the   Con- 

"  ^deration 


Sefl.VII.  no  Mearinefs  or  Di  lad  vantage.         235 

in  every  Thing  determin'd  by  his  own  Counfel,  having  no 
other  Rule  but  his  own  Wifdorn  :  his  Will  not  being  fubjeft 
to,  or  reftrain'd  by  the  Will  of  any  other,  and  others  Wills 
being  perfectly  fubjeft  to  his.  (4.).  That  his  Wijdom,  which  de 
termines  his  Will,  is  fwpreme,  perfect,  underived,  felf-fufficient, 
and  independent ;  fo  that  it  may  be  faid  as  in  Ifai.  xl.  14.  With 
rwhom  took  He  Counfel?  And  who  inftrufted  Him  and  taught  Him 
in  the  Path  of  Judgment,  and  taught  Him  Knowledge  >  and  foc^a- 

ed  Him  the  Way  of  Under/landing? There  is  no  other  divine 

Sovereignty  but  this :  And  this  is  properly  abfolute  Sovereignty  : 
No  other  is  defirable  ;  nor  would  any  other  be  honourable,  or 
liappy  :  And  indeed  there  is  no  other  conceivable  or  poflible. 
JTis  the  Glory  and  Greatnefs  of  the  divine  Sovereignty,  that 
God's  Will  is  determin'd  by  his  own  infinite  all-fufficient  Wif- 
dom  in  every  Thing  ;  and  in  nothing  at  all  is  either  directed  by 
any  inferiour  Wifdom,  or  by  no  Wifdom  ;  whereby  it  would 
become  fenfelefs  Arbitrarinefs,  determining  and  acting  without 
Reafon,  Defign  or  End. 

If  God's  Will  is  iUadily  and  furely  determined  in  every 
Thing  by  fupreme  Wifdom,  then  it  is  in  every  Thing  neceflarily 
determined  to  that  v?hich  is  moft  wife.  And  certainly  it  would 
be  a  Difadvantage  and  Indignity,  to  be  otherwife.  For  if  the 
divine  Will  was  not  neceffarily  determin'd  to  that  which  in 
every  Cafe  is  wifeft  and  bell,  it  muft  be  fubjedt  to  fome  Degree 
of  undefigning  Contingence  ;  and  fo  in  the  fame  Degree 
liable  to  Evil.  To  fuppofe  the  divine  Will  liable  to  be  carried 
Either  and  thither  at  Random,  by  the  uncertain  Wind  of  blind 
Contingerice,  which  is  guided  by  no  Wifdom,  no  Motive,  no 

intelligent 

"  fideration  of  the  eternal  Aptitudes  of  Things,  it  is  as  neceflarily 
"  determined,  as  if  it  were  phyfically  impell'd,  if  that  were  poflible, 
*'  But  it  is  Unflcilfulnefs,  to  fuppofe  this  an  Objection.  The  great 
*'  Principle  is  once  eftablifhed,  -viz.  That  the  divine  Will  is  deter- 
**  mined  by  the  eternal  Reafon  and  Aptitudes  of  Things,  inftead  of 
"  being  phyfically  impelled  ;  and  after  that,  the  more  ftrong  and 
"  neceflary  this  Determination  is,  the  more  perfect  the  Deity  muft 
"  be  allowed  to  be:  It  is  this  that  makes  him  an  amiable  and* 

*  adorable   Being,  whofe  Will    and  Power  are  conftantly,    immutably 
determined,    by  the  Conlideration  of  what  is  wifeft  and    beft ;    in 
ftead    of  a  furd  Being,    with    Power,    but   without  DiTcerning  and 
Reafon'.      It    is   the   "Beauty  of  this  Nectjfity,  that  it  is  ftrong  as  Fate 

itfelft  ivith  all  the  Advantage  of  Reafon  and  Goodnefs. It   is 

ftrange,    to  fee  Men  contend,    that  the  Deity  is  not  Free,    becaufe  he 
is     neceflarily   rational,     immutably  good   and   wife ;    when   a   Man 

'  is  allowed  ftill  the  perfeder  Being,    the  more  fixedly  and  conftantly 

*  his  Will  is   determined    by   Reafon  and  Truth."     Inquiry  into  the 

of  the  Hum,  Soul.    Edit.  3,  Vol.  H.  P,  403,  404. 


Necefity  of  a&ing  rioft  wifely,        Part  IV. 

intelligent  Didate  whatfoever,  (if  any  fuch  Thing  were  poflible) 
would  certainly  argue  a  great  Degree  of  Imperfection  and 

Meannefs,  infinitely  unworthy  of  the  Deity. If  it  be  a  Dif- 

advantage,  for  the  divine  Will  to  be  attended  with  this  moral 
Neceffity,,  then  the  more  free  from  itj  and  the  more  left  at 
Random,  the  greater  Dignity  and  Advantage.  And  confe- 
quently  to  be  perfedly  free  from  the  Diredion  of  Undertiand- 
ing,  and  univerfally  and  entirely  left  to  fenfelefs  unmeaning 
Contingence,  to  ad;  abfolutely  at  Random,  would  be  the 
fupreme  Glory.  , 

It  no  more  argues  any  Dependance  of  God's  Will,  that  his 
fupremely  wife  Volition  is  neceffary,  than  it  argues  a  Depend 
ance  of  his  Being,  that  his  Exiftence  is  neceflary.  If  it  be 
fomething  too  low,  for  the  fupreme  Being  to  have  his  Will  de 
termined  by  moral  Neceffity,  fo  as  neceflarily,  in  every  Cafe> 
to  will  in  the  higheft  Degree  holily  and  happily  ;  then  why 
is  it  not  aifo  fometliing  too  low,  for  him  to  have  his  Exiftence, 
and  the  infinite  Perfection  of  his  Nature,  and  his  infinite 
Happinefs  determined  by  Neceffity  ?  It  is  no  more  to  God's 
Difhonour,  to  be  neceflarily  wife,  than  to  be  neceflarily  holy: 
And  if  neither  of  them  be  to  his  Dishonour,  then  it  is  not  to  his 
Diflionour  neceflarily  to  ad  holiiy  and  wifely.  And  if  it  be 
not  difhonourable,  to  be  neceflarily  holy  and  wife,  in  the 
higheft  poflible  Degree,  no  more  is  it  mean  or  difhonourable* 
neceflarily  to  ad  holily  and  wifely  in  the  higheft  poflible  Degree  j 
or  (which  is  the  fame  Thing)  to  do  that,  in  every  Cafe,  which 
above  ail  other  Things  is  wifeft  and  beft. 

The  Reafon  why  it  is  not  difhonourabie,  to  be  neceflarily 
moft  holy,  is,  becaufe  Holinefs  in  itfelf  is  an  excellent  and 
honourable  Thing.  For  the  fame  Reafon,  it  is  no  Diihonour 
to.  bfi-uecefifarily  moft  wife,  and  in  every  Cafe  to  ad  moft  wifely, 
or  do  the  Thing  which  is  the  wifeft  of  all ;  for  Wlfdom  is  alfo 
in  itfelf  excellent  and  honourable. 

The  forementione*d  Author  of  the  Ejfay  on  the  Freedom  of  Will, 
&t.  as  has  been  obferved,  reprefents  that  Dodrine  of  the 
divine  Will's  being  in  every  Thing  neceflarily  determined  by 
fuperiour  Fitnefs,  as  making  the  blefled  God  a  Kind  of  al 
mighty  Minifter  and  machanical  Medium  of  Fate^  And  he 
infills,  P.  93,  94.  that  this  moral  Neceifity  and  Impoflibility  is 
in  EfFed  the  fame  Thing  with  phyfical  and  natural  Neceffity 
andlmpoffibility  :  And  in  P.  54,  55.  he  fays,  "  The  Scheme 
"  which  determines  the  Will  always  and  certainly  by  the 

"  Underftanding, 


no  Meannefs  or  Difadvantage.         237 

*r  Underftariding,    and  the  Underftanding  by  the  Appearance 

**  of  Things.,    fee/us  to   take   away   the   true  Nature  of  Vice 

"<  and  Virtue.     For  the  fublimeft  of  Virtues,    and  the  vilelt 

"  of  Vices,  feem  rather  to  be  Matters  of  Fate  and  Neceffity, 

**  flowing  naturally  and  neteiTarily  frofn  the   Exiftence,    the 

"  Circumltances,  and  prefent  Situation  of  Perfons  and  Things  : 

'"  For  this  Exiftence  and  Situation  neceflarily  makes  fuch  an 

"  Appearance  to  the  Mind ;    from  this  Appearance  flows  a 

"  neceiTary  Perception  and  Judgment,  concerning  thefe  Things ; 

'"  this  Judgment  neceflarily  determines  the  Will:  And   thus 

"  by  this  Chain  of  neceflary  Cauies,  Virtue  and  Vice  would 

"  lofe    their  Nature,  and  become  natural  Ideas,  and  neceflary 

"  Things,  initead  of  moral  and  free  Aftions." 

.  And  yet  this  fame  Author  allows,  P.  30,  31.  That  a  per- 
feftly  wife  Being  will  conftantly  and  certainly  chufe  what  is 
moil  fit ;  and  fays,  P.  102,  103.  •'  I  grant,  and  always  have 
"  granted,  that  wherefoever  there  is  fuch  an  antecedent  fupe- 
"  riour  Fitnefs  of  Things,  Godafts  according  to  it,  fo  as  never 
"  to  contradift  it;  and  particularly,  in  all  his  judicial  Pro- 
*'  ceedings,  as  a  Governor,  and  Diftributer  of  Rewards  and 
'*  "Punimments,"  Yea,  he  fays  exprefly,  P.  42.  "  That  it  is 
*'  not  poflible  for  God  to  aft  other  wife,  than  according  to 
"  this  Fitnefs  and  Goodnefs  in  Things." 

So  that  according  to  this  Author,  putting  thefe  feveral  Paffages 
of  his  EiTay  together,  there  is  no  Virtue,  nor  any  Thing  of  a  moral 
Nature,  in  the  moft  fublime  and  glorious  Afts  and  Exercifes  of 
God's  Holinefs,  Juftice,  and  Faithfulnefs ;  and  He  never  does 
any  Thing  which  is  in  itfelf  fupremely  worthy,  and  above  all 
other  Things  fit  and  excellent,  but  only  as  a  Kind  of  mecha 
nical  Medium  of  Fate  ;  and  in  what  he  does  as  the  Judge,  and 
moral  Governor  of  the  World,  He  exercifes  no  moral  Excellency? 
exercifmg  no  Freedom  in  thefe  Things,  becaufe  He  afts  by 
moral  Neceflity,  which  is  in  Effeft  the  fame  with  phyfical  or 
natural  Neceflity  ;  and  therefore  he  only  afts  by  an  Hobbijlical 
Fatality;  as  a  Being  indeed  of  <vaft  Understanding,  as  <wellas  Ponuer 
find  Efficiency,  ( as  He  faid  before)  but  without  a  Will  to  chufe,  being 
a  Kind  of  almighty  Minifter  of  Fate,  a&ing  under  its  fupreme  In- 
Jiuence.  For  He  allows,  that  in  all  thefe  Things  God's  Will 
is  determined  conftantly  and  certainly  by  a  fuperiour  Fitnefs, 
and  that  it  is  not  poflible  for  Him  to  aft  otherwife.  And  if 
thefe  Things  are  fo,  what  Glory  or  Praife  belongs  to  God 
for  doing  holily  and  juftly,  or  taking  the  moft  fit,  holy,  wife 
and  excellent  Courfe,  in  any  one  Inftance  ?  Whereas,  accord- 
H  h  ing 


23$    Neceffity  of  GOD'S  atling  wifely,  &c.  Part  IV « 

ing  to  the  Scriptures,  and  alfo  the  common  Senfe  of  Mankind, 
it  don't  in  the  leaft  derogate  from  the  Honour  of  any  Being; 
that  through  the  moral  Perfection  of  his  Nature,  he  neceffarily 
ads  with  fupreme  Wifdom  and  Holinefs  :  But  on  the  con 
trary,  his  Praife  is  the  greater  :  Herein  confifts  the  Height  of 
his  Glory. 

The  fame  Author,  P.  ^6.  fuppofes*  that  herein  appears  the 
excellent  Character  of  a  'wife  and  good  Man,  that  tho'  he  can  chftfe 
contrary  to  the  Fitnefs  of  Things,  yet  he  does  not ;  butfiiffers  himjelf 
to  be  dire  fled  by  fritrtcfs;  and  that  in  this  Condud  He  imitates 
the  blejjed  God.  And  yet  He  fdppofes  'tis  contrariwife  with  the 
blefled  God  ;  not  that  he  fufFers  Himfelf  to  be  directed  by 
Fitnefs,  when  He  can  chttfe  contrary  to  the  Fitnefs  of  Things,  but 
that  he  cannot  chvfe  contrary  to  the  Fiinefs  of  Things;  as  he  fays, 
P.  42. — That  it  is  not  pojjible  for  God  to  act  otherivife,  than> 
according  to  this  Fitnefs,  <vohere  there  is  any  Fitnefs  or  Goodnefs  in 
Things;  Yea,  he  fuppofes,  P.  31,  That  if  a  Man  'were  per- 
feclly  'wife  and  good,  he  could  not  do  othernvife  than  be  conftantly 
and  certainly  determined  by  the  Fitnefs  of  Things* 

One  Thing  more  I  would  obferve,  before  I  conclude  this 
Sedion ;  and  that  is,  That  if  it  derogates  nothing  from  the 
Glory  of  God,  to  be  neceffarily  determined  by  fuperiour  Fitnefs 
in  fome  Things,  then  neither  does  it  to  be  thus  determined  in 
all  Things ;  from  any  Thing  in  the  Nature  of  fuch  Neceffity, 
as  at  all  detracting  from  God's  Freedom,  Independence,  abfo- 
lute  Supremacy,  or  any  Dignity  or  Glory  of  his  Nature,  State, 
or  Manner  of  acling  ;  or  as  implying  any  Infirmity,  Reftraint, 
Of  Subjection.  And  if  the  Thing  be  fuch  as  well  confifts  with 
God's  Glory,  and  has  nothing  tending  at  all  to  detract  from 
it ;  then  we  need  not  be  afraid  of  afcribing  it  to  God  in  too 
many  Things,  left  thereby  we  fhould  detrad  from  God's 
Glory  too  much. 


(XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX) 


S  E  C  T  1  O  £7 


(    239    ) 

SECTION     VIIL 

Some  farther  Objections  again/I  the  moral  Neceflky 
of  GOD'S  Volitions  confidered. 

THE  Author  laft  cited,  as  has  been  obferved,  owns  that 
God,  being  perfectly  wife,  will  conftantly  and  certainly 
chufe  what  appears  molt  fit,  where  there  is  a  fuperiour 
Fitnefs  and  Goodnefs  in  Things ;  and  that  it  is  not  poffible 
for  him  to  do  otherwife.  So  that'it  is  in  EfFeft  confefs'd,  that 
in  thofe  Things  where  there  is  any  real  Preferablenefs, 
'tis  no  Difhonour,  nothing  in  any  Refpecl  unworthy  of  God, 
for  him  to  a<ft  from  Neceifity ;  notwithftanding  all  that  can 
be  objected  from  the  Agreement  of  fuch  a  NeceSty,  with  the 
Fate  of  the  Stoicks,  and  the  Neceffity  maintain'd  by  Mr.  Holies. 
From  which  it  will  follow,  that  if  it  were  fo,  that  in  all  the 
different  Things,  among  which  God  chufes,  there  were  ever 
more  a  fuperiour  Fitnefs  or  Preferablenefs  on  one  Side,  then  it 
would  be  no  Dimonour,  or  any  Thing,  in  any  Refpecl,  un 
worthy,  or  unbecoming  of  God,  for  his  Will  to  be  necefTarily 
determined  in  every  Thing.  And  if  this  be  allowed,  it  is  a 
giving  up  entirely  the  Argument,  from  the  Unfuitablenefs  of 
fuch  a  Neceffity  to  the  Liberty,  Supremacy,  Independence  and 
Glory  of  the  divine  Being  ;  and  a  refting  the  Whc4e  Weight  of 
the  Affair  on  the  Decifion  of  another  Point  wholly  diverfe  ;  <viz* 
Whether  it  befo  indeed,  that  in  all  the  various  poiuble  Things 
which  are  in  God's  View,  and  may  be  conlidered  as  capable 
Objects  of  his  Choice,  there  is  not  evermore  a  Preferablenefs 
in  one  Thing  above  another.  This  is  denied  by  this  Author; 
who  fuppofes,  that  in  many  Inftances,  between  two  or  more 
poffible  Things,  which  come  within  the  View  of  the  divine 
Mind,  there  is  a  perfect  Indifference  and  E'quality  as  to  Fitnefs, 
or  Tendency  to  attain  any  good  End  which  God  can  have  in 
View,  or  to  anfwer  any  of  his  Defigns.  Now  therefore  I 
would  confider  whether  this  be  evident. 

The  Arguments  brought  to  prove  this,    are  of  two  Kinds, 
(i.)  It   is  urged,    that   in   many  Inftances   we   muft  fuppofe 
there  is  abfolutely  no  Difference  between  various  poffible  Ob 
jects  of  Choice,    which  God  has  in  View  :    And  (2.)  that  the 
H  h  3  Difference 


240       Of  God's  creating  the.  World,        Part  IV. 

Difference  between  many  Things  is  fo  inconfiderable,  or  of 
fuch  a  Nature,  that  it  would  be  unreafonable  to  fuppofe  it  to 
be  of  any  Confequence;  or  to  fuppofe  that  any  of  God's  wife 
t)efigns  would  not  be  anfwered  in  one  Way  as  well  as  the  other. 

Therefore, 

I.  The  firft  Thing  to  be  confidered  is,  Whether  there,  are 
any  Inftances  wherein  there  is  a  perfect  Likenefs,  and  ab- 
folutely  no  Difference,  between  different  Objects  of  Choice, 
that  are  propofed  to  the  divine  Underftanding  ? 

And  here  in  the  firfi  Place,  it  may  be  worthy  to  be  confi 
dered,  whether  the  Contradiction  there  is  in  the  Terms  of.  the. 
Queftion  propofed,  don't,  giye  Reafon  to  fufpect  that  there  is. 
an  Inconfiftence  in  the  Thing,  fuppofed.  'Tis  inquired,  whe 
ther  different  Objects  of  Choice  mayn't  be  abfolutely  without. 
Difference  ?  If  they  are  abfolutely  without  Difference,  then  how 
are  they  different  Objects  of  Choice  ?  If  there  be  abfolutely  no. 
Difference  in  any  Refpects,  then  there  is  no  Variety  or  DiftinSion  : 
For  Distinction  is  only  by  fome  Difference.  And  if  there  be 
jjo  Varlcty^  among  propofed  Objefls  of  Choice,  then  there  is  no 
Opportunity  for  Variety  of  Choice,  or  Difference  of  Determina 
tion.  For  that  Determination  of  a  Thing  which  is  not  dif 
ferent  in  any  Refpect,  is  not  a  different  Determination,  but  the. 
fame.  That  tkis  is  no  Quibble,  may  appear  more  fully  anon. 

The  Arguments,  to.  prove  that  the  moil  High,  in  fome  In- 
dances,  chufes  to  do  one  Thing  rather  than  another,  where 
the  Things  themfelves  are  perfectly  without  Difference,  are. 
two. 

i.  That  the  various  Parts  of  infinite  Time  and  Space,  ab-» 
folutely  confidered,  are  perfectly  alike,  and  don't  differ  at  all 
one  from  another  :  And  that  therefore,  when  God  determined 
to  create  the  World  in  fuch  a  Part  of  infinite  Duration  and. 
Space,  rather  than  others,  he  determin'd  and  prefer'd  among 
various  Objects,  between  which  there  was  no  Preferablenefs, 
and  abfolutely  no  Difference. 

Anf<w.  This  Objection  fuppofes  an  infinite  Lengtji  of  Time, 
before  the  World  was  created,  diftinguifhed  by  fucceffive  Parts, 
properly  and  truly  fo  ;  or  a  Succeffion  of  limited  and  un- 
meafurable  Periods  of  Time,  following  one  another,  in  an  in 
finitely  long  Series  :  which  muft  needs  be  a  groundlefs  Imagi 
nation.  The  eternal  Duration  which  was  before  the  World, 
being  only  the  Eternity  of  God's  Exiftence ;  wliich  is  nothing 

elfe 


Sed.  VIII.         atfucb  a  Time  and  Place. 

elfe  but  his  immediate,  perfeft  and  invariable  PofTe.T.on  of  ths 
Whole  of  his  unlimited  Life,  together  and  at  once  ;  '/it<e  in^r^ 
minabilist  tota,  fimul  & perfe&a  Poj/e//to.  Which  is  fo  generally- 
allowed,  that  I  need  not  Hand  to  demonftrate  it.  i 

So  this  Objection  fuppofes  an  Extent  of  Space  beyond  the 
Limits  of  the  Creation,  of  an  infinite  Length,  Breadth  and 
Depth,  truly  and  properly  dillinguiihed  inco  different  meafur- 
«tble  Parts,  limited  at  certain  Stages,  one  beyond  another,  in 
an  infinite  Series.  Which  Notion  of  abfolute  and  infinite  Space- 
is  doubtlefs  as  unreasonable,  as  that  now  meution'd,  of  abfo 
lute 


*  "  If  all  created  Beings  were  taken  away,  all  Poffibility  of  any  Mu- 
*'  tation  or  Succeffion  of  one  Thing  to  another  would  appear  to 
"  be  alfo  removed.  Abftradt  Succeffion  in  Eternity  is  fcarce  to  be 
"  underftood.  What  is  it  that  fucceeds  ?  One  Minute  to  another 
44  pew-haps,  <velut  unda  fupervenit  undam.  But  when  we  imagine 
*'  this,  we  fancy  that  the  Minutes  are  Things  feparately  exilHng. 
4  This  is  the  common  Notion ;'  and  yet  it  is  a  manitert  Prejudice. 
'  Time  is  nothing  but  the  Exiftence  of  created  fuceflive  Beings, 
'  and  Eternity  the  neceffary  Exigence  of  the  Deity.  Therefore,  if 
4  this  neceffary  Being  hath  no  Change  or  Succeffion  in  his  Nature, 
4  his  Exiftence  muft  of  Courfe  be  unfucceffive.  We  feem  to  com- 
4  mit  A  double  Overiight  in  this  Cafe;  frji,  we  find  Succeiiion  in 
4  the  neceffary  Nature  and  Exiitence  of  the  Deity  himfelf :  Which 
'  is  wrong,  if  the  Reafoning  above  be  conclufive.  And  then 
4  we  afcribe  this  Succeffion  to  Eternity,  confidered  abftracledly 
4  from  the  eternal  Being  ;  and  fuppofe  it,  one  knows  not  what,  a 
4  Thing  fubfifting  by  itfelf,  and  flowing,  one  Minute  after  another. 
4  This  is  the  Work  of  pure  Imagination,  and  contrary  to  the 
4  Reality  of  Things.  Hence  the  common  metaphorical  Expreflions  ; 
4  Time  runs  a-pace,  let  us  lay  hold  on  the  prefenf  Minute,  and^ 
'  the  like.  The  Philofophers  themfelves  miflead  us  by  their  Illustrations  : 
*  They  compare  Eternity  to  the  Motion  of  a  Point  running  on. 
4  forever,  and  making  a  tracelefs  infinite  Line.  Here  the  Point  is 
'  fuppofed  a  Thing  actually  fublifting,  representing  the  prefent  Mi- 
4  nute  ;  and  then  they  afcribe  Motion  or  Succeffion  to  it :  that  is, 
4  they  afcribe  Motion  to  a  mere  Non-entity,  to  illuftrate  to  us  a 

4  fucceffive   Eternity    made    up   of  finite   fucceflive    Parts If  once 

4  we  allow  an  all-perfeft  Mind,  which' hath  an  eternal,  immutable  and 

4  infinite  Comprehenfion  of  all  Things,    always  (and  allow  it  we  muft). 

*4  the  Diftinction  of  paft    and  future    vanifhes   with  Refpeft  to    fuch  a 

*4  Mind In   a  Word,     if    we    proceed   Step    by    Step,     as    above, 

44  the  Eternity  or  Exiftence  of  the  Deity  will  appear  to  be  Vi't<s 
44  intefminabiltSi  tota^  Jimul  &  perfeEta  PoJJ'ejJio ;  how  much  foever 
44  this  may  have  been  a  Paradox  hitherto."  Enquiry  into  the  Nature 
of  the  Human  Sou/,  Vol.  2.  P.  409,  410,  411.  Edit.  3. 


242         Of  GOD'S  placing  differently        Part  IV, 

lute  and  infinite  Duration.  'Tis  as  improper,  to  imagine  that 
the  Immenfity  and  Omniprefence  of  God  is  diftinguiihed  by  a 
jSeries  of  Miles  and  Leagues,  one  beyond  another  ;  as  that 
the  infinite  Duration  of  God  is  diftinguimed  by  Months  and 
Years,  one  after  another.  A  Diverfity  and  Order  of  diftinct 
Parts,  limited  by  certain  Periods,  is  as  conceivable,  and  does 
as  naturally  obtrude  itfelf  on  our  Imagination,  in  one  Cafe  as 
the  other  ;  and  there  is  equal  Reafon  in  each  Cafe,  to  fuppofe 
that  our  Imagination  deceives  us.  'Tis  equally  improper,  to 
talk  of  Months  and  Years  of  the  divine  Exiftence,  and  Mile- 
fquares  of  Deity  :  And  we  equally  deceive  ourfelves,  when 
we  talk  of  the  World's  being  differently  fix'd  with  Refpect  to 
either  of  thefe  Sorts  of  Meafures.  I  think,  we  know  not  what 
we  mean,  if  we  fay,  the  World  might  have  been  differently 
placed  from  what  it  is,  in  the  broad  Expanfe  of  Infinity  ;  or, 
that  it  might  have  been  differently  fix'd  in  the  long  Line  of 
Eternity  :  And  all  Arguments  and  Objections  which  are 
built  on  the  Imaginations  we  are  apt  to  have  of  infinite  Exten- 
fion  or  Duration,  are  Buildings  founded  on  Shadows,  or 
Caftles  in  the  Air. 

2.  The  fecond  Argument,  to  prove  that  the  moft  High  wills 
one  Thing  rather  than  another,  without  any  fuperiour  Fitnefs  or 
Preferablenefs  in  the  Thing  prefer'd,  is  God's  actually  placing 
in  different  Parts  of  the  World,  Particles  or  Atoms  of  Matter 
that  are  perfectly  equal  and  alike.  The  forementioned  Author 
fays,  P.  78,  &c.  ((  If  one  would  defcend  to  the  minute  fpeci- 
"  fie  Particles,  of  which  different  Bodies  are  compofed,  we 
•c  fliould  fee  abundant  Reafon  to  believe  that  there  are  Thou- 
«f  fands  of  fuch  little  Particles  or  Atoms  of  Matter,  which. 
<c  are  perfectly  equal  and  alike,  and  could  give  no  diftinct  Pe- 
"  termination  to  the  Will  of  God,  where  to  place  them."  He 
there  inftances  in  Particles  of  Water,  of  which  there  are  fuch 
immenfe  Numbers,  which  compofe  the  Rivers  and  Oceans  of 
this  World  ;  and  the  infinite  Myriads  of  the  luminous  and  fiery 
Particles,  which  compofe  the  Body  of  the  Sun  ;  fo  many,  that 
it  would  be  very  unreafonable  to  fuppofe  no  two  of  them 
inould  be  exactly  equal  and  alike. 


(i.)  To  this  I  anfwer:  That  as  we  muft  fuppofe 
Matter  to  be  infinitely  divifible,  'tis  very  unlikely  that  any  two 
of  all  thefe  Particles  are  exactly  equal  and  alike  ;  fo  unlikely, 
that  it  is  a  Thoufand  to  one,  yea,  an  infinite  Number  to  one, 
but  it  is  otherwife  :  And  that  altho'  we  (hould  allow  a  great 

Similarity 


Sedl.VIIL  fnnilar  Particles.  $4.$ 

Similarity  between  the  different  Particles  of  Water  and  Fire, 
as  to  their  general  Nature  and  Figure  ?  and  however  fmall  we 
iuppofe  thofe  Particles  to  be,  'tis  infinitely  unlikely,  that  any  two 
of  them  ihould  be  exactly  equal  in  Di mentions  and  Quantity 

of  Matter. If  we  mould  fuppofe  a  great  many  Globes  of 

the  fame  Nature  with  the  Globe  of  the  Earth,  it  would  be  very 
ftrange,  if  there  v/ere  any  two  of  them  that  had  exaftly  the 
fame  Number  of  Particles  of  Duft  and  Water  in  them.  But 
infinitely  lefs  ftrange,  than  that  two  Particles  of  Light  ftould 
have  juft  the  fame  Quantity  of  Matter.  For  a  Particle  of 
Light  (according  to  the  Doctrine  of  the  infinite  Divifibility  of 
Matter)  is  compofed  of  infinitely  more  aflignable  Parts,  than 
there  are  Particles  of  Duft  and  Water  In  the  Globe  of  the; 
Earth.  And  as  it  is  infinitely  unlikely,  that  any  two  of  thefe 
Particles  mould  be  equal ;  fo  it  is,  that  they  mould  be  alike  ia 
other  Refpefts :  To  inftance  in  the  Configuration  of  their 
Surfaces.  If  there  were  very  many  Globes,  of  the  Nature  of 
the  Earth,  it  would  be  very  unlikely  that  any  two  ihould  have1 
exactly  the  fame  Number  of  Particles  of  Duft,  Water  and  Stone, 
in  their  Surfaces,  and  all  pofited  exactly  alike,  one  with  Re- 
fpect  to  another,  without  any  Difference,  in  any  Part  difcernable 
either  by  the  naked  Eye  or  Microfcope ;  but  infinitely  lefs 
ftrange,  than  that  two  Particles  of  Light  mould  be  perfectly 
of  the  fame  Figure.  For  there  are  infinitely  more  aifignable 
real  Parts  on  the  Surface  of  a  Particle  of  Light,  than  there  are 
Particles  of  Duft,  Water  and  Stone,  on  the  Surface  of  the 
terreftrial  Globe. 

Anf.  2.  But  then,  fuppofing  that  there  are  two  Particles 
or  Atoms  of  Matter  perfectly  equal  and  alike,  which  God  has 
placed  in  different  Parts  of  the  Creation  j  as  I  will  not  deny  it 
to  be  poflible  for  God  to  make  two  Bodies  perfectly  alike,  and 
put  them  in  different  Places ;  yet  it  will  not  follow,  that  two 
different  or  diftinct  Acts  or  Effects  of  the  divine  Power  have 
exactly  the  fame  Fitnefs  for  the  fame  Ends.  For  thefe  two 
different  Bodies  are  not  different  or  diftinct,  in  any  other 
Refpects  than  thofe  wherein  they  differ :  They  are  two  in  no 
other  Refpects  than  thofe  wherein  there  is  a  Difference.  If 
they  are  perfectly  equal  and  alike  in  themf elves,  then  they  can  be 
diftinguifhed,  or  be  diftinct,  only  in  thofe  Things  which  are 
called  Circumftances  ,*  as,  Place,  Time,  Reft,  Motion,  or  fomc 
other  prefent  or  paft  Circumftances  or  Relations.  For  'tis 
Difference  only,  that  conftitutes  Diftinction.  If  God  makes 
two  Bodies  in  taemfdvei  every  Way  equal  and  alike,  and  agreeing 

pe-rfeftly 


244  '"Of  GOD'S  placing  differently       Part  IV. 


in  all  other  Circumftances  and  Relations,  but  only 
their  Place  ;  then  in  this  only  is  there  any  Diliindtion  or  Du 
plicity.  The  Figure  is  the  fame,  the  Meafure  is  the  fame,  the 
Solidity  and  Refinance  are  the  fame,  and  every  Thing  the 
fame,  but  only  the  Place.  Therefore  what  the  Will  of  God 
determines,  is  this,  namely,  that  there  fhould  be  the  fame 
Figure,  the  fame  Extenfion,  the  fame  Refinance,  &c.  in  two 
different  Places*  And  for  this  Determination  he  has  fome 
Reafon.  There  is  fome  End,  for  which  fuch  a  Determination 
and  Adi  has  a  peculiar  Fitnefs,  above  all  other  Ads.  Here  is 
no  one  Thing  determined  without  an  End,  and  no  one  Thing 
without  a  Fitnefs  for  that  End,  fuperiour  to  any  Thing  elfe.  If 
it  be  the  Pleafure  of  God  to  caufe  the  fame  Refiftancc,  and  the 
fame  Figure,  to  be  in  two  different  Places  and  Situations,  we 
can  no  more  juftly  argue  from  it,  that  here  muft  be  fome 
Determination  or  Ad  of  GodY)Will,  that  is  wholly  without 
Motive  or  End,  then  we  can  argue  that  whenever,  in  any 
Cafe,  it  is  a  Man's  Will  to  fpeak  the  fame  Words,  or  make 
the  fame  founds  at  tv/o  different  Times  ;  there  mufl  be  fome 
Determination  or  Aft  of  his  Will,  without  any  Motive  or  End. 
The  Difference  of  Place,  in  the  former  Cafe,  proves  no  more 
than  the  Difference  of  Time  does  in  the  other.  If  any  one 
fhould  fay  with  Regard  to  the  former  Cafe,  that  there  muft  be 
fomething  determined  without  an  End,  viz.  That  of  thofe  two 
fimilar  Bodies,  this  in  particular  fhould  be  made  in  this  Place, 
and  the  other  in  the  other,  and  (hould  inquire  why  the  Creator 
did  not  make  them  inaTranfpofuion,  when  both  are  alike,  and 
each  would  equally  have  fuited  either  Place  ?  The  Inquiry 
fuppofes  fomething  that  is  not  true  ;  namely,  that  the  two 
Bodies  differ  and  are  diftinft  in  other  Refpecls  befides  their 
Place.  So  that  wish  this  Diftindlion,  inherent  in  them,  they 
might  in  their  firft  Creation  have  been  tranfpofed,  and  each 
might  have  begun  its  Exiftence  in  the  Place  of  the  other. 

Let  us  for  Clearnefs  fake  fuppofe;  that  God  had  at  the 
Beginning  made  two  Globes,  each  of  an  Inch  Diameter,  both 
perfect  Spheres,  and  perfectly  folid  without  Pores,  and  per- 
feclly  alike  in  every  Refpeft,  and  placed  them  near  one  to 
another,  one  towards  the  right  Hand,  and  the  other  towards 
the  left,  without  any  Difference  as  to  Time,  Motion  or  Reft, 
paft  or  prefent,  or  any  Circumftance,  but  only  their  Place  ; 
and  the  Queftion  (hould  be  alk'd,  Why  God  in  their  Creation 
placed  them  fo  ?  Why  that  which  is  made  on  the  right  Hand,- 
was  not  made  on  the  left,  and  vice  verj'a  .?  Let  it  be  well  con- 

fidered, 


Sedt.VIII.  firnilar  Parties.  245 

fidered,  whether  there  be  any  Senfe  in  fuch  a  Queftion ;  and 
whether  the  Inquiry  don't  fuppofe  fomething  falfe  and  abfurd. 
Let  it  be  confidered,  what  the  Creator  mull  have  done  other- 
wife  than  he  did,  what  different  Aft  of  Will  or  Power  he  muft 
have  exerted,  in  order  to  the  Thing  propofod.  All  that  could 
have  been  done,  would  have  been  to  have  made  two  Spheres, 
perfectly  alike,*  in  the  fame  Places  where  he  has  made  them, 
without  any  Difference  of  the  Things  made,  either  in  them- 
felves,  or  in  any  Circumftance  ;  fo  that  the  whole  Effect  would 
have  been  without  any  Difference,  and  therefore  juft  the  fame. 
Ey  the  Suppofition,  the  two  Spheres  are  different  in  no  other 
ReTpeft  but  their  Place  ;  and  therefore  in  other  Refpefts  they 
ate  the  fame.  Each  has  the  fame  Roundnefs :  It  is  not  a 
diftincl:  Rotundity,  in  any  other  Refpeft  but  its  Situation. 
There  are  alfo  the  fame  Dimenfions,  differing  in  nothing  but 
their  Place.  And  fo  of  their  Refinance,  and  every  Thing  elfe 
that  belongs  to  them. 

Here  if  any  chufes  to  fay,  "  that  there  is  a  Difference  in 
another  Refpeft,  <vrz.  That  they  are  not  N  U  M  E  R I C  A  L  L  Y 
the  fame:  That  it  is  thus  with  all  the  Qualities  that  belong 
to  them  :  That  it  is  confelfed  they  are  in  fome  Refpefts 
the  fame  ;  that  is,  they  are  both  exactly  alike;  but  yet  nume-< 
rkally  they  differ.  Thus  the  Roundnefs  of  one  is  not  the 
fame  numerical,  individual  Roundnefs  with  that  of  the  Other." 
Let  this  be  fuppofed ;  then  the  Queftion  about  the  Determi 
nation  of  the  divine  Will  in  the  Affair,  is,  Why  did  God  will, 
that  this  individual  Roundnefs  Ihould  be  at  the  right  Hand,  and 
the  other  individual  Roundnefs  at  the  left  ?  Why  did  not  he 
make  them  in  a  contrary  Pofition  ? — Let  any  rational  Perfon 
confider,  whether  fuch  Queftions  be  not  WTords  without  a  Mean 
ing  ;  as  much  as  if  God  mould  fee  fit  for  fome  Ends  to  caufe 
the  fame  Sounds  to  be  repeated,  or  made  at  two  different 
Times ;  the  Sounds  being  perfectly  the  fame  in  every  other 
Refpeft,  but  only  one  was  a  Minute  after  the  other ;  and  it 
Ihould  be  alk'd  upon  it,  why  God  caufed  thefe  Sounds,  nume 
rically  different,  to  fucceed  one  the  other  in  fuch  a  Manner  ? 
why  he  did  not  make  that  individual  Sound  which  was  in  the 
iirft  Minute,  to  be  in  the  fecond  ?  and  the  individual  Sound  o£ 
the  laft  Minute  to  be  in  the  firft  ? — Which  Inquiries  would  be 
«ven  ridiculous ;  as  I  think  every  Perfon  muft  fee  at  once,  in 
the  Cafe  propofed  of  two  Sounds,  being  only  the  fame  repeat 
ed,  abfolutely  without  any  Difference,  but  that  one  Circum- 
of  Time.  If  the  moft  High  fees  it  will  anfvver  fome 
I  i  good 


246     Of  GOD'S  chit/ing  among  like  :fhingsy    P.  Ivi? 

good  End,  that  the  fame  Sound  fhould  be  made  by  Lightning 
at  two  diftinct  Times,  and  therefore  wills  that  it  ihould  be  fo, 
muft  it  needs  therefore  be,  that  hetein  there  is  fome  Act  of 
God's  Will  without  any  Motive  or  End  ?  God  faw  fit  often,  at 
diftinct  Times,  and  on  different  Occafions,  to  fay  the  very 
fame  Words  to  Mofes ;  namely  thofe,  /  am  Jehovah.  And 
would  it  not  be  unreafonable,  to  infer  as  a  certain  Confequence' 
from  this,  that  here  muft  be  fome  Aft  or  Acts  of  the  divine 
Will,  in  determining  and  difpofing  thefe  Words  exactly  alike 
at  different  Times,  wholly  without  Aim  or  Inducement  ?  But 
it.  would  be  no  more  unreafonabk  than  to  fay,  that  there  muft 
be  an  Act  of  God's  without  any  Inducement,  if  he  fees  it  beft, 
and  for  fome  Reafons,  determines  that  there  mail  be  the  fame 
tcance,  the  fame  Dimenfions,  and  the  fame  Figure,  in 
diitinct  Places. 

If  in  the  Inftance  of  the  two  Spheres,  perfectly  alike,  it  be 
.fed  poffible  that  God  might  have  made  them  in  a  contrary 
roiition  ;  that  which  is  made  at  the  right  Hand,  being  made  at 
the  Left ;  then  I  afk,  Whether  it  is  not  evidently  equally  poffi- 
ble,  if  God  had  made  but  one  of  them,  and  that  in  the  Place 
of  the  right-hand  Globe,  that  he  might  have  made  that  nume 
rically  different  from  what  it  is,  and  numerically  different  from 
what  he  did  make  it ;  tho'  perfectly  alike,  and  in  the  fame 
Place ;  and  at  the  fame  Time,  and  in  every  Refpect,  in  the 
fame  Circumftances  and  Relations  ?  Namely,  Whether  he 
might  not  have  made  it  numerically  the  fame  with  that  which 
he  has  now  made  at  the  left  Hand;  and  fo  have  left  that 
which  is  now  created  at  the  right  Hand,  in  a  State  of  Non- 
exiftence  ?  And  if  fo,  whether  it  would  not  have  been  poffible 
to  have  made  one  in  that  Place,  perfectly  like  thefe,  and  yet 
numerically  differing  from  both  ?  And  let  it  be  confidered, 
whether  from  this  Notion  of  a  numerical  Difference  in  Bodies, 
perfectly  equal  and  alike,  which  numerical  Difference  is  fome- 
thing  inherent  in  the  Bodies  themfelves,  and  diverfe  from  the 
Difference  of  Place  or  Time,  or  any  Circumftance  whatfoever  ; 
it  will  not  follow,  that  there  is  an  infinite  Number  of  numeri 
cally  different  poffible  Bodies,  perfectly  alike,  among  which 
God  chufes,  by  a  felf-detennining  Power.,  when  he  goes  about 
to  create  Bodies. 

Therefore,  let  us  put  the  Cafe  thus :  Suppofmg  that  God  in 
the  Beginning  had  created  but  one  perfectly  folid  Sphere,  in  a 
certain  Place ;  and  it  (hould  be  inquired,  Why  God  created  that 

individual 


Sedl.  VIII.      and  Things  of  trivial  difference.     247 

individual  Sphere,  in  that  Place,  at  that  Time  ?  And  why  he 
did  not  create  another  Sphere  perfectly  like  it,  but  numerically 
different,  in  the  fame  Place,  at  the  fame  Time  ?  Or  why  he 
chofe  to  bring  into  Being  there,  that  very  Body,  rather  than 
any  of  the  infinite  Number  of  other  Bodies,  perfectly  like  it ; 
cither  of  which  he  could  have  made  there  as  well,  and  would 
have  anfwered  his  End  as  well  ?  Why  he  caufed  to  exift,  at 
that  Place  and  Time,  that  individual  Roundnefs,  rather  than 
any  other  of  the  infinite  Number  of  individual  Rotundities,  juft 
like  it  ?  Why  that  individual  Refinance,  rather  than  any  other 
of  the  infinite  Number  of  poffible  Refinances  juft  like  it  ?  And 
it  might  as  reafonably  be  aiked,  Why,  when  God  firft  caufed 
it  to  Thunder,  he  caufed  that  individual  Sound  then  to  be  made, 
and  not  another  juft  like  it  ?  Why  did  he  make  Choice  of  this 
very  Sound,  and  reject  all  the  infinite  Number  of  other  poffible 
Sounds  juit  like  it,  but  numerically  differing  from  it,  and  all 
differing  one  from  another  ?  I  think,  every  Body  muft  be  fen*- 
fible  of  the  Abfurdity  and  Nonfenfe  of  what  is  fuppofed  in  fuch 
Inquiries,  And  if  we  calmly  attend  to  the  Matter,  we  (hall  be 
convinced,  that  all  fuch  Kind  of  Objections  as  I  am  an-fwer- 
ing,  are  founded  on  nothing  but  the  Imperfection  of  our  Man 
ner  of  conceiving  of  Things,  and  the  Obfcurenefs  of  Language, 
and  great  Want  of  Clearnefs  and  Precision  in  the  Signification 
of  Terms. 

If  any  fhall  find  Faylt  with  this  Reafoning,  that  it  is  going 
3.  great  Length  into  metaphyfical  Niceties  and  Subtilties ;  I 
anfwer,  The  Objection  which  they  are  in  Reply  to,  is  a  me 
taphyfical  Subtiity,  and  muft  be  treated  according  to  the  Na 
ture  of  it.* 

II.  Another  Thing  alledged  is,  That  innumerable  Things 
whic.h  are  determined  by  the  divine  Will,  and  chofen  and  done* 
by  God  rather  than  others,  differ  from  thofe  that  are  net 
chofen  in  fo  inconiiderable  a  Manner,  that  it  would  be  unrea* 
fonable  to  fuppofe  the  Difference  to  be  of  any  Confequence* 
or  that  there  is  any  fuperiour  Fitnefs  or  Goodnefs,  that  God 
can  have  Refpect  to  in  the  Determination. 

I  i  3  To 

*  "  For  Men  td  have  Recourfe  to  Subtilties,  in  raifing  difficulties^ 
"  and  then  complain,  that  they  (hould  be  taken  off  by  minutely 
»,'  examining  thefe  Subtilties,  is  a  ftrange  Kind  of  Procedure," 
Nature  of  the  Human  Saul,  V.  %.  P.  331=, 


248  Of  GOD'S  chiifing  among  fmz\\  Matters.    P.  IV. 

To  which  I  anfwer ;  it  is  impofiible  for  us  to  determine 
with  any  Certainty  or  Evidence,  thut  becaufe  the  Difference  is 
very  fmall,  and  appears  to  us  of  no  Confideration,  there 
fore  there  is  abfolutely  no  fuperiour  Goodnefs,  and  no  valuable 
End  which  can  be  propofed  by  the  Creator  and  Governor  of 
the  World,  in  ordering  fuch  a  Difference.  The  foremention'd 
Author  mentions  many  Inftances,  One  is,  there  being  one 
Atom  in  the  whole  Univerfe  more,  or  lefs.  But  I  think  it 
would  be  unreafonable  to  fuppofe,  that  God  made  one  Atom  in, 
vain,  or  without  any  End  or  Motive.  He  made  not  one  Atom 
but  what  was  a  Work  of  his  almighty  Power,  as  much  as  the 
whole  Globe  of  the  Earth,  and  requires  as  much  of  a  conilant; 
Exertion  of  almighty  Power  to  uphold  it ;  and  was  made  and 
is  upheld  underftandingly,  and  on  Defign,  as  much  as  if  no. 
other  had  been  made  but  that.  And  it  would  be  as  unreafon 
able  to  fuppofe,  that  he  made  it  without  any  Thing  really 
aimed  at  in  fo  doing,  as  much  as  10  fuppofe  that  he  made  the 
Planet  Jupiter  without  Aim  or  Defign. 

'Tis  poffible,  that  the  mofl  minute  Effects  of  the  Creator's 
Power,  the  fmalleft  affignable  Differences  between  the  Things 
which  God  has  made,  may  be  attended,  in  the  whole  Series 
of  Events,  and  the  whole  Compafs  and  Extent  of  their  Influ 
ence,  with  very  great  and  important  Confequences.  If  the 
Laws  of  Motion  and  Gravitation,  laid  down  by  Sir  Jfaac  New 
ton,  hold  univerfally,  there  is  not  one  Atom,  nor  the  leaft  affign 
able  Part  of  an  Atom,  but  what  has  Influence,  every  Moment, 
throughout  the  whole  material  Univerfe,  to  caufe  every  Part 
to  be  otherwife  than  it  would  be,  if  it  were  not  for  that  parti 
cular  corporeal  Exiftence.  And  however  the  Effect  is  infen- 
fible  for  the  prefent,  yet  it  may  in  Length  of  Time  become, 
great  and  important. 

To  illuftrate  this,  Let  us  fuppofe  two  Bodies  moving  the 
fame  Way,  in  ftrair  Lines,  perfectly  parallel  one  to  another ; 
but  to  be  diverted  from  this  parallel  Courfe,  and  drawn  one. 
from  another,  as  much  as  might  be  by  the  Attraction  of  an 
Atom,  at  the  Diftance  of  one  of  the  furtheft  of  the  fix'd  Stars 
from  the  Earth  ;  thefe  Bodies  being  turned  out  of  the  Lines 
of  their  parallel  Motion,  will,  by  Degrees,  get  further  and 
further  diftant,  one  from  the  other ;  and  tho'  the  Diitance  may 
be  imperceptible  for  a  long  Time,  yet  at  Length  it  may  become 
very  great.  So  the  Revolution  of  a  Planet  round  the  Sun  be 
ing  retarded  or  accelerated.,  and  the  Orbit  of  its  Revolution 

made 


Seel.  VIII.  Neceffity  conjifttnt  with  free  Grace.     249 

made  greater  or  lefs,  and  more  or  lefs  elliptical,  and  fo  its 
periodical  Time  longer  or  fhorter,  no  more  than  may  be  by 
the  Influence  of  the  leaft  Atom,  might  in  Length  of  Time  per 
form  a  whole  Revolution  fooner  or  later  than  otherwife  it 
would  have  done  ;  which  might  make  a  vaft  Alteration 
with  Regard  to  Millions  of  important  Events.  So  the  Influence 
pf  the  leaft  Particle  may,  for  ought  we  know,  have  fuch  EfFe<ft 
on  fomething  in  the  Conftitution  of  fome  human  Body,  as  to 
caufe  another  Thought  to  arife  in  the  Mind  at  a  certain  Time, 
than  otherwife  would  have  been ;  which  in  Length  of  Time 
(yea,  and  that  not  very  great)  might  occafion  a  vaft  Alteration, 
through  the  whole  World  of  Mankind.  And  fo  innumera 
ble  other  Ways  might  be  mention'd,  wherein  the  leaft  affign- 
able  Alteration  may  poflibly  be  attended  with  great  Confe- 
quences. 

Another  Argument t  which  the  foremention'd  Author  brings 
againft  a  necelfary  Determination  of  the  divine  W7ill  by  a  fupe- 
riour  Fitnefs,  is,  that  fuch  Doftrine  derogates  from  the  Freenefs 
of  God's  Grace  and  Goqdntjk,  in  chufing  the  Objects  of  his 
Favour  and  Bounty,  and  from  the  Obligation  upon  Men  tq 
Tbankfulnefs  for  fpecial  Benefits.  P.  89,  &c. 

In  anfwer  to  this  Objection,  I  would  obferve, 

1.  That  it  derogates  no  more  from  the  Goodnefs  of  God, 
to  fuppofe  the  Exercife  of  the    Benevolence  of  his  Nature  to 
be  determined  by  Wifdom,  than  to  fuppofe  it  determined  by 
Chance,  and  that  his  Favours  are  beftowed  altogether  at  Ran 
dom,  his  Will  being  determined  by  nothing  but  perfect  Acci 
dent,  without  any  End  or  Defign  whatfoever ;  which  muft  be 
the  Cafe,  as  has  been  demonftratep!,  if  Volition  be  not   deter 
mined  by  a  prevailing  Motive.     That  which  is  owing  to  per- 
feft  Contingence,    wherein  neither  previous  Inducement,  nor 
antecedent  Choice  has  any  Hand,  is  not  owing  more  to  Good 
nefs  or  Benevolence,  than  that  which  is  owing  to  the  Influence 
pf  a  wife  End, 

2.  'Tis  acknowledged,  that  if  the  Motive  that  determines  the 
Will  of  God,  in  the  Choice  of  the  Objeds  of  his  Favour,  be 
any  moral  Quality  in  the  Object,  recommending  that  Object 
to  his  Benevolence  above  others,   his  chuiing  that  Objeft  is 
not  fo  great  a  Manifeftation  of  the  Freenefs  and  Sovereignty  of 
his  Grace,  as  if  it  were  otherwife.     But  there  is  no  Neceflity 

uppofing  this.,  in  Qrder  to  our  fuppofing  that  he  has  fome 

wife 


250     Neceflity  confident  'with  free  Grace.  Part  IV, 

wife  End  in  View,  in  determining  to  beftow  his  Favours  ort 
one  Perfon  rather  than  another.  We  are  to  diftinguiih  be 
tween  the  Merit  of  the  Objefl  of  God's  Favour,  or  a  moial  Qua 
lification  of  the  Qbjeft  attracting  that  Favour  and  recommend 
ing  to  it,  and  the  natural  Fitnefs  of  fuch  a  Determination  of 
the  A&  of  God' s  Goodnefs,  to  anfwer  fome  wife  Deiign  of  his 

own,  fome  End  in   the  View  of  God's  Omnifcience. 'Tis 

God's  own  Aft,  that  is  the  proper  and  immediate  Object  of 
his  Volition. 

3.  I  fuppofe  that  none  will  deny,  but  that  in  fome  Inftances, 
God  acls  from  wife  Defign  in  determining  the  particular  Sub- 
jecls  of  his  -Favour  :  None  will  fay,  I  prefume,  that  when 
God  diiHnguifhes  by  his  Bounty  particular  Societies  or  Perfons, 
He  never,  in  any  Inftance,  exercifes  any  Wifdom  in  fo  doing, 
aiming  at  fome  happy  Confequence.  And  if  it  be  not  denied 
to  be  fo  in  fome  Inftances,  then  I  would  inquire,  whether  in 
thefe  Inftances  Gocfs  Goodnefs  is  lefs  manifefted,  than  in 
thpfe  wherein  God  has  no  Aim  or  End  at  all  ?  And  whether 
thi  Suhjefts  have  lefs  Caufe  of  Thankfulnefs  ?  Andiffo,  who 
fHflll  be  thankful  for  the  Beftowment  of  diftinguiming  Mercy, 
With  that  enhancing  Circumftance  of  the  Diftinftion's  being 
made  without  an  End  ?  How  mall  it  be  known  when  God  is 
influenced  by  fome  wife  Aim,  and  when  not  ?  It  is  very  mani-: 
feft  with  Refpeft  to  the  Apoftle  Paul,  that  God  had  wife  Ends 
inchufing  him  to  be  a  Chriftian  and  an  Apoftle,  who  had  been 
a  Perfecutor,  &c.  The  Apoftle  himfelf  mentions  one  End. 
I  Tim.  i.  15,  1 6.  Chrijl  Jefus  came  into  the  World  to  fa^e  S  inner s^ 
ofnjohom  I  am  chief.  Ho<vabeit>for  this  Canfe  I  obtained  Mercy,  that 
in  me  firft)  jFefus  Chrijl  mightjhe-vj  forth  all  Long-fiifferingt  for  a. 
Pattern  to  them  ivho  fhould  hereafter  believe  on  Him  to  Life  e<ver- 
lafting.  But  yet  the  Apoftle  never  look'd  on  it  as  a  Diminution 
of  the  Freedom  and  Riches  of  divine  Grace  in  his  Election, 
which  He  fo  often  and  fo  greatly  magnifies.  This  brings  me 
to  obferve, 

4.  Our  fuppofing  fuch  a  moral  Neceflity  in  the  Acls  of  God's 
Will  as  has  been  fpoken  of,  is  fo  far  from  neceffarily  derogat 
ing  from  the  Riches  of  God's  Grace  to  fuch  as  are  the  chofen 
Objefts  of  his  Favour,  that  in  many  Inftances,  this  moral  Ne 
ceflity  may  arife  from  Goodnefs,  and  from  the  great  Degree  of 
it.  God  may  chufe  this  Objeft  rather  than  another,  as  having 
a  fuperiour  Fitnefs  to  anfwer  the  Ends,  Defigns  and  Inclina 
tions  of  his  Goodnefs ;  being  more  fmful,  and  fo  more  mife- 

rable 


Seel.  VIIL  Of  Arminian  Fatality.  251 

rable  and  neceflltous  than  others ;  die  Inclinations  of  infinite 
Mercy  and  Benevolence  may  be  more  gratified,  and  the  gra 
cious  Defign  of  God's  fending  his  Son  into  the  World  may  be 
more  abundantly  arifwered,  in  the  Exercifes  of  Mercy  lowards 
fuch  an  Object,  rather  than  another. 

One  Thing  more  I  would  obferve,    before  I  finim  what  I 
have  to  fay  on  the  Head  of  the  Neceffity  of  the  Acts  of  God's 
Will ;    and  that  is,    that  fomething  much   more  like  a  fervile 
Subjection  of  the  divine  Being    to  Fatal  Neceffity,   will  follow 
from  Arminian  Principles,  than  from  the  Doctrines  which  they 
oppofe.     For  they  (at  leall  molt  of  them)  fuppofe,  with   Re- 
fpeft  to  all  Events  that  happen  in  the  moral  World  depending  oii 
the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents,    which  are  the  moil  important 
Events  of  the  Univerfe,    to  which  all  others  are  fubordinate  ; 
I  fay,    they  fuppofe  with  refpeft  to  thefe,    that  God  has  a  cer 
tain  Foreknowledge  of  them,    antecedent  to   any  Purpofes   or 
Decrees  of  his  about  them.     And  if  fo,  they  have  a  rix'd  cer 
tain  Futurity,  prior  to  any  Defigns  or  Volitions  of  his,  and  in 
dependent  on  them,  and  to  which  his  Volitions  muft  be  fubject, 
as  He  would   wifely  accommodate   his  Affairs  to   this   fix'd 
Futurity  of  the  State  of  Things  in  the  moral  World.     So  that 
here,  inftead  of  a  moral  Neceffity  of  God's  Will,  arifing  from 
or  confining  in  the  infinite  Perfection   and  Blefiednefs  of  the 
divine  Being,    we  have  a  fix'd  unalterable  State  of  Things, 
properly  diitinft  from  the  perfect  Nature  of  the  divine  Mindy 
and  the  State  of  the  divine  Will  and  Defign,    and  entirely  in 
dependent  on  thefe  Things,    and  which  they  have  no  Hand  in, 
becaufe  they  are  prior  to  them  ;  and  which  God's  Will  is  truly 
fubjeft  to,    being  obliged  to  conform  or  accommodate  himfelf 
to  it,  in  all  his  Purpofes  and  Decrees,    and  in  every  Thing  He 
does   in   his  Difpofals   and  Government   of  the  World;    the 
moral  W^orld  being  the  End  of  the  natural ;    fo  that  all  is  in 
vain,    that  is  not  accommodated  to   that  State  of  the  moral 
World,    which  confifts  in,    or  depends  upon  the  Afts  and  State 
of  the  Wills   of  moral  Agents,    which  had  a  fix'd  Futurition 
from  Eternity.     Such  a  Subject-ion  to  Neceffity  as  this,    would 
truly  argue  an  Inferiority  and  Servitude,  that  would  be  unwor 
thy  of  the  fupreme  Being  ;  and  is  much  more  agreeable  to  the 
Notion  which  many  of  the  Heathen  had  of  Fate,  as  above  the 
Gods,  than  that  moral  Neceffity  of  Fitnefs  and  Wifdom  which 
has  been  fpoken  of;    and  is  truly  repugnant  to  the  abfolute- 
Sovereignty  of  God,  and  inconfiftent  with  the  Supremacy  of  his 
Will ;  and  really  fubjects  the  WTill  of  the  moft  High  to  the  Will 
of  his  Creatures,  and  brings  him  into'  Dependence  upon  them, 

SECTION 


O/  /&•  Objedlion  about  Part  IV, 


SECTION     IX. 

Concerning  that  Qljeftion  againft  the  Dofirine 
which  has  been  maintain  d^  that  it  makes  GOD 
the  Author  of  Sin. 

'"I  ^IS  urged  by  Arminians,  that  the  Doctrine  of  the  Neceffi- 
JL  ty  ot  Men's  Volitions,  or  their  neceffary  Connexion 

with   antecedent  Events  and  Circumftances,    makes  the  firft 

Caufe,  and  fupreme  Orderer  of  all  Tilings,  the  Author  of  Sin; 

in  that  he  has  fo  conftituted  the  State  and  Courfe  of  Things. 

that  {inful  Volitions  become  neceiTary.    in  Confequence  of  his 

Difpofal.  Dr.  Whitby>  in  his  Difcourfe  on  the  Freedom  of  the 
l,  *  cites  one  of  the  Antients,  as  on  his  Side,  declaring  that 

f  lis  Opinion  of  the  Necefiity  of  the  Will  "  abfolvcs  Sinners,  as 
doing  nothing  of  their  own  Accord  which  was  Evil,  and 
would  caft  all  the  Blame  of  all  the  Wickednefs  committed  in 
the  World,  upon  God,  and  upon  his  Providence,  if  that 
were  admitted  by  the  Affertors  of  this  Fate  j  whether  he  him- 
felf  did  neceflitate  them  to  do  thefe  Things,  or  ordered  Mat 
ters  fo  that  they  Ihould  be  conftrain'd  to  do  them  by  fome  o- 
ther  Caufe."  And  the  Doctor  fays  in  another  Place,  §  f(  In 
the  Nature  of  the  Thing,  and  in  the  Opinion  of  Philofophers, 
Caufa  deficiens  ,  in  rebus  necejfariist  ad  Caujam  per  fe  efficien- 
tern  reducenda  eft.  In  Things  neceflary,  the  deficient  Caufe 
muft  be  reduced  to  the  efficient.  And  in  this  Cafe  the  Reafou 
is  evident  ;  becaufe  the  not  doing  what  is  required,  or  not 
avoiding  what  is  forbidden,  being  a  Defect,  muft  follow 

"  from  the  Pofition  of  the  neceflary  Caufe  of  that  Deficiency." 

Concerning  this,  I  would  obferve  the  following  Things. 

I.  If  there  be  any  Difficulty  in  this  Matter,  'tis  nothing  pe 
culiar  to  this  Scheme  ;  'tis  no  Difficulty  or  Difadvantage 
wherein  it  is  diftinguilhed  from  the  Scheme  of  Arminians  ;  and 
therefore  not  reafonably  objected  by  them. 

Dr.  Whitly  fuppofes,  that  if  Sin  neceflarily  follows  from 
God's  withholding  Affiftance,  or  if  that  Affiftance  be  not  given 

which 

*  On  the  five  Points.     P.  361.         $  /J/V/P.  486. 


BefL  IX.       making  God  the  Author  of  Sin.       253 

which  is  absolutely  neceffary  to  the  avoiding  of  Evil  ;  then  in 
the  Nature  of  the  Thing,  God  muft  be  as  properly  the  Author 
of  that  Evil,  as  if  he  were  the  efficient  Caufe  of  it.  From 
whence,  according  to  what  he  himfelf  fays  of  the  Devils  and 
damned  Spirits,  God  muft  be  the  proper  Author  of  their  perfect 
unreftrained  Wickednefs  :  He  muft  be  the  efficient  Caufe  o£ 
the  great  Pride  of  the  Devils,  and  of  their  perfect  Malignity 
againft  God,  Chrift,  his  Saints,  and  all  that  is  Good,  and  of 
the  infatiable  Cruelty  of  their  Difpofition.  For  he  allows,  that 
God  has  fo  forfaken  them,  and  does  fo  withhold  his  Affiftance 
from  them,  that  they  are  incapacitated  from  doing  Good,  and 
determined  only  to  Evil.  ||—  Our  Doctrine,  in  its  Confequence, 
makes  God  the  Author  of  Men's  Sin  in  this  World,  no  more, 
and  in  no  other  Senfe,  than  his  Doftrine,  in  its  Confequence> 
makes  God  the  Author  of  the  hellim  Pride  and  Malice  of  the 
Devils.  And  doubtlefs  the  latter  is  as  odious  an  Effect  as 
the  former* 

Again,  if  it  Vf\\\  follow  at  all,  that  God  is  the  Author  of  Sin, 
from  what  has  been  fuppofed  of  a  fure  and  infallible  Connection 
between  Antecedents  and  Cohfequents,  it  will  follow  becaufe 
cf  this,  o;/zk  That  -  for  God  to  be  the  Author  or  Orderer  of 
thofe  Things  which  he  knows  before-hand,  will  infallibly  be 
attended  with  fuch  a  Confequ'ence,  is  the  fame  Thing  in  Effect, 
as  for  him  to  be  the  Author  of  that  Confequence.  But  if  this 
be  'fo,  this  is  a  Difficulty  which  equally  attends  the  Doctrine 
of  Arminians  themfelves  ;  at  leaft,  of  thofe  of  them  who  allow 
God's  certain  Fore-knowledge  of  all  Events.  For  on  the 
Suppofition  of  fuch  a  Fore-knowledge,  this  is  the  Cafe  with 
Refpect  to  every  Sin  that  is  committed  :  God  knew,  that  if  he 
ordered  and  brought  to  pafs  fuch  and  fuch  Events,  fuch  Sins 
Would  infallibly  follow.  As  for  Inftance,  God  certainly  fore 
knew,  long  before  Judas  was  born,  that  if  he  ordered  Things 
fo,  that  there  fhould  be  fuch  a  Man  born,  at  fuch  a  Time, 
and  at  fuch  a  Place,*  and  that  his  Life  fhould  be  preferved,  and 
that  he  fhould,  in  divine  Providence,  be  led  into  Acquaintance 
with  Jefus  ;  and  that  his  Heart  fhould  be  fo  influenced  by- 
God's  Spirit  or  Providence,  as  to  be  inclined  to  be  a  Follower 
of  Chrirt  ;  and  that  he  mould  be  One  of  thofe  Twelve,  which 
mould  be  chofen  conftantly  to  attend  him  as  his  Family  ;  and 
that  his  Health  fhould  be  preferved  fo  that  he  mould  go  up  to 
Jerufalem,  at  the  laft  Paffover  in  Chrift's  Life  ;  and  it  mould  be 
fo  ordered  that  Judas  mould  fee  Chrift's  Kind  Treatment  of 
K  k  the 


.  302.  305, 


254  fw  GOD  is  concern d  Part  iVff 

the  Woman  which  anointed  him  at  Bethany,  and  have  that? 
Reproof  from  Chrift,  which  he  had  at  that  Time,  and  fee  and 
hear  other  Things,  which  excited  his  Enmity  againft  his 
Mailer,  and  other  Circumftances  mould  be  ordered,  as  they 
were  ordered  ;  it  would  be  what  would  moft  certainly  and  in 
fallibly  follow,  that  Judas  would  betray  his  Lord,  and  would 
foon  after  hang  himfelf,  and  die  impenitent,  and  be  font  to 
Hell,  for  his  horrid  Wickednefs. 

Therefore  this  fuppofed  Difficulty  ought  not  to  be  brought 
as  an  Objection  againft  the  Scheme  which  has  been  maintain  d, 
as  dif agreeing  with  the  Arminiau  Scheme,  feeing  'tis  no  Diffi 
culty  owing  to  fuch  a  Di/agreement ;  but  a  Difficulty  wherein 
the  Arminians  fhare  with  us.  That  muft  be  unreafonably  made 
an  Objection  againft  our  Differing  from  them,  which  we  fhould 
not  eicape  or  avoid  at  all  by  agreeing  with  them. 

And  therefore  I  would  obferve, 

II.  They  who  object,  that  this  Doclrine  makes  God  the 
Author  of  Sin,  ought  diftinclly  to  explain  what  they  mean  by 
that  Phrafe,  The  Author  of  Sin.  I  know,  the  Phrafe,  as  it  is 
commonly  ufed,  fignifies  fomething  very  111.  If  by  the  Author 
of  Sin,  be  meant  the  Sinner,  the  Agent,  or  Afior  of  Sin,  or  the 
Doer  of  a  wicked  Thing ;  fo  it  would  be  a  Reproach  and  Blaf- 
phemy  to  fuppofe  God  to  be  the  Author  of  Sin.  In  this 
Senfe,  I  utterly  deny  God  to  be  the  Author  of  Sin;  rejecting 
fuch  an  Imputation  on  the  moft  High,  as  what  is  infinitely  to 
be  abhor' d  ;  and  deny  any  fuch  Thing  to  be  the  Confequence 
of  what  I  have  laid  down.  But  if  by  the  Author  of  Sin,  is  meant 
the  Permitter,  or  not  a  Hinderer  of  Sin ;  and  at  the  fame 
Time,  a  Difpofer  of  the  State  of  Events,  in  fuch  a  Manner, 
for  wife,  holy  and  moft  excellent  Ends  and  Purpofes,  that  Sin, 
if  it  be  permitted  or  not  hindered,  will  moft  certainly  and  in.r- 
fallibly  follow  :  I  fay,  if  this  be  all  that  is^eant,  by  being  the 
Author  of  Sin,  I  don't  deny  that  God  is  the  Author  of  Sin, 
(tho5  I  diflike  and  rejeft  the  Phrafe,  as  that  which  by  Ufe  and 
Cuftom  is  apt  to  carry  another  Senfe)  it  is  no  Reproach  for  the 
moft  High  to  be  thus  the  Author  of  Sin.  This  is  not  to  be 
the  Aflor  of  Sin,  but  on  the  contrary,  of  Holinefs.  What  God 
doth  herein,  is  holy ;  and  a  glorious  Exercife  of  the  infinite 
Excellency  of  his  Nature.  And  I  don't  deny,  that  God's  be 
ing  thus  the  Author  of  Sin,  follows  from  what  I  have  laid  down  ; 
and  I  aflert,  that  it  equally  follows  from  the  Doftrine  which  is 
maintain'd  by  moft  of  the  Arminian  Divines, 

That 


#.  IX.         in  the  Exigence  of  Sin.  25  J 

That  it  is  moft  certainly  fo,  that  God  is  in  fuch  a  Manner 
the  Difpofer  and  Orderer  of  Sin,  is  evident,  if  any  Credit  is  to 
be  given  to  the  Scripture  ;  as  well  as  becaufe  it  is  impoffible  in 
the  Nature  of  Things  to  be  otherwife.  In  fuch  a  Manner  God 
ordered  the  Obilinacy  of  Pharaoh,  in  his  refufmg  to  obey  God's 
Commands,  to  let  the  People  go.  Exod.  iv.  21.  /  at;///  harden 

his  Heart ,  and  he  Jhall  not  let  the  People  go.   Chap.^vii.   2 5. 

Aaron  thy  Brother  Jhallf peak  unto  Pharaoh,  that  he  fend  the  Chil 
dren  of  Ifrael  out  ofhh  Land.  And  I  will  harden  Pharaoh'*  Heart , 
and  multiply  my  Signs  and  my  Wonders  in  the  £<?#;/ o/*  Egypt :  But 
Pharaoh  Jhall  not  harken  unto  you;  that  I  may  lay  mine  Hand  upon 
Egypt,  by  great  'judgments,  &c.  Chap,,  ix.  12.  And  the  Lord 
harden3 d  the  Heart  of  Pharaoh,  and  he  hearken d  not  unto  them,  as 
the  Lord  hadfpoken  unto  Mofes.  Chap.  x.  i.  2.  And  the  Lord 
f aid  unto  Mofes,  Go  in  unto  Pharaoh  ;  for  I  have  harden  d  his  Heart ', 
and  the  Heart  of  his  Servants,  that  I  might  ftcw  thefc  my  Signs 
before  Him,  and  that  thou  mayft  tell  it  in  the  Ears  of  thy  Son,  and 
thy  Sons  Son,  what  ^Things  I  have  wrought  inE,gypt,  and  my  Signs 
which  I  have  done  among!}  them, that  ye  may  know  that  I  am  the  Lord. 
Chap.  xiv.  4  And  I  will  harden  Pharaoh'-f  Heart,  that  he  Jhall 
follow)  after  them;  and  I  will  be  honoured  upon  Pharaoh,  and  upon 
all  his  Htf.  V.  8,  And  the  Lor-d  harden  d  the  Heart  of  Pharaoh 
King  of  Egypt,  and he  piirfued after  theCkildren  fl/' Ifrael.  And  it? 
is  certain  that  in  fuch  a  Manner,  God  for  wife  and  good  End*, 
ordered  that  Event,  Jofeptis  being  fold  into  Egypt  by  his  Bre 
thren.  Gen.  xlv.  5.  Now  therefore  be  not  grieved,  nor  angry 
with  yourf elves,  thatyefoldme  hither;  for  God  didfendme  before  yon 
topreferve  Life.  Ver.  7,  8,  God  did  fend  me  before  you  topreferve  & 
Pcfterity  in  the  Earth,  and  to  fave  your  Lives  by  a  great  Deliverance  ; 
J'o  that  now  it  was  not  you,  thatfent  me  hither,  but  God.  Pial.  evil. 
17.  He  fent  a  Man  before  them,  even  Jofeph,  tuba  was,  fold  for  a 
Servant.  'Tis  certain,  that  thus  God  ordered  the  Sin  and  Folly 
of  Sihon  King  of  the  Amorites,  in  refufing  to  let  the  People  of 
7/W/pafs  by  him  peaceably.  Deut.  ii.  30.  But  Sihon  King  of 
Hefhbon  would  not  let  us  pafs  by  him ;  for  the  Lord  thy  God  harden' d 
bis  Spirit,  and  made  his  Heart  obftinate,  that  he  might  deliver  Him 
into  thine  Hand.  'Tis  certain,  that  God  thus,  ordered  the  Sia 
and  Folly  of  the  Kings  of  Canaan,  that  they  attempted  not  to 
make  Psace  with  Ifrael,  but  with  a  ftupid  Boldnefs  and  Obfti- 
nacy,  fet  themfelves  violently  to  oppofe  them  and  their  God, 
Jolh.  xi.  20.  For  it  was  of  the  Lord,  to.  harden  their  Hearts,  that 
they  Jhould  come  againji  Ifrael  in  Battle,  that  he  might  deflrny  them 
Utterly,  and  that  they  might  have  no  favour;  but  that  he  might 
4?ftroy  them,  as  the  Lord  commanded  Mofes,  'Tis  evident,  that 
K  k 


256  Hozv  G  0  D  is  concern  d         Part  IV, 

thus  God  ordered  the  treacherous  Rebellion  cf  Ztflektak,  againft 
the  King  of  Babylon.  Jer.  lii.  3.  For  thro'  the  Anger  of  the  Lord 
it  came  to pafs  in  Jemfalem,  and  Judah,  '////  He  bad  cajl  them  out 
from  bis  Prefence,  that  Zedekiall  rebelled  againji  tke  King  of  Ba 
bylon.  So  2  Kings  xxiv.  20.  And  'tis  exceeding  rnanifeft,  that 
God  thus  orllered  the  Rapine  and  unrighteous  Ravages  of  Nebu 
chadnezzar,  in  fpoiling  and  ruining  the  Nations  round  about. 
Jer.  XXV.  9.  Behold ',  I  will  fend  and  take  all  the  Families  of  the 
North,  faith  the  Lord,  and  Nebuchadnezzar  my  Servant,  and  wilt 
bring  them  againft  this  Land,  andagait/ft  all  the  Nations  round  a- 
kout ,  and  will  utterly  defiroy  them,  and  make  them  an  Ajionijhment  y 
and  an  Hijfing,  and  perpetual  Defolations.  Ch.  xliii.  10.  ii.  Iwill 
fend  and  take  Nebuchadnezzar  the  King  of  Babylon,  my  Servant ; 
andlwillfet  his  'Throne  upon  thefe  Stones  that  I  have  hid,  and  he 
fhallfpread  his  royal  Pavilion  over  them.  And  when  he  comet h,  he 
Jhall  f?7iite  the  Land  of  Egypt,  and  deliver  fuch  as  are  for  Death  to 
J)eath,  and  fuch  as  are  for  Captivity  to  Captivity,  and  fuch  as  are 
for  the  Sword  to  the  Sword.  Thus  God  reprefents  himfelf  as 
fending  for  Nebuchadnezzar,  and  taking  of  him  and  his  Armies, 
and  bringing  him  againft  the  Nations  which  were  to  be  deftroy- 
ed  by  him,  to  that  very  End,  that  he  might  utterly  deftroy' 
them,  and  make  them  defolate ;  and  as  appointing  the  Work 
-.'hat  he  mould  do,  fo  particularly,  that  the  very  Perfons  were 
c^figned  that  he  mould  kill  with  the  Sword  ;  and  thofe  that 
fhould  be  kill'd  with  Famine  and  Peftilence,  and  thofe  that 
fhould  be  carried  into  Captivity ;  and  that  in  doing  all  thefe 
Things,  he  mould  aft  as  his  Servant  :  By  which,  lefs  can't  be 
intended,  than  that  he  fhould  ferve  his  Purpofes  and  Defigns. 
And  in  Jer.  xxvii.  4,  £,  6.  God  declares  how  he  would  caufe. 
him  thus  to  ferve  his  Defigns,  viz.  by  bringing  this  to  pafs  in 
his  fovereign  Difpofals,  as  the  great  PofTeiTor  and  Governor  of 
the  Universe,  that  difpofes  all  Things  juft  as  pleafes  him. 
Thus  faith  the  Lord  of  Ho/Is,  the  God  of  Ifrael  ;  /  have  made  the 
Earth,  the  Man  and  the  Beaft  that  are  upon  the  Ground,  by  my  great 
JPovoer,  and  my  Jiretched  out  Arm,  and  have  given  it  unto  whom  it 
feemed  meet  unto  me :  And  now  I  have  given  all  thefe  Lands  into 
the  Hands  of  Nebuchadnezzar  MY  SERVANT,  and  tke  Beafi 
of  the  Field  have  I  given  alfo  to  ferve  him.  And  Nebuchadnezzar  is 
fpoken  of  as  doing  thefe  Things,  by  \\w\ng\i\s  Arms  Jlrengthencd 
by  God,  and  having  GsJ's  Sward  put  into  his  Hands,  for  this 
End.  Ezek.  xxx.  24,  25;,  26.  Yea,  God  fpeaks  of  his  terribly 
ravaging  and  wafting  the  Nations,  and  cruelly  deftroying  all 
Sorts,  without  Diftinclion  of  Sex  or  Age,  as  the  Weapon  in, 
God's  Hand,  and  the  Inftrument  of  his  Indignation,  whicli 

God 


Sedt.  IX.         in  the  Exiftence  of  Sin.  257 

God  makes  ufe  of  to  fulfil  his  own  Purpofes,  and  execute  his  owri 
Vengeance.  Jer.  Ii.  2O,  &c.  Thou  art  my  Battle-Axe ,  and  Wea~ 
pans  of  War :  For  with  thee  will  I  break  inPieces  the  Nations,  and 
with  thee  I  will  dejiroy  Kingdoms,  and  with  thee  I  will  break  in. 
Pieces  the  Horfe  and  his  Rider,  and  with  thee  I  will  break  m 
Pieces  the  Chariot  and  his  Rider  ;  with  thee  alfo  will  I  break  hi 
Pieces  Man  andWomani  and  with  thee  will  I  break  in  Pieces  Ola*. 
andYoung;  and  with  thee  will  I  break  in  Pieces  the  young  Man  and 
the  Maid,  &c.  'Tisreprefented,  that  the  Defigns  of  Nebuchadnez 
zar,  and  thofe  that  deftroyed  Jerufalem,  never  could  have  been 
accompliihed,  had  not  God  determined  them,  as  well  as  they ; 
Lam.  iii.  37.  Who  is  he  that  faith,  and  it  cometh  to  pafs,  and  the 
Lord  comrnandeth  it  not  ?  And  yet  the  King  of  Babylon's  thus 
deftroying  the  Nations,  and  efpecially  the  "Jews,  is  fpoken  of 
as  his  great  Wickednefs,  for  which  God  finally  deftroyed  him. 

Jfai.  xiv.  4,  5,  6,  12.  Hab.  ii.  5, 12,  and  Jer,  Chap.  1.  &  H. 

"Tis  moft  manifeft,  that  God,  to  ferve  his  own  Defigns,  provi-. 
dentially  ordered  Shimei's  curfing  David.  2  Sam.  xvi.  to,  n. 

The  Lord  hath  faid  unto  him,  Curje  David, Let  him  curfe,for 

the  Lord  hath  bidden  him, 

'Tis  certain,  that  God  thus,  for  excellent,  holy,  gracious 
and  glorious  Ends,  ordered  the  Faft  which  they  committed, - 
who  were  concerned  in  Chrift's  Death  ;  and  that  therein  they 
aid  but  fulfil  God's  Defigns.  As,  I  truft,  no  Chriftian  will  deny 
it  was  the  Defign  of  God,  that  Chrift  fliould  be  crucified,  ancf 
that  for  this  End,  he  came  into  the  World.  "Tis  very  manifeft 
by  many  Scriptures,  that  the  whole  Affair  of  Chrift's  Cruci 
fixion,  with  its  Circumflances,  and  the  Treachery  of  Judas, 
that  made  Way  for  it,  was  ordered  in  God's  Providence,  in 
Purfuance  of  his  Purpofe ;  notwithftanding  the  Violence  that 
is  ufed  with  thofe  plain  Scriptures,  to  obfcure  and  pervert  the 
Senfe  of  them.  Aft.  ii.  23.  Him  being  delivered,  by  the  determinate 
CqunfelandForeknowlcdgeofGod,  \  ye  ha<vetaken,  and  with  wicked. 
Hands,  have  cntclfiedandjlain.  Luk.  xxii.  21,22.  ||  But  behold  the 
Hand  of  him  that  betrayeth  met  is  with  me  on  the  Table :  And  truly 

the 

+  "  Grotius,  as  well  as  Beza,  obfcrves,  that  Prcgncjis  muft  here 
"  fignify  Decree  ;  and  Elfner  has  fhewn  that  it  has  that  Signification, 
"  in  approved  Gretk  Writers.  And  it  is  certain  Egdotos  fignifies  due 
"  given  up  into  the  Hands  of  an  Enemy."  Doddridge  in  Lcc. 

j|  «*  As  this  Paflfage  is  not  liable  to  the  Ambiguities,  which  fome 
"  have  apprehended  in  Aci.  ii.  23,  and  iv.  28.  (which  yet  feem 
**  on  the  Whole  to  be  parallel  to  it,  in  their  moH  natural  Conilruc- 

««  tion 


258  How  GOD  is  concerned         Part  IV. 

the  Son  of  Man  goeth,  as  it  was  determined.  Aft.  iv.  27,  28.  For 
of  a  'Truth,  againft  thy  holy  Child  Jefus,  whom  thou  haft  anointed, 
both  Herod,  and  Pontius  Pilate,  with  the  Gentiles ,  and  the  People 
cf\{t2£\.,were gathered 'together,  for  to  dowhatfotver  thy  Hand  and 
thy  Counfel  determined  before  to  be  done.  Aft,  iii.  17,  18.  And 
now  Brethren,  /  wot  that  through  Ignorance  ye  did  it,  as  did 
plfo  your  Rulers :  Rut  thefe  Things,  which  God  before  had  Jhewed 
by  the  Mouth  of  all  his  Prophets,  that  Chrift  Jhouldfujfer,  he  hath 
fo  fulfilled.  So  that  what  thefe  Murderers  of  Chrift  did,  is  fpo- 
ken  of  as  what  God  brought  to  pafs  or  ordered,  and  that  by 
which  he  fulfilled  his  own  Word. 

In  Rev.  xvii.  17.  The  agreeing  of  the  Kings  of  the  Earth  to* 
give  their  Kingdom  to  the  Beaft,  tho'  it  was  a  very  wicked  Thing 
in  them ,  is  fpoken  of  as  a  fulfilling  God's  Will,  and  what  God 
had  put  it  into  their  Hearts  to  do.  'Tis  manifeft,  that  God  fome- 
times  permits  Sin  to  be  committed,  and  at  the  fame  Time  or^ 
ders  Things  fo,  that  if  he  permits  the  Faft,  it  will  come  to  pafs, 
becaufe  on  fome  Accounts  he  fees  it  needful  and  of  Importance 
that  it  mould  come  to  pafs.  Matt,  xviii.  7.  //  mufl  needs  be, 
that  Offences  come  ;  but  Wo  to  that  Man  by  fwhom  the  Offence  com- 
eth.  With  I  Cor.  xi.  19.  For  there  muji  alfo  be  Herejies  amsng 
j>ou,  that  they  which  are  approve dt  may  he  made  manifeft  amongyou^ 

Thus  it  is  certain  and  demonftrable,  from  the  holy  Scrip 
tures,  as  well  as  the  Nature  of  Things,  and  the  Principles  of 
Arminians,  that  God  permits  Sin  •  and  at  the  fame  Time,  fo 
orders  Things,  in  his  Providence,  that  it  certainly  and  infalli 
bly  will  come  to  pafs,  in  Confequence  of  his  Permiffion. 

I  proceed  to  obferve  in  the  next  Place, 
III.  That  there  is  a  great  Difference  between  God's 
being  concerned  thus,  by  his  PermiJ/ion,  in  an  Event  and  Aft, 
which  in  the  inherent  Subjeft  and  Agent  of  it,  is  Sin,  (tho'  the 
Event  will  certainly  follow  on  his  Permiffion,.)  and  his  being 
Concerned  in  it  by  producing  it  and  exerting  the  Aft  of  Sin  ; 
or  between  his  being  the  Orderer  of  its  certain  Exiftence,  by 
yot  hindering  it,  under  certain  Circumftances,  and  his  being  the 

proper 

tion)  I  look  upon  it  as  an  evident  Proof,  that  thefe  Things  are, 
in  the  Language  of  Scripture,  faid  to  be  determined  or  decreed, 
(or  exadly  bounded  and  mark'd  out  by  God,  as  the  Word, 
Orixo,  moft  naturally  fignifies)  which  he  fees  in  Fadl  will  hap 
pen,  in  Confequence  of  his  Volitions,  without  any  neceflitaling 
Agency ;  as  well  as  thofe  Events,  of  which  he  is  properly  the 
Author."  Dodd,  in  Lcc, 


Secft.  IX.  In  the  Exigence  of  Sin. 

proper  Attor  or  Author  of  it,  by  a  pofiti<ve  Agency  or  ILfficiehcsi 
And  this,  notwithstanding  what  Dr  Whitly  offers  about  a  Saying 
of  Philofophers,  that  Caufa  deficiens,  in  Rebus  necejjariis,  ad  Cau- 
fam  perfe  efficientem  reducenda  eft.     As  there  is  a  vaft  Difference 
between  the  Sun's  being  the  Caafe  of  the  Lightfomenefs  and 
Warmth   of  the   Atmofphere,    and   Brightnefs   of  Gold   and 
Diamonds,    by  its  Prefence  and  pofitive  influence  ;  and  its  be 
ing  the  Occafion  of  Darknefs  and  Frott,    in  the  Night,    by  its 
Motion,  whereby  it  defcends  below  the  Horizon.     The  Motion 
of  the  Sun  is  the  Gccaiion  of  the  latter  Kind  of  Events ;    but 
it  is  not  the  proper  Caufe,  Efficient  or  Producer  of  them  ;  tho* 
they  are  neceflarily  confequent   on  that  Motion,    under  fuch 
Circumftances  :  No  more   is  any  Action   of  the  divine  Being 
the  Caufe  of  the  Evil  of  Men's  Wills.     If  the  Sun  were   the 
proper  Caufe  of  Cold  and  Darknefs,   it  would  be  the  Fountain. 
of  thefe  Things,  as  it  is  the  Fountain  of  Light  and  Heat :  And 
then  fomething  might  be  argued  from  the  Nature  of  Cold  and 
Darknefs,    to  a  Likenefs  of  Nature  in  the  Sun  ;    and  it  might 
be  juftly  infer'd,  that  the  Sun  itfelf  is  dark  and  cold,   and  that 
his  Beams  are  black  and  frofty.      But  from  its  being  the  Caufe 
no  other  wife  than  by  its  Departure,    no  fuch  Thing   can  be 
infer'd,    but  the  contrary;    it  may  juftly  be  argued,    that  the 
Sun  is  a  bright  and  hot  Body,  if  Cold  and  Darknefs  are  found 
to  be  the  Confequence  of  its  Withdrawment ;    and  the  more 
conftantly  and  rieceflarify  thefe  Effects  are  connected  with,    and 
confined  to  its  Abfence,    the  more  ftrongly  docs  it  argue  the 
Sun  to  be  the  Fountain  of  Light  and  Heat.     So,   inafmuch  as 
Sin  is  not  the  Fruit  of  any  pofitive  Agency  or  Influence  of  the 
moft  High,  but  on  the  contrary,  arifes  from  the  withholding  of 
his  Aclion  and  Energy,    arid  under  certain  Circumftances,    ne 
ceflarily  follows  on  the  Want  of  his  Influence  ;    this  is  no  Ar 
gument  that  he  is  finful,    or  his  Operation  Evil,    or  has  any 
Thing  of  the  Nature  of  Evil ;    but  on  the  contrary,    that  He, 
and  his  Agency,    are  altogether  good  and  holy,    and  that  he  is 
the  Fountain  of  all  Holinefs.     It  would  be  ftrange  arguing  in- 
dted,   becaufe  Men  never  commit  Sin,    but  only  when  God 
leaves   them  to  themfelves,    and  neceffarily  fin,    when  he  does 
io,    that  therefore  their  Sin  is  not  from  themfelves,    but  from 
God ;  and  fo,  that  God  muft  be  a  finful  Being  :    As  ftrange  as 
it  would  be  to  argue,  becaufe  it  is  always  dark  when  the  Sun  is 
gone,    and  never  dark  when  the  Sun  is  prefent,    that  therefore 
all  Darknefs  is  from  the  Sun,    and  that  his  Difk  and  Beam  a 
muft  needs  be  black* 

IV,  It 


5.60  How  GOD  is  concerned  Part  IV, 

IV.  It  properly  belongs  to  the  fupreme  and  abfolute  Gover- 
iio-r  of  the  Univerfej  to  order  all  important  Events  within  his 
Dominion,  by  his  Wifdom  :  But  the  Events  in  the  moral 
World  are  of  the  moft  important  Kind ;  fuch  as  the  moral  Ac 
tions  of  intelligent  Creatures,  and  their  Confequences. 

Thefe  Events  will  be  ordered  by  fomething.  They  will 
either  be  difpofed  by  Wifdom,  or  they  will  be  difpofed  by 
Chance  ;  that  is,  they  will 'be  difpofed  by  blind  and  undefign- 
ing  Caufes,  if  that  were  poflible,  and  could  be  called  a  Difpo- 
"fal.  Is  it  not  better,  that  the  Good  and  Evil  which  happens 
in  God's  World,  fhould  be  ordered,  regulated,  bounded  and 
determined  by  the  good  Pleafure  of  an  infinitely  wife  Being, 
who  perfe&ly  comprehends  within  his  Underftanding  and  con- 
ftant  View,  the  Univerfality  of  Things,  in  all  their  hxtent  and 
Duration,  and  fees  all  the  Influence  of  every  Event,  with 
Refpeft  to  every  individual  Thing  and  Circumftanee,  through 
out  the  grand  Syftem,  and  the  Whole  of  the  eternal  Series  of 
Confequences ;  than  to  leave  thefe  Things  to  fall  out  by 
Chance,  and  to  be  determined  by  thofe  Caufes  which  have  no 
Underftanding  or  Aim  ?  Doubtlefs,  in  thefe  important  Events, 
there  is  a  better  and  a  worfe,  as  to  the  Time,  Subject,  Place* 
Manner  and  Circumftances  of  their  coming  to  pafs,  with  Re 
gard  to  their  Influence  on  the  State  and  Courfe  of  Things* 
And  if  there  be,  'tis  certainly  beft  that  they  fhould  be  deter 
mined  to  that  Time,  Place,  &c.  which  is  beft.  And  therefore 
'tis  in  its  own  Nature  fit,  that  Wifdom,  and  not  Chance,  fhould 
order  thefe  Things.  So  that  it  belongs  to  the  Being,  who  is 
the  Poffeffor  of  infinite  Wifdom,  and  is  the  Creator  and  Owner 
of  the  whole  Syftem  of  created  Exiftences,  and  has  the  Care  of 
all ;  I  fay,  it  belongs  to  him,  to  take  Care  of  this  Matter ;  and 
he  would  not  do  what  is  proper  for  him,  if  he  mould  negleft  it. 
And  it  is  fo  far  from  being  unholy  in  him,  to  undertake  this 
Affair,  that  it  would  rather  have  been  unholy  to  negleft  it ;  as 
it  would  have  been  a  neglecting  what  fitly  appertains  to  him  ; 
and  fo  it  would  have  been  a  very  unfit  and  unfuitable  Neglecl. 

Therefore  the  Sovereignty  of  God  doubtlefs  extends  to  this 
Matter  :  efpecially  confidering,  that  if  it  mould  be  fuppofed 
to  be  otherwife,  and  God  mould  leave  Men's  Volitions,  and 
all  moral  Events,  to  the  Determination  and  Difpofition  of 
blind  and  unmeaning  Caufes,  or  they  mould  be  left  to  happen 
perfectly  without  a  Caufe ;  this  would  be  no  more  confiftent 
with  Liberty,  in  any  Notion  of  it,  and  particularly  not  in  the 

Arminian 


Sed.  IX.         in  rbe  Exiftence  of  Sin.  261 

Arminian  Notion  cf  it,  than  if  thefe  Events  were  fubjeft  to  the 
Difpofal  of  divine  Providence,  and  the  Will  of  Man  were  de 
termined  by  Circumllances  which  are  ordered  and  difpofed  by 
divine  Wifdom  ;  as  appears  by  what  has  been  already  obferved. 
But  'tis  evident,  that  fuch  a  providential  difpoiing  and  deter 
mining  Men's  moral  Aftions,  tho'  it  infers  a  moral  Necellity 
of  thofe  Aftions,  yet  it  does  not  in  the  leaft  infringe  the  real 
Liberty  of  Mankind  ;  the  only  Liberty  that  common  Senfe 
teaches  to  be  neceffary  to  moral  Agency,  which,  as  has  been 
demonftrated,  is  not  inconfiftent  with  fuch  Neceffity. 

On  the  Whole,  it  is  manifeftj  that  God  may  be,  in  the  Manner 
which  has  been  defcribed,  the  Orderer  and  Difpofer  of  that 
Event,  which  in  the  inherent  Subject  'and  Agent  is  moral  Evil  ; 
and  yet  His  fo  doing  may  be  no  moral  Evil.  He  may  will  the 
Pifpofal  of  fuch  an  Event,  and  its  coming  to  pafs  for  good 
Ends,  and  his  Will  not  be  an  immoral  or  finful  Will,  but  a  per- 
feftly  holy  Will.  And  he  may  actually  in  his  Providence  fo> 
difpofe  and  permit  Things,  that  the  Event  may  be  certainly  and 
infallibly  connected  withfuch  Difpofal  and  Permiffion,  and  his  Aft 
therein  not  be  an  immoral  or  unholy,  but  a  p'erfeftly  holy  Aft* 
Sin  may  be  an  evil  Thing,  and  yet  that  there  ihoeld  be  fuch  a 
Difpofal  and  Permiffion,  as  that  it  mould  come  to  pafs,  may  be 
a  good  Thing.  This  is  no  Contradiction,  or  Inconfiftence. 


ofeph's  Brethren's  felling  him  into  Egypt,  confider  it  only  as  it 
was  afted  by  them,  and  w^rh  Refpeft  to  their  Views  a,nd  Aims 
which  were  evil,  was  a  vry  bad  Thing  ;  but  it  was  a  good 
Thing,  as  it  was  an  Event  of  God's  ordering,  and  confider'd 
with  Refpeft  to  his  Views  and  Aims  which  were  good.  Gen. 
3.  2O.  As  for  you,  ye  thought  E<vil  againft  me;  but  God  meant  it  nn-~ 
to  Good.  So  the  Crucifixion  of  Chrift,  if  we  confider  only  thofe 
Things  which  belong  to  the  Event  as  it  proceeded  from  his 
Murderers,  and  are  comprehended  within  the  Compafs  of  the 
Affair  confiderecl  as  their  Aft,  their  Principles,  Difpofitions, 
Views  and  Aims  ;  fo  it  was  one  of  the  moil  heinous  Things 
that  ever  was  done  ;  in  many  Refpeds  the  molt  horrid  of  all 
Acls  :  But  confider  it,  as  it  was  will'd  and  ordered  of  God, 
in  the  Extent  of  his  Defigns  and  Views,  it  was  the  rnoft  ad 
mirable  and  glorious  of  all  Events  ;  and  God's  willing  the 
Event  was  the  moft  holy  Volition  of  God,  that  ever  was  made 
known  to  Men  ;  and  God's  Acl  in  ordering  it,  was  a  divine 
Aft,  which  above  all  others,  manifefts  the  moral  Excellency  of 
the  divine  Being. 

LI  The 


*£2  Of  G  0  £>'s  fccrct  Part  I\C 

The  Confideration  of  thefe.  Things  may  help  us  to  a  diffident. 
Anfwer  to  the  Cavils  of  Armta/ans  concerning  what  has  been 
i'uppofed  by  many  Calvinijh,  of  a  Diftindion  between  a  fecret 
and  revealed  Will  of  God,  and  their  Diverfity  one  from  the 
other ;  fuppofing,  that  the  Calvinifis  herein  afcribe  ineonfiftent 
Wills  to  the  moft  High  :  -Which  is  without  any  Foundation. 
God's/**?/  and  revealed  Will,  or  in  other  Words,  his  difpofing 
and  preceptive  Will  may  be  diverfe,  and  exercifed  in  diflimilar 
Ads,  the  one  in  disapproving,  and  oppofing,  the  other  ia 
willing  and  determining,  without  any  Inccnfiilence.  Becaufe, 
ahho*  thefe  diiiimilar  Exercifes  of  the  divine  Will  may  in 
fome  Refpeds  relate  to  the  &me  Things,  yet  in  Stridnefs  they 
have  different  and  contrary  Objeds,  the  one  Evil  and  the 
other  Good.  Thus  for  Inftance,  the  Chrucifixion  of  Ch rift- 
was  a  Thing  contrary  to  the  reveakd  or  preceptive  Will  of 
'  God ;  becanfe,  as  it  was  view'd  and  done  by  his  malignant 
Murderers,  it  was  a  Thing  infinitely*  contrary  to  the  holy  Na 
ture  of  God,  and  fo  neceffarily  contrary  to  the  holy  Inclina 
tion  of  his  Heart  revealed  in  his  Law.  Yet  this  don't  at 
.all  hinder  but  fhat  the  Crucifixion  o?  Chrift,  confidered  with 
all  thofe  glorious  Confequences,  which  were  within  the  View 
of  the  divine  Omni&ience,  might  be  indeed,  and  therefore 
might  appear  to  God  to  be,  a  glorious  Event ;  and  confe- 
quently  be  agreeable  to  his  Will,  tho'  this  Will  may  be  fecret, 
/.  c\  not  revealed  in  God's  Law.  And  thus  confidercd,  the 
Crucifixion  of  Chrift  was  not  evily  but  good.  If  the  fecret 
Exercifes  of  God's  Will  were  of  a- Kind  that  is  diffimilar  and 
contrary  to  his  revealed  Will,  refpeding  the  fame,  or  like 
Objeds ;  if 'the  Objeds  *>f  both  wece  good,  or  both  evil  ; 
then  indeed  to  aferibe  contrary  Kinds  of  Volition  or  Inclina 
tion  to  God,  refpeding  thefe  Objeds,  would  be  to  afcribe  an 
ineonfiftent  Will  to  God  :  But  to  afcribe  to  Him  different  and 
oppofite  Exercifes  of  Heart,  refpeding  different  Objeds,  and 
Objeds  contrary  one  to  another,  is  fo  far  from  fuppoling  God's 
Will  to  be  inconjiftent  with  itfelf,  that  it  can't  be  fuppofed 
conjiflent  with  itfelf  a.ny  other  Way.  For  any  Being  to  have 
a  Will  of  Choice  refpeding  Good,  and  at  the  fame  Time  a 
Will  of  Rejedion  and  Refufal  reipeding  Evil,  is  to  be  very 
confident :  But  the  contrary,  viz.  to  have  the  fame  Will  to 
wards  thefe  contrary  Objeds,  and  to  chufe  and  love  both  Good 
and  Evil  at  the  fame  Time,  is  to  be  very  ineonfiftent. 

There  is   no  Inconfiftcnce  in  fuppofmg,  that  God  may  hate 
a  Thing  as  it  is  ifl  itfelf,  and  considered  limply  as  Evil,  and 

yet 


Sect.  IX.  and  revealed  Will.  2*63 

yet  that  it  may  be  his  Will  it  fnould  come  to  pafs,  ccn- 
fideririg  all  Confequences.  I  believe,  there  is  no  Pcrfon  of 
good  Underflanding,  who  will  venture  to  fay,  he  is  certain 
that  it  is  impoffibie  it  fliould  be  beft,  taking  in  the  whole 
Compafs  and  Extent  of  Exiitence,  and  all  Confequences  in 
the  endlefs  Series  of  Events,  that  there  (houid  be  fuch  a  Thing 
as  moral  Evil  in  the  \Vorld.  *  And  if  fo,  it  will  certainly  fol 
low,  that  an  infinitely  wife  Being,  who  always  chufes  what  is 
belt,  mull  chufe  that  there  fhouid  be  fuch  a  Thing.  And  if 

L  1  3  f°> 

*  Here  are  worthy  to  be  obferved  fome  Paffages  of  a  late  noted 
Writer,  of  our  Nation,  that  no  Body  who  is  acquainted  with  Hira 
will  fufpedl  to  be  very  favourable  to  Calvinrfm.  "  It  is  difficult 
**  (fays  he)  to  handle  the  NeceJ/ity  of  Evil  in  fuch  a  Manner,  as 
"  not  to  fturrrble  fuch  as  are  not  above  being  alarmed  at  Propo- 
A'  fitions  which  have  an  uncommon  Sound.  But  if  Philofcphers 
"  will  but  reflect  calmly  on  the  Matter,  they  will  find,  that  confidently 
"  with  the  unlimited  Power  of  the  fupreme  C?.ufe,  it  may  be  faid,  that 

14  in  the  beft  ordered  Syftem,    Evils  muft  have  Place."-- "Turn- 

lull's   PRINCIPLES   of  moral  Philofophy.      Page.    3zy,  328.       He 
is  there  Ipeaking  of  moral  Evilsj  as  may  be  fcen. 

Again,  the  fame  Author,  in  \\isfecond  Volume  entitled,  Chriftian  Pkl- 
Jofopby,  Page.  35.  has  theie  Words:  "  If  the  Author  and  Governor  of 
"  all  Things  be  infinitely  perfcEl^  then  whatever  is,  is  right;  of  ail 
-**  pollible  Syftems  he  hath  chofen  the  beji  :  And  confequently  there  is  no 

^  abfclutc  Evil  in    the  Univerfe, —This  being  the  Cafe,    all  the 

.*'  feeming  Imperfections   or  Evils  in  it  are  fuch  only  in  "a  partial  View  5 
**  and  with  Refpedt  to  the  whale  Syftem,  they  are  G^oa's." 

Ibid.  Page.  37.  u  V/heKce  then  comes  EvU,  is  the  Queftion  that  hath 
*-«  in  all  Ages  been  reckon'd  the  Gordian  K_not  in  Philoibphy.  And  in- 
ft  deed,  if  we  own  the  Exiftence  of  Evjl  in  the  World  in  an  abf^iutf 
•'  Senfe,  we  diametrically  contradict  what  hath  been  juft  now  prov'd  of 
*'  God.  For  if  there  be  any  Evil  in  the  Syftem,  that  is  not  good  with 
"  Refpedr.  to  the  Whole,  then  is  the  Whole  not  good,  but  evil  ;  or  at  bell, 
41  very  imperfect  :  And  an  Author  muft  be  as  his  Workmanjhip  is ;  as  is 
**  the  Effecl,  fuch  is  the  Caufe.  But  the  Solution  of  this  Difficulty  is 
*'  at  Hand  ;  'That  there  is  no  Evil  in  the  Univerfe.  What !  Are  there 
"  no  Pains,  no  Imperfeduins  ?  Is  there  no  Mifery,  nc-  Vice  in  the 
*'  World?  Or  are  not  thefe  Evils  '?  Evils ;  indeed  they  are  ;  that  is,  thofe 
*4  of  one  Sort  are  hurtful,  and  thofe  of  the  other  Sort  are  equally  hurtful 
"  and  abominable  :  But  they  are  not  evil  or  mifchievous  with  Refpecl  to 
«'  the  Whole.'-* 

Ibid.  Page.  42.  "  But  He  is  at  the  fame  Time  faid  td  create  Evi!f 
"  Darknefs,  Confufion  ;  and  yet  to  do  no  Evjl,  but  io  be  the  Author  of 
•*  Good  only.  He  is  called  the  Father  of  Ltgh'i,  the  Author  of  every 
4t  perfect  and  good  Gift,  ivith  whom  there  /'f  no  Farlabbnefs  nor  Shadow 
f  of  Turning^  who  tempteth  no  Man >  but  givete  to  aL' jf;*  ititr»Uj* 

axi 


264  Q/"GOD'sfecret  Part  IV. 

fo,  then  fuch  a  Choice  is  not  an  Evil,  but  a  wife  and  holy 
Choice.  And  if  fo,  then  that  Providence  which  is  agreeable 
to  fuch  a  Choice,  is  a  wife  and  holy  Providence.  Men  do  ow'// 
Sin  as  Sin,  and  fo  are  the  Authors  and  Aclors  of  it :  They 
love  it  as  Sin,  and  for  evil  Ends  and  Purpofes.  God  don't 
will  Sin  as  Sin,  or  for.  the  Sake  of  any  Thing  evil ;  tho'  it  be 
his  Pleafure  fo  to  order  Things,  that  He  permitting,  Sin  will 
come  to  pafs ;  for  the  Sake  of  the  great  Good  that  by  his 
"Difpofal  (hall  be  the  Confequence.  His  willing  to  orde* 
Things  fo  that  Evil  fhould  come  to  pafs,  for  the  Sake  of  the 
contrary  Good,  is  no  Argument  that  He  don't  hate  Evil,  as 
Evil :  And  if  fo,  then  it  is  no  Reafon  why  he  mayn't  reafona- 
bly  forbid  Evil  as  Evil*  and  punifh  it  as  fuch. 

The  Arminians  thernfelves  muft  be  obliged,  whether  they 
will  or  no,  to  allow  a  Diftindlion  of  God's  Will,  amounting 
to  juit  the  fame  Thing  tjiat  Galwnifts  intend  by  their  Diilinc- 
tion  of  zjecret  and  repealed  Will.  They  muft  allow  a  Diftinc- 
tion  of  thofe  Things  which  God  thinks  bed  (hould  be,  coniider- 
ing  all  Circumftances  and  Conie^.uenges,  and  fo  are  agreeable 
to  his  difpofing  Will,  and  thofe  rl  hings  which  he  loves,  and  are 
agreeable  to  his  Nature,  in  thernfelves  confidered.  Who  is 
there  that  will  dare  to  fay,  that  the  hellifh  Pride,  Malice  and 
Cruelty  of  Devils,  are  agreeable  to  God,  and  what  He  likes 
and  approves  ?  And  yet,  I  truft,  there  is  no  Chriftian  Divine 
but  what  will  allow,  that  'tis  agreeable  to  God's  Will  fo  to 
order  and  difpofe  Things  concerning  them,  fo  to  leave  them 
to  thernfelves,  and  give  them  up  to  their  own  Wickednefs, 
that  this  perfecl:  Wickednefs  mould  be  a  neceffary  Con&- 
quence.  Befure  Dr.  Whitby's  Words  do  plainly  fuppofe  and 
allow  it.  J 

Thefe 


and  upbraideth  not.  And  yet  by  the  Prophet  Ifaias  He  is  introduced 
faying  of  Himfelf,  1 form  Light ',  and  create  Darknefs  ;  1 make  Peace ', 
and  create  Evil :  I  the  Lord  do  all  thefe  Things.  What  is  the 
Meaning,  the  plain  Language  of  all  this,  but  that  the  Lord  <re- 
lighteth  in  Goodnefs,  and  (as  the  Scripture  fpeaks)  Evil  is  his 
Jlrange  Work  f  He  intends  and  purfues  the  univerfal  (rood  of  his 
Creation :  and  the  Evil  which  happens,  is  not  permitted  for  its 
own  fake,  or  thro'  any  Pleafure  in  Evil,  but  becaufe  it  is  requifitc 
to  the  greater  Good  purfued." 

on  the  five  Points,  Edit.  2.  P.  300,  305,  309, 


Sed.  IX.  and  revealed  Will  265 

Thefe  following  Things  may  be  laid  down  as  Maxims  of 
plain  Truth,  and  indifputable  Evidence. 

1.  That  God  is  zperfeflly  happy  Being,  in  the  moft  abfolute 
and  higheft  Senfe  poffible, 

2.  That  it  will  follow  from  hence,  that  God   is  free  from 
every  Thing  that  is  contrary  to  Happinefs ;  and  fo,  that  in  ftrick 
Propriety  of  Speech,  there  is  nofuch  Thing  as  any  Pain>  Grief 
or  Trouble  in  God. 

3.  When  any  intelligent  Being  is  really  crofs'd  and  difap- 
pointed,  and  Things  are  contrary  to  what  He  truly  defires,  He 
is  the  lefs  pleafed,  or  has  lefs  Pleajure  ;  his  Pleafure  and  Happi- 
nefs  is  diminijhed,  and  he  fuffers  what  is  difagreeable  to  him,  or 
is  the  Subject  of fomething  that  is  of  a  Nature  contrary  to  Joy. 
and  Happinefs,  even  Pain  and  Grief.  § 

From  this  laft  Axiom  it  follows,  that  if  no  Diftinclion  is 
to  be  admitted  between  God's  Hatred  of  Sin,  and  his  Will 
with  Refpeft  to  the  Event  and  the  Exiftence  of  Sin,  as  the 
all-wife  Determiner  of  all  Events,  under  the  View  of  all  Con- 
fequences  through  the  whole  Compafs  and  Series  of  Things ; 
I  fay,  then  it  certainly  follows,  that  the  coming  to  pafs  of 
every  individual  Ac\  of  Sin  is  truly,  all  Things  confidered, 
contrary  to  his  Will,  and  that  his  Will  is  really  crofs'd  in  it  ; 
and  this  in  Proportion  as  He  hates  it.  And  as  God's  Hatred 
of  Sin  is  infinite,  by  Reafon  of  the  infinite  Contrariety  of  his 
holy  Nature  to  Sin ;  fo  his  Will  is  infinitely  crofs'd,  in  every 
Aft  of  Sin  that  happens.  Which  is  as  much  as  to  fay,  He 
endures  that  which  is  infinitely  difagreeable  to  Him,  by  Means 
of  every  AcT:  of  Sin  that  He  fees  committed  :  And  therefore, 
as  appears  by  the  preceding  Pofitions,  He  endures  truly  and 
really,  infinite  Grief  or  Pain  from  Every  Sin.  And  fo  He  muft 
be  infinitely  crofs'd,  and  fuffer  infinite  Pain,  every  Day,  in 
Millions  of  Millions  of  Inftances  :  He  muft  continually  be  the 
Subject  of  an  immenfe  Number  of  real,  and  truly  infinitely 
great  Crofles  and  Vexations.  Which  would  be  to  make  him 
infinitely  the  moft  miferable  of  all  Beings. 

If 

\  Certainly  'tis  not  lefs  abfurd  and  unreafenable,  to  talk  of  God's 
Will  and  Defire's  being  truly  and  properly  crofs'd,  without  his  differing 
any  Uneafinefs,  or  any  Thing  grievous  or  difagreeable,  than  it  is  to 
talk  of  fomething  that  may  be  called  a  revealed  Will,  which  nray  ini 
jfome  Refpeft  be  different  from  afecret  Purpofej  which  Purpofe  may  be 
fulfilled,  when  the  other  is  oppofed. 


266  Of  G  0  D's  fecret  Fart  IV, 

If  any  Obje&or  Ihould  fay ;  All  that  thefe  Things  amount 
to,  is,  that  God  may  do  Evil  that  Goad  nwy  come ;  which 
is  juftly  efteem'd  immoral  and  fmful  in  Men  ;  and  therefore 
may  be  juftly  efteem'd  inconfiftent  with  the  moral  Perfections 
of  God.  I  anfwer,  That  for  God  to  difpofe  and  permit  Evil, 
in  the  Manner  that  has  been  fpoken  of,  is  not  to  do  Evil  that 
Good  may  come ;  for  it  is  not  to  do  Evil  at  all. — •. — In  Order 
to  a  Thing's  being  morally  Evil,  there  muft  be  one  ot  thefe 
Things  belonging  to  it :  Either  it  muft  be  a  Thing  unfa  and 
itnfuitable  in  its  own  Nature  ;  or  it  muft  have  a  bad  tendency  ; 
or  it  muft  proceed  from  an  etvilDi/tofition,  and  be  done  for  an 
evil  End.  Eut  neither  of  thefe  Things  can  be  attributed  to 
God's  ordering  and  permitting  fuch  Events,  as  the  immoral 
Acls  of  Creatures,  for  good  Ends,  (i.)  It  is  not  unfa  in  its 
own  Nature,  that  He  fhould  do  fo.  For  it  is  in  its  own  Nature 
fit,  that  infinite  Wifdom,  and  not  blind  Chance,  fhould  diipofe 
moral  Good  and  Evil  in  the  World.  And  'tis  fit,  that  the 
Being  who  has  infinite  Wifdom,  and  is  the  Maker,  Owner,  and 
fupreme  Governor  of  the  World,  fhould  take  Care  of  that 
Matter.  And  therefore  there  is  no  Unfitnefs,  or  Unfuitablenefs 
in  his  doing  it.  It  may  be  unfit,  and  fo  immoral,  for  any 
other  Beings  to  go  about  to  order  this  Affair  ;  becaufe  they 
are  not  poflefs'd  of  a  Wifdom,  that  in  any  Manner  fits  them, 
for  it ;  and  in  other  Refpeds  they  are  not  fit  to  be  trufted  with 
this  Aifair ;  nor  does  it  belong  to  them,  they  not  being  the 
Owners  and  Lords  of  the  Univerfe^ 

We  need  not  be  afraid  to  AfHrm,  that  if  a  vyife  and  good 
Man  knew  with  abfolute  Certainty,  it  would  be  belt,  all 
Things  confidered,  that  there  mould  be  fuch  a  Thing  as  moral 
Evil  in  the  World,  it  would  not  be  contrary  to  his 'Wifdom 
and  Goodne/s,  for  him  to  chufe  that  it  Ihould  be  fo.  'Tis  no 
evil  Defire,  to  defire  Good,  and  todefire  that  which,  all  Things 
confidered,  is  beft.  And  it  is  no  unwife  Choice,  to  chufe  that 
That  mould  be,  which  it  is  beft  mould  be  ;  and  to  chufe  the 
Exiftence  of  that  Thing  concerning  which  this  is  known,  viz. 
that  it  is  beft  it  mould  be,  and  fo  is  known  in  the  Whole 
to  be  moft  worthy  to  be  chofen.  On  the  contrary,  it  wouhl 
be  a  plain  Defeft  in  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs,  for  him  not  to 
chufe  it.  And  the  Reafon  why  he  might  not  order  it,  if  he 
were  able,  would  not  be  becaufe  he  might  not  defire  it,  but  only 
the  ordering  of  that  Matter  don't  belong  to  him.  But  it 
is  no  Harm  for  Him  who  is  by  Right,  and  in  the  greateft  Pro 
priety,  the  fupreme  Orderer  of  all  Things,  to  order  every 

Thing 


Seel.  IX.  and  revealed  Will  •  267 

Thing  in  fuch  a  Manner,  as  it  would  be  a  Point  of  Wifdora  in 
Him  to  chufe  that  they  fhould  be  ordered.  If  it  would  be  a 
plain  Defedl  of  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs  in  a  Being,  not  to  chufe 
that  That  fhould  be,  which  He  certainly  knows  it  would,  all 
Things  confidered,  be  beft  fhoidd  be,  (as  was  but  nowob- 
ferved)  then  it  muft  be  impoffible  for  a  Being  who  has  no 
Defect  of  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs,  to  do  6therwife  than  chufe 
it  fhould  be ;  and  that,  for  this  very  Reafon,  beeaufe  He 
is  perfectly  wife  and  good.  And  if  it  be  agreeable  to  perfect 
Wifdom  and  Goodnefs  for  him  to  chufe  that  it  fhould  be, 
and  the  ordering  of  all  Things  fupremely  and  perfectly  belongs 
to  him,  it  muft  be  agreeable  to  infinite  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs, 
to  order  that  it  fhould  be.  If  the  Choice  is  good,  the  order 
ing  and  difpbfmg  Things  according  to  that  Choice  mull  alfo 
be  good.  It  can  be  no  Harm  in  one  to  whom  it  belongs  to  do 
his  fflill  in  the  Armies  of  Heaven,  and  amongft  the  Inhabitants  of 
the  Earth,  to  execute  a  good  Volition.  If  his  Will  be  good, 
and  the  Objeft  of  his  Will  be,  all  Things  confidered,  good 
and  beft,  then  the  chufing  or  willing  it  is,  not  willing  Evil  that 
Good  may  come.  And  if  fo,  then  his  ordering  according  to 
that  Will  is  not  doixg  Evil;  that  Good  may  come. 

2.  'Tis  not  of  a  bad  Tendency,  for  the  fupreme  Being  thus  ta 
order  and  permit  that  moral  Evil  to  be,    which  it  is  beft  fhould 
come  to  pafs.     For  that  it  is   of  good  Tendency,    is  the  very 

Thing  fuppofed  in  the  Point  now  in  Queftion. — Chrift's 

Crucifixion,    tho'  a  moft  horrid  Fad  in  them  that  perpetrated 
it,  was  of  moft  glorious  Tendency  as  permitted  and  ordered  of 
God. 

3.  Nor  is  there  any  Need  of  fuppofing,    it  proceeds' from  any 
evil  Difpofition  or  dim  :  For  by  the  Suppofition,    what  is  aimrd 
at  is  Good,  and  Good  is  the  actual  Iffue,  in  the  final  Refult  of 
Things. 


S  E  G  T  I  O  «T 


268  Of  Sin's  firft  Entrance  Part  IV, 


SECTION     X. 

Concerning   Sin's    firfl   Entrance    into   the   World. 

THE  Things  which  have  already  been  offered,  may" 
ferve  to  obviate  or  clear  many  of  the  Objections  which 
might  be  raifed  concerning  Sin's  firft  coming  into  the  World  ; 
as  tho'  it  would  follow  from  the  Dodrine  maintain'd,  that 
God  muft  be  the  Author  of  the  firft  Sin,  thro5  his  fo  difpofmg 
Things,  that  it  mould  necelTarily  follow  from  his  Permiffion, 
that  the  fmful  Aft  fhould  be  committed,  &c.  I  need  not 
therefore  ftand  to  repeat  what  has  been  faid  already,  about  fuch 
a  Neceffity's  not  proving  God  to  be  the  Author  of  Sin,  in 
any,  ill  Senfe,  or  in  any  fuch  Senfeas  to  infringe  any  Liberty  of 
Man,  concerned  in  his  moral  Agency,  or  Capacity  of  Blame, 
Guilt  and  Punimment. 

But  if  it  mould  neverthelefs  be  faid,  Suppofing  the  Cafe  fo, 
that  God,  when  he  had  made  Man,  might  fo  order  his  Cir- 
cumftances,  that  from  thefe  Circumftances,  together  with  his 
withholding  further  Affiftance  and  divine  Influence,  his  Sin 
would  infallibly  follow,  Why  might  not  God  as  well  have  firft 
made  Man  with  a  fixed  prevailing  Principle  of  Sin  in  his  Heart  ? 

I  anfwcr,  i.  It  was  meet,  if  Sin  did  come  into  Exiftence, 
atid  appear  in  the  World,  it  mould  arife  from  the  Im  perfection 
which  properly  belongs  to  a  Creature,  as  fuch,  and  mould  ap 
pear  fo  to  do,  that  it  might  appear  not  to  be  from  God  as 
the  Efficient  or  Fountain.  But  this  could  not  have  been,  if 
Man  had  been  made  at  firft  with  Sin  in  his  Heart  ;  nor  unlefs 
the  abiding  Principle  and  Habit  of  Sin  were  firft  introduced 
by  an  Evil  Aft  of  the  Creature.  If  Sin  had  not  arofe  from  the 
Imperfection  of  the  Creature,  it  would  not  have  been  fo  vifible, 
that  it  did  not  arife  from  God,  as  the  pofitive  Caufe,  and  real 
Source  of  it.-  -  But  it  would  require  Room  that  can't  be  here 
allowed,  fully  to  confider  all  the  Difficulties  which  have 
been  ftarted,  concerning  the  firft  Entrance  of  Sin  into  the 
World. 

And 


Sfed.  X.  into  the  Worlds  269 

And  therefore, 

2*  I  would  -obferve,    that  Objections  againft  the  Doclrine 
that  has  been  laid  down,  in  Oppoiition  to  the  Arminian  Notion 
of  Liberty,  from  thefe  Difficulties,  are  altogether  impertinent ; 
becaufe  no  additional  Difficulty  is  incurred,  by  adhering  to  a 
Scheme  in   this  Manner  different  from  theirs,  and  none  would 
be  removed  or  avoided,    by  agreeing  with,  and  maintaining 
theirs.  Nothing  that  the  AmiHians  fay,  about  the  Contingence, 
or  felf- deter  mining  Power  of  Man's  Will,    can  ferve  to  explain 
with  lefs  Difficulty,  how  the  firft  finful  Volition  of  Mankind  could 
take  Place,  and  Man  be  juftly  charged  with  the  Blame  of  it. 
To  fay,  the  Will  was  felf-determined,  or  determined  by  free 
Choice,  in  that  finful  Volition  ;  which  is  to  fay,  that  the  firft: 
finftil  Volition  was  determined  by  a  foregoing  finful  Volition ;  is 
no  Solution  of  the  Difficulty.     It  is  an  odd  Way  of  folving 
Difficulties,  to  advance  greater,  in  order  to  it.     To  fay,  Two 
and  Two  makes  Nine;    or,    that  a  Child  begat  his  Father, 
folves  no  Difficulty  :   No  more  does  it,  to  fay,  The  firft  finful 
Ad  of  Choice  was  before  the  firft  finful  Ad  of  Choice,  and 
chofe  and  determined  it,  and  brought  it  to  pafs.    Nor  is  it  any- 
better  Solution,  to  fay,  The  firft  finful  Volition  chofe,  determined 
and  produced  itfelf ;    which  is  to  fay.    It  was  before  it  was. 
Nor  will  it  go  any  further   towards  helping  us  over  the  Diffi 
culty,    to   fay,    The   firft  finful  Volition   arofe   accidentally, 
without  any  Caufe  at  all  ;    any  more  than  it  will  folve  that 
difficult  Queftion,  How  the  World  could  be  made  out  of  Nothing  ? 
to   fay,    It  came  into   Being  out   of  Nothing,  without  an.y 
Caufe  ;  as  has  been  already  obferved.     And  if  we  mould  allow 
that  That  could  be,  that  the  firft  evil  Volition  mould  arife  by 
perfect  Accident,  without  any  Caufe,  it  would  relieve  no  Diffi 
culty,  about  God's  laying  the  Blame  of  it  to  Man.     For  how- 
was  Man  to  Blame  for  perfecl  Accident,  which  had  no  Caufe, 
and  which  therefore,  he  (to  be  fure)  was  not  the  Caufe  of,  any 
more  than  if  it  came  by  fome  external  Caufe  ? — Such  Kind  of 
Solutions  arc  no  better,  than  if  fome  Perfon,  going  about  to 
folve  fome  of  the  ftrange  mathematical  Paradoxes,  about  infi 
nitely  great  and  fmall  Quantities  ;  as,  that  fome  infinitely  great 
Quantities   are   infinitely   greater   than   fome   other   infinitely- 
great  Quantities ;   and  alfo  that  fome  infinitely  fmall  Quantities 
are  infinitely  lefs  than  others,  which  yet  are  infinitely  little  ; 
in  order  to  a  Solution,  fliould  fay,  That  Mankind  have  been 
under  a  Miftake,    in  fuppofing  a  greater  Quantity  to  exceed  a 
Smaller ;  and  that  a  Hundred  multiplied  by  Ten,  makes  but 
a  fingle  Unit. 

Mm  SE  CTIO» 


Of 


Part 


SECTION     XL 

ty  •  <2  fiippofed  Inconfiftence  of  thefe  Principles  with 
G  0  D's,  moral  Charadkr. 

TH  E  Things  which  have  been  already  obferved,  may  be 
fufficient  to  anfwer  moft  of  the  Objections,  and  filence 
the  great  Exclamations  of  Arminiam  againft  the  Cai-vinifts, 
from  the  fuppofed  Inconfiftence  of  Calvinijlic  Principles  with 
the  moral  Perfections  of  God,  as  exercifed  in  his  Government 
of  Mankind.  The  Confiftence  of  fuch  a  Doftrine  of  Neceffity 
as  has  been  maintained,  with  the  Fitnefs  and  Reafonablenefs 
of  God's  Commands,  Promifes  and  Threatenings,  Rewards 
and  Ptmimments,  has  been  particularly  conlidered  :  The  Cavils 
of  our  Opponents,  as  the'  our  Dodrine  of  Neceffity  made 
God  the  Author  of  Sin,  have  been  anfwered  ;  and  alfo  their 
Objection  againft  thefe  Principles,  as  inconiifient  with  God's 
Sincerity,  in  his  Counfels,  invitations  and  Perfuafions,  has 
been  already  obviated,  in  what  has  been  obferved,  refpeding 
the  Confidence  of  what  Cafofajfts  fuppofe  concerning  the  fecret 
and  revealed  Will  of  God:  By  that  it  appears,  there  is  no 
Repugnance  in  fuppofmg  it  may  be  the  fecret  Will  of  God, 
that  his  Ordination  and  Permiilion  of  Events  (hould  be  fuch 
that  it  (hall  be  a  certain  Canfequence,  that  a  Thing  never  will 
come  to  pafs ;  which  yet  it  is  Man's  Duty  to  do,  and  fo  God's 
preceptive  Willy  that  he  mould  do ;  and  this  is  the  fame 
Thing  as  to  fay,  God  may  fincerely  command  and  require  him 
to  do  it.  And  if  he  may  be  iincere  in  commanding  him,  he 
may  for  the  fame  Reafon  be  fincere  in  counfelling,  inviting 
and  ufmg  Perfuafions  with  him  to  do  it.  Counfels  and  Invi 
tations  are  Manifeftations  of  God's  preceptive  Will,  or  of  what 
God  loves,  and  what  is  in  itfelf,  and  as  Man's  Ad,  agreeable  to 
his  Heart ;  and  not  of  his  difpoling  Will,  and  what  he  chufes 
as  a  Part  of  his  own  infinite  Scheme  of  Things.  It  has  been 
particularly  fhewn,  Part  III.  Section  IV.  that  fuch  a  Neceffity 
ns  has  been  maintained,  is  not  inconfiftent  with  the  Propriety 
and  Fitnefs  of  divine  Commands ;  and  for  the  fame  Reafon, 
not  inconnitent  with  the  Sincerity  of  Invitations  and  Counfels, 
in  the  Corollary  at  the  End  of  that  Sedion.  Yea,  it  hath  been 
ihcwn,  Part  III.  Sed.  7,  Corol.  i.  that  this  Objection  of  Mr- 


Sect.  XL        from  Gofs  moral  Character.         271 

minians,  concerning  the  Sincerity  and  Ufe  of  divine  Exhortati 
ons,  Invitatipns  and  Counfels,  is  demonftrably  againft  them- 
felves. 

Notwithftanding,  I  would  further  obferve,  that  the  Diffi 
culty  of  reconciling  the  Sincerity  of  Counfels,  Invitations  and 
Perfuafions,  with  fuch  an  antecedent  known  Fixednefs  of 
all  Events,  as  has  been  fuppofed,  is  not  peculiar  to  this  Scheme, 
as  diftinguimed  from  that  of  the  Generality  of  Arminians, 
which  acknowledge  the  abfolute  Foreknowledge  of  God  :  And 
therefore,  it  would  be  unreafonably  brought  as  an  Objection  a- 
gainft  my  differing  from  them.  The  main  feeming  Difficulty  in 
the  Cafe  is  this  :  That  God  in  counfelling,  inviting  and  per 
fuading,  makes  a  Shew  of  aiming  at,  feeking  and  ufmg  En 
deavours  for  the  Thing  exhorted  and  perfuaded  to ;  whereas, 
'tis  impoffible  for  any  intelligent  Being  truly  to  feek,  or  ufe  En 
deavours  for  a  Thing,  which  he  at  the  fame  Time  knows  moft 
perfectly  will  not  come  to  pafs  ;  and  that  it  is  abfurd  to  fup- 
pofe,  he  makes  the  obtaining  of  a  Thing  his  End,  in  his 
Calls  and  Counfels,  which  he  at  the  fame  Time  infallibly 
knows  will  not  be  obtain'd  by  thefe  Means.  Now,  if  God 
knows  this,  in  the  utmoft  Certainty  and  Perfection,  the  Way 
by  which  he  comes  by  this  Knowledge  makes  no  Difference* 
If  he  knows  it  by  the  Neceflity  which  he  fees  in  Things,  or 
by  fome  other  Means ;  it  alters  not  the  Cafe.  But  it  is  in 
Effect  allowed  by  Avminians  themfelves,  that  God's  inviting 
and  perfuading  Men  to  do  Things,  which  he  at  the  fame  Time 
certainly  knows  will  not  be  done,  is  no  Evidence  of  Infincerity  ; 
becaufe  they  allow,  that  God  has  a  certain  Foreknowledge  of 
all  Men's  fmful  Aclions  and  Omiffions,  And  as  this  is  thus 
implicitly  allowed  by  moft  Arminians,  fo  all  that  pretend  to 
own  the  Scriptures  to  be  the  Word  of  God,  muft  be  conftrained 

to  allow  it. 'God  commanded  and  counfel'd  Pharaoh  to  let 

his  People  go,  and  ufed  Arguments  and  Perfuafions  to  induce 
him  to  it ;  he  laid  before  him  Arguments  taken  from  his  infi 
nite  Greatnefs  and  almighty  Power,  (Exod.  vii.  16.)  and  fore* 
warned  him  of  the  fatal  Confequences  of  his  Refufal,  from 
Time  to  Time;  (Chap.  viii.  i,  2,  20,  21.  Chap.  ix.  i — -5. 
13 — 17.  and  x.  3,  6.)  He  commanded  Mcfes,  and  the  Elders 
of  IJrael,  to  go  and  befeech  Pharaoh  to  let  the  People  go  ;  and 
at  the  fame  Time  told  them,  he  knew  furely  that  he  would  not 
comply  to  it.  Exod.  iii.  18,  19.  And thoujhalt come >  thouandtht 
Elders  of  Ifrael ,  unto  the  King  of  Egypt,  andyoujhallfay  unto  him  ,* 
?  Lord  God  of  the  Hebrews  hath  met  with  us  ,*  andnvw  let  us  gat 
M  m  3  we 


272  OfOfyZion-frornGfid's  moral  Charade .  RIV. 

<we  bejeech  thce,  three  Days  'Journey  into  the  Wilder  ncfs,  that  <v*e  may 
Sacrifice  unto  the  Lord  our  God :  And,  /  am  jure  that  the  King  of 
Egypt  nvill  not  let  you  go.  So  our  blefled  Saviour,  the  Evening 
wnerein  he  was  betrayed,  knew  that  Pete r  would  fhamefully 
deny  him,  before  the  Morning;  for  he  declares  it 'to  him  with 
Alieverations,  to  fhew  the  Certainty  of  it ;  and  tells  trie  Difci- 
ples,  that  all  of  them  fhould  be  offended  becaufe  of  him  that 
.Night;  Aftftf.  xxvi.  3 1 j — 35.  Job.  xiii.  38.  LuL  xxii.  31, — 34.. 
*Job.  xvi.  32.  And  yet  it  was  their  Duty  to  avoid  thefe  Things  ; 
they  were  very  fwiful  Things,  which  God  had  forbidden,  and 
whicjj  it  was  their  Duty  to  watch  and  pray  againft  ;  and  they 
were  obliged  to  do  fo  from  the  Counfeh  and  r'erfiuijions  Chriit 
ufed  with  them,  at  that  very  Time,  fo  to  do  ;  Matt.  xxvi.  41. 
Watch  and  pray ,  tliat ye  enter  not  into  temptation.  So  that  what 
ever  Difficulty  there  can,  be  in  this  Matter,  it  can  be  no  Objec 
tion  againft  any  Principles  which  have  been  maintained  in  Oppo- 
iition  to  the  Principles  of  Arminiaus  ;  nor  does  it  any  more  con 
cern  me  to  remove  the  Difficulty,  than  it  does  them,  or  indeed 
all  that  call  themfelves  Chriitians,  and  acknowledge  the  divine 

Authority  of  the  Scriptures. Neverthelefs,  this  Matter  may 

poifibly  (God  allowing)  be  more  particularly  and  largely  con- 
iidered,  in  fome  future  Difcourfe,  on  the  Dodrine  of  Predefti- 
•nation. 

But  I  would  here  obferve,  that  however  the  Defenders  of 
that  Notion  of  Liberty  of  Will,  which  I  have  oppofed,  exclaim 
againft  the  Dodrine  of'  Calvinifts,  as  tending  to  bring  Men  into 
Doubts,  concerning  the  moral  Perfections  of  God  ;  it  is  their 
Scheme,  and  not  the  Scherhe  of  Calami/is,  that  indeed  is  juftly 
chargeable  with  this.  For 'tis  one  oi  the  moft  fundamental 
Points  of  their  Scheme  of  Things,  that  a  Freedom  of  Will, 
conlifting  in  felf-determination,  without  all  Neceffity,  is  eifen- 
tial  to  Moral  Agency.  1  his  is  the  fame  Thing  as  to  fay,  that 
fuch  a  Determination  of  the  Will  without  all  Neceffity,  mult 
be  in  all  intelligent  Beings,  in  thofe  Things,  wherein  they  are 
•moral  Agents,  or  in  their  moral  Affs :  And  from  this  it  will  foU 
low,  that  God's  Will  is  not  neceffarily  determined,  in  any 
Thing  he  does,  as  a  moral  Agent,  or  in  any  of  his  A£ts  that  are 
of  a  moral  Nature.  So  that  in  all  Things,  wherein  he  ads 
kolily,  juftly  and  truly,  he  don't  aft  necefiarily  j  or  his  Will  is 
not  neceffarily  determined  to  acl  holily  and  juftly ;  becaufe  if 
it  were  neceflarily  determined,  he  would  not  be  a  moral  Agent 
in  thus  ading  :  His  Will  would  be  attended  with  Neceflity ; 
which  they  fay  is  inconfiftent  with  moral  Agency  ;  «'  He  can  aft 

"  no 


Secl.XI.  OfArm'm.  Arguments  from  Scripture.  273 

no  otherwife;  He  is  at  no  Liberty  in  the  Affair ;  He  is 
determined  by  unavoidable  invincible  Neceflity  :  Therefore 
fuch  Agency  is  no  moral  Agency ;  yea,  no  Agency  at  all/ 
properly  fpeaking ;  A  neceiiary  Agent  is  no  Agent :  He 
being  paifive,  and  (abject  to  Neceflity,  what  he  does  is  no 
Act  of  his,  but  an  Eried  c?f  a  Neceiiity  prior  to  any  Aft  of 
his/'  This  is  agreeable  to  their  Manner  of  arguing.  Now 
then,  what  is  become  of  all  our  Proof  of  the  moral  Perfections 
of  God  ?  How  can  we  prove,  that  God  certainly  will  in  any 
one  Inftance  do  that  which  is  juft  and  holy  ;  feeing  his  Will  is 
determin'd  in  the  Matter  by  no  Neceflity  ?  We  have  no  other 
Way  of  proving  that  any  Thing  certainly  will  be,  but  only  by 
the  Neceiiity  of  the  Event.  Where  we  can  fee  no  Neceiiity, 
but  that  the  Thing  may  be,  or  may  not  be,  there  we  are  un-r 
avoidably  left  at  a  Lois.  We  have  no  other  Way  properly 
and  truly  to  demonftrate  the  moral  Perfections  of  God,  but 
the  Way  that  Mr.  Chubb  proves  them,  in  P.  252,  261,  262, 
263.  of  his  Traces,  viz.  That  God  muft  neceiiarily  perfectly 
know  what  is  moft  worthy  and  valuable  in  itfelf,  which  in  the 
Nature  of  Things  is  beft  and  fitieft  to  be  done.  And  as  this 
is  moft  eligible  in  itfelf,  He  being  ornnifcient,  muft  fee  it  to 
be  fo ;  and  being  both  onmifcient  and  felf-fufficient,  cannot 
have  any  Temptation  to  reject  it ;  and  fo  muft  neceiiarily  will 
that  which  is  beft.  And  thus,  by  this  Neceffity  of  the  De 
termination  of  God's  Will  to  what  is  good  and  beft,  we  de- 
monftrably  eftablilh  God's  moral  Character. 

Carol.  From  Things  which  have  been  obferved,  it  appears, 
that  moft  of  the  Arguments  from  Scripture,  which  Armenians 
make  ufe  of  to  fupport  their  Scheme,  are  no  other  than  begging 
the  Queftion.  For  in  thefe  their  Arguments  they  determine  in 
the  firft  Place,  that  without  fuch  a  Freedom  of  Will  as 
they  hold,  Men  can't  be  proper  moral  Agents,  nor  the  Sub 
jects  of  Command,  Counfel,  Perfuafion,  Invitation,  Promifes, 
Threatenings,  Expoftulations,  Rewards  and  Punifhments ;  and 
that  without  fuch  a  Freedom  'tis  to  no  Purpofe  for  Men  to 
take  any  Care,  or  ufe  any  Diligence,  Endeavours  or  Mean^s,  in 
order  to  their  avoiding  Sin,  or  becoming  holy,  efcaping  Punifh- 
ment  or  obtaining  Happinefs  :  And  having  fuppofed  thefe 
Things,  which  are  grand  Things  in  Queftion  in  the  Debate, 
then  they  heap  up  Scriptures  containing  Commands,  Counfels, 
Calls,  Warnings,  Perfuafions,  Expoftulations,  Promifes  and 
Threatenings ;  (as  dqubtlefs  they  may  find  enough  fuch ;  the 
Bible  is  confefiediy  full  of  theni,  from  the  Beginning  to  the 

End) 


Whether  thefe  Principles  Part  IV, 

End)  and  then  they  glory,  how  full  the  Scripture  is  on  their 
Side,  how  many  more  Texts  there  are  that  evidently  favour 
their  Scheme,  than  fuch  as  feem  to  favour  the  contrary.  But  let 
them  firft  make  manifeft  the  Things  in  Queftion,  which  they 
fuppofe  and  take  for  granted,  and  fhew  them  to  be  conliilent 
with  themfelves,  and  produce  clear  Evidence  of  their  Truth  ; 
and  they  have  gain'd  their  Point,  as  all  will  confefs,  without 
bringing  one  Scripture.  For  none  denies,  that  there  are  Com 
mands,  Cpunfels,  Promifes,  Threatenings,  &c.  in  the  Bible. 
But  unlefs  they  do  thefe  Things,  their  multiplying  fuch  Texts 
of  Scripture  is  infignificant  and  vain. 

It  may  further  be  obferved,  that  fuch  Scriptures  as  they 
bring,  are  really  againft  them,  and  not  for  them.  As  it  has  been 
demonftrated,  that  'tis  their  Scheme,  and  not  ours,  that  is  in- 
confiftent  with  the  Ufe  of  Motives  and  Perfuafives,  or  any 
moral  Means  whatfoever,  to  induce  Men  to  the  Practice  of 
Virtue,  or  abftaining  from  Wickednefs  :  Their  Principles,  and 
not  ours,  are  repugnant  to  moral  Agency,  and  inconfiftent  with 
moral  Government,  with  Law  or  Precept,  with  the  Nature  of 
Virtue  or  Vice,  Reward  or  Punifhment,  and  with  every 
Thing  whatfoever  of  a  moral  Nature,  either  on  the  Part  of 
the  moral  Governor,  or  in  the  State,  Actions  or,  Conduct  of 
the  Subjeft. 


SECTION     XII, 

Of  a  fuppofed  Tendency  of   thefe  Principles  t$ 
Atheifm  and  Licentioufnefs. 

IF  any  objecl  againft  what  has  been  maintain'd,  that  it 
tends  to  Atheifm ;  I  know  not  on  what  Grounds  fuch  an 
Objection  can  be  raifed,  unlefs  it  be  that  fome  Atheifts 
have  held  a  Doclrine  of  Neceflity  which  they  fuppofe  to  be  like 
this.  But  if  it  be  fo,  I  am  perfuaded  the  Arminiam  would  not 
look  upon  it  juft,  that  their  Notion  of  Freedom  and  Contin- 
gence  mould  be  charged  with  a  Tendency  to  all  the  Errors 
that  ever  any  embraced,  who  have  held  fitch  Opinions.  The 

.  K  Stoick 


Se<5L  XIL  tend  to  Atheifrri.  275 

Strict  Philofophers,  whom  the  Cafainifts  are  charged  witri  agree 
ing  with,  were  no  Atheifts,  but  the  greateft  Theifts,  and  near- 
eft  a-kin  to  Chriftians  in  their  Opinions  concerning  the  Unity 
and  the  Perfections  of  the  Godhead,  of  all  the  Heathen  Philo 
fophers.  And  Epicurus,  that  chief  Father  of  Atheifm,  main- 
tain'd  no  fuch  Doctrine  of  Neceflity,  but  was  the  greateft 
Maintainer  of  Contingence. 

The  Doctrine  of  Neceflity,  which  fuppofes  a  neceffary  Con 
nection  of  all  Events,  on  fome  antecedent  Ground  and  Reafon 
of  their  Exiftence,  is  the  only  Medium  we  have  to  prove  the 
Being  of  God.  And  the  contrary  Doctrine  of  Contingence, 
even  as  maintain'd  by  Arminians^  (which  certainly  implies  or 
infers,  that  Events  may  come  into  Exiftence,  or  begin  to  be, 
without  Dependence  on  any  Thing  foregoing,  as  their  Caufe, 
Ground  or  Reafon)  takes  away  all  Proof  of  the  Being  of  God  ; 
which  Proof  is  fummarily  exprefs'd  by  the  Apoftle,  in  Rom.  i.  20. 
And  this  is  a  Tendency  to  Atheifm  with  a  Witnefs.  So  that  in 
deed  it  is  the  Doctrine  of  Armenians,  and  not  of  the  Cakvinifis* 
that  is  juftly  charged  with  a  Tendency  toAtbeifm;  it  being, 
built  on  a  Foundation  that  is  the  utter  Subverfion  of  every  de- 
monftrative  Argument  for  the  Proof  of  a  Deity  j  as  has  been 
Ihown,  Part  II.  Sea.  36. 

And  whereas  it  has  often  been  faid,  that  the  Calvinifttc  Doc 
trine  of  Neceflity,  faps  the  Foundations  of  all  Religion  and 
Virtue,  and  tends  to  the  greateft  Licentioufnefs  of  Practice : 
This  Objection  is  built  on  the  Pretence,  that  our  Doctrine  ren 
ders  vain  all  Means  and  Endeavours,  in  order  to  be  virtuous 
and  religious.  Which  Pretence  has  been  already  particularly 
'confidered  in  the  $th&*9<&»df  this  Part;  where  it  has  been 
demonftrated,  that  this  Doctrine  has  no  fuch  Tendency  j  but 
that  fuch  a  Tendency  is  truly  to  be  charged  on  the  contrary 
Doctrine  :  Inafmuch  as  the  Notion  of  Contingence,  which 
their  Doctrine  implies,  in  its  certain  Confequences,  overthrows 
all  Connection,  in  every  Degree,  between  Endeavour  and 
Event,  Means  and  End. 

And  befides,  if  many  other  Things  which  have  been  ob- 
ferved  to  belong  to  the  Arminian  Doctrine,  or  to  be  plain  Con- 
feqUences  of  it,  be  confidered,  there  will  appear  juft  Reafon 
to  fuppofe  that  it  is  that,  which  muft  rather  tend  to  Licenti 
oufnefs.  Their  Doctrine  excufes  all  evil  Inclinations,  which 
Men  find  to  be  natural  j  becaufe  in  fuch  Inclinations,  they 

are 


276  Whether  ihefe  Principles  Part  IV, 

are  not  felf-determined,    as  fuch  Inclinations   are  riot  owing  to 
any  Choice  or  Determination  of  their  own  Wills.     Which  leads 
Men  wholly  to  juitify   themfelves  in  all  their  wicked  Actions, 
fo  far  as  natural  Inclination  has  had  a  Hand  in  determining  their 
Wills,  to  the  Commiffion  of  them.     Yea,  thefe  Notions  which 
fuppofe  moral  Necefiity  and  Inability  to  be  inconfiitent  with 
Blame  or  moral  Obligation,  will  directly  lead  Men  to  juftify 
the  vileft  Acts  and  Practices,  from  the  Strength  of  their  wicked 
Inclinations  of  all  Sorts ;    ftrong  Inclinations  inducing  a  moral 
Neceffity  ;  yea,  to  excuie  every  Degree  of  evil  Inclinations,  fo 
far  as  this  has    evidently  prevailed,    and  been  the  Thing  which 
has   determined   their  Wills :    Becaufe,    fo  far  as    antecedent 
Inclination  determined  the  Will,    fo  far  the  Will  was  without 
Liberty  of  Indifference  and  Self-determination.     Which  at  lait 
will  come  to  this,    that  Men  will  juitify  themfelves  in  all  the 
Wickednefs  they  commit.     It  has  been   obferved  already,    that 
this  Scheme  of  Things  does  exceedingly  diminifh  the  Guilt  of 
Sin,    and  the  Difference  between  the  greateu  and  fmalleft  Of 
fences  :  *  And  if  it  be  purfued  in  its  real  Confequences,    it 
leaves  Room  for  no  fuch  Thing,    as   either  Virtue  or  Vice, 
Blame  or  Praife  in  the  W7orld.  §    And   then  again,    how  natu 
rally  does  this  Notion  of  the  fovereign  felf- deter  mining  Power 
of  the  Will,  in  all  Things,  virtuous  or  vicious,  and  whatfoever 
deferves  either  Reward  or  Punimment,    tend  to  encourage  Men 
to  put  cfF  the  Work  of  Religion  and  Virtue,  and  turning  from 
Sin  to  God ;    it  being  that  which  they  have  a  fovereign  Power 
to  determine  themfelves  to,   juil  when  they  pleafe;    or  if  not, 
they  are  wholly  excufeable  in  going  on  in  Sin,  becaufe  of  their 
Inability  to  do  any  other. 

If  it  mould  be  faid,  that  the  Tendency  of  this  Doctrine  of 
Neceffity,  to  Liceruioufnefs,  appears  by  the  Improvement  many 
at  this  Day  actually  make  of  it,  to  juftify  themfelves  in  their 
difiblute  Courfes ;  I  will  not  deny  that  fome  Men  do  unrea- 
fonably  abufe  this  Doclrine,  as  they  do  many  other  Things 
which  are  true  and  excellent  in  their  own  Nature  :  But  I  deny 
that  this  proves,  the  Doctrine  itfelf  has  any  Tendency  to 
Licentioufnefs.  I  think,  the  Tendency  of  Doctrines,  by  what 
now  appears  in  the  W^orld,  and  in  our  Nation  in  particular, 
may  much  more  juftiy  be  argued  from  the  general  Effect  which 

has 

*  Part  III.   Sett.   6. 

^  Part  III.  Seft.  6.      Ibid.   Sett.   7.      Part  IV.  Sett.  I.      Part  III. 
Sedt.  3.  Corol.  i.  after  the  arft  Head. 


Se6L  XII.         tend  to  Licentioufnefs.  27*7 

has  been  feen  to  attend  the  prevailing  of  the  Principles  of  Ar-< 
minians,  and  the  contrary  Principles ;  as  both  have  had  their 
Turn  of  general  Prevalence  in  our  Nation.  If  it  be  indeed, 
as.  is  pretended,  that  Cal-vinijlic  Doctrines  undermine  the  very- 
Foundation  of  all  Religion  and  Morality,  and  enervate  and 
difannul  all  rational  Motives,  to  holy  and  virtuous  Practice  j 
and  that  the  contrary  Doctrines  give  the  Inducements  to  Vir 
tue  and  Goodnefs  their  proper  Force,  and  exhibit  Religion  in 
a  rational  Light,  tending  to  recommend  it  to  the  Reafon  o£ 
Mankind,  and  enforce  it  in  a  Manner  'that  is  agreeable  to  their 
natural  Notions  of  Things :  I  fay,  if  it  be  thus,  'tis  remarkable, 
that  Virtue  and  religious  Practice  fhould  prevail  moft,  when 
the  former  Doctrines,  fo  inconfiftent  with  it,  prevailed  almoft 
univerfally  :  And  that  ever  fmce  the  latter  Doctrines,  fo  hap 
pily  agreeing  with  it,  and  of  fo  proper  and  excellent  a  Tendency 
to  promote  it,  have  been  gradually  prevailing,  Vice,  Prophane- 
Tiefs,  Luxury  and  Wickednefs  of  all  Sorts,  and  Contempt  o£ 
all  Religion,  and  of  every  Kind  of  Serioufnefs  and  Strictnefs 
of  Converfation,  fhould  proportionably  prevail ;  and  that  thefe 
Things  mould  thus  accompany  one  another,  and  rife  and  pre 
vail  one  with  another,  now  for  a  whole  Age  together.  'Ti* 
remarkable,  that  this  happy  Remedy  (difcover'd  by  the  free 
Inquiries,  and  fuperiour  Senfe  and  Wifdom  of  this  Age)  againft 
the  pernicious  Effects  of  Cal<vinifm,  fo  inconfiftent  with  Reli 
gion,  and  tending  fo  much  to  banim  all  Virtue  from  the  Earth, 
ihould  on  fo  long  a  Trial,  be  attended  with  no  good  Effect  ; 
but  that  the  Confequence  mould  be  the  Reverfe  of  Amendment; 
that  in  Proportion;  as  the  Remedy  takes  Place,  and  is  tho 
roughly  applied,  fo  the  Difeafe  mould  prevail ;  and  the  very 
fame  difmal  Effect  take  Place,  to  the  higheft  Degree,  which 
Cal<viniQic  Doctrines  are  fuppofed  to  have  fo  great  a  Tendency 
to ;  even  the  baniming  of  Religion  and  Virtue,  and  the  pre 
vailing  of  unbounded  Licentioufnefs  of  Manners.  If  thefe 
Things  are  truly  fo,  they  are  very  remarkable,  and  Matter  of 
tery  curious  Speculation ! 


N  n  SECTION 


Of  Metaphylical  Part 


SECTION     XIII. 

Concerning  that  Objection  againft  the  Reafoning, 
ly  which  the  Calviniftic  Doftrine  is  JupportedY 
that  it  is  Metaphyfical  and  Abftrufe. 


IT  has  often  been  objected  againft  the  Defenders  of  C 
iftic  Principles,  that  in  their  Reafonings,  they  run  into 
nice  Scholaftic  Diftinftions,  and  abftrufe  metaphyfical  Subtilties, 
and  fet  thefe  in  Oppofition  to  common  Senfe.  And  'tis  poflible, 
that  after  the  former  Manner  it  may  be  alledged  againft  the 
Reafoning  by  which  I  have  endeavoured  to  confute  the  Armi- 
nian  Scheme  of  Liberty  and  moral  Agency,  that  it  is  very  ab- 

ftraded  and  metaphyfical. Concerning  this,  I  would  obferve 

the  following  Things. 

I.  If  that  be  made  an  Objection  againft  the  foregoing  Rea 
foning,  that  it  is  metaphyjical,  or  may  properly  be  reduced  to  the 
Science  ot Metaphyjicks ,  it  is  a1  very  impertinent  Objection; 
whether  it  be  fo  or  no,  is  not  worthy  of  any  Difpute  or  Con- 
troverfy.  If  the  Reafcning-.be  good,  'tis  as  frivolous  to  in 
quire  what  Science  it  is  properly  reduc'd  to,  as  what  Language 
it  is  delivered, in  :  And  for  a  Man  to  go  about  to  confute  the 
Arguments  of  his  Opponent,  by  telling  him,  his  Arguments 
2titMetapbjfical,  would  be  as  weak  as  to  tell  him,  his  Arguments 
could  not  be  fabftantial,  becaufe  they  were  written  in  trench  or 
Latin.  The  Queftion  is  not,  Whether  what  is  faid  be  Meta- 
phyficks,  Phyiicks,,Logick,  or  Mathematicks,  Latin,. French; 
Englifh,  or  Mohawk?  But,  Whether  the. Reafoning.  be  good, 
and  the  Arguments  truly  conclufive?  The  foregoing  Arguments 
are  no  more  metaphyfical,  than  thofe  which  we  ufe  againft  the 
Papifts,  to  difprove  their  Doctrine  of  Tranfubttantiation ;  al- 
ledging,  it  is  inconfiftent  with  the  Notion  of  corporeal 
Identity,  that  it  ihould  be  in  ten  Thoufand  Places  at  the  fame 
Time.  'Tis  by  metaphyfical  Arguments  only  we  are 
able  to  prove,  that  the  rational  Soul  is  not  corporeal;  that  Lead 
or  Sand  can't  think  ;  that  Thoughts  are  not  fquare  or  round, 
or  don't  weigh  a  Pound,  The  Arguments  by  which  we  prove 

the 


"6e&.  XIII.      tMfcf  abftrufe  Reafoning. 

the  Being  of  God,  if  handled  clofely  and  diftmftly,  fo  as-to 
.fhew  their  clear  and  demonftrative  Evidence,  mult  be  meta- 
phyfically  treated.  'Tis  by  Metaphy  ticks  only,  that  we  can 
demonftrate,  that  God  is  not  limited  to  a  Place,  or  is  not 
mutable  ;  that  he  is  not  ignorant,  or  forgetful ;  that  it  is  im- 
poflible  for  him  to  lie,  or  be  unjuft  ;  and  that  there  is  one  God 
only,  and  not  Hundreds  or  Thoufands.  And  indeed  we  have 
no  ftrift  Demonfl  ration  of  any  Thing,  excepting  mathematical 
Truths,  but  by  Mctaphyficks.  We  can  have  no  Proof,  that  is 
properly  demonftrative,  of  any  one  Proportion,  relating  to  the 
Being  and  Nature  of  God,  his  Creation  of  the  World,  the 
Dependence  of  all  Things  on  him,  the  Nature  of  Bodies  or 
Spirits,  the  Nature  of  our  own  Souls,  or  any  of  the  great  Truths 
of  Morality  and  natural  Religion,  but  what  is  metaph}  fical. 
I  am  willing,  my  Arguments  mould  be -brought  to  the  left  of 
the  drifted  and  jufteft  Reafon,  and  that  a  clear,  diftinft  and 
determinate  Meaning  of  the  Terms  I  ufe,  fhould  be  infilled  on; 
but  let  not  the  Whole  be  rejected,  as  if  all  were  confuted,  by 
fixing  on  it  the  Epithet  Metapkjjical. 

II.  If  the  Reafoning  which  has  been  made  ufe  of,  be  in 
fome  Senfe  Metaphyfical,  it  will  not  follow,  that  therefore  it 
muft  needs  be  abftrufe,  unintelligible,  and  a-kin  to  the  Jargon 
of  the  Schools.  I  humbly  conceive,  the  foregoing  Reafoning, 
at  leaft  as  to  thofe  Things  which  are  moft  material  belonging 
to  it,  'depends  on  no  abftrufe  Definitions  of  Difdnftions,  or 
Terms  without  a  Meaning,  or  of  very  ambiguous  and  unde 
termined  Signification,  or  any  Points  of  fuch  Abftraftion  and 
Subtilty,  as  tends  to  involve  the  attentive  Underftanding  in 
Clouds  and  Darknefs.  There  is  no  high  Degree  of  Refine 
ment  and  abftrufe  Speculation,  in  determining,  that  a  Thing  is 
not  before  it  is,  #nd  fo  can't  be  the  Caule  of  itfelf ;  or  that  the 
iirft  Act  of  free  Choice,  has  not  another  Aft  of  free  Choice 
going  before  that,  to  excite  or  direft  it;  or  in  determining,  that 
no  Choice  is  made,  while  the  Mind  remains  in  a  State  of 
abfolute  Indifference  ;  that  Preference  and  Equilibrium  never 
co-exift ;  and  that  therefore  no  Choice  is  made  in  a  State  of 
Liberty,  confifting  in  Indifference  :  And  that  fo  far  as  the  Will 
js  determined  By  Motives,  exhibited  and  operating  previous  to 
the  Aft  of  tlte  Will,  fo  far  it  is  not  determined  by  the  Aft  of 
the  Will  itfelf;  that  nothing  can  begin  to  be,  which  befe/re 
was  not,  without  a  Caufe,  or  fome  antecedent  Ground  or  Rea 
fon,  why  it  then  begins  to  be;  that  Effefts  depend  on  their 
;Caufes,  and  are  connefted  with  them  ;  that  Virtue  is  not  the 
N  n  3  worfe^ 


2  So  Of  Metaphysical  Part  IV. 

worfe,  nor  Sin  the  better,  for  the  Strength  of  Inclinatipn,  with 
which  it  is  pradifed,  and  the  Difficulty  which  thence  arifes  of 
doing  otherwife  ;  that  when  it  is  already  infallibly  known,  that 
a  Thing  will  be,  it  is  not  a  Thing  contingent  whether  it  will 
ever  be  or  no  ;  or  that  it  can  be  truly  faid,  notwithftanding, 
that  it  is  not  necefiary  it  (hould  be,  but  it  either  may  be,  or 
may  not  be.  And  the  like  might  be  obferved  of  many  other 
Things  which  belong  to  the  foregoing  Reafoning. 

If  any  (hall  ftill  ftand  to  it,  that  the  foregoing  Reafoning  is 
nothing  but  metaphyfical  Sophiftry  ;  and  that  it  muft  be  fo, 
that  the  feeming  Force  of  the  Arguments  all  depends  on  fome 
Fallacy  and  Wile  that  is  hid  in  the  Obfcurity,  which  always 
attends  a  great  Degree  of  metaphyfical  Abftradion  and  Re 
finement  ;  and  {hall  be  ready  to  fay,  "  Here  is  indeed  fome- 
*'  thing  that  tends  to  confound  the  Mind,  but  not  to  fatisfy  it: 
*f  For  who  can  ever  be  truly  fatisfied  in  it,  that  Men  are  fitly 
"  blamed  or  commended,  punimed  or  rewarded,  for  thofe 
*e  Volitions  which  are  not  from  themfelves,  and  of  whofe  Ex- 
"  iftence  they  are  not  the  Caufes.  Men  may  refine,  as  much 
"  as  they  pleafe,  and  advance  their  abftraft  Notions,  and  make 
**  out  a  Thoufand  feeming  Contradictions,  to  puzzle  our  Un- 
*'  derftandings ;  yet  there  can  be  no  Satisfaction  in  fuch  Doctrine 
*c  as  this  :  The  natural  Senfe  of  the  Mind  of  Man  will  always 
*'  refill  it."  *  I  humbly  conceive,  that  fuch  an  Objector,  if  he 

has 

,    *  A  certain  noted  Author,  of  the  prefent  Age,  fays,  The  Arguments 
for   Neceffity  are  nothing  but  Quibbling,  or  logomachy,  or  vfmg  Words 

•without  a  Meaning,  or  Begging  the  Queftion. —I    don't   know  what 

Kind  of  Neceflity  any  Authors  He  may  have  Reference  to,  are 
Advocates  for;  or  whether  they  have  managed  their  Arguments 
Tfrell,  or  ill.  As  to  the  Arguments  1  have  made  ufe  of,  if  they  are 
Quibbles,  they  may  be  fhewn  to  be  fo :  Such  Knots  are  capable  of 
being  untied,  and  the  Trick  and  Cheat  may  be  detected  and  plainly 
laid  open.  If  this  be  fairly  done,  with  Refpeft  to  the  Grounds  and 
Reafons  I  have  relied  upon,  I  (hall  have  juft  Occafion  for  the' 
future  to  be  filent,  if  not  to  be  afhamed  of  my  Argumentations. 
I  am  willing,  my  Proofs  mould  be  thoroughly  examined ;  and  if  there 
be  nothing  but  Begging  the  Qvejiion^  or  mere  Logomachy,  or  Difpute  of 
Words,  let  it  be  made  manifeft,  and  {hewn  how  the' feeming  Strength 
of  the  Argument  depends  on  my  vjlng  Words  ivithout  a  Meaning,  or 
arifes  from  the  Ambiguity  of  Terms,  or  my  making  ufe  of  Words  in  - 
an  indeterminate  and  unfteady  Manner ;  and  that  the  Weight  of 
my  Reafons  reft  mainly  on  fuch  a  Foundation  :  And  then,  I  (hall 
either  be  ready  to  retraft  what  I  have  urged,  and  thank  the  Man 

that* 


Sedfc.  XIII.          a#J  abftrufe  Reafoning.          281 

has  Capacity  and  Humility  and  Calmnefs  of  Spirit,  fufficienf 
impartially  and  thoroughly  to  examine  himfeif,  will  find  that 
he  knows  not  really  what  he  would  be  at ;  and  that  indeed 
his  Difficulty  is  nothing  but  a  mere  Prejudice,  from  an  inad 
vertent  cuftomary  Ufe  of  Words,  in  a  Meaning  that  is  not 

clearly  underftood,   nor  carefully  reflected  upon. Let  the 

Objeftor  reflect  again,  if  he  has  Candor  and  Patience  enough, 
and  don't  fcorn  to  be  at  the  Trouble  of  clofe  Attention  in  the 

Affair. —He  would  have  a  Man's  Volition  be  from  himfdf. 

Let  it  be  from  himfelf,  moft  primarily  and  originally  of  any  Way 

conceivable  : 


that  has  done  the  kind  Part,    or  (hall  be   juftly  e?pofed  for  my  Ob- 
'ftinacy. 

The  fame  Author  is  abundant  in  appealing,  in  this  Affair,  from  what 
he  calls  Logomachy  and  Sctphljlry^  to  Experience. A  Perfon  can  ex 
perience  only  whaf  pavTes  in  his  own  Mind.  But  yet,  as  we  may 
well  fuppofe,  that  all  Men  have  the  fame  human  Faculties ;  fo  a 
Man  may  well  argue  from  his  own  Experience  to  that  of  others,  in 
Things  that  (hew  the  Nature  of  thofe  Faculties,  and  the  Manner  of 
their  Operation.  But  then  one  has  as  good  Right  to  alledge  his  Ex 
perience,  as  another.  As  to  my  own  Experience,  I  find,  that  in  in 
numerable  Things  I  can  do  as  I  will;  that  the  Motions  of  my  Body, 
in  many  Refpe&s,  inftantaneoufly  follow  the  Acts  of  my  Will  concern 
ing  thofe  Motions ;  and  that  my  Will  has  fome  Command  of  my  Thoughts  ; 
and  that  the  A&s  of  my  Will  are  my  own,  /'.  e.  that  they  are  A&s  of 
my  Will,  the  Volitions  of  my  own  Mind  ;  or  in  other  Words,  that 
what  I  will,  I  will.  Which)  I  prefume,  is  the  Sum  of  what  others 
experience  in  this  Affair.  But  as  to  finding  by  Experience,  that  my 
Will  is  originally  determin'd  by  itfelf ;  or  that  my  Will  firft  chafing 
what  Volition  there  ftall  be,  the  chofen  Volition  accordingly  follows  : 
and  that  this  is  the  firft  Rife  of  the  Determination  of  my  Will  in  any 
Affair;  or  that  any  Volition  arifes  in  my  Mind  contingently;  I  declare, 
I  know  nothing  in  myfelf,  by  Experience,  of  this  Nature;  and  no 
thing  that  ever  I  experienced,  carries  the  leaft  Appearance  or  Shadow 
of  any  fuch  Thing,  or  gives  me  any  more  Reafon  to  fuppofe  or  fufpecl: 
any  fuch  Thing,  than  fo  fuppofe  that  my  Volitions  exifted  twenty 
Years  before  they  exifted.  5Tis  true,  I  find  myfelf  poffefs'd  of  my 
Volitions  before  I  can  fee  the  effectual  Power  of  any  Caufe  to  produce 
them,  (for  the  Power  arid  Efficacy  of  the  Caufe  is  not  feen  but  by  the 
Effeft)  and  this,  for  ought  I  know,  may  make  fome  imagine,  that 
Volition  has  no  Caufe,  or  that  it  produces  itfelf.  But  I  have  no  more 
Reafon  from  hence  to  determine  any  fuch  Thing,  than  I  have  to  de 
termine  that  I  gave  myfelf  my  own  Being,  or  that  I  came  into  Being 
accidentally  without  a  Caufe,  becaufe  I  firft  found  myfelf  poiTeiTed  of 
Being,  before  I  had  Knowledge  of  a  Caufe  of  my  Being. 


$32         Of  Metaphyfical  Reaching.         Part  TV. 

conceivable ;  that  is,  from  his  own  Choice  :  How  will  that 
help  the  Matter,  as  to  his  being  juftly  Warned  or  praifed,  un- 
lefs  that  Choice  itself  be  Blame  or  Praife-worthy  ?  And  hew  is 
the  Choice  itfelf  (an  ill  Choice,  for  Inftance)  filame-worthy, 
according  to  thefe  Principles,  unlefs  that  be  from  himfelf  too, 
in  the  fame  Manner ;  that  is,  from  his  own  Choice  ?  But  the 
original  and  firft  determining  Choice  in  the  Affair  is  not 
from  his  Choice  :  His  Choice  is  not  the  Caufe  of  it. — And  if 
it  be  from  himfelf  fome  other  Way,  and  not  from  his  Choice, 
furely  that  will  not  help  the  Matter  :  If  it  be  not  from  himfelf 
of  Choice,  then  it  is  net  from  himfelf  voluntarily  ;  and  if  fo, 
he  is  furely  no  more  to  Blame,  than  if  it  were  not  from  him 
felf  at  all.  It  is  a  Vanity,  to  pretend  it  is  a  fufficient  An- 
fwer  to  this,  to  fay,  that  it  is  nothing  but  metaphyfical  Refine 
ment  and  Subtil ty,  and  fo  attended  with  Cbfcurity  and  Uncer 
tainty. 

If  it  be  the  natural  Senfe  of  our  Minds,  that  what  is  blame 
worthy  in  a  Man  muft  be  from  himfelf,  then  it  doubtlefs  is  alfo, 
that  it  muft  be  from  fomething  bad\r\  himfelf,  a  bad  Choice,  or 
tad  Difpojttion.  But  then  our  natural  Senfe  is,  that  this  bad 
Choice  or  Difpofition  is  evil  in  itfelf,  and  the  Man  blame 
worthy  for  it,  on  its  o^wn  Account,  without  taking  into  our  No 
tion  of  its  Blame- worthinefs,  another  bad  Choice,  or  Difpofi 
tion  going  before  this,  from  whence  this  arifes  :  For  that  is  a 
ridiculous  Abfurdity,  running  us  into  an  immediate  Contradic 
tion,  which  our  natural  Senfe  of  Blame-worthinefs  has  nothing 
to  do  with,  and  never  comes  into  the  Mind,  nor  is  fuppofed  in 
the  Judgment  we  naturally  make  of  the  Affair.  As  was  c}e- 
monftrated  before,  natural  Senfe  don't  place  the  moral  Evil  of 
Volitions  and  Difpofitions  in  the  Caufe  of  them,  but  the  Na 
ture  of  them.  An  Evil  Thing's  being  FROM  a  Man,  or 
from  fomething  antecedent  in  him,  is  not  eflential  to  the 
original  Notion  we  have  of  Blame-worthinefs :  But  'tis  its 
being  the  Choice  of  the  Heart ;  as  appears  by  this,  that  if  a 
Thing  be/row  us.  and  not  from  our  Choice,  it  has  not  the 
Nature  of  Blame-worthinefs  or  Ill-defert,  according  to  our 
natural  Senfe.  When  a  Thing  is  from  a  Man,  in  that  Senfe, 
that  it  is  from  his  Will  or  Choice,  he  is  to  Blame  for  it,  be- 
caufe  his  Wjll  is  I N  IT:  So  far  as  the  \Vill  is  in  it,  Blame  is 
m  /"/,  and  no  further.  Neither  do  we  go  any  further  in  our 
Notion  of  Blame,  to  inquire  whether  the  bad  W7ill  be  FROM 
a  bad  Wrill  :  There  is  no  Confideration  of  the  Original  of 
that  bad  Will ;  becaufe  according  to  our  natural  Apprehenfion> 

Blame 


Se<a.  XIII.     A  Fault  of  Arminiari  Writers.        ilj 

Blame  originally  conjifts  in  it.  Therefore  a  Thing's  being  from  a 
Man,  is  a  fecondary  Confideration,  in  the  Notion  of  Biame  or 
Ill-defert.  Becaufe  thofe  Things  in  our  external  Actions,  are 
moil  properly  faid  to  be  from  us,  which  wzfrom  our  Choice  ; 
and  no  other  external  Actions  but  thofe  that  are  from  us  in  this- 
Senfe,  have  the  Nature  of  Blame  j  and  they  indeed,  not  fo 
properly  becaufe  they  are  from  us,  as  becaufe  we  are  in  them± 
i.  e.  our  Wills  are  in  them  ;  not  fo  much  becaufe  they  arc 
from  fo  me  Property  of  ours,  as  becaufe  they  are  our  Properties. 
However,  all  thefe  external  Actions  being  truly  from  us,  as 
their  Caufe ;  and  we  being  fo  ufed,  in  ordinary  Speech,  and 
in  the  common  Affairs  of  Life,-  to  fpeak  of  Men's  Actions  and 
Condu.fi  that  we  fee,  and  that  arTecl  human  Society,  as  deferve* 
ing  111  or  Well,  as  worthy  of  Blame  or  Praife ;  hence  it  is  come 
to  pafs,  that  Philofophers  have  incautiouily  taken  all  their 
Meafures  of  Good  and  Evil,  Praife  and  Blame,  from  the 
Dictates  of  common  Senfe,  about  thefe  'overt  Atts  of  Men  ;  to 
the  running  of  every  Thing  into  the  moil  lamentable  and  dread* 
ful  Confunon,  And  therefore  I  obferve,, 

III.  'Tis  fo  far  from  being  true  (whatever  may  be  pretended) 
that  the  Proof  of  the  Dofirme  which  has  been  maintained, 
depends  on  certain  abftrufe,  unintelligible,  metaphyfical  Terms 
and  Notions  ;  and  that  the  Arminian  Scheme,  without  needing 
fuch  Clouds  and  Darknefs,  for  its  Defence,  is  fupported  by 
the  plain  Dictates  of  common  Senfe  ;  that  the  very  Reverfe  is 
moft  certainly  true,  and  that  to  a  great  Degree.  'Tis  fadl  that 
they,  and  not  we,,  have  confounded  Things  with  metaphyfical, 
unintelligible  Notions  and  Phrafes,  and  have  drawn  them  from 
the  Light  of  plain  Truth,  into  the  grofs  Darknefs  of  abftruie 
metaphyfical  Propofitions,  and  Words  without  a  Meaning. 
Their  pretended  Demonftrations  depend  very  much  on  fuch 
unintelligible,  metaphyfical  Phrafes,  as  Self-determination  arid 
Sovereignty  of  the  Will;  and  the  metaphyfical  Senfe  they  put  on 
fuch  Terms,  as  N^ceffity,  Contingency,  Attion,  Agency,  &c.  quite 
diverfe  from  their  Meaning  as  ufed  in  common  Speech  ;  and 
which,  as  they  ufe  them,  are  without  any  confiflent  Meaning, 
or  any  Manner  of  diftinfi  confident  Ideas;  as  far  from  it  as 
any  of  the  abftrufe  Terms  and  perplexed  Phrafes  of  the  Peri- 
patetick  Philofophers,  or  the  moft  unintelligible  Jargon  of  the 
Schools,  or  the  Cant  of  the  wildeft  Fanaticks.  Yea,  we  may 
be  bold  to  fay,  thefe  metaphyfical  Terms,  on  which  they  buikl 
fo  much,  are  what  they  ufe  without  knowing  what  they  mean 
ihemfelves  -,  they  are  pure  metaphyfical  Sounds,  without  any 

Ideaa> 


284          Arminians  too  metaphyfical.         Part  IV. 

Ideas  whatfoever  in  their  Minds  to  anfwer  them ;  inafmuch 
as  it  has. been  demonftrated,  that  there  cannot  be  any  Notion 
in  the  Mind  confiftent  with  thefe  Expreffions,  as  they  pretend 
to  explain  them;  becaufe  their  Explanations  deftroy  them- 
felves.  No  fuch  Notions  as  imply  Self-contradiftion,  and 
Self-abolition,  and  this  a  great  many  Ways,  can  fubfiit  in  the 
Mind  ;  as  there  can  be  no  Idea  of  a  Whole  which  is  lefs  than 
any  of  its  Partsj  or  of  folid  Extenfion  without  Dimenfions,  or 

of  an  Effect  which  is  before  its'  Caufe. • — Arminians  improve 

thefe  Terms,  as  Terms  of  Art,  and  in  their  metaphyfical 
Meaning,  to  advance  and  eftablifh  thofe  Things  which  are 
contrary  to  common  Senfe,  in  a  high  Degree.  Thus,  inftead 
of  the  plain  vulgar  Notion  of  Liberty,  which  all  Mankind,  in 
every  Part  of  the  Face  of  the  Earth,  and  in  all  Ages,  have  ; 
conflfting  in  Opportunity  to  do  as  one  pleafes  j  they  have  in 
troduced  a  new  ftrange  Liberty,  confiding  in  Indifference, 
Contingence,  and  Self-determination  ;  by  which  they  involve 
themfelves  and  others  in  great  Obfcurity,  and  manifold  grofs 
Inconfiftence.  So,  inftead  of  placing  Virtue  and  Vice,  as 
common  Senfe  places  them  very  much,  in  fix'd  Bias  and  In 
clination,  and  greater  Virtue  and  Vice  in  ftronger  and  more 
eftablifiYd  Inclination  ;  thefe,  thro*  their  Refinings  and  abftrufe 
Notions,  fuppofe  a  Liberty  confifting  in  Indifference,  to  be 
effential  to  all  Virtue  and  Vice.  So  they  have  reafoned  them 
felves,  not  by  metaphyfical  Diftinc"Kons,  but  metaphyfical 
Confufion,  into  many  Principles  about  moral  Agency,  Blame, 
Praife,  Reward  and  Punimment,  which  are,  as  has  been  Ihewn, 
exceeding  contrary  to  the  common  Senfe  of  Mankind  ;  and 
perhaps  to  their  own  Senfe*  which  governs  them  in  common 
Life. 


THE 


oooo  -S-oooo  ••*.?  -oooo  -)^>ooo6-&  o 

t  x  U    *  $  3M  <$  I  %  i  $      x  x 


THE 

CONCLUSION. 


WHETHER  the  Things  which  have  been  alledged,  are 
liable  to  any  tolerable  Anfwer  in  the  Ways  of  calm* 
intelligible  and  ttrift  Reafoning,  I  muft  leave  others  to  judge  : 
But  I  am  feniible  they  are  liable  to  one  Sort  of  Anfwer.  'Tis 
not  unlikely,  that'  fome  who  value  themfelves  on  the  fup- 
poied  rational  and  generous  Principles  of  the  modern  ia- 
ihionable  Divinity,  will  have  their  Indignation  and  Difdain  raif- 
ed  at  the  Sight  of  this  Difcourfe,  and  on  perceiving  what 
Things  are  pretended  to  be  proved  in  it.  And  if  they  think 
it  worthy  of  being  read,  or  of  fo  much  Notice  as  to  fay  much 
about  it,  they  may  probably  renew  the  ufual  Exclamations, 
with  additional  Vehemence  and  Contempt,  about  the  fate  of 
the  Heathen,  H oboes'*  Necejfity,  and  making  Men  mere  Machines; 
accumulating  the  terrible  Epithets  of  fatal,  imfruftrable  t  in 
evitable,  irrefiftable,  &c.  and  it  may  be,  with  the  Addition  of 
'horrid  2cs\&  blafphe mous  ;  and*  perhaps  much  Skill  may  be  ufed  to 
fet  forth  Things,  which  have  been  faid,  in  Colours  which  mall 
be  (hocking  to  the  Imaginations,  and  moving  to  the  Paflions  of 
thofe  who  have  either  too  little  Capacity,  or  too  much  Con 
fidence  of  the  Opinions  they  have  imbibed,  and  Contempt  of 
the  contrary,  to  try  the  Matter  by  any  ferious  and  circumfpeft 
Examination.  *  Or  Difficulties  may  be  ftarted  and  infifted  on 
O  o  which 

*  A  Writer,  of  tHe  prefent  Age",  whom  I  have  feveral  Times  had 
Occafion  to  mention,  fpeaks  once  and  again  of  thofe  who  hold  the 
"Dodtrine  of  Necejfity,  as  fcarcely  worthy  of  the  Name  of  Philofo- 

fhers. '• 1  don't  know,  whether  he  has  refpeft  to  any  particular 

Notion    of  Neceflity,      that   fome    may    have    maintain'd  ;     and    if  fo, 

what  Dodrine   of  Neceflity    it   is   that   He  means Whether   I    am 

worthy  of  the  Name  of  a  Philofopher,  or  not,  would  be  a  Queftiort 
little  to  the  prefent  Purpofe.  If  any,  and  ever  fo  many,  fhouid 
deny  it,  1  mould  not  think  it  worth  the  while  to  enter  into  a  Dif- 
pute  on  that  Queftion;  tho'  at  the  fame  Time  I  might  expeft, 

loins 


236         The  C  O  N  C  L  U  S  I  O  N. 

which  don't  belong  to  the  Controverfy  ;  becaufe,  let  them  fj£ 
more  or  lefs  real,  and  hard  to  be  refolved,  they  are  not  what 
are  owing  to  any  Thing  diftinguiihing  of  this  Scheme  from 
that,  of  the  Arminians,  and  would  not  be  removed  nor  dimi- 
nimed  by  renouncing  the  former,  and  adhering  to  the  latter. 
Or  fome  particular  Things  may  be  pick'cl  out,  which  they 
may  think  will  found  h;iimeft  in  the  Ears  of  the  Generality  ; 
and  thefe  may  be  glofs'd  and  defcanted  on,  with  tart  and  con 
temptuous  Words ;  and  from  thence,  the  Whole  treated  with 
Triumph  and  Infult. 

JTis  eafy  to  Tee  how  the  Decifion  of"  moft  of  the  Points  in 
Controverfy,  between  Cal~oinifts  and  Arminiarfst  depends  on  the 
Determination  of  this  grand  Article  concerning  the  Freedom  of 
the  Will requifite  to  moral  Agency  ;  and  that  by  clearing  and  eftab- 
liming  the  Calviniftic  Dodrine  in  this  Point,  the  chief  Argu 
ments  are  obviated,  by  which  Arminian  Doctrines  in  general 
are  fupported,  and  the  contrary  Doclrincs  demonftratively 
confirmed.  Hereby  it  becomes  manifeft,  that  God's  moral 
Government  over  Mankind,  his  treating  them  as  moral  Agents, 
making  them  the  Objects  of  his  Commands,  Counfels  Calls, 
Warnings,  Expoftulations-,  Promifes,  Threatenings,-  Rewards 
and  Punifhments,  is  riot  inconfiftent  with  a  determining  Difpofal 
of  all  Events,  of  every  Kind,  throughout  the  Univerfe,  in  his 
Providence;  either  by  pofitive  Efficiency,  or  Permiffion.  Indeed 
fuch  an  univeifal)  determining  Providence ,  infers  fome  Kind  of 
Neceiiity  of  all  Events ;  fuch  a  Neceffity  as  implies  an  infallible 
previous  Fixednefs  of  the  Futurity  of  the  Event :  But  no  other 
Ne-ceffity  of  moral  Events,  or  Volitions  of  intelligent  Agents, 
is  needful  in  order  to  this,  than  moral  Necejjity  ;  which  does  as 
rnueh  afcertain  the  Futurity  of  the  Event,  as  any  other 
Neceffity.  But,  as  has  been  demonftrated,  fuch  a  Neceffity  is 
not  at  all  repugnant  to  moral  Agency,  and  the  reafonable  Ufe 
of  Commands,  Calls,  Rewards,  Punimments,  &c.  Yea,  not 
only  are  Objections,  of  this  Kind,  againft  the  Doftrine  of  an 
univerfal  determining  Providence,  removed  by  what  has  been 
faid  ;  but  the  Truth  of  fuch  a  Doctrine  is  demonftrated.  As 

it 

fome  better  Anfwer  fhould  be  given  to  the  Arguments  brought  for 
the  Truth  of  the  Do&rine  I  maintain  ;  and  I  might  further  reafoa- 
ably  defire,  that  it  might  be  confidered,  whether  it  don't  become 
thofe  who  are  truly  lucrthy  of  the  Name  of  Philofophers,  to  be 
fenfible,  that  there  is  a  Difference  between  Argument  and  Contempt  ,- 
yea,  and  a  Difference  between  fhe  Contempt iblenefs  of  the  Perjon 
that  argues,  and  the  Ingpnclufinenefs  of  the  Arwmeats  he  offers* 


The  C  O  N  C  L  U  S  I  O  N,        287 

k  has  been  demonftrated,  that  the  futurity  of  all  future  Events 
is  eftablifhed  by  previous  Neceffity,  either  natural  or  moral  ; 
fo  'tis  manifeft,  that  the  fovereign  Creator  and  Difpofer  of  the 
World  has  ordered  this  Necefiity,  by  ordering  his  own  Con- 
dud,  either  in  defignedly  acting,  or  forbearing  to  ad.  For,  as 
the  Being  of  the  World  is  from  God,  fo  the  Circumftances  in, 
which  it  had  its  Being  at  firft,  both  negative  and  pofitive,  muft 
be  ordered  by  him,  in  one  of  thefe  Ways  ;  and  all  the  necef- 
fary  Confsquences  of  thefe  Circumftances,  muft  be  ordered  by 
him.  And  God's  active  and  pofitive  Interpofitions,  after  ths 
World  was  created,  and  the  Confequences  of  thefe  Interpofiti- 
ons  j  alfo  every  Inftance  of  his  forbearing  to  interpofe,  and  the 
fu re  Confequences  of  this  Forbearance,  muft  all  be  determined 
according  to  his  Pleafure.  And  therefore  every  Event  which 
is  the  Confequence  of  any  Thing  whatfoever,  or  that  is  con 
nected  with  any  foregoing  Thing  or  Circumftance,  either  po 
fitive  or  negative,  as  -the  Ground  or  Reafon  of  its  Exiftence, 
mull  ber  ordered  of  God  ;  either  by  a  defigned  Efficiency  and 
Jnterpofition,  or  a  defigned  forbearing  to  operate  or  interpofe. 
But,  as  has  been  proved,  all  Events  whatfoever  are  necefiarily 
connected  with  fomething  foregoing,  either  pofitive  or  negative, 
which  is  the  Ground  of  its  Exiftence.  It  follows  therefore,  that 
the  whole  Series  of  Events  is  thus  connected  with  fomethmg 
in  the  State  of  Things,  either  pofitive  or  negative,  which  is 
original  in  the  Series  ;  /.  e.  fomething  which  is  connected  with 
nothing  preceding  that,  but  God's  own  immediate  Conduct, 
either  his  acting  or  forbearing  to  act.  From  whence  it  follows, 
that  as  God  defignedly  orders  his  own  Conduct,  and  its  conr 
r.ected  Confequences,  it  muft  neceffarily  be,  that  he  defignedly 
orders  all  Things,, 

The'Things  which  have  been  faid,  obviate  fome  of  the  chief 
Objections  of  Arminians  againil  the  Cafainiftic  Doctrine  of  the 
total  Depravity  and  Corruption  of  Mans  Nature,  whereby  his 
Heart  is  wholly  under  the  Power  of  Sin,  and  he  is  utterly  un 
able,  without  the  Interpolation  of  fovereign  Grace,  favingly  to 
love  God,  believe  in  Chrift,  or  do  any  Thing  that  is  truly 
good  and  acceptable  in  God's  Sight.  For  the  mjain  Objection 
3gainft  this  Doctrine  is.-,  that  it  is  inconfiftent  with  the  Freedom 
of  Man's  Will,  confifting  in,  Indifference  and  felf-determining 
Power  ;  becaufe  it  fuppofes  Man  to  be  under  a  Neceffity  of 
Sinning,  and  that  God  requires  Things  of  him,  in  order  to 
his  avoiding  eternal  Damnation,  which  he  is  unable  to  do  ; 
$ad  that  this.  Doftrine  is  wholly  inconfiftent  w.ith  the  Sincerity 
003  of 


288         ffe  C  O  N  C  L  U  S  I  Q  N. 

ofCounfels,  Invitations,  &c.  Now  this  Doctrine  fuppofes  «^ 
other  tieajjity  of  Sinning,  than  a  moral  Neceifity  ;  which,  as 
has  been  (hewn,  don't  at  all  excufe  Sin  ;  and  fuppofcs  no  other 
Inability  to  obey  any  Command,  or  perform  any  Duty,  even  the 
moft  fpiritual  and  exalted,  but  a  moral  Inability,  which,  as  has 
been  proved,  don't  excufe  Perfons  in  the  Non-performance  of 
any  good  Thing,  or  make  them  not  to  be  the  proper  Objects  of 
Commands,  Counfels  and  Invitations.  And  moreover,  it 
has  been  {hewn,  that  there  is  not,  and  never  can  be,  either  in 
Exiftence,  or  fo  much  as  in  Idea,  any  fuch  Freedom  of  Will, 
confuting  in  Indifference  and  Self-determination,  for  the  Sake 
or  which,  this  Doctrine  of  original  Sin  is  caft  out ;  and  that  no 
fuch  Freedom  is  neceifary,  in  order  to  the  Nature  of  Sin,  and 
a  juit  Defert  of  Punifliment. 

The  Things  which  have  been  obferyed,  do  alfo  take  off 
the  main  Objections  of  Arminians  againft  the  Doctrine  of  effica 
cious  Grace ;  and  at  the  fame  Time,  prove  the  Grace  of  God 
in  a  Sinner's  Converfion  (if  there  be  any  Grace  or  divine  In 
fluence  in  the  Affair)  to  be  efficacious,  yea,  and  irrefijlible  too, 
if  by  irreiiftible  is  meant,  that  which  is  attended  with  a  moral 
Neceffity,  which  it  is  impoffible  fhould  ever  be  violated  by  any 
Refiftence.  The  main  Objection  of  Arminians  againft  this 
Doctrine  is,  that  it  is  inconfiftent  with  their  felf-determining 
Freedom  of  Will;  and  that  it  is  repugnant  to  the  Nature  of 
Virtue,  that  it  mould  be  wrought  in  the  Heatt  by  the  deter 
mining  Efficacy  and  Power  of  another,,  inftead  of  its  being 
owing  to  a  felf-moving  Power ;  that  in  that  Cafe,  the  Good 
which  is  wrought,  would  not  be  our  Virtue,  but  rather  God'* 
Virtue ;  becaufe  it  is  not  the  Perfon  in  whom  it  is  wrought, 
that  is  the  determining  Author  of  it,  but  God  that  wrought  it 

in  him. But  the  Things  which  are  the  Foundation  of  thefe 

Objections,  have  been  confidered  \  and  it  has  been  demon- 
flrated,  that  the  Liberty  of  moral  Agents  does  not  confiit  in 
felf-determining  Power ;  and  that  there  is  no  Nesd'of  any  fuch 
Liberty,  in  order  to  the  Nature  of  Virtue ;  nor  does  it  at  all 
hinder,  but  that  the  State  or  Act  of  the  Will  may  be  the 
Virtue  of  the  Subject,  though  it  be  not  from  Self-determina 
tion,  but  the  Determination  of  an  extrinfic  Caufe  ;  even  fo  as 
to  caufe  the  1C  vent  to  be  morally  neceflary  to  the  Subject  of  it. 
And  as  it  has  been  proved,  that  nothing  in  the  State  or  Acts 
of  the  Will  of  Man  is  contingent ;  but  that  on  the  contrary, 
every  Event  of  this  Kind  is  neceflary,  by  a  moral  Neceifity  j 
and  has  alfo  been  now  demonilrated,  that  the  Doctrine  of  an 

univeifal 


We  C  O  N  C  L  U  S  I  O  N.  289 

imiverfal  determining  Providence,  follows  from  that  Doctrine 
of  Neceffity,  which  was  proved Ijefore  :  Andfo,  that  God  does 
decifively,  in  his  Providence,  order  all  the  Volitions  of  moral 
Agents,  either  by  pofitive  Influence  or  Permiffion  :  And  it 
being  allowed  on  all  Hands,  that  what  God  does  in  the  Affair  of 
Man's  virtuous  Volitions,  whether  it  be  more  or  lefs,  is  by  fome 
poiitive  Influence,  and  not  by  mere  Permiffion,  as  in  the  Affair 
of  a  fmful  Volition  :  If  we  put  thefe  Things  together,  it  will 
follow,  that  God's  Affiftance  or  Influence,  mult  be  determin 
ing  and  decifive,  or  muft  be  attended  with  a  moral  Neceflity 
of  the  Event ;  and  fo,  that  God  gives  Virtue,  Holinefs  and 
Converfion  to  Sinners,  by  an  Influence  which  de^ermmes  the 
Effect,  in  fuch  a  Manner,  that  the  Effect  will  infallibly  follow 
by  a  mor^l  Neceffity  ;  which  is  what  Gaftrnrife  mean  by  effica 
cious  and  irrefiitibie, Grace. 

The  Things  which  have  been  faid,  do  likewife  anfwer  the 
chief  Objections  againft  the  Doctrine  of  God's  unlverfal  and 
abfjlute  Decree,  and  aiford  infallible  Proof  of  that  Doctrine; 
and  of  the  Doctrine  of  abfolute,  eternal,  perfonal  EleQion  in  par 
ticular.  The  main  Objections  againft  thefe  Doctrines  are,  that 
they  infer  a  Neceffity  of  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents,  and  of 
the  future  moral  State  and  Acts  of  Men  ;  and  fo  are  not  con 
fident  with  thofe  eternal  Rewards  and  Punifnments,  which  are 
connected  with  Converfion  and  Impenitence ;  nor  can  be  made 
to  agree  with  the  Reafonableriefs  and  Sincerity  of  the  Precepts, 
Calls,  Counfels,  Warnings  and  Expoftulations  of  the  Word  of 
God  ;  or  with  the  various  Methods  and  Means  of  Grace,  which 
God  ufes  with  Sinners,  to  bring  them  to  Repentance  ;  and  the 
Whole  of  that  moral  Government,  which  God  exercifes  towards 
Mankind  :  And  that  they  infer  an  Inconfiftence  between  the 
fecret  and  revealed  Will  of  God ;  and  make  God  the  Author  of 
Sin.  But  all  thefe  Things  have  been  obviated  in  the  preced 
ing  Difcourfe.  And  the  certain  Truth  of  thefe  Doctrines, 
concerning  God's  eternal  Purpofes,  will  follow  from  what  was 
juft  now  obferved,  concerning  God's  univerfal  Providence ;  how 
it  infallibly  follows  from  what  has  been  proved,  that  God 
orders  all  Events,  and  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents  amongft 
others,  by  fuch  a  decifive  Difpofal,  that  the  Events  are  infal 
libly  connected  with  his  Difpofal.  For  if  God  difpofes  all 
Events,  fo  that  the  infallible  Exiftence  of  the  Ejects  is  decided 
by  his  Providence,  then  he  doubtlefs  thus  orders  and  decides 
Things  knowingly,  and  on  Dejign.  God  don't  do  what  he  does, 
»or  order  what  he  orders,  accidentally  and  unawares ;  either 

without 


290  fbe  C  O  N  C  L  U  S  I  O  N. 

ivithovt,  or  bejtde  his  Intention.  And  if  there  be  a  foregoing 
Defign  of  doing  and  ordering  as  he  does,  this  is  the  fame  with 
a  Purpofe  or  Deere.-.  And  as  it  has  been  (hewn,  that  nothing 
is  new  to  God,  in  any  Refpeft,  but  all  Things  are  perfectly 
and  equally  in  his  View  from  Eternity  ;  hence  it  will  follow, 
that  his  Defigns  or  Purpofes  are  not  Things  formed  anew, 
founded  on  any  new  Views  or  Appearances,  but  are  all  eternal 
Purpofes.  And  as  it  has  been  now  (hewn,  how  the  Dodtnne 
of  determining  efficacious  Grace  certainly  follows  from 
Things  proved  in  the  foregoing  Difco'jrfe  ;  hence  will  necef- 
farily  follow  the  Doctrine  of  particular.,  eternal,  abfolute  Elec- 
tibn.  For  if  Men  are  made  true  Saints,  no  otherwife  than  as 
God  makes  them  fo,  and  diftinguifhes  them  from  others,  by  an 
efficacious  Power  and  Influence  of  his,  that  decides  an*  fixes  the 
Event ;  and  God  thus  makes  fome  Saint' »  and  not  others,  oa 
Defign  or  Purpofe,  and  (as  has  been  now  obferved)  no  Defigns 
of  God  are  new  ;  it  follows,  that  God  thus  diftinguifhed  from 
others,  all  that  ever  become  true  Saints,  by  his  eternal  Defign 
or  Decree. — I  might  alfo  fhew,  how  God's  certain  Foreknow 
ledge  muft  fuppofe  an  abfolute  Decree,  and  how  fuch  a  Decree 
can  be  proved  to  a  Demonftration  from  it :  But  that  this  Dif- 
courfe  may  not  be  lengthen'd  out  too  much,  that  muft  be  omit- 
ted  for  the  prefent. 

From  thefe  Things  it  will  inevitably  follow,  that  however 
Chrift  in  fome  Senfe  may  be  faid  to  die  for  all,  and  to  redeem 
all  vifible  Chriftians,  yea  the  whole  World  by  his  Death  ;  yet 
there  muft  be  fomething  particular  in  the  Defign  of  his  Death, 
with  Pvefped  to  fuch  as  He  intended  mould  actually  be  faved 
thereby.  As  appears  by  what  has  been  now  fnewn,  God  has 
the  adual  Salvation  or  Redemption  of  a  certain  Number  in 
liis  proper  abfolute  Defign,  and  of  a  certain  Number  only; 
and  therefore  fuch  a  Defign  only  can  be  profecuted  in  any 
Thing  God  does,  in  order  to  the  Salvation  of  Men.  God 
purfues  a  proper  Defign  of  the  Salvation  of  the  Eleft  in  giving 
Chrift  to  die,  and  profecutes  fuch  a  Defign  with  Refpeft  to  no 
other,  moft  ftriclly  fpeaking  ;  for  'tis  impoflible,  that  God 
ihould  profecute  any  other  Defign  than  only  fuch  as  He  has  : 
He  certainly  don't,  in  the  higheft  Propriety  and  Striftnefs  of 
Speech,  purfue  a  Defign  that  He  has  not.—  And  indeed  fuch 
a  Particularity  and  Limitation  of  Redemption  will  as  infallibly 
follow  from  the  Doclrine  of  God's  Foreknowledge,  as  from 
that  of  the  Decree.  For  'tis  as  inapoflible,  in  Striclnefs  of 
Speech,  that  God  fhould  profecute  a  Defign  or  Aim  at  3 

Thing, 


fbe  C  O  N  C  L  U  S  I  O  N.  29* 

Thing,  which  He  at  the  fame  Time  moft  perfectly  knows  will 
not  be  accompliihed,  as  that  he  fhould  i*fe  Endeavours  for  that 
which  is  befide  his  Decree. 

By  the  Things  which  have  been  proved,  are  obviated  fome 
of  the  main  Objections  againft  the  Dodrine  of  the  infallible  and 
neceffary  Perfeverance  of  Saints,  and  fome  of  the  main  Founda 
tions  of  this  Doctrine  are  eftablilhed.  The  main  Prejudices 
of  Arminians  againft  this  Doctrine  feem  to  be  thefe;  they  fup- 
pofe  fuch  a  neceffary,  infallible  Perfeverance  to  be  repugnant 
to  the  Freedom  of  the  Will ;  that  it  mull  be  owing  to  Man's 
own  felf-determing  Power,  that  he  firft  becomes  virtuous  and 
holy ;  and  fo  in  like  Manner,  it  muft  be  left  a  Thing  contin 
gent,  to  be  determin'd  by  the  fame  Freedom  of  Will,  whether 
he  will  perfevere  in  Virtue  and  Holmefs  ;  and  that  otherwife 
his  continuing  ftedfaft  in  Faith  and  Obedience  would  not  be 
his  Virtue,  or  at  all  Praife- worthy  and  Rewardable  ;  nor  could 
his  Perfeverance  be  properly  the  Matter  of  divine  Commands, 
Counfels  and  Promifes,  nor  his  Apoftacy  be  properly  threaten'd^ 
and  Men  warned  againft  it*  Whereas  we  find  all  thefe  Things 
in  Scripture  :  There  we  find  Stedfaftnefs  and  Perfeverance  in 
true  Chriitianity,  reprefented  as  the  Virtue  of  the  Saints, 
fpoken  of  as  Praife-worthy  in  them,  and  glorious  Rewards 
promifed  to  it ;  and  alfo  find,  that  God  makes  it  the  Subject  of 
his  Commands,  Counfels  and  Promifes ;  and  the  contrary,  of 
Threatenings  and  Warnings.  But  the  Foundation  of  thefe 
Objections  has  been  removed,  in  its  being  fhewn  that  moral 
Neceffity  and  infallible  Certainty  of  Events  is  not  inconfiftent 
with  thefe  Things  ;  and  that,  as  to  Freedom  of  WTill  lying  in 
the  Power  of  the  Will  to  determine  itfelf,  there  neither  is  any" 
fuch  Thing,  nor  any  Need  of  it,  in  order  to  Virtue,  Reward, 
Commands,  Counfels,  &c* 

And  as  the  Doctrines  of  efficacious  Grace  and  abfolute 
Election  do  certainly  follow  from  Things  which  have  been 
proved  in  the  preceding  Difcourfe ;  fo  fome  of  the  main 
Foundations  of  the  Doctrine  of  Perfeverance  are  thereby  efta- 
blimed.  If  the  Beginning  of  true  Faith  and  Holinefs,  and  a 
Man's  becoming  a  true  Saint  at  firft,  don't  depend  on  the 
felf- deter  mining  Power  of  the  Will,  but  on  the  deter 
mining  efficacious  Grace  of  God  ;  it  may  well  be  argued, 
that  it  is  fo  alfo  with  Refpect  to  Men's  being  continued  Saints, 
or  perfevering  in  Faith  and  Holinefs.  The  Converfion  of  a 
Sinner  being  not  owing  to  a  Man's  Self-determination,  but 
to  God's  Determination,  and  eternal  Election,  which  is  abfo- 

lute. 


292         ne  CONCLUSION. 

lute,  and  depending  on  the  fovereign  Will  of  God,  and  ncl 
on  the  free  Will  of  Man  :  as  is  evident  from  what  has  been 
faid :  And  it  being  very  evident  from  the  Sdptures,  that  the 
eternal  Kleftion  which  there  is  of  Saints  to  Faith  and  Holinefs, 
is  alfo  an  Eledion  of  them  to  eternal  Salvation ;  hence  their 
Appointment  to  Salvation  muft  alfo  be  abfolute,  and  not  de- 
penuing  on  their  contingent,  felf- determining  Will.  From 
all  which  it  follows,  that  it  is  abfolutely  fix'd  in  God's  Decree, 
that  all  true  Saints  (hall  perfevere  to,  aftual  eternal  Salvation. 

But    I  mutt  leave  all  thefe  Things  to  the  Confideration  of 
the  fair  and  impartial   Reader ;    and   when  he  has  maturely 
xveigh'd  them,  I  would  propofe  it  to  his  Confideration,  whe 
ther  many  of  the    firtt    Reformers,    and  others  that  fucceeded 
them,  whom  God  in  their  Day  made  the  chief  Pillars  of  his 
Church*  and  greateft   Inftruments  of  their  Deliverance   from 
Error  and  Darknefs,    and   of  the   Support   of  the  Cauffe  of 
Piety   among   them,    have   not  been  injured,  in  the  Contempt 
with  which  they  have  been  treated  by  many  late  Writers,  for 
their   teaching   and   maintaining   fuch  Doctrines  as  are  com 
monly  called  Calvinif.rc.     Indeed  force  of  thefe  new  Writers, 
at  the  fame  Time  that  they  have  reprefented  the  Doctrines  of 
thefe   ancient   and  eminent   Divines,  as  in  the  higheit  Degree 
ridiculous,  and  contrary  to  common  Senfe,   in  an  Often  tation 
of  a  very  generous  Charity,  have  allowed  that  they  were  honeft 
well-meaning  Men  :   Yea,  it  may  be  fome  of  them,  as  tho'  it 
were  in   great   Condefceniion  arid  Compaffion  to   them,  have 
allowed  that  they  did  pretty  well  for  the  Day  which  they  lived 
in,  and  confidering  the  great  Difadvantages  they  laboured  un 
der  :  When  at   the   fame  Time,  their  Manner  of  Speaking  has 
naturally  and  plainly  fuggefted  to  the  Minds  of  their  Readers, 
that  they  were   Perfons,  who   through  the  Lownefs  of  their 
Genius,  and  Greatnefs  of  the  Bigotry,  with  which  their  Minds 
were  (hackled,  and  Thoughts  confined,  living  in  the  gloomy 
Caves  of  Superftition,  fondly  embraced,  and  demurely  and  zea- 
loufly  taught  the  moil  abfurd,  filly  and  monftrous  Opinions, 
worthy  of  the  greateft  Contempt   of  Gentlemen  poffefied  of 
that  noble  and  generous  Freedom  of  Thought,  which  happily 
prevails  in  this  Age  of  Light  and  Inquiry.     When  indeed  fuch 
3s  the  Cafe,  that  we  might,  if  fo  difpofed,  fpeak  as  big  Words 
as  they,  and  on  far  better  Grounds.     And  really  all  the  Ar- 
•minians  on  Earth  might  be  challenged  without  Arrogance  or 
Vanity,  to  make  thefe  Principles  of  theirs  wherein  they  mainly 
differ  from  their  Fathers,    whom  they  fo  much  difpife,  con 
tent 


The  CONCLUSION.          293 

fiftent  with  common  Senfe ;  yea,  and  perhaps  to  produce  any 
Doctrine  ever  embraced  by  the  blindeft  Bigot  of  the  Church  o£ 
Romt't  or  the  moil  ignorant  M.vjjulman ,  or  extravagant  Enthu- 
iiaft,  that  might  be  reduced  to  more,  and  more  demonftrable: 
Inconfiftencies,  and  Repugnancies  to  common  Senfe,  and  to 
themfelves ;  tho'  their  Inconfiftencies  indeed  may  not  lie  fo  deep, 
or  be  fo  artfully  vail'd  by  a  deceitful  Ambiguity  of  Words,  and 

an  indeterminate  Signification  of  Phrafes. 1  will  not  deny, 

that  thefe  Gentlemen,  many  of  them,  are  Men  of  great  Abili 
ties,  and  have  been  helped  to  higher  Attainments,  in  Philofophy, 
than  thofe  antient  Divines,  and  have  done  great  Service  to  the 
Church  of  God  in  fome  Refpects :  But  I  humbly  conceive* 
that  their  differing  from  their  Fathers  with  fuch  magifterial 
Aflurance,  in  thefe  Points  iri  Divinity,  miift  be  owing  to  foma 
other  Caufe  than  fuperiour  Wifdora. 

It  may  alfo  be  worthy  of  Confideration,  whether  the  great 
Alteration  which  has  been  made  in  the  State  of  Things  in  our 
Nation,  and  fome  other  Parts  of  the  Proteftant  World,  in 
this  and  the  paft  Age,  by  the  exploding  fo  generally  Calvinijiic. 
Doctrines,  that  is  fo  often  fpoken  of  as  worthy  to  be  greatly 
rejoiced  in  by  the  Friends  of  Truth,  Learning  and  Virtue,  aa 
an  Inftance  of  the  great  Increafe  of  Light  in  the  Chnftian 
Church  ;  I  fay,  it  may  be  worthy  to  be  confidered,  whether: 
this  be  indeed  a  hap^y  Change,  owing  to  any  fuch  Caufe  as 
an  Increafe  of  true  Knowledge  and  Underftanfting  in  Things 
of  Religion  ;  or  whether  there  is  not  Reafon  to  tear,  that  it 
may  be  owing  to  fome  worfe  Caufe. 

And  I  defire  it  may  be  confidered >  whether  the  Boldnefs 
of  fome  Writers  may  not  be  worthy  to  be  reflected  on,  who 
have  not  fcrupled  to  fay,  that  if  thefe  and  thofe  Things  are 
true  (which  yet  appear  to  be  the  demonftrable  Dictates  o£ 
Reafon,  as  well  as  the  certain  Dictates  of  the  Mouth  of  the 
moil  High)  then  God  is  unjuft  and  cruel,  and  guilty  of  rnani- 
feft  Deceit  and  double-dealing,  and  the  like.  Yea,  fome  have 
gone  fo  far,  as  confidently  to  affert,  That  if  any  Book  which 
pretends  to  be  Scripture,  teaches  fuch  Doctrines,  that  alone  is 
fufficient  Warrant  for  Mankind  to  reject  it,  as  what  cannot  be 
the  Word  of  God.  Some  who  have  not  gone  fo  far,  have 
faid,  That  if  the  Scripture  feems  to  teach  any  fuch  Doctrines, 
fo  contrary  to  Reafon,  we  are  obliged  to  find  out  fome  other  In 
terpretation  of  thofe  Texts,  where  fuch  Doctrines  feem  to  be 
exhibited.  Others  exprefs  themfelves  yet  more  modeftly  :  They 
exprefs  a  Tendernefs  and  religious  Fear,  left  they  mould  re 
ceive  and  teach  any  Thing  that  mould  feem  to  reflect  on  God's 

P  p 


°  N  C  L  U  S  I  O  ISf. 

moral  Character,  or  be  a  Difparagement  to  his  Methods  of 
Adminiftration,  in  his  moral  Government ;  and  therefore  ex- 
prefs  themfelves  as  not  daring  to  embrace  fome  Doctrines, 
though  they  feem  to  be  delivered  in  Scripture,  according  to 
the  more  obvious  and  natural  Conftruction  of  the  Words. 
But  indeed  it  would  mew  a  truer  Modefty  and  Humility, 
if  they  would  more  entirely  rely  on  God's  Wifdom  and  Dif- 
cerning,  who  knows  infinitely  better  than  we,  what  is  agreeable 
to  his  own  Perfections,  and  never  intended  to  leave  thefe  Mat 
ters  to  the  Decifion  of  the  Wifdom  and  Difcerning  of  Men  ; 
but  by  his  own  unerring  Inftruction,  to  determine  for  us  what 
the  Truth  is ;  knowing  how  little  our  Judgment  is  to  be  de 
pended  on,  and  how  extremely  prone,  vain  and  blind  Men  are, 
to  err  in  fuch  Matters. 

The  Truth  of  the  Cafe  is,  that  if  the  Scripture  plainly- 
taught  the  oppofite  Doctrines,  to  thofe  that  are  fo  much  ftum- 
bled  at,  viz.  the  Arminian  Doctrine  of  Free- Will,  and  others 
depending  thereon,  it  would  be  the  greateft  of  all  Difficulties 
that  attend  the  Scriptures,  incomparably  greater  than  its  con 
taining  any,  even  the  moft  myfterious  of  thofe  Doctrines  of  the 
iirft  Reformers,  which  our  late  Free-thinkers  have  fo  fuperci- 

lioufly  exploded. Indeed  it  is  a  glorious  Argument  of  the 

Divinity  of  the  holy  Scriptures,  that  they  teach  fuch  Doctrines, 
which  in  one  Age  and  another,  thro'  the  Blindnefs  of  Men's 
Minds,  and  ftrong  Prejudices  of  their  Hearts,  are  rejected,  as 
moft  abfurd  and  unreafonable,  by  the  wife  and  great  Men  of 
the  World  ;  whkh  yet,  when  they  are  moft  carefully  and 
ftrictly  examined,  appear  to  be  exaftly  agreeable  to  the  moft 
clemonftrable,  certain,  and  natural  dictates  of  Reafon.  By  fuch 
Things  it  appears,  that  the  Foolijhnefs  of  God  is  wifer  than  Men, 
and  God  does  as  is  faid  in  i  Cor.  i.  19,  20  ;  For  it  is  written, 
I  will  deftroy  the  Wifdom  of  the  Wife;  I  will  bring  to  nothing  the 
Under/landing  of  the  Prudent.  Where  is  the  Wife  !  Where  is  the 
Scribe  !  Where  is  the  Difputer  of  this  World  !  Hath  not  God  ?nade 
foolijh  the  Wifdom  of  this  World?  And  as  it  ufed  to  be  in  Time 
paft,  fo  it  is  probable  it  will  be  in  Time  to  come,  as  it  is  there 
written,  in  ver.  27,  28,  29:  But  God  hath  chofen  the  foolijh 
things  of  the  World,  to  confound  the  Wife  :  And  God  hath  chofen. 
the  weak  Things  of  the  World \  to  confound  the  Things  that  are 
mighty  :  And  bafc  Things  of  the  World,  and  Things  which  are 
dtfpifed,  hath  God  chofen  :  Tea,  and  Things  which  are  not,  to 
bring  to  nought  Things  that  are  ;  that  no  Flejh  Jhould  glory  in  his 
Prejence.  AMEN. 

P    I    N    I    St 


[     295     ] 


INDEX. 


[N.  B.  The  Capital  P.  figniiies  the  Part;  this  Mark,  §,  the 
Sett  ion  ;  Concl.  .the  Conciujion ;  and  the  fmall  /.  the  Page  ; 
where  the  Things  here  fpecified,  are  to  be  found.] 


ABftrafied  or  Abftrufe  Rea- 
foning,      whether     juftly 
objected  againft  Calvinijls,  P. 
4.  §.   13.  p.  278. 

A&ion,  Inconfiftence  of  the 
^r/»/#/Vz«Notion  of  it, P.  4.  §.  2. 
p.  j  99.  and  whence  this  arofe, 
p.  204.  what  it  is  in  the  com 
mon  Notion  of  it,  Ibid.  p.  20 1 . 
— and  how  diftinguifh'd  from 
Pajfian,  Ibid.  p.  203. 

Afli-vity  of  the  Nature  of  the 
Soul,  whether  thro'  this,  Voli 
tion  can  arife  without  a  Caufe, 

P.   2.  §.  4.  p.  47. 

Apparent  Good,  the  greateft, 
in  what  Senfe  it  determines  the 
Will,  P.  i.  §.  2.  p.  7. 

Arminians,  obliged  to  talk 
inconfiileritly,  P.  2.  $•  5.  p.  53. 
Ibid.  §.  7.  p.  70.  §.  9.  p.  77. 
where  the  main  Strength  of 
their  pretended  Demonilrations 
lies,  P.  4.  §.  4.  p.  219.  Their 
Objection  from  God's  moral 
Character,  confider'd  and  re 
torted,  Ibid.  §.  ii.  p.  271.  2. 

£rminian  Doflrine,  its  Ten 


dency  to  fuperfede  all  Ufe  of 
Means,  and  make  Endeavours 
vain,  P.  4.  §.  5.  p.  222.  and  in 
Effect,  to  exclude  all  Virtue 
and  Vice  out  of  the  World,  P. 
3.  §.  4.  p.  161,  167.  Ibid.  <$. 
6.  p.  184.  and  §.  7.  p.  190, 
P.  4.  §.  i.  p.  196,7.  Ibid.  §. 

12.  p.  276. 

Atheifm,  the  fuppofe-d  Ten 
dency  of  Cal-i>iniftic  Principles 
to  it,  P.  4.  §.  12.  p.  274, 
How  Arminian  Principles  tend 
to  it,  Ibid.  p.  275. 

Attending  to  Motives,  of  Li~ 
berry's  being  fuppofed  to  con* 
fift  in  an  Ability  for  it,  P.  2, 
§  9.  p.  So. 

Atonement.     See  CHRIST. 

Author  of  Sin,  whether  it 
would  follow  from  the  Doc 
trine  here  maintained,  that  GOD 
is  fo,  P.  4.  §  9.  p.  252. 

T)Lflxie-*-worthinefs,  wherein  it 
confifts,  according  to  com 
mon  Seufej  P.  4.  §  4.  p.  2 1 2, 

CT       •      •/• 
aputttwtt 


196 


I    N    D    E 


X. 


coniiftent    with 
common  Senfe,  P.  4.  §  3. 
p.  206. 

Cavfe,  how  the  Word  is  uf- 
ed  in  this  Difcourfe,  P.  2.  § 
3.  p.  41.  No  Event  <withuut 

one,  P.  2.  §  3.  p.  42. and 

JLffecl,  a  necefiary  Connexion. 
bet  ween  them,  P.  2.  §  8.  p,  73. 
This  refpecls  moral,  as  well  as 
natural Caufes,  P.  2.  §  3.  p.  41 . 

Cbrifi,  his  Obedience  necef- 
jfary,  yet  virtuous  and  Praife- 
worthy,  P.  3.  §  i.  p.  139.  His 
Atonement  excluded  in  Con- 
fequence  of  Arminian  Princi 
ples,  P.  3.$  3.  p.  158. 

Chubb  (Mr.)  the  Inconfift- 
ence  of  his  Scheme  of  Liberty  t 

&c.  P.  2.  ^  9.  p.  85, 98. 

Comma W.r,confifi:ent  with  mo 
ral  Neceffity  and  Inability,  P. 
3.  $4.  p.  159.  P.  4.  §  1 1.  p. 
-270.  Inconfiftent  with  Arminian 
Principles,  P.  3.  §  4.  p.  161. 

Common  Senfe,  why  the  Prin 
ciples  maintain'd  in  this  Dif 
courfe,  appear  to  fome  contrary 
to  it,  P. 4.  §  3.  p.  206.  Necef- 
fary  Virtue  and  Vice  agreeable 

to  it  P.  4.  §  4.  p.  2i2.: Ar- 

-rninian  Tenets  oppofite  to  it, 
P.  3.  §  6.  p.  178.  Ibid.  $  7.  p. 
187. 

Coutingence^.  I.  $3.  p.  20. 
the  Inconiiftence  of  the  Notion , 
P.  2.  §  3.  p.  45.  Whether  ne- 
ceflary  in  order  to  Liberty,  P. 

2.  ^  8.  p.  73. implied  in 

Arminian  Liberty,  and  yet  in- 
confiftent  with  it.  P.  2.  §  13. 
p.  132.  Epicurus  the  greateft 
Maintainer  of  it,  P.  4.  $  6.  p. 
228.  Ibid.  '•  12  p.  275. 


Corruption  Cif  Mans  Nat  UK, 

CONCL.  p.   287. 

Creation  of  the  World,  at  fuch 
a  particulay  Time  and  Place,  P. 

4.  $  a.  p.  240. 

T\Ecree  abfolute,  not  inferring 

Necelfity,  any  more  than 

certain  Fore-knowledge   does, 

P.   2.    §   12.  p.    122.  HOW  it  fol 

lows    from  Things  proved    in 
this  Difcourfe.  CONCL.  p.  289. 

Determination.  See  Will. 

Dictates.  See  Underjtanding* 


TjFfia.  See 
~*  Efficacious  Grace.  Co.  p.  28?. 

Eleflion  perjonal.  See  Decree. 

Endeavours,  what  it   is   for 
them  to  be  in  vain,  P.  4.  §  5. 
p.  220.  .......  Render'd  vain  by 

Arminian  Principles,  Ibid,  p, 
222.  But  not  fo  by  Calvinijm, 
Ibid.  p.  224.  -----  -See  Sincerity. 

Entrance  of  Sin  into  the 
World,  P.  4.  §  10.  p.  268. 

Equilibrium.  See  Indifference. 

Exhortation.  See  Invitation. 

pAllen  Man.  See   Inability. 
*  Fatejhical,  P.  4.  $  6.  p.  228. 

Fatality,  the  Principles  of 
Armimans  inferring  that  which 
is  moft  mocidng,  P.  4.  §  8.  p. 
251. 

Foreknowledge  of  God,  of  Vo 
litions  of  moral  Agents,  proved,, 
P.  2.  §  n.  p.  98.  ------  Inconfift- 

ent  with  Contingence,  P.  2. 
§  12.  p.  1  17.  Proves  Neceffity, 
as  much  as  a  Decree,  Ibid,  p, 
122.  The  feeming  Difficulty  of 
reconciling  it  with  the  Since 
rity  of  his  Precepts,  Counfels, 


INDEX. 


,#c,  not  peculiar  to  the  Calvin- 
iftic  Scheme,  P.  4.  §  li.  p.  27 1. 

/^OZ),-  his  Being  how  known, 

P.  2.  ^3.  p.  43. P.  4.  \   12. 

p.  275.  His  moral  Excellencies 
neceilary,  yet  virtuous  and 
praife- worthy,  P.  3.^  i.  p.  135. 
P.  4.  §  4.  p.  219.  The  Ne- 
ceffity  of  his  Volitions,  P.  4.  § 
7.  p.  230.  Whether  the  Prin 
ciples  maintain'd  in  this  Dif- 
courfe  are  inconfiilent  with  his 
moral  Character,  P.  4.  $  n. 
p.  270.  How  Arminianifm  de- 
Itroys  the  Evidence  of  his  mo 
ral  Perfections.  Ibid.  p.  272. 

Grace  of  the  Spirit ,  excluded 
by  Arminian  Principles,  P.  3 .  ^ 

3.  p.  159. 

Grace,  its  Freenefs  confident 
with  the  moral  Neceflity  of 
God's  Will,  P.  4.  S  8-  p-  249. 

JJTAbits,  virtuous  and  vicious, 
inconfiilent  with  Arminian 
Principles,  P.  3.  §  6.  p.  181. 

Heathen,  of  their 'Salvation, 
P.  3.  S  5.  p.  177- 

Hobbes,  'his  Doftrine  of  Ne 
ceflity,  P.  4.  ^  6.  p.  229. 

JMpojfibility,  the  fame  as  ne 
gative  NccelTity,P.  i.§3.p.  19. 
Inability,   how  the  Word  is 
ufed  in  common  Speech,  and 
how  by  Metaphyjicians  and  Ar- 
minians,  P.  i .  §   4.    p.    14,  17. 
P.  4.  S  3-  p.  207.    Natural  and 
moral,  P.  I .  ^  4.  p.  20.  Moral, 
the  feveral  Kinds  of  it,  P.  i .  \ 

4.  p.  25.  P.  3.  U- P-  '65- 

t  fallen  Man  to  perform 

Obedience,  P,  3.  $  3, 


p.  157.  What  does,  and  what 
does  not  excufe  Men,  P.  3.  ^ 

3.  p.  155.  Ibid.  $4.  p.  167.  P. 

4.  ^  3.  p.  206. 
Inclinations;  fee   Habits. 
Indifference,  whether  Liberty 

confilts  in  it,  P.  2.  ^  7.  p.  63* 
—  Not  neceffary  to  Virtue,  but 
inconfiftent  with  it,  P.  3.  ^  6, 
p.  178. 

Indifferent  Things,  thofe 
which  appear  fo,  never  the  Ob- 
j  eels  of  Volition,  P,  i.  §  2, 
p.  7.  P.  2.  ^  6.  p.  56.  Whether 
the  Will  can  determine  itfelf  in 
chuling  among  fuch  Things, 
P.  2.  §  6.  p.  57. 

Invitations,  confident  with 
moral  Neceflity  and  Inability. 
P,3.  U-P-  169.  P.  4.  ^  ill 
p.  270.  But  not  confident  with 
Arminian  Principles,  P.  2.  §  9. 
p.  81.  P.  3.  §  7.  p.  188.  P.  4. 


T  A<ws,  the  End  whereof  is  to 
bind  to  one  Side,  render'd 
ufelefs  by  Arminian  Principles, 
P,  3.  §4.  p.  162. 

Liberty,  the  Nature  of  it,  P.  i. 
$v  5.  p.  27.  The  Arminian  No 
tion  of  it,  Ibid.  p.  28.  This 
inconfiftent  with  other  Armi 
Notions,  P.  z.  §  9.  p.  77. 


Licentiwfnefs  ,  whether  the 
Cal<vinrftic  Doctrine  tends  to  it, 
P.  4.  §  12.  p.  275.  ---  See£-v- 
deavours. 

JJFAchines,  whether  Cahinifm 
makes  Men  fuch.   P.  4. 


5.  p.  226. 

Mca?is  } 


fee  Endeavours. 

Metapfyjical 


298 

Metaphyjlcal  Reafc.ning  ;  fee 
Abft  railed. To  be  juitly  ob 
jected  againft  the  Arminian 
Scheme,  P.  4.  §  13.  p.  283. 

Moral  Agency,  its  Nature., 
P.  i.  S  5-p.°29. 

Motives,  what  they  are,  P.  i. 
§  2.  p.  5,  6.  The  ftrongeft 
determining  the  Will,  Ibid. 
p.  6.  P.  2.  §  10.  p.  88.  ^r- 
'minian  Principles  inconfiftent 
with  their  Influence  and  Ufe 
sn  moral  Actions,  P.  3.  §  7.  p. 
185.  P.  4.  §  ji.  p.  273. 

JVTAtural  Notions;  fee  common 
J-V  Senfe. 

NeceJ/tty,  how  the  Term  is 
ufed  in  common  Speech,  and 
how  by  Philofophers,  P.  i. 
\  3.  p.  13.  P.  4.  §3.  p.  207. 

Philofophical,   of  various 

Kinds,  Ibid.  p.  21  o.  Natural 
and  moral,  P.  i.  §  4«  p-  20. 
P.  4.  §  4.  p.  217. — No  Liberty 
without  moral  Neceffity,  P.  2. 
$  8.  p.  73.  Neceffity  and  Con- 
tingence,  both  inconfiftent  with 
Arminian'  Liberty,  P.  2.  (j  13. 

p.  131 . Neceffity  of  God's 

Volition,  P.  3.  §  i.  p.  135. 
P.  4.  §  7.  p.  230.  This  con- 
fiftent  with  the  Freenefs  of  his 
Grace,  Ibid.  §  8.  p.  249.— Ne 
ceffity,  of  Chrift's  Obedience, 
£sV.  P.  3.  §  2.  p.  140. — of  the 
Sin  of  fuch  as  are  given  up  to 

Sin,  P.  3.  §  3.  p.  153. of 

fallen  Man,  in  general,  P.  3.  § 
3.  p.  157.  What  Neceffity 
v/holly  excufes  Men,  P.  3.  §  4. 
p.  1 68.  P.  4.  §  3.  p.  206.  and 
^  4-  P-  215. 


INDEX. 


QBedience;  fee 
mands, 


p  Articles  perfeflly  alike,  of  the 
Creator's  placing  fuch  dif 
ferently,  P.  4.  ^  8.  p.  242. 

Perjeverance  of  Saints  ,  C  o  N- 
CLUS.  p.  291. 

Promifes,  whether  any  arc 
made  to  the  Endeavours  of 
unregenerate  Sinners,  P.  3.  >j 
5.  p.  176. 

Providence,  Univerfal  and  de- 
cifive.  CONCL.  p.  286. 
IDEdempiion  particular.   CON- 
CLUS.  p.  290. 

Reformers  the  firft,  how  treat 
ed  by  many  late  Writers.  CON 
CL  us.  p.  292. 
VJints  in  Heaven,    their  Li 

berty,  P.  4.  ^  4.  p.  219." 
Scripture,    of   the  Arminians 
Arguments  from  thence,  P.  4. 

§  ii.  p.  173- 

Sclf  -determining  Po<wer  of  the 
Will,  its  Inconfiftence,  P.  2. 
§  i  .  p.  3  1  .  Evajicns  of  the  Ar 
guments  a"gainft  it  confider'd, 
P.  2  §  2.  p.  35.  Ihewn  to  be 
impertinent,  Ibid.  ^  5.  p.  _ji. 

Sin;    fee    Author,    Entrance. 

Sincerity  of  Dejtres  and  En 
deavours,  whatisnojuftExcufe, 
P.  3.  ^  5.  p.  170.  The  different 
Sorts  of  Sincerity,  Ibid.  p.  175. 

Sloth,  not  encouraged  by 
Calvinifm,  P.  4.  ^  5.  p.  224. 

Stoic  Philofophers,  great  The- 
ifts,  P.  4.  §  1  2.  p.  274.-See  -Ftfte. 

Sufpending  Petition,  of  the 
Liberty  of  the  Will  fnppofed 
to  confift  in  an  Ability  for  it., 

P.  2.  §  7.  p.  70.       P.     3.     §    4. 

p.  164.  Ibid,  ^  7.  p.  1  8/5. 

Tendency 


*T>Enclency  of  the  Principles 
"^  here,  maintain'd,  to  Atheifm 
and  Licentioufnefs,  the  Ob- 
jeftion  confider'd  and  retorted, 
P.  4.§.  12.  p.  274. 


INDEX.  299 

determine  the  Will,  P.  i.  §  2. 
p.  7. 

Volition,  not  without  a  Caufe, 

P.  2.  §3.  p.  46.  P.  2.  §4.  p.  50. 


e  and  Vice,  the  Being 
of  neither  of  them  confiit- 
ent  with  Arminian  Principles  ; 
See  Arminian  Doftrine.  Their 
Eflence,  not  lying  in  their 
Caufe,  but  their  Nature,  P.  4. 
§  i.  p.  192. 

Underftandingy  how  it  deter 
mines  the  Will,  P.  i.  §  2.  p, 
12.  P.  2.  §  9.  p*  76.  Dictates 
of  the  Underftanding  and  Will, 
as  fuppofed  by  fome,  the  fame, 
P.  2.  §  9.  p.  81. 

Uneafinefs,    as   fuppofed   to 


its  Nature,  P.  i. 
i.  p.  i,  fcfr.  Its  Deter 
mination,  P.  i.  §  2.  p.  5.  &c. 
The  very  Being  of  fuch  a  Fa 
culty  inconfiftent  with  Armi 
nian  Principles,  P.  3.  ^  7.  p. 

190. Of  God,  fecret  and 

revealed,  P.  4.  \  9.  p.  262.  Ar- 
minians  themfelves  oblig'd  to 
allow  fuch  a  Diftinclion.  Ibid, 
p.  264. 

Willingnefs  to  Duty,  what  Is 
no  Excufe  for  the  Negleft  of 
it.  'See  Sincerity. 


[   i   ] 


REMARKS 

ON         THE 

ESSAYS   on  the  PRINCIPLES  of 
MORALITY  and  NATURAL 
RELIGION, 

InaLETTERtoaMinifterofthe 
CHURCH  of  SCOTLAND  : 

By  the  Reverend  Mr.  JONATHAN  ED 
WARDS,  Prefident  of  the  College  of  N  E  w- 
JERSEY,  and  Author  of  the  late  I  N  QJJ  i  R  Y  in 
to  the  MODERNNOTIONS  of  the  FREEDOM: 
of  WILL. 

'Rev.  SIR, 


XXXXX.  ^^  Intimations  you  have  given  me  of  the  Ufe 
X  X  which  has,  by  Tome,  been  made  of  what  I  have 

X  T  X  w"tten  on  the  Freedom  of  the  Will,  &c.  to  vin- 
X  X  dicate  what  is  faid  on  the  Subject  of  Liberty  and 

XXXXX  Neceifity  by  the  Author  of  the  E/ays  on  the  Prin* 
ciples  of  Morality  and  Natural  Religion,  has  occafioned  my  read-- 
ing  this  Author's  Eflay  on  that  Subject,  with  particular  Care 
and  Attention^  And  I  think  it  muft  be  evident  to  every  one, 
that  has  read  both  his  Eflay  and  my  Inquiry,  that  our  Schemes 
are  exceeding  reverfe  from  each  other.  The  wide  Difference 
appears  particularly  in  the  following  Things. 

This  Author  fuppofes,  that  fuch  a  Neceflity  takes  place  with 
to  all  Mens  Actions,   as  is  inconfiftent  with  Liberty  a, 


•a  P,  160,  161,  164,  165,  and  many  other  Places, 


and  plainly  denies  that  Men  have  any  Liberty  in  acting.  Thu? 
in  p.  1 68.  ai-'ter  he  had  been  fpeaking  of  the-  Neceffity  of  our 
Determinations,  as  connected  with-  Motives,  he  concludes  with 
faying,  "  In  Ihort,  if  Motives  are  not  under  our  Power  or 
Direction,  which  is  con-feffedly  the  Fad,  we  can  at  Bottom  have 
-..-  •  .  NO  LIBERT  Y."  Whereas  I  have  abundantly  expreiTed 
it  as  my  Mind,  that  Man,  in  his  moral  Actions,  has  true  Li 
berty;  and  that  the  moral  Neceffity  which  univerfally  takes 
Place,  is  not  in  the  leaft  inconfiftent  with  any  thing  that  is  pro 
perly  called  Liberty,  and  with  the  utmoft  Liberty  that  can  be 
defired,  or  that  can  poffibly  exift  or  be  conceived  of  a. 

I  find  that  fome  are  apt  to  think,  that  in  that  Kind  of  mo 
ral  Neceffity  of  Mens  Volitions,  which  I  fuppofe  to  be  univer- 
fal,  at  leaft  fome  Degree  of  Liberty  is  denied ;  that  though  it 
be  true  I  allow  a  Sort  of  Liberty,  yet  thofe  who  maintain  a 
felf- determining  Power  in  the  Will,  and  a  Liberty  of  Contin- 

fence  and  Indifference,  hold  an  higher  Sort  of  Freedom  than 
do  ;  but  I  think  this  is  certainly  a  great  Miftake. 
Liberty,  as  I  have  explained  it,  in  p.  38.  and  other  Places, 
is  the  Power,  Opportunity,  or  Advantage  that  any  one  has  to  do* 
as  he  phafes,,  or  condudh?g>  IN  ANY  RESPECT,  according  to 
his  Pleafure  ;  without  coniidering  how  his  Pleafure  comes  to  be 
as  it  is.  It  is  demonitrable,  and  I  think  has  been  demonftrat- 
ed,  that  no  Neceffity  of  Meris  Volitions  that  I  maintain,  is  in 
confiftent  with  this  Liberty  :  And  I  think  it  is  impoffible  for  a- 
ny  one  to  rife  higher  in  his  Conceptions  of  Liberty  than  this : 
If  any  imagine  they  deli  re  higher,  and  that  they  conceive  of  a 
higher  and  greater  Liberty  than  this,  they  are  deceived,  and  de 
lude  theinfeives  with  confufed  ambiguous  Words,  inftead  of  I- 
deas.  If  any  one  mould  here  fay,  "  Yes,  I  conceive  of  a 
Freedom  above  and  beyond  the  Liberty  a  Man  has  of  conduc 
ing  in  any  RefpeCl  as  he  pleafes,  viz,  a  Liberty  of  chujing  as 
he  pleafes."  Such  an  one,  if  he  reflected,  would  either  blufh' 
or  laugh  at  his  own  Inftance.  For,  is  not  chufing  as  he  pleafes, 
conducting,;  IN  SOME  RESPECT,  according  to  his  Plea 
fure,  an-d  ftill  without  determining  how  he  came  by  that  Plea 
fure  ?  If  he  fays,  "  Yes,  I  came  by  that  Pleafure  by  my  own 
Choice."  If  he  be  a  Man  of  common  Senfe,  by  this  Time  he 
will  fee  his  own  Abfurdity  :  For  he  muft  needs  fee  that  his  No 
tion  or  Conception,  even  of  this  Liberty,  don't  contain  any 
judgment  or  Conception  how  he  comes  by  that  Choice,  which 
firft  determines  his  Pleafure,  or  which  originally  fixed  his  own- 
Will  refpefting  the  Affair,  Or  if  any  mail  fay,  "  That  a  Man 

exercifes 

a  Inquiry^  P.  27^-30,    J^,    134,    I98_*<?6,   3*4*  Hfy  23*™ 


(     3     ) 

exercifes  Liberty  in  this,  even  in  determining  his  own  Choice, 
but  not  as  he  pleafes,  or  not  in  Confequence  of  any  Choice, 
Preference,  or  Inclination  of  his  own,  but  by  a  determination 
arifing  contingently  out  of  a  State  of  abfolute  Indifference  ; '" 
this  is  not  rifing  higher  in  his  Conception  of  Liberty  ;  as  fuch  a 
Determination  of  the  Will  would  not  be  a  voluntary  Determi 
nation  of  it.  Surely  he  that  places  Liberty  in  a  Power  of  do 
ing  fomething  not  according  to  his  own  Choice,  or  from  his 
Choice,  has  not  a  higher  Notion  of  it,  than  he  that  peaces  it 
in  doing  as  he  pleafes,  or  ading  from  his  own  Election.  It 
there  were  a  Power  in  the  Mind  to  determine  itfelf,  but  not  by  its 
Choice  or  according  to  its  Pleafure,  what  Advantage  would  it 
give  ?  and  what  Liberty,  worth  contending  for,,  would  be  exer- 
cifed  in  it  ?  Therefore  no  Arminian,  Pelagian,  or  Epicurean^ 
can  rife  higher  in  his  Conceptions  of  Liberty,  than  the  Notion 
of  it  which  I  have  explained  :  Which  Notion  is,  apparently, 
perfectly  confident  with  the  Whole  of  that  NeceiTity  of  Mens 
Aftions,  which  Itfuppofe  takes  Place.  And  I  fcruple  not  t» 
fay  'tis  beyond  all  their  Wits  to  invent  a  higher  Notion,  or  form 
a  higher  Imagination  of  Liberty  ;  let  them  talk  of  Sovereignty 
of  the  Will,  f elf -determining  Power,  Self-motion,  Self-dire£iion9 
arbitrary  Decifion,  Liberty  ad  utrumvis,  Power  of  chujlng  diffe 
rently  in  given  Cafes,  &c.  &c.  as  long  as  they  will.  'Tis  ap^- 
parent  that  thefe  Men,  in  their  ftrenuous  Affirmation,  and 
Difpute  about  thefe  Things,  aim  at  they  know  not  what,  fight 
ing  for  fomething  they  have  no  Conception  of.  fubftituting  a 
Number  of  confufed  unmeaning  W^ords,  infiead  of  Things, 
and  inftead  of  Thoughts.  They  may  be  challenged  clearly  to 
explain  what  they  would  have  :  They  never  can  anfwer  the 
Challenge. 

The  Author  of  the  EjTays,  through  his  whole  EiTay  on  Li 
berty  and  Neceffity,  goes  on  that  Suppofition,  that,  in  order 
to  the  Being  of  real  Liberty,  a  Man  muft  have  a  Freedom  that 
is  oppofed  to  moral  Neceffity  :  And  yet  he  fuppofes,  P.  175, 
thaty^r/6  a  Liberty  muft  fignify  a  Power  in  the  Mind  of  fitting 
without  and  againft  Motives,  a  Poiuer  of  acling  without  any 
View,  Purpofe  cr  Dejign,  and  even  of  atting  in  Contradiction  to 
our  own  Dejtres,  and  Averfiovs,  and  to  all  our  Principles  of  Afii~< 
en  ;  and  is  an  Abfardity  altogether  incotififient  with  a  rational  Na 
ture.  Now,  who  ever  imagined  fuch  a  Liberty  as  this,  a  high 
er  Sort  or  Degree  of  Freedom,  than  a  Liberty  of  following 
one's  own  Views  and  Purpofes,  and  acling  agreeable  to  his  own 
Inclinations  ^and  Paffions  ?  Who  will  ever  reafonably  fuppofq 
that  Liberty,  which  is  an  Abfurdity  altogether  inconfiftent  with  a 

3  rational 


(     4     ) 

National  Nature,  to  be  a  Kind  of  Liberty  above  that  which, 
is  confident  with  the  Nature  of  a  rational  intelligent  defigning 
Agent. 

The  Author  of  the  Ej/ays  feems  to  fuppofe  fucb  a  Necefiity 
to  take  Place,  as  is  inconfiftent  with  forne  fuppofable  POWER, 
OF  ARBITRARY  CHOICER;  or  that  there  is  fome  Liber 
ty  conceivable,  whereby  Mens  own  Aftions  might  be  more 
PROPERLY  IN  THEIR  POWER  b,  and  by  which  Events  might 
be  more  DEPENDENT  ON  OURSELVES  c  :  Contrary  to  what  I 
fuppofe  to  be  evident  in  my  Inquiry  d.  What  Way  can  be  ima 
gined,  of  our  Actions  being  more  in  cur  Povoer,  from  ourfelves, 
or  dependent  on  ourfelves,  than  their  being  from  our'  Power  to 
fulfil  our  own  Choice,  to  aft  from  our  own  Inclination,  purfue 
our  own  Views,  and  execute  cur  own  Defigns  ?  Certainly,  to 
be  able  to  act  thus,  is  as  properly  having  our  Aclions  in  our 
Power,  and  dependent  on  ourfelves,  as  a  Being  liable  to  be  the 
Subjects  of  Afts  and  Events,  contingently  and  fortuitoufly, 
^without  Dejire,  View,  Purpofe  or  Dejign,  ofiany  Principle  of  Ac 
tion  within  ourfelves  ;  as  we  muft  be,  according  to  this  Author's 
own  declared  Senfe,  if  our  Adions  are  performed  with  that  Li 
berty  that  is  oppofed  to  moral  Neceffity. 

This  Author  feems  every  where  to  fuppofe,  that  Neceffity,  mod 
properly  fo  called,  attends  all  Mens  Adions ;  and  that  the 
Terms  necejfary,  unavoidable,  impnffible,  &c.  are  equally  appli 
cable  to  the  Cafe  of  moral  and  natural  Neceffity.  In  P.  173, 
he  fays,  The  Idea  of  neceifary  and  unavoidable  equally  agrees ,' 
both  to  moral  and  phyjtcal  NeceJ/ity.  And  in  P.  184.  All  Things 
that  fall  out  in  the  natural  and  moral  World  are  alike  necejjary. 
P.  1 74  This  Inclination  and  Choice  is  unavoidably  caufed  or  oc- 
cajtoned  by  the  prevailing  Motive.  In  this  lies  the  Neceffity  of  our 
A&ions,  that  in  fuch  Circumftances  it  was  impoffible  <we  could  afl 
ctherwife.  He  often  exprefles  himfelf  in  like  Manner  elfewhere, 
fpeaking  in  ftrong  Terms  of  Mens  Actions  as  unavoidable,  what 
they  cannot  forbear,  having  no  Power  over  their  own  Aftions* 
the  Order  of  them  being  rmalterably  fixed,  and  infeparably  link 
ed  together,  &c,  e. 

On  the  contrary,  I  have  largely  declared,  that  the  Connec 
tion  between  antecedent  Things  and  confequent  Ones,  which 
takes  Place  with  regard  to  the  Acls  of  Mens  Wills,  which  is 
called  moral  Neceffity,  is  called  by  the  Name  of  Neceffity  im 
properly  ;  and  that  all  fuch  Terms  as  muft,  cannot ,  impojjible9 
unable,  irreftftable,  unavoidable,  invincible,  &c.  when  applied 
here,  are  not  applied  in  their  proper  Signification,  and  are  ei 
ther 

a  P.   169.     b  P.   191,   185,   197,  206.       c  P.   183.     d  P.   382,  283. 
t  P.   180,  188,  193,  194,  195,  197,  198,  199,  205,  206. 


(     5     ) 

ther  ufed  nonfenfically,  and  with  perfecl  Infignificance,  or  in  3 
Senfe  quite  diverfe  from  their  original  and  proper  Meaning,  and 
their  Ufe  in  common  Speech  a  :  And  that  fuch  a  Neceliity  as 
attends  the  Acls  of  Mens  Wills,  is  more  properly  called  Cer 
tainty,  than  Necejfity  ;  it  being  no  other  than  the  certain  Ccn- 
neclion  between  the  Subject  and  Predicate  of  the  Proportion 
which  affirms  their  Exiftence  b. 

Agreeable  to  what  is  obferved  in  my  Inquiry  c,  I  think  it  is 
evidently  owing  to  a  ftrong  Prejudice  in  Perfons 'Minds,  anting 
from  an  infeniible  habitual  Perverlion  and  Mifapplication  of 
fuch  like  Terms,  as  neceffary,  impnjfible,  unable,  unavoidable, 
invincible,  &c.  that  they  are  ready  to  think,  that  to  fuppoie  a 
certain  Connection  of  Mens  Volitions  without  any  foregoing 
Motives  or  Inclinations,  or  any  preceding  moral  Influence 
whatfoever,  is  truly  and  properly  to  fuppofe  fuch  a  ftrong  irre 
fragable  Chain  of  Caufes  and  Effects,  as  ftands  in  the  Way  of, 
and  makes  utterly  vain,  oppofite  Delires  and  Endeavours,  like 
immovable  and  impenetrable  Mountains  of  Brafs ;  and  impedes 
our  Liberty  like  Walls  of  .Adamant,  Gates  of  Brafs,  and  Bars 
of  Iron  :  Whereas  all  fuch  Reprefentations  fuggeft  Ideas  as  far 
from  the  Truth,  as  the  Eaft  is  from  the  Weft.  Nothing  that  I 
maintain,  fuppofes  that  Men  are  at  all  hindered  by  any  fatal 
Neceflity,  from  doing,  and  even  willing  and  chufing  as  they 
pleafe,  with  full  Freedom  ;  yea  with  the  higheft  Degree  of  Li 
berty  that  ever  was  thought  of,  or  that  ever  could  poiTibly  enter 
into  the  Heart  of  any  Man  to  conceive.  I  know  it  is  in  vain 
to  endeavour  to  make  fome  Perfons  believe  this,  or  at  leaft  ful 
ly  and  fteadily  to  befieve  it :  For  if  it  be  demonftrated  to  them, 
ftill  the  old  Prejudice  remains,  which  has  been  long  fixed  by 
the  Ufe  of  the  Terms  necejjary,  muft,  cannot,  impoffible,  £c,  the 
Affociation  with  thefe  Terms  of  certain  Ideas  inconfiftent  with 
Liberty,  is  not  broken  ;  and  the  Judgment  is  powerfully  warp 
ed  by  it ;  as  a  Thing  that  has  been  long  bent  and  grown  ftttf, 
if  it  be  ftraitened,  will  return  to  its  former  Curvity  again  and  a- 
gain. 

The  Author  of  the  E/hys  mod  manifeftly  fuppofes,  that  if 
Men  had  the  Truth  concerning  the  real  Neceflity  of  all  their 
Actions  clearly  in  View,  they  would  not  appear  to  themfelves, 
or  one  another,  as  at  all  Praife-worthy  or  culpable,  or  under 
any  moral  Obligation,  or  accountable  for  their  Actions  d'. 
Which  fuppofes,  that  Men  are  not  to  be  blamed  or  praifed  for 
any  of  their  Actions,  and  are  not  under  any  Obligations,  nor 

are 

a    Inquiry,    P.    13 20,  22,   23,    24,  25,  26,    166,  20 209, 

211,    217— 219,     283,   284.       b   Inquiry,   P.    15, 17,        c  P.   206 

." 1209.     d  P.  207,  209,   and  other  Places. 


lire  truly  accountable  for  any  thing  they  do,  by  Reafon  of  this 
^Neceffity ;  which  is  very  contrary  to  what  I  have  endeavoured 
to  prove,  throughout  the  third  Part  of  my  Inquiry.  I  humbly 
conceive  it  is  there  fhewn,  that  this  is  fo  far  from  the  Truth, 
that  the  moral  Neceffity  of  Mens  Actions,  which  truly  take 
Place,  is  requifite  to  the  Being  of  Virtue  and  Vice,  or  any 
thing  Praife-worthy  or  culpable  :  That  the  Liberty  of  Indiffer 
fence  and  Contingence,  which  is  advanced  in  Oppofition  to  that 
Neceffity,  is  inconfiftent  with  the  Being  of  thefe  ;  as  it  would 
fuppofe  that  Men  are  not  determined  in  what  they  do,  by  any 
yirtuous  or  vicious  Principles,  nor  ad  from  any  Motives,  In 
tentions  or  Aims  whatfoever ;  or  have  any  End,  either  good  or 
bad,  in  acting.  And  is  it  not  remarkable,  that  this  Author 
ftiould  fuppofe,  that,  in  order  to  Mens  Actions  truly  having 
any  Defert,  they  mufl  be  performed  without  any  View,  Pur,poje, 
Defign,  or  Dejire,  or  any  Principle  of  Aftion9  or  any  thing  a- 
greeable  to  a  rational  Nature  ?  As  it  will  appear  that  he  does,  if 
we  compare,  P.  206,  207,  with  P.  175. 

The  Author  of  the  EJ/ays  fuppofes,  that  God  has  deeply  im 
planted  in  Man's  Nature,  a  ftrong  and  invincible  Apprehenfion, 
or  Feeling,  as  he  calls  it,  of  a  Liberty,  and  Contingence  of  his 
own  Actions,  oppofite  to  that  Neceffity  which  truly  attends 
them  ;  and  which  in  Truth  don't  agree  with  real  Fact  a,  is  not 
agreeable  to  ftrict  philofpphic  Truth  b,  is  contradictory  to  the 
Truth  of  Things  c,  and  which  Truth  contradicts  d,  not  tally 
ing  with  the  real  Plan  e  :  And  that  therefore  fuch  Feelings  are 
deceitful/",  are  in  Reality  of  the  delufive  Kind^.  *He  1 peaks 
of  them  as  a  wife  Delufion  h,  as  nice  artificial  Feelings,  mere 
ly  that  Confcience  may  have  a  commanding  Power  /  :  Meaning 
plainly,  that  thefe  Feelings  are  a  cunning  Artifice  of  the  Au 
thor  of  Nature,  to  make  Men  believe  they  are  free,  when  they 
are  not  k.  He  fuppofes  that  by  thefe  Feelings  the  moral  World 
has  a  difguifed  Appearance  /.  And  other  Things  of  this  Kind 
he  fays.  He  fuppofes  that  all  Self-approbation,  and  all  Re- 
morfe  of  Confcience,  all  Commendation  or  Condemnation  of 
ourfelves  or  others,  all  Senfe  of  Defert,  and  all  that  is  connect 
ed  with  this  Way  of  thinking,  all  the  Ideas,  which  at  prefent 
are  fuggefted  by  the  Words  ought,  Jhould,  arife  from  this  Delu 
fion,  and  would  entirely  vanifh  without  it  m. 

All  which  is  very  contrary  to  what  I  have  abundantly  infifted 
on  and  endeavoured  to  demonftrate  in  my  Inquiry  ;  where  I  have 

largely 

a  P.    200.      b  P.    152.     c  P.    183.       d  P.    186.       e  P.   205.      /P. 

203,    204,    an.     g  P.    183.      h  P.    209.     /  P.    2ii.     k  P«    153% 
/  P.  214.      m  P.    1 60,    194,  199,  205,    206.,   207,    209. 


(     7     ) 

largely  fliewri,  that  it  is  agreeable  to  the  natural  Senfe  of  Man 
kind,  that  the  moral  Necejfity  or  Certainty  that  attends  Meni 
Actions,  is  coniiftent  with  Praife  and  Blarney  Reward  and  Pu- 
riiiTiment  ;  n  and  that  it  is  agreeable  to  our  natural  Notions; 
that  moral  Evil,  with  its  Defert  of  Dillike  and  Abhorrence, 
and  all  its  other  Ill-defervings,  confrfts  in  a  certain  Deformity 
in  the  Nature  of  the  Difpofitions  and  Ads  of  the  Heart,  and 
riot  in  the  Evil  of  fomething  elfe,  diverfe  from  thefs,  fuppofed 
to  be  their  Caufe  or  Occafion  o. 

I  might  well  afk  here,  whether  any  one  is  to  be  found  in  the 
World  of  Mankind,  who  is  confcious  to  a  Senfe  or  Feeling,  na 
turally  and  deeply  rooted  in  his  Mind,  that,  in  order  to  a  Man'a 
performing  any  Adion  that  is  Praife  or  Blame-worthy,  he  muft 
exercife  a  Liberty  that  implies  and  fignifies  a  Power  of  ading 
without  any  Motive,  View,  Defign,  Defire,  or  Principle  of 
Adion  ?  For  fuch  a  Liberty  this  Author  fuppofes  That  muft  be 
which  is  oppofed  to  moral  Neceffity,  as  I  have  already  obferved 
once  and  again.  Suppoling  a  Man  fhould  actually  do  Good, 
independent  of  Delire,  Aim,  Inducement,  Principle  or  End, 
is  it  a  Dictate  of  invincible  natural  Senfe,  that  his  Aft  is  more 
meritorious  or  Praife-worthy  than  if  he  had  performed  it  for 
fome  good!  End,  and  had  been  governed  in  it  by  good  Principles 
and  Motives  ?  And  fo  I  might  alk,  on  the  contrary,  with  Re- 
fped  to  evil  Adions/. 

The  Author  of  the  Effays  fuppofes  that  the  Liberty  without 
Neceffity  which  we  have  a  natural  Feeling  of,  implies  Contin- 
gence  :  And  fpeaking  of  this  Contingence,  he  fometimes  calls 
it  by  the  Name  of  Chance.  And  'tis  evident,  that  his  Notion 
of  it,  or  rather  what  he  fays  about  it,  implies  Things  happen- 
\t^f^oofely  9  fortuitoujly  ,  by  Accident,  and  without  a  Caufeq. 
Now  I  conceive  the  flighteft  Reflection  may  be  fufficient  to  fa- 
tisfy  any  one,  that  fuch  a  Contingence  of  Mens  Adions,  ac 
cording  to  our  natural  Senfe,  is  fo  far  from  being  eflential  to 
the  Morality  or  Merit  of  thofe  Adions,  that  it  would  deftroy 
it  ;  and  that,  on  the  contrary,  the  Dependence  of  our  Adions 
on  fuch  Caufes,  as  inward  Inclinations,  Incitements  and  Ends, 
is  eiTential  to  the  Being  of  it.  Natural  Senfe  teaches  Men, 
when  they  fee  any  thing  done  by  others  of  a  good  or  evil  Ten 
dency,  to  inquire  what  their  Intention-  was  ;  what  Principles 
and  Views  they  were  moved  by,  in  order  to  judge  how  far  they 
are  to  be  juftified  or  condemned  ;  and  not  to  determine,  that, 


n  Inquiry  Part  IV.  Sedl.  4.  throughout,  o  Idem,  Part  IV.  Seft.  r. 
throughout,  and  P.  282  -  283.  f  See  this  Matter  illuftrated  in  my 
Inquiry,  Part  IV.  Sed.  4.  efpecially,  P.  215  -  3X7.  q  P,  156,  157, 

*&   i50»  i77>  *78j  J$J»  *%}  584i  3185.' 


in  order  to  their  being  approved  or  blamed  at  all,  the  Aftioi 
muft  be  performed  altogether  fortuitoufly,  proceeding  from  no 
thing,  arifmg  from  no  Caufs.  Concerning  this  Matter,  I  have 
fully  exprelfed  my  .Mind  in  the  Inquiry  r. 

If  the  Liberty  which  we  have  a  natural  Senfe  of  as  neceffary 
to  Defert,  coniifts  in  the  Mind's  Self-determination,  without 
being  determined  by  previous  Inclination  or  Motive,  then  In 
difference  is  edential  to  it,  yea  abfolute  Indifference  ;  as  is  ob~ 
ferved  in  my  Inquiry  s.  But  Men  naturally  have  no  Notion  of 
any  fuch  Liberty  as  this,  as  eflential  to  the  Morality  or  Deme 
nt  of  their  Actions ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  fuch  a  Liberty,  if 
it  were  poffible,  would  be  inconfiftent  with  our  natural  Notion::; 
of  Defert,  as  is  largely  mown  in  the  Inquiry  t.  If  it  be  agree- 
able  to  natural  Senfe,  that  Men  muft  be  indifferent  in  determin 
ing  their  own  Actions  ;  then,  according  to  the  fame,  the  more 
they  are  determined  by  Inclination,  either  good  or  bad,  the 
lefs  they  have  of  Defert :  The  more  good  Actions  are  performed 
from  good  Difpoiitions,  the  lefs  Praife- worthy  ;  and  the  more 
evil  Deeds  are  from  evil  Difpofitions,  the  lefs  culpable  ;  and  in 
general,  the  more  Mens  Adions  are  from  their  Hearts,  the  lefs 
they  are  to  be  commended  or  condemned  :  Which  all  muft  know- 
is  very  contrary  to  natural  Senfe. 

Moral  Neceffity  is  owing  to  the  Power  and  Government  of  the 
Inclination  of  the  Heart,  either  habitual  or  occafional,  excited  by 
Motive :  But,  according  to  natural  and  common  Senfe,  the 
more  a  Man  does  any  Thing  with  full  Inclination  of  Heart,  the 
more  is  it  to  be  charged  to  his  Account  for  his  Condemnation  j 
if  it  be  an  ill  Aclion,  and  the  more  to  be  afcribed  to  him  for  his 
Praife,  if  it  be  good. 

If  the  Mind  were  determined  to  evil  Actions  by  Contingence, 
from  a  State  of  Indifference,  then  either  there  would  be  one 
Fault  in  them,  or  elfe  the  Fault  would  be  in  being  fo  perfectly- 
indifferent,  that  the  Mind  was  equally  liable  to  a  bad  or  good 
Determination.  And  if  this  Indifference  be  Liberty,  then  the 
very  ErTence  of  the  Blame  or  Fault  would  lie  in  the  Liberty  it- 
felf,  or  the  Wickednefs  would,  primarily  and  fummarily,  lie 
in  being  a  free  Agent.  If  there  were  no  Fault  in  being  indif 
ferent,  then  there  would  be  no  Fault  in  the  Determination's  be 
ing  agreeable  to  fuch  a  State  of  Indifference  :  That  is,  there 
could  no  Fault  be  reafonably  found  with  this,  'viz.  that  oppo- 
fite  Determinations  adtuaily  happen  to  take  Place  indifferently > 
fometimes  good  and  fometimes  bad,  as  Contingence  governs 
and  decides.  And  if  it  be  a  Fault  to  be  indifferent  to  Good 

and 

r.P  184- — r86,   rgo,  215,  216,  and  other  Placei,    *  64—65. 
*  Efpecially  in  P<ut  III,  Sea,  6.  and  7. 


(    9     ) 

and  Evil,  then  fuch  Indifference  is  no  Indifference  to  Good  and 
Evil,  but  is  a  Determination  to  Evil,  or  to  a  Fault ;  and  fuch 
an  ^indifferent  Difpofition  would  be  an  evil,  faulty  Difpofition, 
Tendency  or  Determination  of  Mind.  So  inconfiilent  are  thefe 
Notions  of  Liberty,  as  effential  to  Praife  or  Blame. 

The  Author  of  the  E/hjs  fuppofes  Mens  natural  delufivc 
Senfe  of  a  Liberty  of  Contingence,  to  be,  in  Truth,  the  Foun 
dation  of  all  the  Labour,  Care  and  Induftry  of  Mankind  u  ;  and 
that  if  Mens  practical  Ideas  had  been  formed  on  the  Plan  of  uni- 
*verfal  Neceffity,  the  ignava  Ratio,  the  inafii<ve  Doflrine  of  the 
Stoicks,  would  have  followed  ;  and  that  there  would  have  been  no 
RooMy^r  Forethought  about  Futurity,  or  any  Sort  of  Industry  and 
Care  iv  :  plainly  implying,  that,  in  this  Cafe,  Men  would  fee 
and  know  that  all  their  Induftry  and  Care  fignified  nothing, 
was  in  vain,  and  to  no  Purpofe,  or  of  no  Benefit ;  Events  be 
ing  fixed  in  an  irrefragable  Chain,  and  not  at  all  DEPENDING 
on  their  Care  and  Endeavour;  as  he  explains  himfelf,  particu 
larly,  in  the  Inftance  of  Mens  Ufe  of  Means  to  prolong  Life*  : 
Not  only  very  contrary  to  what  I  largely  maintain  in  my  In- 
quiry  y$  but  alfo  very  inconfiftently  with  his  own  Scheme,  in 
what  lie  fuppofes  of  the  Ends  for  which  God  has  fo  deeply  im 
planted  this  deceitful  Feeling  in  Mans  Nature  ;  in  which  he 
manifeftly  fuppofes  Mens  Care  and  Induftry  not  to  be  in  vain 
and  of  no  Benefit,  but  of  great  Ufe,  yea  of  abfolute  Necefllty, 
in  order  to  the  obtaining  the  moft  important  Ends  and  neceffary 
Purpofes  of  human  Life,  and  to  fulfil  the  Ends  of  Action  to  the 
BEST  ADVANTAGE;  as  he  largely  declares  z.  Now, 
how  fhall  thefe  Things  be  reconciled  ?  That,  if  Men  had  a 
clear  View  of  the  real  Truth,  they  would  fee  that  there  was  no 
ROOM  for  their  Care  and  Induftry,  becaufe  they  would  fee  it 
to  be  in  vain,  and  of  no  Benefit ;  and  yet  that  God,  by  having 
a  clear  View  of  real  Truth,  fees  that  their  being  excited  to  Care 
and  Induftry,  will  be  of  excellent  Ufe  to  Mankind,  and  great 
ly  for  the  Benefit  of  the  World,  yea  abfolutely  neceflary  in  or 
der  to  it :  And  that  therefore  the  great  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs 
of  God  to  Men  appears,  in  artfully  contriving  to  put  them  on 
Care  and  Induftry  for  their  Good,  which  Good  could  not  be 
obtained  without  them  ;  and  yet  both  thefe  Things  are  main 
tained  at  once,  and  in  the  fame  Sentences  and  Words  by  this 
Author.  The  very  Reafon  he  gives,  why  God  has  put  this 
deceitful  Feeling  into  Men,  contradicts  and  deftroys  itfelf ;  that 
God  in  his  great  Goodnefs  to  Men  gave  them  fuch  a  deceitful 
R  r  Feeling, 

«  P.  184.      w'P.   189.      x  P.  184,   185.     y  Efpecially  Part  IV. 
Scft.  5.       %  P.  188, 192.    and  in  many  other  Places, 


Feeling,  becaufe  it  was  very  ufeful  and  neceflaiy  for  them,  and 
greatly  for  their  Benefit,  or  excites  them  to  Care  and  Induftry 
lor  their  own  Good,  which  Care  and  Induftry  is  ufeful  and  ne~ 
ceifary  to  that  End  :  And  yet  the  very  Thing  that  this  great 
Benefit  of  Care  and  Induftry  is  given  as  a  Reafon  for,  is  God's 
deceiving  Men  in  this  very  Point,  in  making  them  think  their 
Care  and  Induftry  to  be  of  great  Benefit  to  them,  when  indeed 
it  is  of  none  at  all ;  and  if  they  faw  the  real  Truth,  they  would  fee 
all  their  Endeavours  to  be  wholly  ufelefs,  that  there  was  NO 
ROOM  for  them,  and  that  the  Event  don't  at  all  DEPEND  upon 
them  a. 

And  befides,  what  this  Author  fays,  plainly  implies,  (as  ap 
pears  by  what  has  been  already  obferved)  that  it  is  neceffary 
iMen  Should  be  deceived,  by  being  made  to  believe  that  future 
Events  are  contingent,  and  their  own  future  Actions  free>  with 
fuch  a  Freedom,  as  llgnifies  that  their  Actions  are  not  the  Fruit 
of  their  own  Defires,  or  Defigns,  but  altogether  contingent, 
fortuitous  and  without  a  Caufe.  But  how  mould  a  Notion  of 
Liberty,  coniifting  in  Accident  or  loofe  Chance,  encourage 
Care  and  Induftry  ?  I  mould  think  it  would  rather  entirely  dif- 
courage  every  Thing  of  this  Nature.  For  furely,  if  our  Acti 
ons  don't  depend  on  our  Defires  and  Defigns,  then  they  don't 
depend  on  our  Endeavours,  flowing  from  our  Delires  and  De 
figns.  This  Author  himfelf  feems  to  fuppofe,  that  if  Men  had 
indeed  fuch  a  Liberty  of  Contingence,  it  would  render  all  En 
deavours  to  determine  or  move  Mens  future  Volitions,  in  vain  : 
He  fays,  that,  in  this  Cafe,  to  exhort,  to  inftruB,  to  promife,  or 
to  iknatev,  would  be  to  no  Purpofe  b.  Why  ?  Becaufe  (as  he 
himfelf  gives  the  Reafon)  then  our  Will  would  be  capricious  and 
arbitrary,  and  -use  Jhould  be  thrown  loofe  altogether,  and  our  ar 
bitrary  Po-ver  could  do  us  Good  or  III  only  by  Accident.  But  if 
fuch  a  loofe  fortuitous  State  would  render  vain  others  Endea 
vours  upon  us,  for  the  fame  Reafon  would  it  make  ufelefs  our 
Endeavours  on  ourfelves :  For  Events  that  are  truly  con 
tingent  and  accidental,  and  altogether  loofe  from  and  indepen 
dent  of  all  foregoing  Caufes,  are  independent  on  every  fore 
going  Caufe  within  ourfelves,  as  well  as  in  others. 

I  fuppofe  that  it  is  fo  far  from  being  true,  that  our  Minds 
are  naturally  poiTefled  with  a  Notion  of  fuch  Liberty  as  this, 
fo  itrongly,  that  it  is  impoffible  to  root  it  out,  that  indeed  Men 
have  no  fuch  Notion  of  Liberty  at  all,  and  that  it  is  utterly 
impoflible,  by  any  Means  whatsoever,  to  implant  or  introduce 

fuch 

a  P.  188,    189,  &c,        b  P.  178,  413,  ^\^ 


fuch  a  Notion  into  the  Mind.  As  no  fuch  Notions  as  imply 
Self-contradiction  and  Self-abolition  can  fubfift  in  the  Mind,  as 
I  have  ihewn  in  my  Inquiry  c  ;  I  think  a  mature  fenlible  Coi-ifi- 
deration  of  the  Matter,  fufficient  to  fatisfy  any  one,  that  even 
the  greateft  and  molt  learned  Advocates  themielves  for  Liberty 
of  Indifference  and  Self-determination,  have  no  fuch  Notion  ; 
and  that  indeed  they  mean  fomething  wholly  inconfiftent  with, 
and  direftly  fubveriive  of  what  they  ftrenuouily  affirm,  and 
earneftly  contend  for.  By  a  Mans  having  a  Power  of  deter 
mining  his  own  Will,  they  plainly  mean  a  Power  of  determining 
his  Will,  as  he  pleafes,  or  as  he  chafes  ;  which  fuppofes  that 
the  Mind  has  a  Choice,  prior  to  its  going  about  to  conform 
any  Aclion  or  Determination  to  it.  And  if  they  mearrthat 
they  determine  even  the  original  or  prime  Choice,  by  their  own 
Pleafure  or  Choice,  as  the  Thing  that  caufes  and  directs  it;  I 
fcruple  not  moil  boldly  to  affirm,  that  they  fpeak  they  know 
not  what,  and  that  of  which  they  have  no  Manner  of  Idea  ; 
becaufe  no  fuch  contradictory  Notion  can  come  into,  or  have 
a  Moment's  Subfiftence  in  the  Mind  of  any  Man  living,  as  an 
original  or  firil  Choice  being  caufed,  or  brought  into  Being,  by 
Choice.  After  all  they  fay,  they  have  no  higher  or  other 
Conception  of  Liberty,  than  that  vulgar  Notion  of  it,  which  I 
contend  for,  viz.  a  Mans  having  Power  or  Opportunity  to  do 
as  he  chufes  :  Or  if  they  had  a  Notion  that  every  Ac~t  of  Choice 
was  determined  by  Choice,  yet  it  would  deilroy  their  Notion  of 
the  Contingence  of  Choice ;  for  then  no  one  Adt  of  Choice! 
would  arife  contingently,  or  from  a  State  of  Indifference,  but 
every  individual  Ac\,  in  all  the  Series,  would  arife  from  fore 
going  Bias  or  Preference,  and  from  a  Caufe  predetermining 
and  fixing  its  Exiftence,  which  introduces  at  once  fuch  a  Chair* 
of  Caufes  and  Effects,  each  preceding  Link  decifively  fixing  the 
following,  as  they  would  by  all  Means  avoid. 

And  fuch  Kind  of  Delufion  and  Self-contradiftion  as  this 
don't  arife  in  Mens  Minds  by  Nature  :  It  is  not  owing  to  any 
natural  Feeling  which  God  has  ftrongly  fixed  in  the  Mind  and 
Nature  of  Man  ;  but  to  falfe  Philofophy,  and  ih'ong  Prejudice, 
from  a  deceitful  Abufe  of  Words.  It  is  artificial;  'not  in  the 
Senfe  of  the  Author  of  the  Ej/ays,  fuppoiing  it  to  be  a  deceitful: 
Artifice  of  God  ;  but  artificial  as  oppofed  to  natural,  and  as 
owing  to  an  artificial  deceitful  Management  of  Terms,  to 
darken  and  confound  the  Mind.  Men  have  no  fuch  rl  hing 
when  they  firit  begin  to  exercife  Reafon  ;  but  rnuft  have  a  great 
deal  of  Time  to  blind  themfelves  with  metaphyfkal  Confufion, 
before  they  can  embrace,  and  reft  in  fuch  Definitions  of  Liberty 
as  are  given,  and  imagine  they  underftand  them. 

R  r  3  On 

c  P.  183,  184.  Sae  alfo  P.  34'  39>  4°»  5*>  53>  56>  13 ^  !34> 
300,  aoj,  212,  214. 


C      12      ) 

On  the  Whole,  I  humbly  conceive,  that  whcfoever  will  give 
himfelf  the  Trouble  of  weighing,  what  I  have  offered  to  Cpn- 
fideration  in  my  Inquiry,  mult  be  fenfible,  that  fuch  a  moral 
Neceffity  of  Mcns  Attions  as  I  maintain,  is  not  at  all  inconfiit- 
ent  with  any  Liberty  that  any  Creature  has,  or  can  have,  as  a 
free,  accountable,  moral  Agent,  and  Subject  of  moral  Govern 
ment  ;  and  that  this  moral  Neceffity  is  fo  far  from  being  incon- 
fiftent  with  Praife  and  Blame,  and  the  Benefit  and  Ufe  of  Mens 
own  Care  and  Labour,  that  on  the  contrary  it  implies  the  very 
Ground  and  Realon,  why  Mens  Aclions  are  to  be  afcribed  to 
them  as  their  own/ in  that  Manner  as  to  infer  Defert,  Praife 
and  Blame,  Approbation  and  Remorfe  of  Confcience,  Reward 
and  Punifhment;  and  that  it  eftablifhes  the  moral  Syftem  of  the 
Univerfe,  and  God's  moral  Government,  in  every  Refpeft, 
with  the  proper  Ufe  of  Motives,  Exhortations,  Commands, 
Courifels,  Promifes,  and  Threatenings ;  and  the  Ufe  and  Be 
nefit  of  Endeavours,  Care  and  Induftry  :  And  that  therefore 
there  is  no  Need  that  the  ftricl:  philofophic  Truth  ihould  be  at 
all  concealed  from  Men  ;  no  Danger  in  Contemplation  and  pro 
found  Difcwery  in  thefe  Things.  So  far  -from  this,  that  the 
Truth  in  this  Matter  is  of  vail  Importance,  and  extremely- 
needful  to  be  known ;  and  that  the  more  clearly  and  perfectly 
the  real  Fad  is  known,  and  the  more  conftantly  it  is  in  View, 
the  better ;  and  particularly,  that  the  clear  and  full  Knowledge 
of  that  which  is  the  true  Syftem  of  the  Univerfe,  in  thefe  Re- 
fpefts,  would  greatly  eftablifh  the  Doftrincs  which  teach  the 
true  Chriftian  Scheme  of  divine  Adminiftration  in  the  City  of 
God,  and  the  Gofpel  of  Jefus  Chrift,  in  its  moil  important 
Articles ;  and  that  thefe  Things  never  can  be  well  eftablifhed, 
and  the  oppofite  Errors,  fo  fubverfive  of  the  whole  Gofpel, 
which  at  this  Day  fo  greatly  and  generally  prevail,  be  \vell 
confuted,  or  the  Arguments  by  which  they  are  maintained, 
anfwered,  till  thefe  Points  are  fettled  :  While  this  is  not  done, 
it  is,  to  me,  beyond  Doubt,  that  the  Friends  of  thofe  great 
Gofpel  Truths,  will  but  poorly  maintain  their  Controverfy  with 
the  Adverfaries  of  thofe  Truths :  They  will  be  obliged  often  to 
dodge,  fhtiffle,  hide,  and  turn  their  Backs ;  and  the  latter  will 
have  a  ftrong  Fort,  from  whence  they  never  can  be  driven,  and 
Weapons  to  ufe,  which  thofe  whom  they  oppofe  will  find  no 
Shield  to  fcreen  themfelves  from  ;  and  they  will  always  puzzle, 
confound,  and  keep  under  the  Friends  of  found  Doclrine  ;  and 
glory,  and  vaunt  themfelves  in  their  Advantage  over  them  ;  arid 
carry  their  Affairs  with  an  high  Hand,  as  they  have  done  al 
ready  for  a  long  Time  paft. 

I  conclude,  Sir,  with  afkirg  your  Pardon  for  troubling  you 

with 


C   13   ) 


with  fo  much  faid  in  Vindication  of  myfelf  from  the  Imputation 
of  advancing  a  Scheme  of  Neceffity,  of  a  like  Nature  with  that 
of  the  Author  of  the  Ej/ajs  on  the  Principles  of  Morality  and 
Natural  Religion.  Confidering  that  what  I  have  faid  is  not  on 
ly  in  Vindication  of  myfelf,  but,  as  I  think,  of  the  moft  im 
portant  Articles  of  moral  Philofophy  and  Religion  ;  I  truft,  in 
what  I  know  of  your  Candour,  that  you  will  excufe, 


Your  obliged  Friend  and  Brother, 


STOCKBRIDGE,  J.     EDWARDS. 

July  25,   1757. 


FOURTEEN  DAY  USE 

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